Interpretations and coherence of the fair and equitable treatment standard in investment treaty arbitration by Pandya, Abhijit P.G.
  
 
Interpretations and Coherence of the 
Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration 
 
 
Abhijit P.G. Pandya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ph.D. Law (Submission) 
London School of Economics 
 
Copyright 2011 Abhijit P.G. Pandya 
 Abstract 
 
 
The fundamental aims of this thesis is to demonstrate problems regarding key forms of liability formulated under 
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard (‘FET’ hereinafter). These are problems that are likely to occur for 
developing countries who are attempting to prevent future breaches of the same type illustrated in the current 
jurisprudence, through developing appropriate responses. 
 
 
Principal Propositions: 
 
This thesis will propose the following regarding the FET standard: 
 
1. The FET standard has been used to create rules. 
2. The rules created under the FET standard operate on state institutions and state 
policy creating a framework of administrative liability that is unique as it operates 
without classic constitution constraints. 
3. This form of unique administrative liability of FET confers a governance role on 
arbitrators, to control state institutions and policy sanctioned by liability, through 
transplantation of administrative law into the investment treaty framework. 
4. This unique administrative liability is applied to developing countries through the 
investment treaty framework. 
5. For reasons of lack of coherence of this unique administrative law and problems 
faced by developing countries accommodating legal transplants in the law and 
development movement; developing countries, those most likely to face 
administrative law claims, may not be able to comply with this unique 
administrative law. 
6. If FET is to create unique rules of administrative liability, investment treaty 
arbitration must alter its current institutional approach to dispute-resolution 
under FET in order to, increase legal certainty, be sensitive to both problems 
faced by the law and development movement regarding legal transplantation and 
be aware of reasons why national courts may operate with constitutional 
constraints.  
 
 
 Brief Note on Methodology 
 
Tudor’s work on the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard gives a comprehensive account of the origins and 
content of the standard.1 The aim here was not to repeat on what was done there but to initial key questions of 
acceptability regarding the content. Hence although a ten year period of jurisprudence is surveyed, between 1999-
2009, the aim here as been to predominantly highlight not only inconsistencies to deal with the important issue of 
coherence, but also to demonstrate the impact such interpretations may have on investment treaty arbitration as a 
system of rule-making, along-side issues of compliance of the content by developing states.  
 
To this end some focus is given to the following questions, which are considered questions of fundamental 
importance to the viability of the approach of rule-making under FET in the analysed period: What does this 
system of rule-making seek to do, and can it achieve those ends? If not, how can it be improved in such a role, if 
feasible, or is it realistic to detach such a role from it? 
 
Hence the method here is to survey the cases and illustrate what rules the FET standard is creating. Then it is to 
highlight whether these rules can be identified by those who may rely on them, investors, and those who face a 
burden under them, states. Critically, this approach does no t  weigh approaches in the jurisprudence according to 
chronological patterns. This is fundamentally because this system was not designed to be a rule-making institution. 
Thus at present all decisions are of equal validity through both the existing method of identifying sources of 
international law and a procedural omission of a system of precedent governing what decisions take precedence over 
others. It is felt that to do this would be not only to create a criteria that does not exist as a matter of law, and to 
do so would be, as a matter of international law, wrong. It would also undermines the flexibility of afforded to the 
system of using a vast jurisprudence of international decisions, including previous investment treaty disputes, at its 
disposal in order to formulate arguments and judgments for both parties and adjudicators, respectively. 
 My approach as outlined above, is thus to bring to the surface key positions in FET jurisprudence that 
illustrate the scope or rights available under three elements of it: (i) Legitimate Expectations; (ii) Transparency 
and (iii) Denial of Justice. Under first two, as it shall be seen, claims are posited predominantly with respect to acts 
of organs of the state. Under the third claims exist with respect to institutions and processes that may exist to deal 
with the investor’s complaints. These elements are chosen as they form the bulk of the current issues dealt with 
under FET, and due to a limitation of space available here to address the above key questions.  
 The above three elements shall form an empirical basis in order to formulate a discursive and critical 
narrative that seeks to address the key questions. The steps in this process are outlined briefly below: 
 
 
Stages of the Argument: 
                                                
1 I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Investment Law 
(OUP) (2007). 
  
The argument proceeds in the following stages: 
 
Chapter 1 explores the distinction between adjudication and norm-making, arguing that FET is used to make 
rules by arbitrators. Chapters 2 to 4 look at the following rules applied by the FET standard: legitimate 
expectations, transparency, and denial of justice. Chapter 5 and 6 discuss the implications of legitimate 
expectations and transparency on both investment treaty arbitration and developing countries, and any difficulties 
that may be encountered in practice. Chapter 7 proposes changes that may assist in dealing with these difficulties. 
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Chapter 1 
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’: The Standard 
 
1.1. Introduction. 
 
1.2. Distinguishing between adjudication and law/rule-making. 
A. Adjudication. 
B. Law-Making in the public sphere. 
 
1.3. Fair and Equitable Treatment an overview. 
A. Investment Arbitration as a system of adjudication. 
B. Origins and the Nature of FET. 
C. FET standards as Rules. 
 
1.4. Initial Concerns and Issues. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this chapter is to show that FET is used by arbitrators to make rules. It will do this by explaining the 
difference between law-making and adjudication. It will attempt to determine whether the reasoning under FET to 
find liability is merely an exercise of adjudication determining fairness of a state’s actions or, also, an exercise that 
involves arbitrators creating rules in order to give some substantive meaning to the FET standard.  
 
If the latter is demonstrated, it will be questioned whether investment treaty arbitration, a unique dispute resolution 
process operating without direct governmental or constitutional control, can effectively carry out rule-making in 
contrast to national legislatures that are equipped with technical expertise, such as professional legal draftsman, 
and appropriate policy input, to do so.  
 
This shall set-up the three stage analysis in this thesis for subsequent chapters: Have arbitrators been able to create 
workable rules from the perspective of coherency by interpreting FET? and, secondly, What is the precise nature of 
this rule-making process through FET?, further finally, Can such rules created by arbitrators using FET be 
complied with by developing states?  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.1.Introduction 
 
Investment treaty arbitration is a system of resolving disputes between investors 
and states.1 Litigation is taken by investors against states for breaches of 
investment treaties between the investor’s state of nationality and the defendant 
state (the ‘host-state’ hereinafter).2 These treaties consist of obligations owed by 
defendant states to the state of which the investor is a national. One of these 
obligations is the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard (‘FET’ hereinafter), 
which is the standard that concerns this thesis.  
 
The FET standard is textually ambiguous.3 It is not clear at all, from a literal 
reading of the standard, whether it should be used to make rules, or to decide 
disputes on a case by case basis in general abstract terms in relation to whether 
states have been fair. This has been a matter of choice for arbitrators adjudicating 
disputes between investors and states, and, as will be demonstrated below, they 
have chosen the former over the latter. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand that arbitrators have chosen to pro-
actively interpret the standard to create law. To illustrate this, the differences 
between mere adjudication without law-making, adjudication with law-making, 
and legislative law-making shall be outlined in abstract, before analysing 
interpretations of FET.  
 
This outline shall include discussion of the key issues that domestic courts face in 
interpreting ambiguous legislation, a similar problem to that faced by arbitrators 
dealing with FET. The various safeguards and concerns in relation to domestic 
courts interpreting legislation shall be highlighted. This will intimate that there are 
                                                
1 A.Redfearn, M.Hunter, N. Blackaby & C. Partasides, Law and Practice of International 
Arbitration 4th Ed (Thomson : Sweet & Maxwell) (2004) at p. 474-477 
2 Redfearn & Hunter (n1 above) ibid. ; S.W. Schill, The Multilateralizatoin of international 
investment law (Cam U. P) (2009) at p.365-369; Z. Douglas, The International Law of 
Investment Claims (Cam U. P) (2009) at p.17-39. 
3 I. Tudor, The fair and equitable treatment standard in the international law of foreign investment 
(OUP) (1998) at p.126-127. 
 difficulties and challenges that arbitrators face in interpreting FET. The rest of 
this work shall assess whether they have met these and other criteria for the 
interpretations of the FET standard. 
 
This shall lead to the key question in this thesis. This is whether arbitrators have 
been able to use FET to create rules, and if so whether such rules are clear and 
workable, and if not whether the safeguards and concerns relevant to domestic 
courts interpreting ambiguous law need to be applied. This, last issue, shall be 
discussed at the end of the thesis. This is after, particular FET interpretations have 
been assessed in relation to three key issues:  
 
(i) Whether such interpretations are clear and coherent;  
(ii) Whether they can be complied with by states; and  
(iii) Whether any identifiable role conferred upon investment treaty arbitration by 
FET interpretations is appropriate,4 bearing in mind that it is, fundamentally, a 
private dispute resolution process.5   
 
On a prima facie reading of investment treaties there is no mandate to make rules, 
only interpret treaties in accordance with the law of treaties. However 
interpretations, whether determinable as rules or not, may have to bear in mind 
that many investment treaties consist of both a capital-exporting state (usually a 
developed country) and a capital-importing state (usually a developing country).6 
This means that investor claimants can frequently be from developed states and 
the defendants, in the same dispute, can potentially be a developing country. As 
will be seen investors may demand a certain form of conduct under FET from 
respondent states that are developing countries. The important issue then may 
become whether, under FET, these complaints have been turned into rules 
                                                
4 Discussed in Chapter 6. 
5 W. Mattli, ‘Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration’ (2001) 
55(4) Int. Org. 919 at p.919-942; G. Van Harten, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a 
species of global administrative law’  (2006) 17(1) EJIL 121 at p.126  
6 J. W. Salacuse, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their 
impact on foreign investment in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 Int’L 655 at p.655-661. 
 through interpretations of FET, and if so, whether arbitrators have created such 
rules so that developing states can: identify, relate to, and, comply with them.7 
 
For ease of discussion the term ‘adjudication’ here shall include, not exclusively, 
all forms of dispute resolution, whether domestic or international. 
   
 
1.2.Distinguishing between Adjudication and Rule/Law-Making 
 
 
In broad and general terms, subject to exceptions, law-making is different in the 
processes of adjudication. The latter identifies specific rules applicable to resolve 
factual disputes, to legislative rule-making which seeks to apply to broader 
schemes of control of human agency.  
 
The aim of the discussion below is not to weigh the appropriateness of literature 
aiming to characterise the roles or judges, but to elicit the key aims of judicial 
processes both at the national level and at the international private level embodied 
in arbitration. This is to support the argument that the activity of arbitrators in 
using the FET standard is one of law-making, not adjudication. 
 
 
A. Adjudication 
 
 
The general role of adjudication. 
 
At its most fundamental level adjudication is about resolving disputes.8 It plays a 
similar role irrespective of parties to a dispute, whether between two private 
parties or two states.9 Adjudication conducted between private parties can have 
general benefits for human agency, whether in economic terms or in social terms. 
For example, in a domestic context, judicial processes can ensure social and 
                                                
7 See, Chapters 5 and 6 for fuller discussions on these issues. 
8 S. Shetreet, ‘Judging in society: The Changing role of courts’  in S. Shetreet Ed., The role 
of courts in society (Martinus Nijhoff) (1988) at p.468; H. J. Abraham, The Judicial Process 6th 
Ed (OUP) (1993) at p.93-94. 
9 G. B. Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer) (2009) at p.64. 
 political stability through the resolution of disputes.10 Commercial dispute 
resolution, such as arbitration, can serve an important market-enabling function 
by enforcing agreements or meeting the costs of breaching them.  
 
This simplistic formulation of the judicial role, has been subject to more complex 
composite conceptions. These include bringing together political and other 
behavioural tendencies of judges to take characterisations of adjudication beyond 
a mere dispute resolution function.11 Thus when playing its role as an adjudicator 
of breaches of constitutional provisions, courts may enshrine limits or extend 
principles such as to act as effective constitutional legislators.12 An example of this 
can be found in the broad distinction between judicial activism and judicial 
conservatism with respect judicial approaches of the U.S. Supreme Court to the 
U.S. Bill of Rights.13 Thus in certain cases a realistic view14 of adjudication is one 
that concedes that it may also involve understanding values of adjudicators that 
bear upon the adjudication of a dispute. 
 
This may not be a universal approach, and has to be taken with the caveat that 
judicial approaches between states differ, and importantly judicial approaches in a 
                                                
10 Tort law provides a classic example of this, though providing individual relief the form 
of damages, it also assists in bringing about a sense of justice and contentment in those 
that are harmed. Mass tort claims, such as asbestos litigation, are a good example: M.J. 
Sacks & P.D. Black, ‘Justice, improved the unrecognised benefits of aggregation ans 
sampling in the trial of mass tort claims’ (1992) 44 Stan Law. Rev 815 at p.838-841. (This 
discussion is primarily one of procedure). Though this is not an exclusively domestic 
idea, see also the idea behind mass-claims processes: See, H. Das, ‘The Concept of Mass 
Claims and the Specificity of Mass Claims Resolution’ in Permanent Court of 
International Arbitration, Redressing Injustices Through Mass Claims Processes (OUP) (2006) at 
p. 5. 
11  C. Guarnieri & P. Pederzoli, The Power of Judges (OUP) (2002) at p.68-77 
12  A. Cox, ‘Constitutional adjudication and the promotion of human rights’ (1966-67) 80 
Harv. Law. Rev. 91 at p.91-95; M. Pawa, ‘When the Supreme Court restricts 
constitutional rights, can congress save us? An examination of section 5 of the 
fourteenth amendment’ (1993) 141(3) Un. Pen. Law. Rev. 1029 at p.1029-1034 For a 
discussion of a restriction of constitutional rights by the court, See 
13 For discussion of this differences, See: M. de S-O-L’E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A 
comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (OUP) (2004) at p.322-360 
14 For a contrasting view of ideal objective judicial approaches that mirror societies 
values, rather than personal preference, See R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harv. 
Uni. Press) (1986) at p.211-213. 
 state cannot wholly be divorced from the particular constitutional construct of the 
states they operate in, including the range of judicial dialogues that have been 
created with respect to certain political and constitutional issues.15 
 
The role of public adjudicators in national contexts in interpretating law. 
 
As well as dispute resolution, the role of national courts is also to enforce law, and 
thus lend support to legislative function. This will involve determination of 
whether a particular legislative provision is applicable, or, where it is not, whether 
it was intended to be.16 As far as the latter is concerned, there is scope for error, 
irrespective of how accurate judicial techniques to determine legislative intention 
are.17 Further some judicial determinations on resolving questions of 
interpretation may amount to a usurpation of legislative function, and, where the 
determination is at odds with legislative intent, clash with it.  
 
Herein lies a choice between whether courts out not to determine the dispute at 
all and defer to the legislature in the absence of legislative intention, or whether 
they should formulate some other technique, such as determining the purpose of 
the law in question,18 in order to allow them to resolve the dispute rather than 
dismiss it. This is not so distinct from arbitrators having to choose between 
excluding a plaint by an investor under FET, and bringing it within the scope of 
deliberations as to whether it has breached FET.  
 
                                                
15 A.J. Arnaud. ‘From Limited Pluralism to Plural Law. Normative approach versus 
cultural perspective’ (1998) 11(3) Ratio. Juris 246 at p. 253-255. 
16 S. Corcoran, ‘Theories of Statutory Interpretation’ in S. Corcoran & S. Bottomley, 
Interpreting Statues (Federation Press) (2005) at p.15. 
17 C.P. Curtis, ‘A better theory of legal interpretation’ (1949-50) 3 Vand. L. Rev. 407 at p. 
409- p.410, & p.415.  The ‘Pepper and Hart’ test is used in English law, which allows a 
court in strict circumstances to look at discussions pertaining to the enactment of a 
particular rule. (See, Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593) Broader contextual analysis that 
includes looking at legislative history is also used by the U.S. Supreme Court, with 
awareness of not using it to override a viable literal meaning. See, W. N. Eskridge, Jr. 
‘The New Textualism’ (1989-90) 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 at p.621-625. 
18 As classically advocated by Pound and others, See: R. Pound, ‘Common Law and 
Legislation’ (1908) 21 Harv. Law. Rev. 383 at p. 385-6. 
 In some Western democracies this is left to a matter of choice for the particular 
adjudicators, and errors of outcome are seen as acceptable flaws, albeit subject to 
criticism, in the face of overall benefits of adjudicatory activism on interpretation. 
From a certain realist perspective, the latter is an inescapable fact of the 
adjudicatory process itself often having to use legislation to decide the dispute. 
 
Despite certain adjudicatory techniques being useful, though not always wholly 
accurate, processes in determining appropriate interpretations of legislation that fit 
with intentions of legislature, there are formal oppositions to them. One is a 
critique relating to a lack of democratic participation in the methods used by 
adjudicators to find appropriate pathways of legislative intent. At a simplistic level, 
these formal oppositions argue that as adjudication lacks broader public 
participation it is thus fundamentally constitutionally illegitimate. This argument 
lends its support from the orthodox constitutional paradigm on the basis that it is 
not the function of courts to make law.19 Other criticisms include that these 
merely allow adjudicators with a particular agenda to surreptitiously take on a 
legislative role.20 This is particularly the case as it is judges, not legislatures that 
decide whether a law is ambiguous.21 Further, such a role if encouraged, may 
result in lackadaisical drafting and creation of laws by legislators.22 
 
However, such criticisms can be countered by the fact that it is precisely because 
one of the fundamental roles of national adjudicators to support legislative 
function that issues of interpretation appear in front of them. Further it is 
unrealistic to assume that textual accuracy of legislation is always possible vis-à-vis 
legislative intent. Thus adjudicators will inherently be left to determine appropriate 
meanings of legislation, or tidy-up ambiguities, as an inescapable part of the 
process of adjudicating disputes. This is where a range of judicial techniques to 
                                                
19 See A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the law of the constitution (Liberty) at p.3-18. 
discussed below. 
20 J.M. Landis, (1929-30) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 at p.886-887. 
21 Landis at p.888. 
22 Curtis at p.411-412. 
 determine legislative intent have been pursued.23 These include looking into 
legislative history also bringing in the broader social, economic and political 
context of the legislation.24 Further, the legislative monopoly of legislators ensures 
that unacceptable interpretations of law, or unacceptable judicial activism, can be 
controlled by the passage of subsequent legislation and the ability to dismiss 
adjudicators that persistently undermine legislative will. Such safeguards, in a 
democracy, ensure that adjudicators do not trump the legislative outcomes of 
elected legislatures.    
 
However the arguments against judge made law do not end with democratic 
conceptualisations of sovereignty, as illustrated by the positive law thesis of 
Parliamentary sovereignty in UK law.25 In that paradigm the relationship of the 
court with the legislator is that of enforcer of law for the breaches of legal order, 
whether created by custom or formal decree and the adjudicator does not carry 
out any form of law-making.26 This deference to the legislator by the adjudicator 
on issues of law-making can be justified, inter alias, due to legislation being subject 
to a wide range of inputs that standard procedural rules serving as information 
gateways to adjudicators, despite including evidential rules that permit special 
witnesses (or experts), do not cater for.27  
 
Other problems of adjudication forming a law-making institution also include 
technical short-comings of being able to make policy that is inherent in 
legislation.28 Further, as the primary goal of adjudicators is to resolve disputes 
with expediency, due to costs of the process, this does not sit comfortably with 
                                                
23 See Pepper v. Hart (n 17). 
24 W.N. Eskridge, J.r., ‘Dynamic statutory interpretation’ (1986-87) 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1479 at p.1479-1482; N. Devins & L. Fisher, ‘Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability’ 
(1998) 84 Va. L. Rev. 83 at p.84-86. 
25 One of the classic proponents of this is the seminal constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey. 
See (n 19 above). See: Holmes, ‘The Theory of Legal Interpretation’ (1899) 12 Harv. 
Law. Rev. 417 at p.418-419. 
26 C.D. Breitel, ‘The law makers’ (1965) 65 Colum. L. Rev. 749 at p.755 
27 Macey, ‘Promoting public-regarding legislation through statutory interpretation: An 
interest group model’ (1986) 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 at p. 
28 A.V. Dicey, Law and Opinion in England during the 19th Century (Macmillan) (1914) 2nd Ed. 
at p.369 
 intense appraisals by adjudicators of policy that arises through determining valid 
interpretations of legislation.  
 
The risk of having outcomes contrary to legislative intent in adjudication, can be 
justified by the broader public benefits of national adjudicators resolving disputes, 
so as long as extreme and consistent violations of legislative activity do not occur. 
Such violations may build a case for restricting adjudicative power to interpret 
legislation or to determine which are appropriate legislative interpretations. These 
restrictions on adjudicator’s discretions may be justified in order to ensure that 
public interest in having democratic legislatures, and the legislator’s aim inherent 
in legislation, is preserved.29 
 
The criticisms of adjudicatory activism do not import that such behaviour has no 
role. The benefits of pro-active judicial behaviour in the interpretative process is 
that it allows the court to support the purpose behind law or regulation by making 
a finding in favour of the purpose it purports the law to hold.30 Such behaviour is 
ascribed as supporting legislatures (the rule of law) and seen to be legitimate 
adjudicatory function. 
 
The Problem of ‘Interpretative Choice’ when faced with an ambiguous clause. 
Adjudicators faced with the language of an ambiguous provision, such as the FET 
clause (‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’), have to make a determination as to what the 
clause entails. In most cases the language of law is clear and its meaning easy to 
ascertain from taking the written words of the text literally or it is ambiguous law 
that needs to be subject to adjudicatory reasoning to determine its meaning.31 
                                                
29 Posner, ‘Legal Formalism, Legal Radicalism and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution’ (1987) 37 Case. W. L. Rev. 179 at p.196-97. 
30 E.g., The U.S. Supreme Court’s pro-competition approach in the use of dormant 
commercial clause doctrine to interpret Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution: J. Rossi, 
‘Transmission siting in deregulated wholesale power markets: Re-imagining the role of 
courts in resolving federal-state siting impasses’ (2005) 15 Duke. Envt’l. L. & Pol. F. 315 
at p.323-325; See also, T.J. Peretti, In Defense of a Political Court (Princeton Uni. P) (1999) 
at p.80-91. 
31 Michelmas, ‘The Supreme Court, 1985 term- forward: Traces of Self-Government’ 
(1986) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at p.4-5. 
 However, adjudicators do often engage in matters of political judgment, whether 
they realise it or not, when they are faced with choices of two or more arguably 
valid interpretations of a particular law or ambiguous law that needs to be subject 
to adjudicatory reasoning to determine its meaning. With respect to this problem 
of ‘interpretative choice’ they will be forced to employ a range of interpretative 
techniques if they wish to provide a meaning for the text, rather than dismissing 
the applicability of the law. These, in broad terms, seek to determine the intention 
and purpose of legislative drafters. Although determination of ‘intention’ and 
‘purpose’ share similar methods of discovery, they are, nevertheless, distinct 
concepts.32   
 
Adjudicators can also be influenced by existing domestic political axioms. Thus 
political issues that divide opinions of citizens may divide judicial approaches to 
questions of legislative interpretation.33 To further illustrate using an example, as a 
result of the political context associated with political-social goals of equality of 
outcome, there has been a tendency by some judges towards egalitarian 
distribution in judicial decision-making.34  
 
In this process of interpretation of the law, adjudicators choosing one valid 
interpretation over another essentially act as legislators. On one view adjudicators, 
in this role as supplementary law-makers, are seen to be useful because they are 
not subject to the democratic pressures of national legislators and policy-makers.35 
This political decision-making of adjudicators does not mean that the process of 
adjudication is no longer a neutral setting for disputes. Rather it is a reflective of a 
paradigm of a particular form of problem that adjudicators face when left open to 
                                                
32 Curtis, p.422-p.424. For an example of erroneously eliding the two together, See 
Eskridge Jr.  at p.1487 
33 W. Mishler & R. S. Sheehan, ‘The Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian institution? 
The impact of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions. (1993) 87(1) Am. Pol. Sc. 
Rev. 87 at p.90-91. 
34 M. Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (OUP) (1989) at p.11-12; J. 
W. Hurst, ‘The functions of courts in the United States’ (1980-81) 15(3/4) Law and Soc 
Rev. 401 at p.444- 457. 
35 H. Fix-Fierro, Courts, Justice and Efficiency: A socio-legal study of economic rationality in 
administration (Hart) (2003) at p. 5. 
 the problem of ‘interpretative choice’ described above. Neither, in the process of 
solving this dispute, is it realistic to assume that adjudicators will behave 
completely independently of particular value-judgments they hold. Some forms of 
adjudication, for example those involving considerable public interest or 
conflicting constitutional principles, can bring out such tendencies due to an open 
scope left to adjudicators to determine the scope of burdens and rights prior to 
finding for a particular party or dismissing the dispute.36 This is despite the de-
politicisation of the adjudicatory function being strongly supported by having 
judicial independence and impartiality as key values that ought to be followed in 
adjudicatory process. 
 
The problems of ‘interpretative choice’ are not always determined by adjudicators 
solely applying legal methods. Adjudicators can operate with assistance from 
academic or practical experts in relation to the subject matter of the dispute are 
called to decide upon.37 Such broader input may ensure that the solution to the 
‘interpretative choice’ is of greater accuracy and thus mitigating the concerns of 
the legislators. 
 
Following from this, to be effective in determining choices between 
interpretations adjudicators need to appreciate limitations on their ability to 
determine both the intention of legislatures, and the consequences of their choice. 
This may stem from both a democratic deficit in judicial choice and the inability 
of adjudicators to have appropriate input from relevant policy making groups 
when making their determinations. Thus where an interpretative choice amounts 
to policy-formation that is conducted through a range of input mechanisms it 
                                                
36 P. Hughes, ‘The Significance of Public Pressure on Judicial Independence’ in A. Dodek 
& L. Sossin, Judicial Independence in Context (Irwin Law) (2010) at p.259-260.  
37 Hon. Justice G.V. La Forest, ‘Who is listening to Whom? The Discourse between the 
Canadian Judiciary and Academics’ in B.S Markesinis Ed., Law Making, Law Finding and 
Law Shaping (OUP) (1997) at p.70-77 
 maybe that the judicial body is incapable of determining all relevant views that 
may be expressed by the specific legislation at hand,38 or its implications. 
 
Problems and challenges of interpreting ambiguous law 
Generally law becomes ambiguous when it fails to render any viable meaning after 
applying the literal rule of interpretation to it.39 At this juncture that adjudicators 
can dismiss this aspect of the dispute (or the whole of it where that is the sole 
aspect of the dispute) for having no basis with respect to the legislation that 
cannot be interpreted or seek to employ some method to render a useful meaning. 
From a purist perspective, where the constitutional function, or mandate, of the 
court is not to make law, they should dismiss the case at this juncture.40 This is 
justified on the simplistic basis any interpretation they create is law-making and 
contrary to a constitutional orthodoxy of the separation of legislative and judicial 
functions.41 This is simplistic view purports that there are no possible methods 
that adjudicators can employ to legitimise their acts with respect to the legislative 
process. Traditionally courts on many occasions have not done this. Instead they 
have sought to proffer some interpretation that they can justify with respect to 
their constitutional position as adjudicators, and not law-makers.42 This is said to 
allow courts to offer dispute resolution in the presence of ambiguous legislation 
thereby fulfilling their judicial role, despite the fact that it has often met with 
criticisms of judicial politicking.43  
                                                
38 See, P. Pettit, ‘Collective Intentions’ in N. Naffine, R. Owens & J. Williams, Eds., 
Intention in Law and Philosophy (2001) at p.241-249,  cited in S. Corcoran, ‘Theories of 
Statutory Interpretation’ in S. Corcoran & S. Bottomley, Interpreting Statues (Federation 
Press) (2005) at p. 17 
39 Also called the ‘golden-rule’ or ‘first-rule’ of interpretation in English law, See R. Cross, 
Statutory Interpretation 3rd (Ed.) (Butterworths) (1995) at p.5-32. 
40 E. Freund, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ (1917) 65 U. Penn. Law. Rev. 207 at p.208-209; 
One of the classic proponents of this is the seminal constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey. 
See A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the law of the constitution (Liberty) ; For a 
similar articulation, See: Holmes, ‘The Theory of Legal Interpretation’ (1899) 12 Harv. 
Law. Rev. 417 at p.418-419. 
41 E. Freund (n 36 above). 
42 W.N. Eskridge, J.r., ‘Dynamic statutory interpretation’ (1986-87) 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1479 at p.1479-1482 
43 N. Devins & L. Fisher, ‘Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability’ (1998) 84 Va. L. 
Rev. 83 at p.84-86 
  
The justifications adjudicators offer can essentially be divided into two camps, 
though adjudicators may offer both at any given time:44 (a) The justification that 
the offered interpretation follows the intention of the legislator; and (b) The 
justification that the offered interpretation follows the purpose of the legislator.45 
Both of these justifications use the method of looking at legislative history of the 
legislation to determine what intention and purpose are, in order to render 
constitutional legitimacy to the interpretative process.46 Generally, this method is 
used and preferred over broader canvassing of legislative inputs that adjudicators 
maybe unable to evidentially control, in terms of both efficacy of adjudication and 
most importantly in terms of reliability, relevant documentation. The credibility of 
both these justifications, however, does not just depend on the viability of the 
interpretation that is produced but also on whether such justifications are 
themselves acceptable. What follows below is a very brief discussion of the latter, 
the form of justification, and subsequently the former, the method of such 
justifications. 
 
The primary concern of justifications of judicial action to determine intention and 
purpose is one of constitutional legitimacy. This concern is based around the notion 
that it is not permitted for adjudicators to determine either, and that this is solely a 
task for legislators. Whilst democratic legislators are empowered to go through the 
deliberative process of deciding what the goals of legislation should be and 
whether those goals are desired, courts are not. Though simplistic in its 
formulation, the significance of this obstacle to such adjudicatory action is not to 
be underestimated from the point of view that it gives rise to significant concerns 
                                                
44 For distinction, See: B. Currie, ‘The Distinterested Third State’ 28 Law & Contp. Prob. 
754 at p.761-762; M. H. Redish & T.T. Chung, ‘Democratic Theory and the Legislative 
Process: Mourning the death of orginalism in statutory interpretation’ (1993-94) 68 Tul. 
L. Rev. 803 at p.813-815. 
45 For example, determining purpose in interpreting tax-law: See, D.A. Geier, 
‘Interpreting tax legislation: The Role of purpose’ (1995) 2(8) Flor. Tax. Rev. 492 at 
p.494-497. 
46 Curtis, p.422-p.424. For an example of erroneously eliding the two together, See 
Eskridge Jr.  at p.1487 
 by legislators where judges are seen to indirectly be usurping their role through 
their aims of solving interpretative problems.                    
 
The methodological problems with justifications of intention and purpose are chiefly 
concerned with the accuracy of determining either.47 Firstly, legislative history is 
often not a solid indicator of legislative intent or aims of legislators.48 Informal 
discussions, which may be of greater relevance, may not be recorded or maybe 
confidential beyond adjudicatory disclosure. Whilst history of formal deliberations 
of legislative process, including committee meetings of politicians and civil-
servants are useful in providing a context for determining both, such a context 
runs into evidential difficulties when broadened to the more difficult areas of 
public input.49 Thus general public views canvassed by politicians, and other 
policy-making bodies may not be available in formal stages of legislative 
deliberation, and thus not subject to adjudicatory contextualisation during the 
determination of a particular interpretative pathway.50 Alternatively, they may be 
justifiably precluded by the rules of evidence on the grounds of direct relevance 
and reliability, the former being difficult to determine in the case of informal 
discussions and broader public-policy input into legislation. This means that in 
realistic terms adjudicatory determinations maybe significantly limited in their 
ability to determine legislative intention and purpose through being confined to 
looking at legislative history, and this limitation will be significant where the bulk 
of relevant information for determining a valid interpretation is outside the formal 
documentation of legislative history. This cost of evidential control is related to 
the cost-effectiveness of litigation, unlimited browsing of legislative background 
                                                
47 L. Brilmayer, ‘Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent’ (1979-80) 78 Mich. 
L. Rev. 392 at p.392-393. 
48 N.S. Zeppos, ‘Legislative history and the Interpretation of Statutes: Towards a fact-
finding model of statutory interpretation’ (1990) 76 Va. L. Rev. 1295 at p.1319-1320; R. 
I. Nunez, ‘Nature of Legislative Intent and the use of legislative documents as extrinsic 
aids to statutory interpretation: A re-examination’ (1972-1973) Calf. West. Law. Rev. 128 
at p.128. 
49 These are partly to do determining ‘relevance’, a key criteria for admissibility 
(particularly in common law jurisdictions): E.g. I.H. Dennis, The Law of Evidence  (Sweet 
& Maxwell) (2002) at p.50-67. 
50 R. I. Nunez (n48 above) at p.130-135. 
 may involve delving into significant policy detail that is beyond the time and 
institutional capacity, in terms of personnel, of adjudication.  
 
The methodological problem of weighing up relevance of material that is of 
relevance in line with rules of evidence, may encourage retrospectively 
constructing relevance to fit a particular interpretation that an adjudicator wishes 
to push. Such risks of exposure of judicial preference are thus inherent judicial 
determination of legislative intentions and goals. There is also a fundamental and 
distinct concern with respect to determining purpose that does not exist with 
determining intention. This is that purpose is determined a posteriori, through 
extrapolation, and may involve a far greater degree of digression from formal 
evidence of legislative history than determining intention.51 In simple terms, whilst 
intention is a construction of the legislature, purpose is very a much a 
construction of the adjudicator. Without close methodological control beyond 
relevance of legislative history, determination of purpose may lead to a significant 
risk of adjudicatory usurpation of legislative function. 
 
These risks associated with adjudicatory construction of ambiguous legislation 
continue to engender debates as to the merits and problems of giving adjudicators 
such a role. They have resulted in stricter tests for engaging in exercises of 
determination of legislative intention and purpose,52 and often a re-affirmation of 
the benefits of reliability of the literal rule, despite problems of guaranteeing that 
legislators meanings can be reflected in literal interpretations,53 coupled with the 
power to dismiss the dispute for lack of express legislative sanction.  
 
 
Procedure and Adjudication 
                                                
51 Redish & Chung (n 44 above) at p.865-867. 
52 See Restriction of Pepper v. Hart test in English law: S. Vogenaeur, ‘A retreat from 
Pepper v. Hart: A reply to Lord Steyn’ (2005) 25(4) OJLS 629 at p.638-654; Redish & 
Chung at p.840-847. 
53 F. Jerome, ‘Words and music: Some remarks on Statutory Interpretation’ (1947) 47 
Colum. L. Rev. 1259 at p.1260-61. 
 Effective adjudication requires effective procedure to ensure that parties can place 
all relevant material before adjudicators. For example, procedural delineations 
within adjudication, such as different process in dealing with facts and evidence in 
common-law criminal hearings are part of the overall machinery of effectively 
determining a dispute. The role of the jury is an important deviation from the 
judicial fact-finding function, based on the value of attaching common societal 
values to public participation in criminal and civil adjudicatory outcomes.54 The 
existence of juries is based on there being merit for public value judgments to 
enter into dispute resolution in order to ensure that outcome is line with societal, 
including cultural views, of the larger public. This is theorised as making the 
exercise of power over the individual in adjudicatory outcome more acceptable 
from the perspective of the democratic value of public participation in the 
exercise of power. 
 
Other adjudicatory tools include the principle of precedent, which are rules not 
enacted by public legislatures. It is an important tools for judges to solve particular 
types of despites and ensure there is a consistency in how similar disputes are 
solved. This is regarded as important from the point of view of acceptance of 
both the outcome of the adjudicatory process and the adjudicatory process itself. 
It is important both from the view that there is no partiality over particular 
disputants and that, as a consequence, adjudication is perceived to be fair. This 
latter aspect also has a social value of ensuring that there is no preference in 
outcome between similar adjudications, though brought by different parties. 
 
Further, in precedent based adjudicatory systems the ability to rectify particular 
aspects of judicial law making is important to ensure coherence and clarity of rules 
in their creation and application.55Due to adjudicatory processes being non-
specialist – law-making, detailed deliberation of law over similar disputes is said to 
                                                
54N. Vidmar, ‘A historical and comparative perspective on the common law jury’ in N. 
Vidmar Ed., World Jury Systems (OUP) (2000) at p.17-13. 
55 J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (2nd Ed) (Stanford. Uni. Press) (1985) at p.27-32 
 allow judges to hone in the language and appropriateness of law created through 
adjudication. 
 
In order to use precedent to clarify rules made in adjudicatory process, 
adjudicatory flexibility for interpreting prior decisions in English law is unlimited 
in higher courts. The existence of a hierarchy of adjudicatory law-making 
facilitates this. Thus higher courts are able to completely reject prior judicial-law 
making.56 Although there may be some adjudicatory rule-making in interpretation, 
textually being clarified through appeal mechanisms in this way, that still cannot 
give effect the intentions of the legislators. In instances, complex economic 
ramifications of interpreting tax legislation form an example of this. By contrast 
some law-making that is better suited to an adjudicatory process than others, for 
example, the finer details of a rule of equity such as an estoppel. This is because 
the specifics of its form or content has no general public ramifications, including 
social and economic impact, and a democratic legislative procedure that involves 
general public consultation and debate through elected legislative chamber where 
there are no experts on chancery law is not likely to make the rule more effective. 
   
 
B. Law-Making in the Public Sphere. 
 
In general terms, law-making is about providing order to human interactions in a 
diverse amount of fields.57 How this is carried out depends on the society. To give 
a facile distinction to illustrate: the order to which a particular society is subject to 
is a matter for public approval in a democracy, or its rulers in an autocracy.58 In a 
democracy, such order is subject to various forms of input, including individuals, 
groups and institutions, so as to ensure that it is not only effective, but it 
represents the views of citizens. In a democracy the power to enact laws is given 
                                                
56 Z. Bankowsi, D. N. MacCormick & G. Marshall, ‘Precedent in the United Kingdom’ in 
D. N. MacCormick & R. S. Summers, Interpreting Precedents (Ashgate) (1997) at p.342-343. 
57 R.D. Cooter, ‘Structural Adjudication and the New law Merchant: A model of 
decentralised law’ (1994) 14 Int. Rev. Law. Econ. 215 at p.220. 
58 C.D. Breitel, ‘The law makers’ (1965) 65 Colum. L. Rev. 749 at p.755 
 to one or more political parties who represent a particular field of views on key 
matters of public interest. Their empowerment is a result of a competitive 
electoral discourse that involves successful persuasion, using political marketing, 
of public opinion. As a result, political parties have become considerably adept at 
engaging public opinion, professionals and policy institutions in developing policy.  
 
In a democracy the elected government may further engage a range of public 
policy institutions and other bodies in formulating appropriate policies on a range 
of public life before formal enactment through the legislative process occurs. 59 
This has become increasingly so in the United Kingdom and the United States 
where government has had an increasing role in the public sphere over the 
twentieth century (the role of the state in the life of the individual) in contrast to 
nineteenth century liberal laissez-faire governance. The latter, by contrast, is a 
model of less intervention of the state in private affairs of individuals and 
economic agents. 
 
By contrast, as discussed above, adjudicatory law-making does not have such an 
input by institutional design or public consent. This may be of concern whether 
adjudicatory law-making is done in the public sphere. This is where judge made 
rules have a broader impact than parties to the adjudication and affect a range of 
human agency beyond parties to the particular dispute. In simple terms, parties to 
a dispute do not generally carry public opinion or interest effectively enough to 
enable judges to make general law.  
 
In the classic constitutional paradigm of states, the primacy of law making is left 
to legislators. However, legislators are not the only law-making agents.60 Private 
law making, however, is only done at a micro-level, of limited general scope due 
to the monopoly of legislatures, and its inability to make general social order 
                                                
59 E.g., In the Environmental field, G.T. McDonald & L. Brown, ‘Going beyond 
environmental impact assessment: Environment input to planning and design’ (1995) 
15(6) Env. Imp. A. Rev. 483 at p.493-494. 
60 J.L. Louis, ‘Law-making by private groups’ (1937-38) 51 Harv. Law. Rev. 201 at p. 201-
202. 
 without adequate input.61 A classic example of private law-making is that of 
contractual agreements between private agents. 
 
Further, the distinction between adjudication and law-making is one based on 
utility of separating institutional function. Separation of capacity to make rules 
corroborated the ability of courts and leg by legislatures to act as organs of 
institutional accountability upon each other is said to prevent the abuse of 
power.62 An effective law-making institution may need a monopoly of law-making 
power.63  
 
Finally it should be borne in mind that in some democratic common-law 
jurisdictions law-making is done by executive decree thus subject to no 
democratic control.64 This is justified on an the exceptional basis that utility of 
government and state function has often to be placed above democratic mandate, 
such as in times of war. This concept of the necessity of expediency is also noted 
by the right to expropriate enshrined in the Hull formula for expropriation, a 
standard now embedded in the bulk of bilateral investment treaties.65 
 
 
 
1.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment Overview. 
  
 
A. Investment Arbitration as a system of adjudication. 
 
                                                
61 R.D. Cooter (n 57) at p.215-217. A classic example of limiting laissez-faire activity of 
corporations is through environmental regulation: See, G. Donnel, S. Hart, & B. Yeung, 
‘Do corporate global environmental standards create or destroy market value?’ (2000) 
46(8) Manag. Sc. 1059 at p.1059-1063.  
62 T. Persson, G. Roland & G. Tabellini, ‘Separation of powers and political 
accountability’ (1997) 112(4) Qt. Jnl. Econ. 1163 at p.1163-1170. 
63 Glennon at p.758. 
64 In the U.S. efficiency of government function in the form of a Presidential decree can 
be placed above constitutional values, See: M. J. Glennon, ‘Two views of Presidential 
foreign affairs power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?’ (1988) 13 Yale J. Int’l L. 5 at 
p.11-13.  65 A.F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (OUP) (2003) at p.476. 
 Basic History and Adjudication. 
Prior to the existence of arbitration for investment disputes for complaints against 
foreign states, investors usually had to lobby their embassies to attempt to 
alleviate adverse action by the host-state’s government.66 This was only marginally 
successful, and not a solid basis of investor protection, as the success of this 
process very much depended upon the relationship between the two states and 
the cost to that relationship that lobbying on behalf of one’s investor would have. 
Hence the diplomatic system offered a form of investor protection that was 
wholly political in nature. It was hoped that with the creation of the World Bank’s 
Investment dispute resolution mechanism (ICSID) that such political investment 
protection would be put on to a neutral legal dispute resolution footing through 
arbitration. The added advantage of this system was that it would aid the flow of 
capital due to the availability of a neutral protection forum, and thus assist in the 
promotion of capital to developing areas of the world which were high political 
risk zones for commercial activity. 
 
Further investment treaty arbitration, like general international commercial 
arbitration, has become popular partly due to perceived bias, and other 
shortcomings of national courts in the developing world,67 and the availability of a 
common, universal and understandable procedure that it offers.68 As to the 
former, it was seen that in the developing world, whereas resources, cheap-labour 
and other opportunities away from competitors were in abundance for foreign 
investors, an inadequate justice system would preclude the appropriate resolution 
of important commercial disputes. Concerns regarding justice in the developing 
world included procedural and substantive delays, uncertainties in outcome where 
contract law was inadequate, expense and publication of outcome.69Bilateral 
                                                
66 C. F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (OUP) (2008) at p.8-20 
67 Under old colonial regimes native justice was not to be trusted at all, and foreign courts 
were substituted for national ones to deal with disputes relating to foreigners,  See W.E. 
Grigsby, ‘The Mixed Court of Egypt’ (1896) 12 L.Q. Rev. 252 at p.252-255 
68 Typically investment treaty arbitration disputes occur under UNCITRAL, ICSID and 
other common arbitral procedural rules. See, Redfearn and Hunter, (n1 above). 
69 H.P. De Vries, ‘International Commercial Arbitration: A substitute for national courts’ 
(1982-83) Tul. L. Rev. 42 at p.43 
 Investment treaties thus included provisions for dispute resolution through 
international arbitration.70 This was also seen as a bonus due to the usage of the 
usual channel of diplomatic protection for foreign investment causing political 
embarrassment and risking foreign relations for the state of the foreigner.71 
 
From these origins the system of investment treaty arbitration became truly 
transnational following the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties with 
provisions for arbitration since the end of the cold war. These offered arbitration 
as a method of dispute resolution that is possible in a number of locations 
supported by enforcement of decisions in numerous jurisdictions due the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards of 1958 (‘New York Convention’ hereinafter).72 Further as over 130 states 
have at least one investment treaty, the continuously forming jurisprudence has a 
universal transnational application.73 This, explained further below, is a result of 
tribunals determining the meaning of very similarly drafted bilateral investment 
treaties and fundamental provisions that repeat in other investment protection 
agreements.74 
 
On one argument, the rise of investment treaty arbitration is also, particularly, 
attributable to the need of former colonial powers, and other developed states, to 
access resources in places where traditional overseas commercial activity took 
                                                
70 Redfearn & Hunter (n1 above). at p.483; S. Greenberg, C.Kee,  J.R. Weeramantry, 
International Commercial Arbitration (Cam. U. P) (2011) at p.9-10. 
71 K.J. Vandevelde, ‘The BIT program: A Fifteen-Year Appraisal in the Development 
and Expansion of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1992) 86 Am. Soc. Int’l Proc. 532 at 
p.534-535. 
72 See Redfearn & Hunter (n1) at p.523. 
73 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-2000 UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (UN) (2000) 
at p.13-20. In the same survey only 11 out of 1,857 bilateral investment treaties (0.59 %) 
were between developed states at p.10. For a further discussion of proliferation see, Z. 
Elkins, A. T. Guzman & B.A. Simmons, ‘Competing for capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000’ (2006) 60 Int. Org. 811 at p.814-819.  
74 T.H. Cheng, ‘Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2007) 30 Ford. 
Int’l. Jnl.  at p. ; S.D. Franck, ‘The Nature (2005) 12 U.C. Davis Jnal of Int L. & Pol.  47,  
 place and as a part of a capital-export strategy in foreign policy both during and 
following the cold-war.75 
 
Operating Parameters and Procedural Concerns. 
The tribunals operating under ITA are controllable by virtue of the rules of public 
international law. However, as shall be briefly illustrated here these give a lot of 
lee-way to arbitrators to determine the parameters of the applicable law and scope 
of jurisdiction. Further, the only remedy available to states party to an investment 
treaty is to disengage from treaty obligations with very little ability to influence the 
scope of the dispute and penalise adjudicators who step beyond acceptable 
boundaries for the dispute in relation to state acts. This potentially leaves the 
scope of the dispute unacceptable to states, by the significant discretion given to 
the arbitrator to define this. Whether this has been done appropriately in relation 
to FET is one of the key issues discussed later in this thesis.  
 
The functioning controls on tribunals operating under ITA are subject to the rules 
of treaty interpretation, and any choice of law provisions, which may provide for 
applicable rules of public international law in determining the dispute, or law of 
the host-state including its foreign investment law. However, it is predominantly 
the use of investment treaty arbitration as a source of public international law that 
is of particular concern here. 
 
This arises due to two reasons: (a) investment treaty disputes being subject to 
applicable rules of public international law; (b) investment treaty decisions 
themselves being a valid source of international law.76 Thus subject to appropriate 
jurisprudential constructs, arbitrators do have the opportunity to make a coherent 
                                                
75 M. Sornarjah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cam. Uni. Press) (1996) at p.8-
14;  
76 This is particularly so in ICSID proceedings, where Article 42(1) of ICSID states: 
‘Tribunals may shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by 
parties…and such rules of international law as may be applicable’. In C. H. Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary (Cam. U. P) (2001) at p.549 & p.542-563. This latter aspect of 
this provision allows arbitrators and parties to a dispute to proffer preferable arbitral 
decisions. 
 body of law using open-textured standards such as FET. This opportunity is 
supported by the arbitrators having a lot of lee-way in the jurisdiction phase of the 
dispute under ICSID rules, and no constraints under other rules such as 
UNCITRAL, to determine the scope of the dispute.  
 
Another factor giving considerable discretion to arbitrators to determine the 
scope of disputes is that of the rules of interpreting treaties. The key provisions of 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 state:77 
 
Article 31(1): ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’. 
 
Article 32: ‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the 
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31:  (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads 
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.   
  
 
The supplementary means are only engaged if upon applying Article 31 one is left 
with an ambiguity.78 These provisions allow arbitrators to determine what 
intentions and purposes of the treaties are in order to interpret the FET 
standard.79 This grants arbitrators considerable scope in defining the standard and 
the breadth of protection to be afforded to the investor under it. Further to this 
decisions of tribunals under FET can be used, arbitrators, investors and states to 
decipher the FET clause. This is due to the ICSID convention80, and also the 
                                                
77 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, UN Treaties Series 
vol. 1115 at p.331; Discussed fully in: I.M. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 2nd Ed (Mellaland Schill) (1984) at p.114-159 
78 Sinclair (n76 above); S.L. Sboki, ‘Supplementary means of interpretation’ in E. 
Cannizzaro Ed., The Law of Treaties beyond the Vienna Convention (OUP) (2011) at p.147.  
79 This problem was noted by McDougal at the time of negotiating the law of treaties, 
See E. Criddle, ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty 
Interpretation’ (2003-04) 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 431 at p.441 
80 (see n 75). N.B. Decisions of other forums would be included as decisions here. 
 method of using international decisions as a supplementary source of international 
law.81 
 
Operating Parameters and Substantive Concerns. 
Investment treaty arbitration is not subject to constitutional constraints of 
domestic courts.  This would not normally be of concern if the system is similar in 
processing claims as the International Court of Justice, where states can determine 
the exact parameters of each dispute.82 However, as illustrated above this is not 
the case. As a result of ITA allowing individual claims against the state, it is 
possible for investors to make a range of complaints under FET about states, 
including feasibly about the content, or repeal of, primary legislation and domestic 
constitutional arrangements, and for arbitrators to accept this as within the 
jurisdictional scope of the dispute. To give a contrasting illustration: English 
courts did not traditionally have powers of judicial review of administrative action, 
nor do they at present embark upon ruling primary legislation unfair, even with 
respect to unwritten constitutional values.83  
 
Thus it will be interesting to note by which acts of the defendant state the 
ambiguous and open-texture of the FET standard is engaged with by arbitrators, 
and whether it is used to ride rough shod over likely domestic constitutional 
arrangements by reviewing not just acts of public administrations, but also 
legislative acts as well. The latter would give them greater powers than courts in 
jurisdictions with confined constitutional roles for courts such as the U.K. 
 
Further if the latter has been the case, how arbitrators have justified decision-
making in the latter, considering that adjudicators have institutional limitations in 
                                                
81 Article 38(1) d of the Statute of the International Court of Justice at http://www.icj-
cij.org 
82 S. Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 1920-2005 Vol II, 4th Ed. 
(Martinus Nijhoff) (2005) at p.506-507. 
83 J. Limbach, ‘The Law-Making Power of the Legislature and the Judicial Reivew’ in B.S 
Markesinis Ed., Law Making, Law Finding and Law Shaping (OUP) (1997) at p.157-159. 
 determining legislative matters that are in the public sphere.84 Some commentators 
have presumed that it is a system of adjudication that is centred on general 
commercial arbitration, thus private in nature.85 As shall be seen arbitrators have 
been offered the opportunity through the types of claim to extend FET to 
determine matters within the public sphere such as tax, water, gas supply, 
immigration, media regulation, import licences. Whether they have done so 
appropriately will determine whether further state control is justified.  
  
 
B. Origins and the Nature of FET. 
 
 
The fair and equitable treatment standard first appeared in the Draft Agreement 
for the International Trade Organisation.86It also appears in Freedom, Commerce 
and Navigation Treaties of the United States in the 1950s.87 Subsequent 
appearances include within a proposal for a draft the agreement for investment 
protection in 1957 by Abs and Shawcross.88 It is also placed in a model agreement 
of investment protection proposed by the OECD in 1967.89 Since then BITs have 
significantly proliferated, particularly after the end of the Cold War, so that several 
                                                
84 Van Harten highlights this in his work. See, G Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
and Public Law (OUP) (2007) at p.143-149; M. Loughlin & G. Van Harten, ‘Investment 
Treaty Arbitration as a species of global administrative law’ (2006) 17(1) EJIL 121 at 
p.131-133.  
85 Douglas in his description of the misses the potential of the system engaging  in 
disputes of a public nature: Z. Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’ (2003) 74 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 151 at p.151-160. This is not to say there is not a 
significant contractual element to investment treaty arbitration: See, J. Crawford, ‘Treaty 
and Contract in Investment Arbitration’ (2008) 24(3) Arb. Int’l. 351 at p.360-366. 
86 In Article II(2) of the Havana Charter 1948. See, International Trade Organisation, The 
Havana Charter  (1948) at p.2-7. 
87 R.R. Wilson, United States Commercial Treaties and International Law (New Orleans: Hauser 
Press) (1960) at p. 118-122. 
88 See, Article 1 of the Abs-Shawcross Draft as discussed in G. Schwarzenberger, The 
Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments Abroad: A Critical Commentary’ 
(1960) 9 J. Pub. L. 147 at p.147-158.  
89 OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (1967) 
 thousand treaties may now incorporate the standard.90 The FET provision has a 
high frequency of appearance in BITs due to the manner in which developing 
countries, by mirroring behaviour of other developing states for fear of being 
excluded from investment benefits, sign up to model BITs that include the 
standard.91 
 
There is a matter of debate as to whether the FET standard is no more than a 
treaty provision that reflects the minimum standard in international law. This 
approach, of the minimum standard, refers to the standard of treatment of foreign 
nationals in customary international law that states could not fall foul of. This is 
elucidated in the Neer decision of the Mexican –United States Claims Tribunal: 
 
‘‘that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should 
amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental 
action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would 
readily recognise its insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency proceeds from deficient execution of an 
intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of country do not empower the authorities to measure 
up to international standards is immaterial’.92 
 
Note that this elucidation does leave it open for tribunals to determine acts of 
state organs that are contrary to it, though it sets a very high threshold for a 
breach. Thus it is not easy for a claimant to satisfy. 
 
FET, by contrast, gives no indication of what the threshold for a breach is and 
this is left to arbitrators. This can be seen from the following example of a typical 
FET clause is this one, taken from the 2008 German Model BIT: 
‘Article 2 [Admission and Protection of Investments] subsection 2: 
                                                
90 Of Tudor’s sample of 365 BITs only 19 did not have FET thus 0.05%, See I. Tudor, (n 
3 above). at p.23. By extrapolation, considering there are at least 3,000 bilateral 
investment treaties currently in force (See, ) over 2,844 (99.5%) will have the standard. 
91 See, A.T. Guzman ; K. Vandevelde, ‘The political economy of a bilateral investment 
treaty’ (1998) 92 AJIL 621 at p.626 -629;  
92  LF. Neer and Pauline Neer v. Mexico (US v. Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 60 at p.61-62 
 Each Contracting State shall in its territory in every case accord investments by investors of the other 
Contracting State fair and equitable treatment as well as full protection under this Treaty’.93  
 
 
The critical thing to note here is that the standard is ‘open-textured’. The language 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ does not give any indication as what ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ is. It leaves it to arbitrators deciding disputes between 
investors and states to decide what this is. Depending on what states want from a 
system of investment arbitration, this can leave too much to arbitrators to decide 
the level of protection afforded to foreign investors, which may come at a cost to 
the state.  
 
Partly due to this ‘open-texture’ not being amenable to definition, some 
commentators have assumed that the fair and equitable treatment standard is not 
amenable to definition or content. Thus one commentator states:  
 
‘The standard of fair and equitable treatment is relatively imprecise. Its meaning will often 
depend on the specific circumstances of the case at issue’.94  
 
This is also the view taken by one leading judge in international law:  
‘the meaning of what fair and equitable treatment is defined when that standard is applied to a 
specific set of facts’.95 . 
 
Another judge states: ‘At the same time, this lack of precision [in the meaning of fair and 
equitable treatment] may be a virtue rather than a shortcoming. In actual practice, it is 
                                                
93 At UNCTAD database found at http://ita.uvic.ca 
94 G. Sacredoti, ‘Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection’ 
(1997) 269 Recueil des Cours 251, at p.346 Cited in C. Schreuer ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (2005) JWIT 357 at 364.  
95 Opinion of Judge Schwebel in MTD Equity v. Chile Award (25 May 2004) ICSID 
ARB/01/07 at para 109. 
 impossible to anticipate in the abstract the range of possible types of infringements upon the 
investor’s legal position’96.  
These views are entirely arguable due to the ‘open-texture’ of the standard.  
 
This approach is taken in dispute resolution without any regard to the investment 
treaties, which generally do not state this. This approach for Professor Scheurer 
incorporates useful flexibility, over a constructive approach that defines the FET 
standard to contain certain elements.97 The opportunity afforded by the latter 
approach is to increase legal certainty for both the investor and the state by giving 
a rough criteria as to what FET constitutes. Such a non-proscriptive approach has 
been argued by tribunals:  
 
‘fair and equitable treatment should be understood to be treatment in an even-handed and just 
manner, conducive to fostering the promotion of foreign investment. Its terms are framed as a pro-
active statement – “to promote”, “to create”, “to stimulate”-rather than prescriptions for a 
passive behaviour of the State or avoidance of prejudicial conduct to the investors’.98  
 
A third approach, one not entirely precluded due to the ‘open-texture’ of the 
standard, is to create rules or yardsticks that the state has to comply with, and 
following a failure to do so will lead to a breach of the standard. The nature of 
current interpretations, summarised below and seen in detail later in the thesis, 
shows that the third approach has found significant ground in the interpretation 
of FET.99 It is that approach that shall be the key focus in this work. 
   
 
C. FET Standards as Rules: 
 
                                                
96 C. Schreuer ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’ (2005) JWIT 357 at 
365. 
97 C. Scheurer (n95 above).  
98 MTD Equity(n 94 above) at para 113. 
99 See Tudor (n3 above) at p.154-180  
 A summary of standards formulated through interpretations of FET is given 
below. This is preceded by a brief discussion of what rules or law are as opposed 
to value judgments, to explain why FET standards are rules not the latter. 
 
Attributes of a law. 
 
A brief and elementary description of what a law is shall be described below in order to support 
the argument that interpretations under the FET standard are law, not value statements. This 
determination, outlined below, is based on basic legal positivism. 
 
There is a distinction between a law and a moral, or value judgment. As Hart summarises, 
discussing Austin and Bentham’s legal positivism: ‘What both Bentham and Austin were anxious to 
assert were the following two simple things: First, in the absence of an express constitutional or legal provision, it 
could not follow from a mere fact that a rule violated standards of morality that it was not a rule of law; and, 
conversely it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule was morally desirable it was a rule of law’.100  
  
The critical question is how to determine the difference between a law and moral or value. This 
distinction is provided by a classic example of the positivists view is given by Austin, who 
describes law as ‘a command backed up as a sanction’.101 There are two key elements of the nature of 
law here. The first is that a law, as opposed to a value judgment or moral, is a ‘command’ in the 
sense that not only does it have an intended subject (which value-judgments also do), but it also 
wishes to alter or define the agency of that subject in some way, including prohibiting it from 
doing certain things.102 The second attribute of Austin’s notion of law is that this must be 
supported by some recourse for disobedience.103 A value-judgment is never, by contrast, 
                                                
100 H.L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1957) 71 Harv L. 
Rev. 593 at p.599. For general criticism of Hart’s positivism, See: N. Lacey, A life of H.L. 
A. Hart, the Nightmare and the Noble Dream (OUP) (2004) at p.229-234. For a contrasting 
view that the focus of defining law should be factors of obedience, See: L.L. Fuller, 
‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law- A reply to Professor Hart’ (1957) 71 Harv. L. Rev 630 at 
p.633-635. Also linking law to human agency to define it- See L.L. Fuller, ‘Human 
Purpose and Natural Law’ (1953) 53 J. Philos. 697 at p.697-700. However these are 
attributive descriptions rather than comprehensive definitions of law. 
101 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence 
(Hackett) (1998) at p.9-32. 
102 H.L.A. Hart, Concept of Law 2nd Ed. (OUP) (1997) at p.19-25. 
103 A classic example being the award of damages following the resolution of private 
disputes, or criminal imprisonment. E.g. punitive damages as a sanction in private law, 
See: G.T. Schwartz, ‘Deterrence and Punishment in the Common law of punitive 
damages: A Comment’ (1982) 56 St. Cal. L. Rev. 133 at p.133-134. For criminal 
sentencing,  
 intended to be sanctioned if it is not followed: it is merely an aspiration of how agency of certain 
subjects ought to be carried out. 
Thus, by contrast, a value-judgment does not and cannot change agency of its subject. As stated, 
a basic level a formal law is something that prohibits certain conduct or delineates the 
appropriate boundaries of appropriate conduct.104 The discussion here shall be left at the basic 
distinction, as outlined above, and not enlarged into a discussion of ideal attributes of law. For 
example, a further attribute of a law is that it has to be understood as such by its subject.105 
However, this may be arguably an ideal attribute for a law, rather than something that goes to the 
heart of whether an intended statement is a rule or not.  
 
Overall, laws have the following characteristics: (i) The desire to change human or institutional 
agency; (ii) The ability to bring about that change; (iii) The ability to sanction breaches of the law. 
 
FET interpretations 
The relevance of FET in investment treaty arbitration in terms of outlining its 
legal structure began with the case of Metalclad when it became clear that the 
tribunal was not reflecting minimum standard, or giving a generic synopsis on 
what the standard would involve, but was rather setting down criteria for the 
conduct of government organs when dealing with investors.106 Below is a short 
synopsis of current standards under FET that states have to comply with: 
 
(i) Ensuring all legal requirements for the operation of the investment are 
accessible to the investor. 
In Metalclad the requirement of ‘transparency’ was said to include a requirement 
for making accessible to the investor ‘all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of 
initiating, completing and successfully operating investments made, or intended to be made, under 
the Agreement’.107 
 
The requirement of transparency here making sure firstly that the rules are in the 
public domain so accessible by the investor and that they are clearly drafted. A 
                                                
104 E.g., Using law to limit the boundaries of government action: See, J. Nedelsky, ‘Law, 
boundaries, and the bounded self’ (1990) 30 Representations. 162 at p.162-163. 
105 See L.L. Fuller (cited n.92 supra). 
106 Metalcad Corporation v. United Mexican States Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 at para. 99-
101. 
107 Metalclad (n 105 above) at para 76. 
 secondary burden on the state would be to comply with requests by the investor 
for information relating to relevant laws to the investment to the state.  
 
 
(ii) Ensuring that administrative requirements placed at the start of the investment 
project are not made more onerous during its operation without  prior 
consultation with the investor and  without giving a justification for such a 
change. 
In Metalclad the investor obtained permits to run its waste treatment business. 
Near the completion of the preparation of the business the investor ran into 
difficulties with State administration. Further, on completion the State encouraged 
an application for new permits to run the investment, which were not stated to be 
compulsory. The application was rejected without any hearing or explanation. 
Thus the tribunal in Metalclad stated that: ‘The absence of a clear rule as to the 
requirement or not of a municipal construction permit, as well as the absence of any established 
practice or procedure of handling applications for a municipal construction permit, amounts to a 
failure on the part of Mexico to ensure the transparency required by NAFTA’.108 The cases 
of Wastemanagement and Tecmed also demonstrate this principle. This strand of 
liability will go towards establishing a burden on the state to ensure that local 
administration is consistent with respect to the administrative requirements 
imposed on the investor.  
 
(iii) Revocation of investment permit without justification or arbitrarily and 
without consultation.  
The requirement can be found in municipal administrative law rules of prior 
consultation109. Many investments need local permits in order to satisfy local law 
in order to function legally in the host-state. The decision of Incesya makes it clear 
that investments that do not satisfy local law or law of the host-state do not enjoy 
                                                
108 Metalclad (n98 above) at para 88. 
109 For example, in the English case of R v. Liverpool Corporation, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet 
Operators’ Association [1972] 2 QB 299 where it was held that a decision by a government 
body on how many cab licences to grant per annum could not be done without prior 
consultation of those cab-drivers likely to be affected by the decision. 
 the series of rights available under an investment treaty110. Thus the investor 
would be wary of non-compliance. However once local law is satisfied, a change 
of the law without prior consultation of the investor or done arbitrarily will breach 
the standard. In Tecmed an investment was made in lands and buildings through an 
auction for a landfill operation. The investor was given a licence for an indefinite 
period. There was then a revocation of the licence and the investor sued as a 
result of the loss. The tribunal stated that the host-state was bound to protect the 
expectations of the investor through its treaty obligations by virtue of the good-
faith principle in international law.111 In Tecmed the investor had an expectation 
that the licence would run indefinitely.  
 
 
(iv) Freedom from discriminatory conduct by the State or State bodies. 
This is an obligation for the State to treat all individuals equally.112 This obligation 
under the fair and equitable treatment standard prescribes greater protection than 
the non-discrimination provision in investment treaties. This is because 
discrimination under the fair and equitable treatment standard is not fixed by the 
test of ‘in like circumstances’ as is the case with the provision of non-
discrimination113. This is because the fair and equitable treatment standard is a 
                                                
110 Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26 
(02/08/06) (Jurisdiction), which denied the investor jurisdiction because it had failed to 
comply with local laws.  Note also Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25 (16/08/07)  (Jurisdiction) on this point.  
111 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2 (29 May 03) (‘Tecmed’ hereinafter) at para: 154. Good faith in treaty law has 
been described as ‘the duty of giving effect to the expressed intention of the parties, that is, their intention as 
expressed in the words used by them in the light of surrounding circumstances’ in McNair The Law of Treaties  
(Cambridge University Press) (1965) at p. 365. Thus a good faith reading of an investment treaty 
would be that which ‘protects and promotes’ investments as the ‘basic value’ of an investment treaty. 
This is stated in preambles to most treaties: R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(Kluwer Law) (1995) at p.8-22. 
112 Claims in equal treatment to third state nationals ‘in like circumstances’ can also be 
claimed through a Most-Favoured-Nation (‘MFN’) clause. (See, Maffezini v. Spain 
ICSID ARB 97/9 (20/01/00)(Jurisdiction)).  
113 For in like circumstances see analysis in Feldman, where there the supposed domestic 
beneficiaries of tax advantages are said to be ‘in like circumstances’ with the investor. 
The test of ‘in like circumstances’ here is predicated on similarity of business type, 
namely cigarette export. Perhaps a rationale for keeping non-discrimination protection 
limited to similar business as domestic legislative framework is likely to be similar and 
 non-contingent standard. This means that a comparator of how the state treats 
another national is not needed to assess a finding of discrimination under the 
standard. Thus, for example, the tribunal in CMS, elucidating the notions in 
Tecmed and Metalclad made a point about how other industries as compared to the 
investment were treated differently through the economic crisis in Argentina in  
2000 and 2002. With respect to the difference in treatment: ‘The longer the 
differentiation is kept the more evident the issue becomes, thus eventually again reinforcing the 
related finding about the breach of fair and equitable treatment’.114  
 
In Pope and Talbot, there was a breach of fair and equitable treatment by virtue of a 
breach of non-discrimination. A closer look at the facts illustrates that the 
investor, a lumber exporter, was not ‘in like circumstances’ to those businesses it 
claimed were receiving more favourable treatment, as Canadian businesses did not 
export lumber. Further the acts of the State complained of were wholly related to 
prescriptions put in place to maintain an inter-state quota on imports and exports.  
If Pope and Talbot and CMS were followed non-discrimination under the fair and 
equitable treatment standard is clearly a broader notion than direct discrimination 
enshrined in the national treatment rule. This is because there is no requirement 
that there be domestic industry comparators which were receiving favourable 
treatment. In fact without the ‘in like circumstances’ limitation to a discrimination 
claim there is nothing to prevent an investor simply to look at the best business 
treatment and claiming such treatment. The investor could claim that this is the 
most ‘equitable’ approach in dealing with differences in treatment. As an example, 
such a claim may be based on a greater administrative efficiency in dealing with 
permits for other businesses. The burden would thus shift on the state to 
demonstrate that those differences in nature would justify different treatment. The 
approached in  Pope and Tablot and CMS would thus place a positive obligation on 
states to ensure that investors receive the best treatment available in the domestic 
                                                                                                                                      
thus disparities of treatment will be fairly attributable. : Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/99/1 (NAFTA). (16/12/02) at paras 170-173, 
114 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8 (US/Argentina BIT). at para 294. 
 market115.  As a limit to the non-discrimination principle, it is clear from the case 
of ADF v. US that pre-existing domestic law, if it forms the basis on which an 
investor contracts with a State, cannot itself breach fair and equitable treatment 
despite the fact that it is on its face discriminatory116.  
 
 (v) Freedom from ‘unexpected and unwarranted conduct’ by the host-state 
The case of Wastemanagement No2 protects the investor against ‘arbitrary’ conduct 
by the state.117 Arbitrary conduct is against the general principle of fairness in 
public law as the investor is not permitted to participate in state-decision making 
nor is given prior warning of it. Permitting arbitrary conduct leaves the investor at 
risk of unexpected interference by the host-state making it difficult to calculate 
and project, amongst other things: business strategy, profit gain and expenditure. 
It would also permit the state to operate above the rule of law towards the 
investor causing an imbalance in decision-making power that is likely to put the 
investor off due to the risk of whimsical action at the behest of the state. This is a 
form of investment risk that investment treaties seek to remove through ‘promoting 
and protecting’ investments. 
 
In Metalclad the tribunal applied the reasoning in Tecmed that stated that arbitrary 
decision making would lead to a breach of fair and equitable treatment. In Tecmed 
a change in the pre-agreed criterion for the functioning of the investment without 
warning and with no consultation lead to a finding of arbitrary conduct. Thus the 
tribunal in Tecmed stated: ‘The foreign investor also expects the host State to act consistently, 
i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any pre-existing decisions or permits issued by the State that 
were relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its 
commercial and business activities’. However the phrase ‘arbitrary’ is broad and does 
                                                
115 In fact the strands of liability proposed in this chapter, due to the non-contingent 
nature of fair and equitable treatment, would give the investor greater protection than 
non-nationals where the legal system of the state is not as protective as the threshold 
purported in these strands. 
116 As reasoned in ADF Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/1 
(NAFTA) at para 157.  
117 See, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Number 2), ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (NAFTA) at para 98. 
 not intimate what arbitrary conduct is. Elucidating from these two cases, a more 
specific definition for this conduct would be ‘conduct which interferes with the investment 
which is unexpected and unwarranted’118. As to the threshold for a breach of this 
obligation the tribunal in Wastemanagement said conduct would be arbitrary if it 
followed domestic law and was still found to: ‘shock, or at least surprise, a sense of 
judicial propriety’119.  
 
The case of Champion trading v. Egypt120 illustrates that awareness of the obligation 
that the host-state imposed would defeat a claim for arbitrary conduct by the 
host-state. Here all the government measures were available in public and the 
prices were there for the investors to see.121 In PSEG v. Turkey the state arbitrarily 
changed the law that governed the contract, in order to lessen the protection 
afforded to the investor. Arbitrariness here was as a result of the Government’s 
disregard of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s decision in safeguarding the 
Claimant’s rights in the form of a Concession as opposed to contracts governed 
by the private law of Turkey.  The Government did a volte-face following the 
decision of the Court and insisted that the investment contract should be 
governed by the private law of Turkey.122 It would be ‘unexpected’ for a legally 
binding court decision to be annulled by the host-state thus such conduct would 
breach this strand of the fair and equitable treatment standard.   
 
(vi) That the State must entrench regulations that affect the investment and 
cannot alter them. 
 
                                                
118 Thus in Pope and Talbot (cited supra) the tribunal stated that arbitrary audit of the 
investor by the State coupled with threats revoking the operating rights of the investment 
would constitute a violation of the fair and equitable treatment provision. 
119 At para 98. 
120 Champion Trading Company, Ameritrade International, Inc., James T. Wahba, John B. Wahba, 
Timothy T. Wahba v. Egypt ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9 (27/10/06). 
121 Champion (n119 above) at para 164. 
122 PSEG Global Inc. And Konya Ilgin v. Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/05) (Award 19/01/07). For specifics see outline of Claim at para 224. 
 The requirement of consistent conduct initially outlined in Tecmed is broad and 
thus inherently ambiguous123. There are two strands of liability that have emerged 
under this head. Firstly, which will be dealt with here, there is a requirement that 
the host-state must entrench domestic law that lead to the investor investing the 
host-state. Secondly, which will be dealt with subsequently, the host-state must 
not renege on representations made to the investor. The first of these forms of 
investor protection is justified on the basis on the difference between an investor 
and state in terms of an ability to change the legislative context in which the 
investment operates. Changes in law that are unexpected may increase investment 
costs and give rise to difficulties in projection of profits thereby undermining 
business stability.124 This is a requirement that follows from protection from 
‘unexpected and unwarranted’ conduct as defined above125. However it grants further 
protection than that strand.  From the case of PSEG it can be seen that 
continuing legislative changes which impact on the contractual or administrative 
law governing the investment will breach the fair and equitable treatment standard 
as the investor would not know the nature of his rights or obligations, either as a 
contracting party or vis-à-vis government administration, in the host-state’s legal 
system.126 Thus in order to prevent the investor from being placed in this position 
the host-state must ensure that the laws are entrenched. 
 
In Enron v. Argentina the tribunal stated that expectations as to future conduct 
based on existing legislation would give rise to breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard if that legislation was subsequently changed127. In that case 
Enron claimed that one of the core reasons why it had invested in TGS was the 
existence of the Convertibility Law that fixed the Argentine Peso to the US 
                                                
123 See also, Tecmed (n 110 above). 
124 The Tribunal in PSEG (n 121 above) stated with respect to the states unjustifiable use of the 
legislature to  override the judicial decision: ‘Stability cannot exist in a situation where the law kept 
changing continuously and endlessly’. Such changes may also be a result of legal ‘interpretation and 
implementation’ that would thus also have to be consistent (at para 254). Note that such changes 
may also affect further credit to be acquired by the investor thereby hampering growth. Such 
conduct cannot said to be conducive to ‘promoting and protecting’ investment. 
125 See (n123 above) 
126 PSEG (n121 above) at para 250. 
127 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/3 (22/05/07). 
 Dollar. In 1999 due to economic crisis, the dollar adjustment was removed. As a 
result Enron claimed that as a consequence of the dollar adjustment removal it 
had suffered financial loss. The tribunal stated that changing the Convertibility 
Law was a breach of the investor’s expectations thus a breach of fair and equitable 
treatment and the umbrella clause.. In CMS v. Argentina the investor successfully 
claimed for losses in profit suffered as a result of Argentina repealing the law that 
ensured dollar tariffs for Gas supply services. The investor stated that without the 
dollar tariff it would never have invested, as a shareholder, in Argentina.  In CMS 
the tribunal stated the following, further elucidating Tecmed, ‘the number of treaties, 
both bilateral and multilateral, that have dealt with this standard also unequivocally shows that 
fair and equitable treatment is inseparable from stability and predictability’128. The tribunal in 
CMS found that by repealing the dollar conversion the state had breached the fair 
and equitable treatment standard. Following the decisions in CMS v Argentina and 
Enron v. Argentina it is now clear that the initially vague requirement of consistency 
outlined at the start of the chapter is the specific obligation not to change the 
regulatory regime that the investor operates under.  
 
(vii) The state must  not renege on representations made to the investor. 
There is an obligation now under the fair and equitable treatment provision that 
the host-state must not renege on representations made to an investor. The cases 
of Metalclad, Tecmed and Wastemanagement all demonstrate this doctrine. They all 
involve the state either: (i) granting a requisite permit for the operation of the 
investment, or (ii) stating that it would be granted if certain criterion were fulfilled 
and then subsequently reneging on this promise. The requirement of  not 
changing representations by the State to the investor has thus far been based on 
an unhelpful notion of ‘investor expectations’129. This notion does not elucidate the 
                                                
128 CMS (n 113 above) at para 276. 
129 In Tecmed (n110 above) the tribunal stated that the fair and equitable treatment requirement: 
“...requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments  treatment that does not affect the basic 
expectations that were taken into  account by the foreign investor to make the investment...” (at para 154). Lord 
Fraser in Council for Civil Service Union v. Minister for Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374 states 
‘Legitimate…expectation may arise either from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from 
the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue’. (at p.401). P.Elias, 
‘Legitimate Expectation and Judicial Review’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), New Directions in 
Judicial Review (London: Stevens, 1988) 37-50. 
 core protection strand highlighted here. It causes difficulty as it is exceptionally 
broad as and involves, to a degree, a subjective analysis would as to what the 
investor ‘expected’ to ensure investment promotion and protection130. An 
expectation, notionally, follows a representation hence not reneging on 
representations is the key action that the investor needs to be protected against. 
There are some limits in the case law as to investor protection against a state 
reneging on its representations to the investor. Now it seems tribunals will not 
accept vague statements as being the basis of such ‘expectations’. Thus in PSEG v. 
Turkey the tribunal found that there could be no case for a breach of the investor’s 
‘expectations’ as there were no identifiable commitments or promises made by the 
State which give rise to such an expectation131. Further, the State’s representation 
that it needed foreign investment was not a statement that gave rise to a legitimate 
expectation but more a statement of general policy.132 Where there are false 
representations that have been made by the investor that have led to a statement 
relating to the investment project by the state, the latter cannot be used for the 
basis of an ‘expectation’ claim under the fair and equitable treatment clause.133 
Further, in PSEG, the State’s inconsistency in stating that it was possible to have a 
branch of a foreign incorporated company for the function of the investment in 
Turkey and then stating that the investment had to be locally incorporated was a 
breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard.134 
 
(viii) Freedom from  bias in conduct towards an investor by the administrative 
apparatus of the state. 
                                                
130 Broad based expectations of the investor where upheld by the tribunal in the 
following cases: Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico; ADF Group Inc. v. USA, 9 January 2003, ICSID 
Case ARB(AF)/00/1, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, Final 
Award, 1 July 2004, LCIA Case No. UN3467.  
131 PSEG (n 121) above at para 242. 
132 See PSEG (n121 above) at para 243. 
133 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) 
26/01/06. One commentator has stated that prior knowledge that an investor ought to 
have should mitigate against a finding of fair and equitable treatment. See (see P. 
Muchilinski ‘Caveat Investor’? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 527 at p. 542 .   
134 See PSEG (n121 above) at para 248. 
 In Azurix the Tribunal stated that it was clear that the tariff regime and billing 
rights of the investment, a water supply business, had been politicized by the state 
because of concerns of water supply pricing in the forthcoming elections by the 
extant government.135 The fixing of billing prices caused significant loss for the 
investor as profits could not be increased to meet the initial set up cost of the 
investments and continuous expenditure. This breached the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. However, the tribunal also noted in its finding of a breach 
that it was significant that, once the service of water supply was transferred to a 
new business, the new service provider was allowed to raise tariffs. This 
demonstrated bias against the investor. Further, the Tribunal stated that repeated 
calls of the state for the non-payment of bills by customers of the investment 
verged on ‘bad faith’.  
 
The case of Metalclad can also be read to demonstrate a requirement of non-bias 
towards the investor. Thus in Metalclad after withdrawal of the investor’s operating 
permit  the State pursued the investor in local courts without justification and as a 
result of the failed litigation there was a significant delay in starting up the 
business. This would be biased conduct prohibited under the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. It is worth noting, from this decision, that bias can be 
inherent within government activity working against an investor without 
simultaneously working in favour of anyone else. Thus this is a distinct obligation 
than that of the freedom of discrimination requirement.  Systemic bias in Azurix 
could be seen from the fact that the subsequent service provider was allowed to 
do many things, such as regional price variations, that the investor was not.  
 
 
(ix) Application of strands of Public law liability to courts. 
It seems from the current jurisprudence that the court, despite being classified as 
an organ of a state in international law, will be exempt from these strands of 
public law liability. This is following the case of Loewen which did not apply the 
                                                
135 Azurix v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) (United States/Argentina BIT) 
at para 378. 
 denial of justice test in Neer.136. However, it is difficult to see why a court should 
be exempt from these strands of liability when other government bodies are not 
or the state is not exempt in carrying out regulatory function (the incumbent duty 
of those bodies). It is perhaps a failure to see the court as another administrative 
organ of the State in investment treaty arbitration137. This chapter will promote 
this strand of liability as a part of the fair and equitable treatment standard and 
state that the Loewen decision is wrong.138  
 
Synopsis . 
 
As FET rules have led to a breach of FET in the above cases,139 the basic Austinian notion of 
law, as opposed to value-judgment, is satisfied. Further, the enforcement of FET standards is 
possible due to the existence of the New York Convention.140 Thus the important requirement 
of enforcement is satisfied. 
 
Overall, FET standards are laws for the following key reasons: (i) They compel the state to some 
level of compliance if the state is to avoid similar breaches to other investors; (ii) failure of 
meeting the standards has led to a breach of the FET standard; (iii) Breaches are able to be 
enforced through the New York Convention for the violation of FET standards.  
 
 
                                                
136 Both the Mondev and Loewen  decisions state that denial of justice claims can be 
brought under the fair and equitable treatment standard (Mondev International Ltd. v. United 
States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (NAFTA). (11/10/02) at para 127 and 
Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3. 
(NAFTA) at para 132). Both claims failed. Mondev did not pass the jurisdiction phase as 
the Neer threshold of ‘outrageous’ failures by the judicial process of the state was used. 
(see LF. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S. v. Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 60 at p.61.  
137 For the purposes of international law a court is recognised as an organ of the state in 
international law. See Greenwood ‘State Responsibility for the Decisions of National 
Courts’ in Fitzmaurice and Sarooshi (eds) Issues of State Responsibility before International 
Judicial Institutions (Hart) (2004) at p.57. See also Article 4 of the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Reponsibility, in Crawford, The International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries Cambridge 
University Press (2002). 
138 For criticism of the Loewen case see: Rubins, ‘Loewen v. United States: The Burial of 
an Investor-State Arbitration Claim’, (2005) 21 Arbitration Int’l  1 at p.1-13. 
139 See Table 1 breaches. 
140 See Weeramantry et al (n69 above ). 
 1.4 Initial Concerns and Issues. 
 
One characterisation of the above rules, argued by Van Harten, is that FET has 
been used to create a system of public administrative and regulatory accountability 
delegated to the private sphere of commercial dispute-resolution.141 This is an 
extension of the usual private sphere of contractual dispute resolution by 
arbitration.142  
 
By contrast, general private commercial arbitration is subject to territorial 
restrictions of states, including their rule of law and courts, investment arbitration 
under the ICSID system is not. This is termed the ‘delocalised’ nature of ICSID, 
which is a unique freedom from control by national courts amongst arbitration 
dispute-resolution processes. If a state is liable under ICSID proceedings there is 
very little a state can do to avoid payment, there is no domestic review of the 
decision and enforcement available due to the ‘delocalised’ nature of ICSID.143 
The same is not true of private commercial arbitration that is subject to domestic 
courts controlling its jurisdiction and assessing whether enforcement should be 
permitted. 
 
As FET does construct laws outside the framework of sovereign powers 
accountable to domestic legislatures and the above characterisation of public 
nature of certain disputes is of some value. This is when assessing whether public 
interest decisions are made by arbitrators without public participation, issues of 
consent and accountability may arise depending on how the rules are applied. 
Thus, such concerns shall be met by first seeing how these rules are used in 
specific cases then making an analysis of the nature of the rules. 
 
                                                
141 G Van Harten, ‘The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of 
Individual Claims Against the State’ [2007] 56 ICLQ at p.371 -373.  
142 G Teubner, “Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Teubner 
(ed.) Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth: Aldershot) (1997) at p.10-11; G Teubner, 
‘Contracting Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law’ (2000) 9 Social & Legal 
Studies 399 at p. 399- p.402 
143 Note that it is also possible for investment treaty disputes under the UNCITRAL 
rules. See, Redfearn & Hunter (n1 above). 
  
As well as the public nature of disputes giving rise to issues of accountability, 
briefly described above, there are also fundamental issues regarding whether the 
law produced is realistic and workable. These concerns stem from the power 
given to arbitrators under FET, as described, and the fact that the usual 
constraints that come on domestic courts when granted such power, such as 
constitutional restrictions and the ability to refine jurisprudence through a system 
of precedent or appellate control are absent.144 
  
At a primary level, for the laws to work they have to be able to make clear what 
obligations they involve upon states, and how those obligations arise. In order to 
do so, not only do these obligations have to be clearly defined, they have to be 
applied consistently between decisions. 
 
In the absence of a system of precedent, appellate and legislative control such a 
law-making role under FET creates challenges of legal consistency and coherence. 
145 As discussed the merits of a system of precedent are that they allow clear 
requirements of how standards are engaged and what there thresholds are to be 
                                                
144 T.H. Cheng, ‘Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2006-07) 30 
Ford. Int’l L.J. 1014 at p.1016 &p.1022-1026. 
145 Tudor’s work is not an identification of legal consistency (n3 above); Other critiques 
do not do this sufficiently: S.D. Franck, ‘Legi; B. Choudhary’s attempt at defining the fair 
and equitable treatment standard by looking at the standard through some cases does not 
explore how key components of those standards are at odds with one another. See B. 
Choudhary ‘Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment in 
International Law’ (2005) JWIT 297 A not so dissimilar approach is taken by Ian Laird in 
‘Recent Developments In NAFTA Article 1105’ in NAFTA Investment law and Arbitration: 
Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects ed T. Weiler (2004) Transnational Publisher. 
Other writings fail at classification: see S. Vasciannie ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ (1999) BYIL 99 at p.130-145 (In 
section titled content). One sees in Vasciannie’s analysis in 1999 that he noted only two 
identifiable cases where the standard was used and that he failed to classify them. The 
deficiencies in Vasciannie’s analysis are partly attributable to very recent surge in use of 
the standard. Some aspects of the recent surge is identified by Klein Bronfman. However 
Klein Bronfman’s work fails to classify the content as strands of liability and the 
delineations therein are still subject to ambiguities. (see Klein Bronfman, M. ‘Fair and 
Equitable Treatment: An Evolving Standard’ (2006) 10 Max Planck UNYB 609). A 
similar broad approach has been followed in McLachlan, Shore, Weiniger International 
Investment Arbitration Substantive Principles (2007) OUP at paras 7.101-7.140.  
 created through a series of adjudicatory improvements over time. What follows in 
this thesis is now an assessment of legal clarity, or coherence. Subsidiary to this 
other arguably important attributes of FET rules to make them workable shall be 
discussed.  
 
The most important of these subsidiary requirements is the likelihood that such 
law can be complied with by respondent states many of whom are developing 
countries. Many of the laws created under the FET standard give the investor 
rights against administrative and regulatory processes of the state. In some states 
were administrative bodies are undeveloped or non-existence there may be 
difficulties of compliance with these rules. The use of FET in a similar vein to 
judicial review, but without constitutional constraints, can potentially give 
investors greater rights than domestic nationals. Considering that investment 
treaties that include FET, may also incorporate non-discrimination (national 
treatment) provisions to ensure the aims of giving investors equal rights (but no 
more) to domestic nationals,146 this would shift general protection of the investor 
as one of positive-discrimination or preference over and above national treatment.  
 
•  •  • 
 
What follows after this chapter is a discussion of how such rules have been 
applied, particularly in terms of identifying in that discussion inconsistencies and 
variances between fundamental aspects of those rules in different cases. This is 
part of an assessment of one of the key yardstick for workability argued in this 
thesis: legal coherence of FET rules. 
 
Overall, three key facts will be looked at following the discussion on 
jurisprudence. 
 
                                                
146 Sample investment treaties are given at the UNCTAD database available on : 
http://ita.uvic.ca 
 (a) The importance of coherence or clarity of the rule- whether the rules can be 
ascertained by states, and investors now that FET is used to create rules. 
(b) Capacity to comply with the rule-whether the rules can be complied with by their 
intended subjects, including likelihood of states being able to meet the costs of 
implementation, considering both that  many are developing countries and many of  
whom may not have developed national institutions and professional administrators. 
(c) The effect of the rules on the characteristics and perception of the rule-
maker-Does it turn the rule-making body into something that the subjects 
themselves would not want governing them. This is an analysis of the nature of 
legislative action under FET and shall be explored in Chapter 6. 
 
These factors, including reasons for their choice, will be explained, explored and 
elaborated in Chapters 5 and 6 and accountability in Chapter 7. Any feasible 
alterations stemming from the substantive law and a subsequent analysis will also 
be discussed in chapter 7. What follows now is a discussion of the substantive law. 
 
  
Chapter 2-The doctrine of legitimate expectations in investment treaty 
arbitration 
2.1 Introduction. 
A. Basic Concepts within the doctrine. 
B. Rationales for the doctrine in English Law. 
C. Legitimate Expectations and Good Conduct. 
2.2 Legitimate Expectations under FET. 
     A. An overview of Approaches. 
     B. The ambiguity surrounding the requirement of a direct 
representation. 
     C. Protection from changes of representation. 
     D. Contrasting Positions within the scope of rights. 
     E. Positions of Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration. 
     F. Conclusions.  
2.3 Legitimate Expectations in English Law. 
2.4. Conclusions. 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This chapter will illustrate how the doctrine of legitimate expectations is used in 
investment treaty arbitration. It will try to ascertain whether the use of the doctrine in investment 
treaty arbitration lacks coherence. To demonstrate whether there is incoherence of the doctrine this 
chapter will analyse whether there is sufficient variance and inconsistencies between decisions on 
key attributes of the doctrine. This will be done as to how much protection decisions give to 
investors under the doctrine, including whether they protected from changes in law or policy by the 
state. It will also determine whether there are clear requirements as to how the doctrine are 
engaged. It will also give a comparison of the approach of English law to the doctrine, to show 
whether deference to the legislature acting as a constitutional constraint and a system of precedent 
have resulted in coherence of the doctrine in English law.  
 
 2.1 Introduction. 
 
The doctrine of legitimate expectations is a doctrine of public law that law 
protects individuals from changes to representations made by Government 
bodies. This is by giving individuals a right to participate in administrative 
decision-making, though this can potentially extend to giving individuals a right to 
a particular decision of the body or a particular national policy.1  
 
 
A. Basic Concepts within the doctrine. 
 
The scope of the doctrine theoretically can cover both the protection of 
substantive and procedural rights.  
By substantive protection it is meant that the doctrine protects the 
individual by forcing the Government body to make good its representation to the 
individual by altering or keeping its policy, or law, where it harms an individual’s 
interests.  
By way of contrast, procedural legitimate expectations offer a more limited 
form of protection by affording rights of effective participation, where there is a 
change of position by the state.2 This includes a right to be heard prior to a 
decision being made by a Government body and a right to make representations 
during the decision-making process.3 The absence of such an opportunity to 
participate in administrative decision making may lead to compensation.4 
 
                                                
1 See C. Forsyth, ‘The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations’ [1988] 
CLJ 238, at p.239; John Hlophc’s (1987) 104 SALJ 165 at p.165-171; P.Elias, ‘Legitimate 
Expectation and Judicial Review’ in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds), New Directions in Judicial 
Review (London: Stevens, 1988) at p. 37-50. P.Craig, ‘Legitimate Expectations: A 
Conceptual Analysis’ (1992) 108 LQR 79 at p.82-82; P. Craig & S. Schonberg, 
‘Substantive Legitimate Expectations after Coughlan’ (2000) PL 684 at p.684-689. 
2 R.Singh, ‘Making Legitimate Use of Legitimate Expectations’ (1994) 144 NLJ 1215 at 
p.1215(1); 
3 C. Forsyth, ‘The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations’ [1988] CLJ 
238 at p.253-254.  
4 E.g., S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government (NAFTA) (UNICTIRAL) of Canada 8 ICSID 
Rep. 3 at p.114-115. 
 B. Rationales for the doctrine in English Law. 
 
The rationales in English law shall be outlined below in order to appreciate 
the reasons for using the doctrine in investment treaty arbitration to engage state 
responsibility. 
The rationale for the doctrine in English law reflects the core rationales for 
judicial review. This is ensuring the rule of law by subjecting the acts of state 
organs to judicial process, and protecting individuals from arbitrary decisions 
from Government bodies by ensuring the decisions are reasoned out through 
reflecting individual concerns.5 The importance of maintaining the rule of law is 
deeply rooted in the idea of public law and its key aim to serve the public interest 
by providing useful accountability of government action.6  
The legitimate expectations doctrine in English Law, is a part of a process 
of judicial review of administrative action. This is concerned with the manner in 
which a decision is made. A classic example of this is the Wednesbury doctrine of 
‘reasonable’ decision-making in English law, that is concerned on whether 
administrative discretion is exercised properly, but whether the policy that granted 
such a discretion is appropriate. Thus the Wednesbury doctrine does not go so far 
as to determine whether such decisions as a matter of policy ought to have been 
made, but rather is concerned with the appropriateness of the administrators 
conduct with respect to a judicial yardstick.7  
                                                
5For a short discussion of rationales of legitimate expectations see Schonberg, Legitimate 
Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) at p.7 See also Lord Denning MR, Freedom under 
the law (Hamlyn Lecture) (1949)  at p.126. For a full discussion of municipal judicial 
review purposes, See Chapter 1. For similar aspirations for international law, See B. 
Kingsbury, N. Krisch & R.B. Stewart, ‘Forward: Global Governance as Administration-
National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law & 
Cont Prob 1 at p.4 
6 See, T.R.S. Allan, ‘Legislative supremacy and the rule of law: Democracy and 
constitutionalism’ (1985) 44 Camb. L.J. 111 at p.112-115. Lord Woolf ‘Protection of the 
Public a New Challenge’ Hamlyn Lecture (1990) at p.12 and p.16. 
7 In the U.S. this is possible for courts only so far as the U.S. Constitution permits for the 
vindication of constitutional rights and procedure. See, W.E. Nelson, ‘Deference and the 
limits of deference in the Constitutional jurisprudence of justice by Byron. R. White 
(1986-88) 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 347 at p.355-356. 
 A broader inquiry that looked into the powers given to the decision-maker 
would breach constitutional convention, and lead to judicial usurpation of 
legislative function without public consent.8 Such action would lead the court’s 
decision potentially constitutionally illegitimate. Public law doctrines in English 
law, such as legitimate expectations, cannot operate to review law or policy of 
States due to the judicial usurpation of legislative function inherent in such an 
approach.9 Further, public law is mindful not to fetter the decision-making 
discretion of Government bodies by adversely affecting their mandate contrary to 
the law, so that the execution of important Government policy is not affected.10 
Thus judicial review of policy and legislation, without a constitutional mandate, is 
an effective restriction on the scope or review, which provides a reasonably clear 
and workable boundary for adjudication propriety of administrative action.  
 As Allan states, in relation to this limitation: ‘the predictability of official decisions 
will normally be furthered by adherence to settled rules; but though predictability may enhance 
individual security and autonomy, it should sometimes be sacrificed for the flexibility needed to 
attain important goals’.11 The argument here is that predictability of Government 
conduct ought to be secondary to the achievement of policy objectives within the 
law. The overriding function of government in the majority interest, ought not on 
a utility basis, be fettered by maintaining promises to individuals or policies 
individuals rely on. From this perspective the prevention of  injustice caused in a 
particular case by the state reneging on policy cannot be allowed or it will override 
the decision to renege itself. The latter is assumed by English courts, which are 
constitutionally precluded from reviewing it, to be in the public interest.  
                                                
8 This has been argued to be a natural state of affairs in Western democracies. Farazmand 
argues that Governance functions of policy and law are often carried out by non-elected 
institutions at the necessary cost of electoral choice or accountability. See A. Farazmand 
Modern Systems of Government Exploring the Role of Bureaucrats and Politicians (SAGE 
publishing) (1997) at p.xiii. 
9 For discussion about possibilities, see R.Pagone, ‘Estoppel in Public Law: Theory, Fact 
and Fiction’ (1984) UNSWLJ 267, 275-6.   
10 This is also the approach in other common law countries. See Chief Justice Mclachlin 
of the Canadian Supreme Court in B. Mclachlin, ‘Rules and discretion in the Governance 
of Canada’ (1992) 56 Sask. L. Rev. 167 at p.168 
11 (n6 above) Ibid at p.130. 
 This reflects a reality of domestic governance that on occasion 
representations, policies and promises that individuals rely on have to be changed. 
It will be interesting to see if this is a position used for the doctrine with respect 
to investors, considering that the protection of foreign investment is a key host-
state policy taken up when taking on investment treaty obligations. Thus in the 
case of investors potentially claiming substantive rights, there is a conflict of two 
government policies, the need to protect the investor and the public interest in 
reneging on the representation. It will be interesting to see if tribunals have been 
faced with substantive claims under legitimate expectations, whether they have 
been sensitive to one or another and how they have balanced out these potentially 
competing interests. 
 
C. Legitimate expectations and Good Conduct. 
 
Rights to participation in administrative decision-making that affect the 
individual provided by legitimate expectations improve administrative function. 
They allow adverse decisions to be more acceptable, and prevent the exercise of 
discretion that harms individuals, where such a prevention does not undermine 
government policy.  
Where the doctrine grants procedural rights, these may include individuals 
having an opportunity to be informed of the change of position and be permitted 
to participate in the decision-making process.12 The administrator or state agent 
can then decide to communicate the policy or representations of the individual to 
the relevant policy-maker or factor these representations into her decision. This 
would improve standards of administration, and move the process away from 
perceived arbitrary decision-making by allowing administrators to explain to 
individuals why public interest has overridden their individual concerns and 
                                                
12 A right claimed by investors under the fair and equitable treatment standard, see for 
example CMS v. Argentina ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08 (Award Merits)  and Impreglio 
v. Pakistan (Claim for Jurisdiction ICSID ARB/03/3.  
 ensures adverse individual impact is taken into decision-making. In this way the 
existence of procedural rights improve administrative outcome.13  
  
Legitimate expectations granting a substantive rights to individuals may cause 
government bodies to ensure that representations made to individuals, including 
those regarding law and policy, are met. This in turn ensures certainty for the 
individual about the position of the state. It is, however, also possible that a search 
of legal certainty may restrict executive action and the discretion of policy-makers. 
As Allan suggests, the doctrine may need to strike a balance between the 
competing issue of legal certainty and the general public interest.  
 
The need to value the need for policy and law change by the state, occurs 
due to changes in various social issues and available revenue.14 If investment treaty 
arbitration demonstrates a risk of arbitrators adversely interfering with these 
exigencies, a restriction of the doctrine to procedural rights may be more prudent 
from a utility basis. This is distinct from a restriction based on the preservation of 
democratic consent inherent in a separation of powers justification for procedural 
rights.  
Using the doctrine in investor-state relationships to include of a right to be 
told of why a decision is changed is important. It may be integral to good 
commercial planning. Further, the doctrine can be useful to counter 
administrators hiding key information and policy-changes from investors for the 
sake of administrative efficiency, where it allows information access for 
individuals. This latter potential benefit has to be weighed against what Schonberg 
calls the ‘chilling effect’ that that the doctrine can bring upon administrators.15 
This ‘chilling effect’ would occur as a result of Government departments 
not publishing certain information due to individuals relying on it, where the 
                                                
13 See F. Ansell, ‘Unauthorised Conduct of Government Agents: A restrictive rule of 
equitable estoppel against the Government’ (1986) Univ Chicago LR 1026 at p.1026-
1031. G. Wignall ‘Legitimate Expectation and the Abuse of Power’ (1994) NLJ 1038. 
D.J. Galligan, ‘The Nature and Function of Policies within discretionary power’ (1976) PL 332 at 
p.332-343.  
14 See discussion of deference in Chapter 7. 
15 See Schonberg (n5 above) at p.17 et subsq. 
 doctrine operates to grant rights in the absence of specific representations to 
individuals, and individuals choose to rely on published information. It may also 
occur as result of granting substantive rights under legitimate expectations. 
Administrators and policy-makers, may hide important information that would be 
useful to individuals to avoid lengthy decision-making as a result of individual 
participation. This would be adversely affect any benefits to domestic 
administrative conduct that the use of the doctrine can bring in creating  a more 
transparent administrative process.  
This ‘chilling effect’ is not, however, entirely convincing. Schonberg 
acknowledges that there is no empirical evidence for it and it is based on a 
possible hypothetical behaviour of the state.16  
Overall the doctrine improves administrative processes by allowing both 
administrators, through individual representations, to be better informed. It also 
allows individuals to improve their understanding of administrative process 
through participation and by affording them an opportunity to make 
representations. 
 
2.2. Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
 
A. Overview of Operation. 
 
The doctrine of legitimate expectations is a key part of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. It has been said:  
 
‘the standard of fair and equitable treatment is…closely tied to the notion of legitimate 
expectations which is the dominant element of the standard’.17  
                                                
16 Ibid.  
17 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic (Partial Award) 
(UNCITRAL) (17 03/06) at para 302. 
  
This point is also made by the EDF tribunal: 
 
 ‘The Tribunal shares the view expressed by other tribunals that one of the major 
components of the FET standard is the parties’ legitimate and reasonable expectations with 
respect to the investment they have made.’18 
 
 
The doctrine’s operation is summarised by Professor Wälde in Thunderbird v. 
Mexico, in the following terms: 
 
“the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ relates, (within the context of the NAFTA 
framework), to a situation where a contracting party’s conduct creates reasonable and 
justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on 
said conduct, such that failure by the NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could 
cause the investor (or investment) to suffer damages.”19  
 
 
According to Professor Wälde the expectations have to be ‘reasonable’ through 
looking at the state’s conduct, and the investor has to have relied on them. The 
latter is some positive act by the state to show the investment was motivated by 
the host-state’s policies, representations or law.  
 
What forms the basis of an expectation is outlined in Tecmed:  
 
‘the foreign investor also expec ts  the host State to act consistently, i.e. without 
arbitrarily revoking any pre-existing decisions or permits issued by the State that were 
                                                
18 EDF (Services) Limited v Romania ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13 (Award on 8 
October (2009)  at para 216. 
19 T. Wälde, dissent in: International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA) 26/01/06. at para 147 
 relied upon by the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its 
commercial and business activities’.20  
 
The investor may have under the doctrine substantive rights to a host-state’s laws 
and policy remaining the same unless the state can provide a reason for changing 
them, as indicated by the use of the word ‘arbitrary’. The importance of reliance is 
also emphasised here. 
 
However this statement of the Tecmed tribunal also leaves it open to the 
investor to undertake a subjective claim as to what it ‘expected’.21 Thus the 
tribunal in the Tecmed case stated that FET:  
 
“...requires the Contracting Parties to provide to international investments  treatment 
that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into  account by the foreign 
investor to make the investment...”.22  
 
This appears to be at odds with the objectivity in the  ‘reasonable expectation’ 
approach of Professor Wälde described above. Similarly, Professor Wälde in his 
opinion in Thunderbird emphasises that the expectation must be based on a 
positive act of the state. 
  
‘an investor should be protected against unexpected and detrimental changes  o f  
po l i cy  if the investor has carried out significant investment with a reasonable public 
authority initiated assurance in the stability of such a policy’.23 
                                                
20 Tecnicas  Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico Award of May 29, 2003  (2004) 
43 ILM 133 para. 154  
21 Broad based expectations of the investor where upheld by the tribunal in the following 
cases: Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (NAFTA) 
(20/08/00); ADF Group Inc. v. USA, 9 January 2003, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/00/1, 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, Final Award, 1 July 2004, 
LCIA Case No. UN3467. 
  
22 Tecmed, Award of May 29, 2003  (2004) 43 ILM 133 para. 154. This dictum has been 
repeated in Eureko v. Poland (Partial Award) (19/08/05) at para 235, Occidental 
Exploration and Production Co v. Ecuador LCIA UN.647 at para 185 and in Saluka  
(n17 above) at para 302. 
  
The Tecmed approach may leave it to the investor to bring a claim for an 
expectation that is reasonable as Professor Wälde states, but one where a state 
could not have intended to make to the investor.  
 
In addition to the Tecmed statement above stating that  ‘arbitary’ changes of 
positions by the state would fall foul of the doctrine (thus requiring the host-state 
to show how a state’s action can be justified), the Thunderbird decision leaves an 
appropriate margin of deference to the state’s need to change its policies. It states 
with respect to any regulation that could be passed:  
 
‘[in reference to Chapter 11 of NAFTA] Mexico has in this context a wide 
regulatory ‘ space ’  for  regulat ion; in the regulation of the gambling industry, 
governments have  particularly wide scope o f  regulat ion reflecting national views on 
public morals. Mexico can permit or prohibit any forms of gambling as far as the 
NAFTA is concerned. It can change its regulatory policy and it has a wide discretion 
with respect to how it carries out such policies and administrative conduct’.24 
 
As to how wide this actually is, is unclear. The tribunal in stating ‘wide regulatory 
‘space’ for regulation may leave it open to arbitral tribunals to determine what the 
boundaries of that regulatory space are. 25  The tribunal in the Thunderbird decision 
also appreciated that the scope of investment protection in NAFTA is overridden 
by the state’s need to criminalise certain conduct.26  
Contrary to this statement in Thunderbird and the subjective rights 
sanctioned by Tecmed,  in GAMI the tribunal stated: ‘To repeat: NAFTA arbitrations 
have no mandate to evaluate laws and regulations that predate the decision’.27 This statement 
does not preclude policy review following that juncture, however as Tecmed and 
                                                                                                                                      
23 Thunderbird v. Mexico (n20 above) (Separate Opinion) at para 30. 
24 Thunderbird (n20) majority decision at Para 147. 
25 This form of adjudication, has been described by Van Harten as ‘regulatory 
adjudication’, in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public law  at p.119. See also Chapter 6 on 
regulatory governance. 
26 (n 20 above). 
27 GAMI v Mexico (NAFTA) (2005) 44 ILM para 93 
 Thunderbird grant rights based on host-state policy prior to an investment 
occurring, this position is clearly in conflict.  
Tribunals have given a warning about subjective and broad approaches to 
the doctrine. The tribunal in Saluka to some degree clarifies this: 
 
 ‘This Tribunal would observe, however, [referring to Tecmed, supra] that while it 
subscribes to the general thrust of these and similar statements, it may be that, if their 
terms were to be taken too literally, they would impose upon host States’ obligations 
which would be inappropriate and unreal i s t i c . 
Moreover, the scope of the Treaty’s protection of foreign investment against 
unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exc lus ive ly  be determined by foreign investors’ 
subjec t ive  motivations and considerations. Their expectations, in order for them to be 
protected, must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the 
circumstances.’28 
 
 
Saluka thus adds some objectivity to the basis of the expectation, but it does not 
preclude the investor’s formulation of what it expected in the absence of a direct 
assurance. A realistic appraisal of what ‘reasonableness’ is provided in Thunderbird. 
There echoing Professor Allan, Professor Wälde states:  
 
 ‘Such a protection is, however, not unconditional or ever lasting. It leads to a balancing 
process between the needs for flexible public policy and legitimate reliance on investment backed 
expectations’29 
 
Thus there needs to be a judicious and balanced approach taking the state’s 
policy exigencies into consideration. 30 
                                                
28 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic (Partial Award) 
(UNCITRAL) (17 03/06) at para 304. 
29 Thunderbird v. Mexico (n20 above) separate opinion at para 30. 
30 See also, S.D.Myers v. Government of Canada UNCITRAL (Partial Award 13.11.00) at 
para 261.  
 As to scope of review available to the tribunal the approach outlined in 
Tecmed gives a wide scope to tribunals.  It may open the door to not just 
revocation of permits claims under the doctrine but may also bring into the ambit 
of the doctrine mere changes of Government policy that cause fiscal loss to the 
investor. Such a broad approach, if undertaken, would potentially give the arbitral 
tribunal power to review all Government policy that may impact on the investor, 
and not just look at whether revocation of permits was justified. This would also 
provide a strong form of risk minimisation to the investor. However it may be 
greater than that constitutionally afforded to domestic nationals, as would be the 
case if the national were English (explained below), and potentially allow 
protection of the investor to override important national policy exigencies. 
 
B. The ambiguity surrounding the requirement of a direct representation 
 
The requirement of a direct representation by a state to create a legitimate 
expectation has not been clearly elucidated by tribunals.31 The implications of 
having a strict requirement is that a state will know when it will be made good on 
its promise and can prepare appropriate contingencies to address the impact of 
making good the representation. It will also put the investor on a certain footing, 
that only a clear representation is a promise that the state will keep. In the absence 
of this specific requirement the state may be faced with claims for policy 
representations that it is not subsequently able to keep due to unforeseen 
competing public interests. 
However, in investment treaty arbitration decisions are not consistent with 
respect to a strict requirement for a direct representation made to an investor to 
engage the doctrine. Some decisions intimate a requirements, others allow the 
investor to base his expectation on policy that it feels induced him into the 
contract. This approach is the one taken, for example, by the Tecmed tribunal.32 
Though this was done through the omission of not having a direct requirement. 
                                                
31 Thus in Saluka, an investor who held shares in a bank had a legitimate expectation that 
the state would treaty the bank fair and equitably. (n28 above) at para 309. 
32 Tecmed, (n20 above) at para. 154 (quoted above). 
 In the case of Suez, Socidedad and Interaguas there were no direct 
representations made to the Claimant as to the dollar peso conversion law in the 
Argentine Republic.33 The Claimant designed its case on the basis of two 
circumstances in which it felt, subjectively, gave rise to a legitimate expectation. 
The first was the existence of bilateral investment treaties, not just the specific 
treaty concerning the sending state of the investment. Secondly the existence of 
the law itself, the claimant felt had induced it to invest.34 There is no direct 
representation by the state.   
 
In Saluka v. Czech Republic the tribunal leaves also open the possibility of 
the investor’s expectations being based on law, policy or any other Government 
rule or conduct that the investor feels that has aggrieved him, without a 
requirement of a specific representation.35 A different position as to a requirement 
of representations was also vaguely intimated by the tribunal in Waste Management 
I: 
 ‘the treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State which were reasonably relied 
on by the claimant’36 
 The tribunal in PSEG stated that tribunals will not accept vague 
statements as being the basis of such ‘expectations’. In PSEG v. Turkey the 
tribunal found that there could be no case for a breach of the investor’s 
‘expectations’ as there were no identifiable commitments or promises made by the 
State which give rise to such an expectation.37 In this case there was no backdrop 
                                                
33 Suez,  Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas 
ServiciosIntegrales  del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/17 (Jurisdiction) 
34 Suez (n33 above) at paras 20-23, 31. 
35 n1 (supra).This was also the approach in Tecmed (n 20). This approach has been 
mentioned and agreed with in Azurix : ‘The expectations as shown in that case [Tecmed] are not 
necessarily based on a contract but on assurances explicit or implicit, or on representations, made by the 
State which the investor took into account in making the investment’. (Azurix at para 318).  
36 Wastemanagement Inc v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case no Arb(AF)/98/2 
(Jurisdiction) (2 June 2000), 40 I.L.M. 56. (The claim was rejected on the jurisdiction 
phase for failures to waive domestic proceedings appropriately under NAFTA Article 
1121). 
37 PSEG Global Inc. And Konya Ilgin v. Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/05) (Award 19/01/07) at para 242. 
 of legislation on which to base the formation of expectations on as in the 
Argentine cases concerning the peso-conversion law. The tribunal also noted that 
the  State’s representation that it needed foreign investment was not a statement 
that gave rise to a legitimate expectation to certain rights by implication, but was 
more a statement of general policy.38It thus did not extrapolate to create rights on 
this aspect as the claimant wished. 
The tribunal in EDF echoed a similar approach by saying:  ‘legitimate expectations 
cannot be solely the subjective expectations of the investor’.39  In similarly terms the EDF 
tribunal also stated ‘(Except) Where specific promises or representations are made by the 
State to the investor the latter may not rely on a bilateral investment treaty as a kind of 
insurance policy against the risk of any changes in the Host-state’s legal and economic 
framework. Such expectation would be neither legitimate nor reasonable’.40   
Also, where there are false representations that have been made by the 
investor that have led to a statement relating to the investment project by the 
state, the latter cannot be used for the basis of an ‘expectation’ claim under the 
fair and equitable treatment clause.41 Overall the requirements of specific 
representations is not a concrete one, and it maybe the investor will succeed 
depending very much on the way the tribunal exercises its discretion on this 
important aspect of the doctrine. It leaves it open to investors to pick and choose 
which policy alteration may harm them, thus broadening the potential to harm 
public interest. 
 
C. Protection from changes of representation. 
 
Investment arbitral jurisprudence demonstrates that the doctrine of legitimate 
operations can operate potentially in two ways. 
                                                
38 See PSEG (n37 above) at para 243. 
39 EDF (n18 above). para 215. 
40 EDF (n 18 above) at para 217. 
41 Thunderbird (n 19 above). One commentator has stated that prior knowledge that an 
investor ought to have should mitigate against a finding of fair and equitable treatment. 
See P. Muchilinski ‘Caveat Investor’? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor 
under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 527 at p. 542.    
 The first is to protect the investor from representations or promises made 
by the state and then later not followed. This includes protection of the investor 
against a breach of a promise of a licence that permits the operation of the 
investment in the host state. This has been illustrated by the cases of Metalclad and 
Tecmed.42  The second circumstance in which it applies is to give substantive rights 
to the investor against changes of Government law or policy. This is where the 
Government has created circumstances through a legal or policy framework that 
has encouraged the investor to make the investment and the investor has relied 
upon this.  
 
Protection from changes of representations 
 
The first paradigm outlined above, the doctrine operates to protect the investor 
from changes in representations by the State. Thus in PSEG v. Argentina the 
State’s inconsistency in stating that it was possible to have a branch of a foreign 
incorporated company for the function of the investment in Turkey and then 
stating that the investment had to be locally incorporated was a breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard.43 Thus the tribunal stated: 
 
‘Thirdly, the Tribunal also finds that the fair and equitable treatment obligation 
was seriously breached by what has been described above as the “ro l l er - coaster” 
e f f e c t  
o f  the cont inuing l eg i s lat ive  changes . This is particularly the case of the 
requirements 
relating, in law or practice, to the continuous change in the conditions governing the 
corporate status of the Project, and the constant alternation between private law status 
and administrative concessions that went back and forth. This was also the case, to a 
more limited extent, of the changes  in tax leg i s lat ion’. 44 
 
                                                
42 See synopsis of FET interpretations in Chapter 1. 
43 See PSEG (n37 above) at para 248-250. 
44 PSEG (n37 above) at para 250. 
 This approach is to stop frequent legal changes undermining the investment. 
Changes in law after the investment starts operating that cause it losses will result 
in a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. This is irrespective of a 
finding on expropriation.45 As shall be seen from the later comparative analysis 
both the first, second and third operation of the doctrine goes beyond the 
municipal application of the doctrine. Thus in the first circumstance there is an 
obligation now under the fair and equitable treatment provision that the host-state 
must not revoke the grant of permits given to an investor to operate the 
investment.  
The cases of Metalclad, and Tecmed are also examples of this. They involve 
the state either: (i) granting a requisite permit for the operation of the investment, 
or (ii) stating that it would be granted if certain criterion were fulfilled and then 
subsequently reneging on this promise.46 Thus in Metalclad the claimant stated that 
Mexico, through its local Government interfered with the development of its 
hazardous landfill waste project.  Prior to the purchase of the investment by the 
claimant there was a meeting of the claimant and local officials in which the 
claimant was given the assurance it could operate the investment.47 The Claimant 
was told that the local permit requirements had been satisfied, but not at the 
federal level. The Claimant was told, however, that a permit at the federal level 
could be obtained if the claimant could satisfy federal and state laws.48 The 
Claimant had purchased the investment on the basis of the above statements.  
Following the claimants purchase of the investment the provincial Governor 
publicly denounced the investment and there was no licence given to operate the 
                                                
45 PSEG (n 37 above) at para 278-279. Though the decision made a finding of fair and 
equitable treatment there was no finding of expropriation, hence losses did not have to 
amount to a taking or ‘loss of control’ of the investment. 
46 In Tecmed the tribunal stated that the fair and equitable treatment requirement: “...requires the 
Contracting Parties to provide to international investments  treatment that does not affect the basic expectations 
that were taken into  account by the foreign investor to make the investment...” (n20 above) (at para 154).  
 For history and application to investment treaty arbitration see Stephen Fietta ‘International 
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States: an indication of the limits of 
the "legitimate expectation" basis of claim under Article 1105 of NAFTA?’ (2006) 7(3) JWIT 423 
at p.423-430. 
47 Metalclad (n21 above) at paras 27-33. 
48 Metalclad (n21 above) at para 33. 
 landfill.49 A further requirement for a municipal construction permit was imposed 
by the local Government in order to run the state. The permit was subsequently 
not granted.50   
The tribunal appreciated that the reasons for not granting the permit were 
due to (i) lack of support in the local community and (ii) ecological concerns 
related to permit were not related to the problems of physical construction of the 
landfill, these were not sound grounds for denial. However the tribunal then said 
that the only ground on which the permit could be denied was if there was a 
physical defect in constructing the landfill. The tribunal did not feel that the state’s 
environmental impact concerns were serious and substituted its own views on 
permit requirements. 51 Finding a breach of FET the tribunal emphasised that 
internal law, such as the ecological decree, cannot be used as a basis to override 
treaty obligations.52  
In Tecmed the claimant purchased 99% of the shares in Cytrar, a municipal 
corporation. The Claimant purchased facilities relating to a landfill site to deal 
with hazardous waste. A Government body called the Hazardous Waste and the 
National Ecology Institute of Mexico) refused to grant a renewal of the licence to 
operate the investment. The claim included relief for permission to operate the 
land-fill site.53  
The Tribunal stated that the non-grant of permit was a breach of the 
claimant’s legitimate expectations. The tribunal stated that the fair and equitable 
treatment standard poses a requirement of taking into consideration the basic 
expectations that were taken into consideration by the foreign investor making the 
investment.54 These expectations include the following: (i) That the state to act in 
a consistent manner. (ii) No arbitrary revocation of per-existing decisions or 
permits that were issued by the state that were relied upon by the investor.55 This 
                                                
49 Metalclad (n21 above) at para 37. 
50 Metalclad (n21 above) at paras 50-52. 
51 Metalclad (n21 above)  at paras 92-93. 
52 This was justified by reference to Article 26 and Article 27 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969. at para 100. 
53 Tecmed (n20 above) at para 39. 
54 Tecmed (n20 above) at  para 154.  
55 Ibid. 
 relating of consistency to expectations precludes a state from changing its position 
on a policy basis. The second element of arbitrariness gives tribunals the implicit 
power to quash policy or law that may take the investor by surprise. 
Like Metalclad, the tribunal in Tecmed did not defer to the law and policy of 
the state by granting the importance of the state’s ecological concerns over the 
investor’s rights. The need of a state to protect policy-concerns can be seen from 
the case of Wastemanagement II. This decision concerned a dispute that was 
fundamentally contractual in nature. The tribunal deferred to the financial 
limitations of the state to meet its obligations under the contract due to a fiscal 
crisis.   
In Wastemanagement II the tribunal took into consideration that there was a 
financial crisis in Mexico in 1994 that affected the city this lead to a decline of 
revenues.56 The tribunal did not find the acts of the federal bank to not pay the 
investor, on the basis of financial difficulty, to constitute a breach the investor’s 
expectations.57 The tribunal also noted that the city was under financial difficulties 
and performed part of its contractual obligations. This did not amount to a grossly 
arbitrary conduct or gross unfairness.58  Thus there was no breach of Article 1105 
by the city.  
In Wastemanagement II there is an objective approach to the doctrine, by 
taking a wholistic approach on the facts as to whether the doctrine should be 
engaged and ensuring that the investor is accountable for its own business 
choices. Thus failure  of the business to convince its customers to use its system 
and that the state’s financial losses due to economic difficulty was something that 
the investor as a commercial risk had, in the tribunals, view had to take into 
consideration as a part of the decision to make its investment.59 Not all cases 
follow the same vein. There is no fixed position in case law as to whether 
                                                
56 Tecmed (n20 above) at para  101.  
57 Tecmed (n20 above)  102.  
58 Tecmed (n20 above)  at para 115.  
59 However a different result may be feasible under the MIGA not yet signed or ratified 
by states: ‘foreign investors on the other hand, need a greater measure of security and protection against 
non-commercial risks in the face of growing economic and political uncertainties’ See, I F. I, Shihata, 
‘The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’ (1986) 80 Am. Socy Intl L. Proc. 21’- It 
is questionable whether such non-commercial risks include protection from political and 
economic changes in a state. 
 economic necessity can be used to avoid policy and legal obligations to 
investors.60  
 
Substantive rights against changes of law or policy. 
 
In CMS v. Argentina and Sempra v. Argentina on a similar basis the tribunal 
held that a breach of legitimate expectations occurred when Argentina repealed 
the dollar-peso conversion law. The tribunal’s held that changing the legal 
framework that investors had relied upon on to make their investment would 
breach their legitimate expectations. In these cases tribunals also stated that 
international law defence of necessity would not protect a state from repealing 
laws contrary to FET.61 This is quite a distinct conclusion to the deferential 
approach to the state’s fiscal need in Wastemanagemetn II.   
In the investment treaty arbitration case of Azurix v. Argentina the fair and 
equitable treatment standard was held to be violated due to the investor’s water-
supply business being fettered by pricing concerns. 62 These concerns of the 
public became a part of general political elections when one party promised 
affordable water supply. Following such entrenchment of pricing the investor 
suffered loss. When determining the breach the tribunal focussed on the electoral 
concerns of the public relating to affordable water supply. The tribunals decision 
on granting the investor due process rights amounted to estopping the state from 
changing its position with respect to the prices despite a electoral concern of 
voters of affordable water-supply.63  
This approach impacts on any public-interest factor a state may have in 
relation to changing its policy to the investor. It also overrides the choice and 
views of local inhabitants to have their views taken into consideration b their 
Government. It thus precludes any claim based on a substantive legitimate 
                                                
60 See Sempra Energy Intl. v. Argentina ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 at paras 330-350. 
61 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID  Case No. ARB/01/8 
(US/Argentina BIT) (12/05/05), at paras 317-331. The fair and equitable treatment aspect was 
still upheld on the hearing of the Respondent’s annulment application, CMS Gas Transmission 
Company v.Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8) (Annulment Proceeding). 
62 Azurix  v. Argentine  Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 (Award 14/07/06). 
63 Azurix  (n63 above) at para 372-278. 
 expectation through an electoral or judicial process they may have.  It prevents a 
state from taking fiscal measures that may impact on the investment that are 
needed for social concerns.  
In Enron v. Argentina the dollar-peso conversion law was changed and as a 
result of the change the investor suffered loss.64 The tribunal granted damages on 
the basis that the investor had a legitimate expectation that the law would not 
change. Enron owned shares as part of an indirect investment in TGS, an 
Argentine Gas Transport Company. Enron claimed that one of the core reasons 
why it had invested in TGS was the existence of the Convertibility Law which 
fixed the Argentine Peso to the US Dollar. It argued that the removal of this 
adjustment breached its expectations that the law would remain the same and 
consequently caused it financial loss. The tribunal upheld the claim on the basis 
that the investor had a legitimate expectation that the Convertibility Law would 
not be repealed.  
There are fundamental concerns of the state at play here. The first is 
related to the regulatory powers of the State; and as a subsidiary, the regulatory 
powers of the State in a time of economic crisis. The Tribunal, in its reasoning on 
the fair and equitable treatment issue found that by removing the dollar 
adjustment law, and thus changing the regulatory regime the Argentine Republic 
had breached the investor’s legitimate expectations. The Tribunal stated:  
‘however strong the regulatory powers of the State might be they are still governed by the law and 
the obligation to protect the rights required to individuals’.65  
 The tribunal intimates it will review the law-making powers of the state and that 
the doctrine gave the individual investor rights that could be asserted as against 
the state’s laws. The tribunal did not think it pertinent that Argentina was in an 
economic crisis and had to change the law. This approach has been followed in 
numerous awards against Argentina.66 To avoid liability to the investor the state 
                                                
64 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3 (Award 22/05/07) 
65 Enron (n64 above) at para 220). 
66 See, for example, CMS (n61 above) (Decision on fair and equitable treatment  upheld in annulment 
proceedings- see CMS  Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08 
Annulment Decision (25/09/07at para 85. LG&E  v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (United 
 will thus have to avoid economic mismanagement so that it can meet investor 
obligations. In this instance FET is playing a governance role by setting standards 
of economic management.  
In another case of policy based expectations, Occidental v. Ecuador, the 
foreign investor was found to have a legitimate expectation that laws that may 
grant tax imbursement remained the same, changing the rules by the state would 
result in a breach of the investor’s expectations of a stable and consistent legal 
environment. 67 The use of the doctrine in these cases suggests that the scope of 
review of the arbitral court extends to law and policy.  
 
Liability in the Argentine cases being based on the notion that the investor was 
encouraged by the laws and legal framework in place in the state. Such a 
protection is only usually achieved through lobbying processes by businesses in 
democratic regimes in the West. Thus arbitration here is turning what is often a 
political process into a form of legal protection. In times of economic necessity a 
business’s case for a law to be passed or not repealed would usually have to 
compete with other policy priorities. This approach, due to investment treaty 
obligations on states, may grant foreign investors an advantage in these times over 
domestic businesses and competitors. Overriding national policy priorities 
through this use of the doctrine is of questionable legitimacy, as there is no full 
evaluation of competing national priorities.  
On the other hand, if the opposite position were held, the onus would fall 
heavily on the investor to ensure that the area of policy representation being made 
by the Government body was capable of being met. In turn, business planning 
would have to cater for changes in a states legal and administrative apparatus.68 
                                                                                                                                      
States/Argentina  BIT) (25/07/07). Sempra Energy International v. The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16 ((US/Argentina BIT) (Merits 27/09/07). 
67 Occidental v. Ecuador (UNCITRAL) (01/07/04) (Award) states at para 191, that tax 
laws must remain the same. 
68 The imposition of commercial risk to the investor would improve investment strategy 
and move commercial risk away from the state under the doctrine and to the investor. 
These issues are discussed fully in a separate chapter as a part of the overall current 
impact of investment arbitral review on commercial risk. For a broad premises of 
corporate governance-see D.D. Prentice ‘Some aspects of corporate governances’ in 
D.D. Prentice & P.R.J Holland ed Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (OUP) (1993) 
 The investor would have to ascertain which areas of the State’s policies are most 
subject to change as a part of its investment strategy in order to ascertain likely 
costs and benefits. This may reduce investment in high-risk areas for the state, 
thus precluding key areas of growth through the lack of foreign capital.  
To meet this behavioural change states may wish to give far more specific 
guarantees at the treaty level of policy and legal protection to say they are reducing 
this particular risk. This is despite any countervailing public interest cost and risk 
to the state arising from this legal entrenchment. However, at the moment, 
arbitrators are usurping this decision for states and allocating risks and burdens 
using legitimate expectations, thus creating a fundamental issue of legitimacy 
through this usurpation. Thus if it was a representation on a particular policy area 
that is known to be subject to change the investor could either seek re-affirmation 
of the representation or not undertake such a risk.69   
 
 
D. Contrasting Positions within the scope of rights. 
The doctrine of legitimate expectations in investment treaty arbitration is 
broader than its application in English law. For example, the cases of Tecmed v. 
Mexico and Metalclad v. Mexico  apply the doctrine to prevent a state from going 
back on a representation, and rejecting the basis that the state has a pressing social 
or environmental concern for doing so despite a strong case by the state.70 In the 
cases of CMS v. Argentina, Sempra v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina the tribunals 
applied the doctrine to ensure that a state could not change a law where that 
change would have a detrimental fiscal impact on the investment. 71 This was 
despite the fact that in those cases there was a severe economic emergency in the 
Respondent state that justified the change in law. In Occidental v.Ecuador there was 
                                                                                                                                      
at p.27. Note also P. Hertner ‘Corporate Governance and Multinational Enterprises in 
historical perspective’ in K.J. Hopt, H. Kanda, M.J. Roe, E. Wymeersch & S. Prigge 
Comparative Corporate Governance –the state of the art and emerging research (OUP) (1998)  at 
p.42-43. 
69 See, Muchilinski (n41 above). 
70 Tecmed (n20 above); Metalclad (n1 above). 
71 CMS (n66 above). Enron (n65 above). Sempra (n60 above) at para 113. 
 
 a legitimate expectation to a VAT refund and the state could not pass a law to do 
away with it.72This usage of public law is beyond the usual constitutional 
constraints that apply to domestic courts. 
 
However, the jurisprudence is by no means uniform. In Wastemanagement II 
v. Mexico the local Government failed to, inter alias, pay the investor for the local 
cleaning services the investor provided under the contract with the investor. No 
breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard was found. This was on the 
basis that contractual disputes could not give rise to a NAFTA claim.73  In that 
case the tribunal did not raise the doctrine to counteract the contractual 
misbehaviour by the State despite the fact that non-payment for services rendered 
by the investor undermined the investment. Nor was a relationship between the 
two ascertained.  
By way of contrast to CMS, Sempra & Enron where tribunals stated that 
economic necessity could not mean that the state could renege on obligations to 
the investor,  the tribunal in Wastemanagement II stated that such behaviour was 
acceptable as that Federal State of Mexico was undergoing financial difficulty at 
the time.   
In a sharp contrast to Tecmed and Metalclad, the tribunal in Methanex v. US 
permitted the state to discriminate against an investor and pass a law that 
precluded the operation of a foreign investment where it had a pressing 
environmental concern.74 The lack of findings of breaches in the decisions in 
Wastemanagement II and Methanex were also based on the notion that the investor 
                                                
72 Occidental (n67 above) at para 185. The tribunal importantly stated that investor had 
an expectation that the state would not ‘alter the l egal  and business environment in which the 
investment is made’ at para 191. 
73 Wastmanagement II v. Mexico ICSID ARB/(AF)/00/3 (NAFTA).  In similar vein the 
tribunal in  AMTO held that mere commercial losses, including non-payment of debts 
under contracts is not enough to meet a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. See AMTO v. Ukraine SCC No.080/2005 (ECT) at para 108. By complete 
contrast, though the tribunal in Azurix does not consider it important that expectations 
are based on contract or law to give rise to them- Azurix v. Argentina ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12 at para 318. 
74Methanex Corporation v. U.S.A (UNCITRAL) (NAFTA) (Judgment 03/08/05). For a 
detailed commentary, See T. Weiler, ‘Methanex Corporation v. U.S.A. Turning the point 
on NAFTA Chapter Eleven?’ (2005) 6 JWIT 903 at p.903-914. 
 has to take the risk of the market he is entering in. The latter decision made it 
clear that the investor ought to know or assumed to have taken a commercial risk 
if a particular state concerned has policy concerns that may impact on the 
investment. This is similar to the decision in Wastemanagement II where the investor 
is to have taken the risk of the state being in financial difficulty and thus unable to 
meet its financial obligations to the investor. 
Some restrictions to the to the doctrine are seen in the Continental Casualty v. 
Argentina75 and Duke Energy Electroquil v. Ecuador76 cases. However it is important 
to note that in Duke Energy the basis on which the right of legitimate expectations 
can be formed has been narrowed (e.g. by incorporating a requirement of express 
promises)77, the substantive right – to the status quo of law or policy- has not 
been changed.78 In Continental Casualty the tribunal did point out that the investor 
would need to be aware of the likelihood of the state being able to maintain laws. 
However this obligation on the investor (that would in effect act as a state defence 
to a legitimate expectations claim) would only arise in extreme circumstances, 
such as national emergencies.79 By implication this feasible defence would not 
extend to cover other necessary legislation by the state, which if repealed could 
still form liability under the doctrine. 
 A conservative position, in strict contrast to the expansive usage of the 
doctrine in CMS, Azurix and Sempra to cover extant law at the time when the 
investment is made, is given by the tribunal in EDF. It states: 
 
 ‘The idea that legitimate expectations, and therefore FET, imply the stability of the legal 
and business framework, may not be correct if stated in an overly-broad and unqualified 
formulation. The FET might then mean the virtual freezing of the legal regulation of economic 
                                                
75 Continetal Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 
76 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Republic of Ecuador ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19 
77 See Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Republic of Ecuador ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19 
at paras 355-361 
78 In Duke Energy the tribunal affirms the substantive right before going into narrower 
grounds on which a claim can be formed (See para 355). 
79 Continetal Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 at para  
262. 
 
 activities, in contrast with the State’s normal regulatory power and the evolutionary character of 
economic life.’80  
This approach preserves general regulatory activity of the state, the 
importance of which was intimated by Professor Wälde in Thunderbird. It also is 
realistic in its appraisal of the state’s need to change its position vis-à-vis changing 
economic circumstances. This approach would have lead to a different outcome 
in the Azurix dispute. As to using the doctrine as possible estoppel on the state to 
prevent it from changing the law, the EDF tribunal states: ‘Further, in the Tribunal’s 
view, the FET obligation cannot serve the same purpose as stabilisation clauses specifically 
granted to foreign investors’.81 This is what CMS in effect did using the doctrine. This 
is an usurpation of the state’s direct right to contract with the investor by 
including such a protection through the treaty. 
E.  Positions of Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
 
However, decisions in investment treaty arbitration have not been wholly 
without respect to deferring to a state’s rights to pass laws or regulate.   
In Methanex a tribunal adjudicating under NAFTA could see no reason why 
California’s ban of the investor’s product in the host-state was a breach of 
NAFTA considering that there were environmental and social concerns over the 
investor’s products.   
Importantly, on its holding on expropriation the tribunal stated that The 
tribunal said that expropriation could occur by removal of ‘representations made by the 
host-state that are reasonably relied on by the Claimant’.82 This did not occur here. This is 
because the tribunal felt that Methanex entered into a ‘political economy’ that was 
‘widely known , if not notorious’ for its environmental and health protection 
institutions. The tribunal emphasised that the claimant ought to know of this 
regulatory and institutional process.83 Similarly, in the MTD case the tribunal 
stated that investors could not complain of changes of policy in the ground if had 
                                                
80 EDF (n18 above) at para 217. 
81 EDF (n18 above) at para 218. 
82 Wastemanagement (n36 above) at para 98). 
83 Methanex  (n74 above) at (IV-D-5 paras 9 &10).. 
 not investigated the likelihood of a high frequency of those changes prior to 
making its investment.84 
This is a contrasting position to the allocation of risk to Enron. Methanex intimates 
there is some onus on the investor to know of the risks of the market he is 
entering into. From one perspective, the tribunal was not willing to host-state 
responsible for the investor’s choice in investing into a market that was at risk. 
Whether this is fair on the investor may be dependent on the level of commercial 
risk that investment treaties were supposed to guard against. However, despite an 
adverse finding of the investor from a legitimacy point of view, it must be noted 
that the tribunal is still involved in the allocation of risk.  
If the Methanex approach was taken in the case of Azurix the result would 
be quite different. This would most likely prevent an investor claim as the investor 
would be taken to have known of the risks of investing in a market area that is 
likely to be highly politicised. Thus the price of water-supply in an Argentine 
province, being a key part of the lifestyle of domestic nationals is inextricably 
going to raise social concerns. The approach in Methanex questions the approach 
in Azurix as to whether the investor’s rights should prevail over law-making that 
deals with a pressing social concern, or whether it should be perceived to be an 
investment risk. If the latter approach is taken it would place the claim beyond 
adjudication, and move the fair and equitable treatment standard away from the 
sphere of legal or policy review. It would leave states free to act freely in the law 
of policy sphere, without the constraints of investor risks, as the state would know 
that the investor would be aware of the risks of that market. 
 
Similarly the tribunal in Lauder said regarding a state’s right to regulate media: 
‘There can not be any inconsistent conduct in a regulatory body taking the necessary actions to 
enfore the law, absent any specific-taking that it will refrain from doing so’.85 Similarly the 
tribunal in Genin recognised the state’s need to regulate its banking sector when 
faced with economic turbulence. Thus the tribunal stated: ‘The tribunal further accepts 
                                                
84  MTD Equity Sdn Bhd & another v. The Republic of Chile (2005) 44 ILM 91 at para 
117. 
85 Lauder v. Czech Republic (Award) 9 ICSID Rep 62 at para 108. 
 the Respondent [States] explanation that the circumstances of political transition prevailing in 
Estonia at the time justified heightened scrutiny of the banking sector. Such a regulation by a 
state reflects a clear and legitimate public purpose’.86 Thus it was said that the bank had 
good reason to revoke the licence.  
 
These passages indicate that when faced with genuine regulatory activity or 
policy concerns of the state, the investor may not have a successful claim for 
substantive legitimate expectations.  
F. Conclusions  
The field of jurisprudence is moving towards a requirement of fixed 
representation for a claim for legitimate expectation. However, as there is no 
system of precedent, an investor could feasibly pick the Tecmed decision and 
succeed on formulating an expectation on policy without the state being aware of 
it. This leaves Respondent states under some legal uncertainty with respect to 
when these obligations will be engaged 
It can also be seen that under the second operation of the doctrine there is 
a broad power to judicially review law, policy and administrative conduct of the 
host-state. However,  as seen in the last section it is not the case that investment 
treaty arbitration panels do not defer at all to the law or policy of host states. Thus 
there are different arguments available to the investor as to scope of review over 
regulation, law and policy. In some cases (CMS, Azurix, Enron) there is not a 
scope for the state to justify, due to the outcome in the investor’s favour on 
legitimate expectations, a shift in position due to genuine policy concerns (though 
state necessity to do so for an economic emergency, is arguably, not clearly, within 
such the ambit of a genuine concern).  In others, as the last section shows, 
demonstrates that legitimate regulatory action and policy changes by the state is 
something the investor will not get protection from. As there are arguments for a 
broader position of protection in the former position, in terms of encouraging 
capital through its protection, as well as an important need for states to have 
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(2001) 6 ICSID Rep 236 at paras 299-302.  
 policy changes (thus building a case for deference), legal certainty as to scope of 
protection remains unclear until this battle is suitably resolved. Though as the 
English law position below shows, deference does solve this problem through 
assuming that the state’s right to act in the policy sphere is absolute. However this 
approach may come at a cost of genuine investor plaints when it has relied on a 
particular policy being intact when making its investment. 
As far as direct representations are concerned, the above jurisprudence also 
demonstrates that when there is a direct application for a licence by an investor 
and then there is a refusal to grant it by the state, that will breach the doctrine. 
Also  a revocation of an existing licence that is requisite for an investment to 
function will also be in breach of the doctrine.87  
In some cases where the investor has not taken steps to come to a 
settlement of the dispute with a state institution, there will not be such a breach.88 
Further where the investor enters into a sector that is known for its high-level of 
regulatory activity, the investor will be taken to have taken the risk of regulatory 
investments into consideration. Thus it will not be possible to sue on such a 
basis.89  
If the existing jurisprudence is complementary, one way Methanex might be 
differentiated from Tecmed  and Metalclad is from the view that the investor in the 
latter cases may not have been known to the investor that ecological concerns 
may result in regulatory changes. Thus the investor in those cases could be taken 
to have not accepted such a risk. Tecmed, Methanex, and Metalclad show different 
levels of deference to state policy in the NAFTA context. There is thus little truth 
in the following statement being the uniform approach of NAFTA tribunals: 
 
 ‘It is a fact of life everywhere that individuals may be disappointed in their 
dealings with public authorities…NAFTA was not intended to provide foreign 
                                                
87  as per Tecmed (n20 above) and Metalclad, (n21 above). 
88 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Number 2), ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/3 (NAFTA). (30/04/04) 
89  as per Methanex, (n74 above). 
 investors with blanket protection from this kind of disappointment, and nothing in its 
terms so provides’.90  
 
This comparator to the Tecmed and Metalclad cases is a reminder that the open-
textured drafting of investment treaty standards can lead to different approaches.91 
 
  
 
2.3 Legitimate Expectations in English Law: 
 
In English law the doctrine will be acting under constitutional constraints 
that would prevent the individual form relying on state policy or laws are a basis 
of a claim on legitimate expectations. It will be interesting to see how English law 
has balanced state needs with individual rights, and whether deference, and a 
working system of precedent, gives clarity to the two areas of ambiguity seen with 
FET. These are ambiguity surrounding the scope of review and ambiguity 
surrounding the requirement for a direct representation.   
Generally, as opposed to the investment treaty arbitration use of the 
doctrine as described above, there is a far narrower scope of review under English 
law, due to constitutional constraints operating on courts. In no instances has the 
doctrine given the individual a right to claim against changes in the State’s law or 
policy. Barring one circumstance, English law has not compelled a Government 
body to issue licences or revoke them where a representation has been made to 
the contrary. In that instant the compulsion was only a result of the body acting 
inconsistently with existing Government policy92.  
Overall the procedural rights limitation of the doctrine demonstrates a 
characteristic of the doctrine in English law as one of significant deference to the 
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policy-maker. This proposition is based on the fact that no substantive right is 
granted under the doctrine to entrench Government law or policy. The analysis 
below demonstrates that in a range of policy areas where representations have 
been made by Government bodies and revoked, the decision of the court has 
never touched on the policy or law behind the decision-makers actions.  
As English law operates under a doctrine of precedent, the position of the 
scope of rights available under the doctrine has been fixed by the decision of the 
House of Lords in Findlay. Following the House of Lords decision in Findlay the 
doctrine in English law has been tightly contained so as to only contain procedural 
rights. Any variations from this strict limitation have been overruled.  
A meander from this position in the judgment of Sedley J in Hamble that 
was quickly overruled by the Court of Appeal in ex parte Hargreaves93. Looking at 
a range of some of the key decisions there is a marked deference to a range of 
policy areas. Although all policy areas are not covered by the case law the courts in 
the UK have not interfered with criminal justice policy, tax-policy, fishing policy, 
immigration policy and education policy. The only decision that stems away from 
the paradigm of deference is that of ex p Coughlan which granted substantive 
legitimate expectations. This, however, this was expressly justified as being within 
the existing legal framework.94 Even this decision, the substantive grant was 
granted on the basis that it existed within existing law. This is opposed to a 
method of granting it by preventing a change in law as seen in investment 
arbitration. 
 
As Lord Hoffmann has clearly stated: 
 
‘There is of course an analogy between a private law estoppel and the public law concept 
of legitimate expectation created by a public authority…But it is no more than an 
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94 ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213 at p.230 (paras 23-25).   
 analogy because remedies against public authorities have to take into account the interest 
of the general public which the authority exists to promote’.95 
 
The doctrine of legitimate expectations may be engaged whenever there is 
a representation made to an individual by a Government body96. The leading case 
of Findlay the application before the House of Lords concerned a custom by the 
Home Secretary, to release prisoners automatically if the parole board provided a 
recommendation of release. The Home Secretary changed this policy to release 
prisoners in only exceptional circumstances. The applicants applied for judicial 
review on the basis that the change of policy had defeated their expectation of 
early release under the previous scheme.  
The Home Secretary’s rationale of taking into consideration of the need 
for ‘deterrence, retribution and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of 
criminal justice’, was accepted by House of Lords to defeat the claim97. The decision 
stated that the Home Secretary had a right to change his mind due to policy 
concerns and right of legitimate expectation to procedural rights of a fair hearing 
and the substantive right- i.e. Lord Scarman expressly rejected that there was 
legitimate expectation that the Home Secretary act legally within the ambit of prior 
existing legislation. As Lord Scarman stated:  
 
‘any other view would entail the conclusion that the unfettered discretion conferred by the 
statute upon the minister can in some cases be restricted so as to hamper, or even to 
prevent, changes of policy’. (ibid) The reason for the court leaving this 
discretion untouched was as follows: ‘Bearing in mind the complexity of the issues 
                                                
95 R v. East Sussex CC, ex parte Reprotech Ltd [2002] UKHL 8 at para 34. Cited in  S. 
Wilken The law of waiver, variation and estoppel 2nd Ed. (OUP) (2002)  at para 1.08. This 
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which the Secretary of State has to consider and the importance o f  the publ i c  
interes t  in the adminis trat ion o f  paro le  I cannot think that Parliament 
intended the discretion to be restricted in this way’. (ibid). 
 
From this perspective, Sedley J ’s reasoning in ex p Hamble is an outlier. In 
Hamble English law broadens the scope of review to policy, leaving  the door 
open to substantive review. Hamble concerned the policy of having quotas on 
trawler licences to protect fishing stocks. This policy, based in European law 
fishing restrictions,  resulted in the custom of the sale of trawler licences by virtue 
of volume of ship. The applicants bought a ship in view of obtaining a licence. 
Following their purchase the Minister changed the quota policy making it 
impossible for the applicants to obtain a licence for their ship.  
Sedley J said that the applicants did not have substantive legitimate 
expectations as the Minister had followed a policy change ‘within a band of rational 
policy choices’ on the basis that it would be unfair to leave the applicants following a 
purchase without a licence.98 The decision is sound from the basis that in light of 
the pressing policy needs of the Minister to control quotas, for example to 
preserve fish-stocks, this was an unnecessary restriction placed by the court.  
However, on a more careful analysis the judgment appears to bring the choice of 
policy of the Minister within the ambit of judicial review.  
Inherent in Sedley’s approach is the judicial desire to review policy. This 
approach is characterised by forcing the Minister to justify his change of position, 
in order to ensure the change of policy is a rational one. Though it is an expected 
part of public law that executive decisions should be rational, it is more 
questionable whether it is in the field of judicial competence to determine policy 
rationales. 
The court, of course, cannot qualitatively assess public interest in the 
administration of parole. Any such approach also has the risk of being based on 
                                                
98 at R v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Foot Ex parte Hamble (Overseas) 
Fisheries [1995] 2 All ER 714 at  p.723b. 
 judicial intuition as opposed to qualitative assessment.99  This is an assumption 
that the court takes into account when deciding whether to grant substantive 
protection under the doctrine. This assumption is deferential in effect to the 
legislature-it is an intuitive deference to the law-maker and its determination of 
public interest. 
Thus there is policy deference to the legislature’s criminal justice policy. A 
prisoner cannot claim a legitimate expectation on the basis of a change of release 
policy. All a prisoner could have is the procedural right that his case for release 
would be heard. This approach was confirmed in the case of ex parte Hargreaves.100 
In Hargreaves the English court of appeal did not grant legitimate expectations that 
would fetter the ministers discretion to change sentencing policy from 
considerations of release from a third of sentence being served to half.  
Thus there could be no substantive legitimate expectation that such a 
policy would not be changed. The Court of Appeal also stated that the approach 
by Sedley J in Hamble, described above, was dubious in its approach of leaving the 
grant a substantive legitimate expectation feasible on the basis of fairness.101 
 
Leaning towards the substantive doctrine has been marked by judicial 
trepidation. The case of MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd concerned investments made 
by numerous tax-payers on the basis of tax benefits arising out of existing UK tax 
policy102. This policy allowed viable investment in dollar securities as long as the 
sale of such securities was taxable as capital and not as income, the latter being 
subject to a greater tax burden. The UK Revenue then decided to change policy 
by taxing income on such sales and not capital. The decision rejected the 
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application that the change of decision by the revenue was illegal. As to legitimate 
expectations Bingham L.J. left open the possibility of the doctrine of substantive 
legitimate expectation in the narrow circumstance where the claimant seeking the 
expectation had made it known to the revenue of his specific position and the 
revenue had make specific assurances to that individual based on the individuals 
assurances.103  
However it is not clear from the decision why this approach is suitable 
from the general rule, and the judge does not appreciate that the doctrine in that 
instance approaches a similar use to that of an estoppel104. The approach is, 
however, reluctant and is still marked by judicial deference to the policy-maker. 
To put it in other words, unless a specific representation is made to an individual 
following the individuals consultation with the public body, for the purposes of 
tax policy there will be no legitimate expectation binding the revenue.   
This demonstrates deference to the policy maker. The court could have 
reasoned broadly and permitted a breach of legitimate expectation for the change 
of policy, leaving the burden on the Government to ensure that it met its 
assurances to all individuals by having an open period of application for 
compensation. Bingham L.J.’s approach of specific representations is still stricter 
than that seen in investment arbitration. This is because in investment treaty 
arbitration as present the legitimate expectation claims are based on incidental 
impact of the policy change and not by direct representation.  
Bingham L.J. in MFK Underwriting was wary of the fairness element in the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation should operate to protect the state as much as 
the individual:  
 
‘But fairness is not a one-way street. It imports the notion of equitableness, of fair and open 
dealing, to which the authority is as much entitled to as the citizen’.105 
 
                                                
103 [1990] 1 WLR 1545 at p.1569 B-H 
104 The position has been made clear by Lord Hoffmann’s  ex parte Reprotech (n95 
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105 (n104 above) at p. 1570 A-B 
 This questions whether it is feasible to grant an expectation when there is a 
change of circumstances and where there is no direct assurance given to the 
investor, as that would not necessarily be fair on the state. A mere existence of a 
treaty and existing legal framework in the creation of legitimate expectations can 
be perceived as giving rise to an unfair claim against the state. 
The approach of favouring procedural rights over substantive rights has 
also been preferred in the sphere of immigration policy. Thus in AG of Honk Kong 
v. Ng Yuen Shiu the Hong Kong government had stated that it would interview 
non-Chinese applications for immigration and later reneged on this 
representation.106 It was held by the Privy Council to have breached a legitimate 
expectation of interviewing that it had created by its representation. That this was 
only the right to be interviewed, a due process right, as opposed to a decision on 
the question of immigration, demonstrates that the court in that instance was not 
willing to adjudicate in the policy-sphere. 
 
Judicial deference in the application of the doctrine is also given to 
immigration policy. The principle of legitimate expectations first appeared in 
English law in the case of Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs.107 
Schmidt was a foreign national who had been given leave to enter the United 
Kingdom and study scientology for a limited period. There was an existing policy 
to allow foreign nationals to study at a recognised educational establishment. 
Though initially her chosen institution was recognised by the Government it later 
declared that the institution was unsound and harmful due to its practice. Thus 
the Government reneged on its promise to renew Schmidt’s stay that it had 
granted on entry. Schmidt’s application to hold the Government to its 
representation was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. In a classic statement of 
deference, based on public interest, to the policy-maker Lord Denning stated:  
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107 Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [1969] 2 Ch 149 
 ‘I think that the Minister can exercise his power for any purpose which he considers to 
be for the public good or for the interests of the people of this country’.108  
 
Lord Denning MR stated that those that came under the immigration laws of a 
legitimate expectation to the procedural right to making representations.109 It 
might be said that in such circumstances there is little point in having a procedural 
right, where there is no legal avenue for protection of the individual via policy 
change. However as the rule of law theory justification for public demonstrates, 
that the value of participation here is that ensures the perception of freedom of 
natural justice and preserves individual autonomy. These are values that may be 
important to an economic agent, the investor, in investment treaty arbitration as 
much as they are to a private individual.  
 
 
The case of Coughlan forced a health authority to uphold a promise to keep a 
nursing home for life on the doctrine of legitimate expectation. However, even 
the successful application of the doctrine in this case was based on the principle 
of legality. The health authority created a policy of only providing specialist 
nursing services, general nursing services would be provided by local authorities. 
This resulted in nursing services promised to the applicant in a home ‘for life’ to 
be withdrawn.  The Court to Appeal dismissed the appeal by the Health Authority 
stating that a distinction between general and specialist nursing was vague and 
contrary to the obligation placed by law on the health authority to provide nursing 
services. The Court of appeal stated the applicant had a legitimate expectation that 
the promise of nursing services in the home would be kept and there was a legal 
obligation on the health authority to do so.  
The court gave two circumstances in which a substantive legitimate 
expectation may be held. This would be where a breach of a promise: (i) was so 
unfair as to amount to an abuse of power and (ii) there was no overriding public 
interest in departing from the decision as a result of mere financial loss.   
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It should be noted that the Court did not uphold the legitimate expectation over 
the existing legislation. This possibility did not arise as the law did not leave much 
discretion in the provision of nursing care to the health authority. The decision 
itself is highly questionable considering the revenue constraints upon local 
authorities in providing health services. The decision in essence removes the 
scope for the health authority to make distinctions in services where a limitation 
on revenue exists. 
 
If the individual has not acted fairly in English law then there will be no 
legitimate expectation. In Ex parte Camacq the revenue decided to change its 
position on tax when it discovered that the proposed scheme was not a for a bona 
fide or legitimate purpose. The court said that the revenue could revoke its 
authorisation.110 The court will not uphold a legitimate expectation with respect to 
a representation and where the applicant acquired the representation from the tax 
body by not disclosing all the relevant facts. The court here did analyse whether it 
was appropriate for the revenue to revoke it authorisation, but this was done by 
analysing whether such an act was within the powers granted to the revenue by 
statute. Thus the analysis of whether it was fair to revoke was done within the 
doctrine of legality. 
 
The court is also deferential to the state in the case of state employment 
contracts. The case of Hughes v. Department of Health and Social Security concerned a 
change of date as to the retirement dates of certain classes of civil servants.111 A 
representation by Government departments to their civil servants to employ them 
beyond the age of 60 could be changed and the expectation could only exist as 
                                                
110 R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners Ex parte Camacq Corporation et al [1990] 1 
W.L.R. 191 
111Hughes v. Department of Health and Social Security [1985] A.C. 776 Note Lord 
Diplock’s classic statement of deference at p.788 B-C: ‘[the expectation] remains the case only 
so long as the departmental circular announcing that administrative policy to the employees affected by it 
remains in force. Administrative policies may change with changing circumstances, including changes in 
the political complexion of governments. The liberty to make such changes is something that is inherent in 
our constitutional form of Government. When a change in administrative policy takes place and is 
communicated in a departmental circular…any reasonable expectations that may have been aroused by 
them by any previous circular are destroyed’. 
 long as such policies existed and would terminate where there was a change of 
policy. The effect of this decision is that when law or policy is changed, 
expectations based on those law or policies will desist. There can be no 
expectation that such policies will continue in the future, as that would allow the 
doctrine to entrench the policy making discretion of the Government. This would 
mean that the relevant Minister would not be able to change age of employment 
policy if there was a need to do so on the basis of limited revenue. 
 
The case of Bhatt Murphy v. Independent Assessor concerned the existence of a 
Government compensation scheme which was subsequently abolished.112  The 
applicants applied for compensation following the abolishment and their 
application was rejected on the basis they should have started the application prior 
to the scheme being abolished. The applicants claimed that they had a legitimate 
expectation based on the existence of a scheme and the Government was under a 
duty to consult them as to abolishment. The court stated that the mere existence 
of Government scheme was not by itself sufficient to create a legitimate 
expectation that the scheme would be continued. Further, the minister was 
entitled to abolish it without consultation or notice.  
The tribunal stated however, applying Coughlan, that the protection of 
procedural legitimate expectations in English law had to be one based on a 
focussed representation to the individual. The individual cannot rely on mere 
existence of policy remaining stagnant to create legitimate expectation where that 
policy was not aimed at the individual. This is a contrast to a pseudo-estoppel 
approach in investment treaty arbitration where the investor can rely on law or 
policy where it is not clearly focussed on the investor.  
Thus, in contrast, the Argentine cases broad provisions of law to allow 
capital flow created a legitimate expectations that such policy would remain the 
same. It can be seen from this perspective that the doctrine in investment 
arbitration goes further. That an investor has an expectation that Government 
policy will remain the same. The doctrine of legitimate expectations in English 
                                                
112 Regina (Bhatt Murphy (a Firm) and Others v. Independent Assessor Regina (Niaz et 
al) v. SSHD (TLR 21/07/08) 
 public law is characterised by deference to law or policy maker. As it gives no 
substantive right, it follows the fundamental principle of ‘legality’ that underpins 
public law. This is made clear by the case of Findlay. A core part of this reasoning 
is the importance that English Public law gives pre-eminent regard to the inherent 
discretion granted to ministers’ by the relevant law. That courts do not interfere 
with the powers that are granted, but only the manner in which they are exercised.  
 
The limitation of the doctrine to procedural rights demonstrates that policy areas 
are beyond the reach of the doctrine in English law. This means that the scope of 
review is restricted to procedural failings or the manner in which the decision is 
undertaken rather than the policy upon which the decision is taken. Thus the 
investment treaty decisions in the Argentine cases would not give rise to a breach 
of the doctrine.  It is an inherent policy deference that limits the application of 
legitimate expectations doctrine in English law. This deference is characterised 
mainly by two elements: 
 
(i) the public body has given reasons for its decisions (the reasons 
themselves are reviewable by an English court on the grounds of 
‘rationality’). The law or policy under which the decision-making power 
is given is never reviewed. 
(ii) Upholding the expectations does not go contrary to the powers granted 
to the public authority. In other words if upholding the representation 
would breach the limits of powers granted to the public authority.  
 
It can be seen from contrasting the English approach to the investment treaty 
arbitration approach that  that there is a greater scope of review in arbitral review 
by permitting a substantive doctrine of legitimate expectations. The judicial 
approach in English law recognised that there are important reasons for 
Government flexibility for changing the policy was given as follows. Thus in cases 
such as Re Findlay the unfairness of the individual applicants was overridden by  
‘the aim of improving public safety and increasing public confidence in the administration of 
justice’. This highlights the deferential approach by English courts. 
  
 
EU Law: 
What follows is not a comprehensive account, but one that intimates the 
paradigm of administrative deference. 
 The doctrine in EC law has been closely linked to the doctrine of legal 
certainty. In the leading case of SNUPAT the ECJ recognised that there were 
limits to the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations. The court 
stated that these doctrines could not override the exigencies of policy making by 
the Community. In this case the policy dealt with steel tariffs:  
 
‘That allegation disregards the fact that the principle of respect for legal certainty, 
important as it may be, cannot be applied in an absolute manner, but that its application 
must be combined with that of the principle of legality; the question which of these 
principles should prevail in each particular case depends upon a comparison of the public 
interest with the private interests in question, that is to say: 
 
 on the one hand, the interest of the beneficiaries and especially the fact that they might 
assume in good faith that they did not have to pay contributions on the ferrous scrap in 
question, and might arrange their affairs in reliance on the continuance of this position  
 
on the other hand, the interest of the community in ensuring the proper working of the 
equalization scheme, which depends on the joint liability of all understandings consuming 
ferrous scrap; this interest makes it necessary to ensure that other contributors do not 
permanently suffer the financial consequences of an exemption illegally granted to their 
competitors’.113    
 
This approach of deference to the principle of legality has been the paradigm 
approach by the court in subsequent cases. Thus in the Algera case the applicant 
had been promised a job by a community institution and then having taking legal 
                                                
113 [1961] ECR 53 at p. 87. 
 action against the community with respect to another matter, was denied a job.114 
The Court decided that it such a right once granted could not be revoked, so long 
as it was within the field of legality.115  The deference to legality is inherent in the 
decision of Euroagri where the court stated that aid policy that was in itself illegal 
could not result in a decision that could not later be revoked, irrespective of the 
expectations it had created.116  
 
The case of Durbeck involved the passage of a Community regulation that 
suspended the free circulation of certain types of apples from certain countries 
such as Chile.117 Durbeck wished to release certain apples into the market but was 
precluded from doing so by the relevant authorities. The Community passed the 
law after the community apple producers sough a protective measure when the 
policy was originally announced. It was noted by the ECJ that the measures 
affected those who had apples that were about to be released and existing 
contracts in relation to apples in transit. For this reason there was a specific 
provision in the Regulation (Article 3(3) of EEC No. 2702/72) to deal with apples 
in transit as it was conceded that those individuals would have a legitimate 
expectation that there contracts would be fulfilled.  
The ECJ noted that the protective measure in the regulation could only 
protect those who the Community with its limited data might be affected. The 
ECJ then reviewed the information available to the Community to pass the 
measure.118 It appreciated that the community had knowledge of the risk of excess 
apples flooding the community market. The community also had knowledge of 
pricing trends that would affect the disposal of apples in the future. The Court 
rejected Durbeck’s application that it had a legitimate expectation to continue 
trading in the proscribed apples. It reaffirmed its position in the Tomadin case that 
                                                
114 (Cases 7/56 and 3-7/57, Algera v. Common Assembly [1957] ECR 39 
115 at p.55. This principle was confirmed in the case of Verli- Wallace v. Commission 
[1983] ECR 2711. 
116 Euroagri Srl v. Commission [2004] ECR II-369 at para 87. 
117 Durbeck v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen (C-112/80) [1981] ECR 1095 
118 Durbeck at (n118 above) at p. 1115. 
 there are limits to the legitimate expectations doctrine for the individual where 
there is a greater community interest at stake:  
 
'the field of application of this principle cannot be extended to the point of generally 
preventing new rules from applying to the future effects of situations which arose under 
earlier rules in the absence of obligations entered into with the public authorities…this is 
particularly true in a field such as the common organisation of markets, the purpose of 
which necessarily involves constant adjustment to the variations of the economic situation in 
the various agricultural sectors'.119 
 
The ECJ here has deferred to the community’s ability to pass measures to 
protect the single market. 
 
The position in EC law poses an interesting comparator, as like investment 
treaty arbitration, EC law is a treaty-based system. The distinction here, to 
investment treaty arbitration, is that these policy areas are within the Treaty. The 
Contracting Parties to the Treaty have delegated such legislative or policy-making 
functions to the European Commission. No such delegation of powers is written 
into investment treaties. As described in Chapter 1 there is an absence of 
delegated policy-making in the express drafting of bilateral and multi-lateral 
investment treaties, such as NAFTA.  
 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
The scope of review is considerable under legitimate expectations. No 
decision in English law has gone as far as to demand from the state a change in 
policy to meet an individual injustice caused by a decision to revoke a 
representation by a Government body. Further, English law the courts does not 
engage the doctrine of legitimate expectation to create substantive rights or grant 
                                                
119 Case 84/78 Tomadini [1979] ECR 1801 which deferred to Community agricultural 
policy when the doctrine was raised at p. 1815. 
 compensation by virtue of changes of the law on the breach of an individual’s 
legitimate expectation.  
In English public law accountability is provided within an existing 
framework of law and policy. It is not the constitutional role of English public law 
to provide accountability for law or policy itself. Such processes may be unique to 
the each state and providing a level of accountability as appropriate. 120 
 The operation of the doctrine in investment arbitration, as in 
English law, also operates to grant the investor procedural rights when a 
government body carries out a decision. The fourth is not wholly explored thus 
far in the jurisprudence but involves the grant of public law procedural rights of 
participation and due-process in a manner similar to the municipal operation of 
the doctrine. Thus the tribunal in Rumeli & Telsim v. Kazakhstan states: 
 
‘as emphasised by the AMCO I and II decisions, regardless of the examination of the 
substantive grounds relied upon by a State agency in the framework of the revocation of a 
licence. “the mere lack of due process would have been an insuperable obstacle to the 
lawfulness  of the revocation”’.121   
 
 
Not all formulations in investment treaty arbitration support substantive rights. 
There is a balanced approach intimated in investment treaty arbitration by the 
Saluka tribunal. After reviewing the approach in the CME, Tecmed, 
                                                
120 For an account of the plurality of systems of Government in the world and problems of 
governance, See G R. Wilkinson & S.Hughes ed, Global governance: critical perspectives (Routledge) 
(2002). Note also RD Grillo,  Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture, and Ethnicity in 
Comparative Perspective (OUP) Clarendon Press (1998) at p.1-14. For problems this causes in 
international law- See, D. Donoho, ‘Relativism versus universalism in Human Rights: The Search 
for Meaningful standards’ (1991) 27 Stanf. L.J 345 at p.345-349. B. Graefrath, ‘The Application 
of International Human Rights standards to states with different economic, social and cultural 
systems, in The United Nations after forty years: human rights (1986) cited in R. Higgins Problems and 
Processes International Law and How we use it  OUP (2004)  at p.96-96 ftns, 3&4. See also P. 
Kleingeld,  ‘Defending the plurality of states: Cloots, Kant and Rawls’ (2006) 32 (Oct) Social 
Theory and Practice 559  at p.559-567. 
121 Rumeli Telekom A.S. & Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetrleri A.S. v. 
Kazakhstan ICSID ARB/05/16 (Award 29/07/08) at para 327. Here the tribunal stated 
that there was a wrongful termination of contract by the Respondent states as it had not, 
as promised, taken into consideration reports as to contractual performance by the 
investor. 
 Wastemanagement and OPEC decisions, the tribunal stated this regarding legitimate 
expectations: 
 
‘If their terms were taken too literally, they would impose upon host-states obligations which 
would be inappropriate and unrealistic…their expectations [of the investor], in order for them to 
be protected must give rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the 
circumstances…No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time 
of the investment remain totally unchanged’122 
 
This is perhaps a more realistic and fairer way of constructing the substance of the 
rights, so that states can meet their public policy exigencies without excessive fear 
of liability to investors. However, it just one preferable elucidation that can be 
picked by investors and states over others. 
•  •  • 
 
Overall, it has been seen that under FET there are decisions that grant the 
investor the right to particular policies or law, and do not just compensate the 
investor for legislative and policy changes or limit the doctrine to rights of 
participation in administrative process. There are also contrasting decisions that 
suggest that the grant of such rights to the investor are not appropriate. Further, 
investment arbitration has not made it clear that for an expectation to arise 
legitimately it has to be based exclusively on an express representation to the 
investor. These inconsistencies leave the outcome of investment treaty litigation 
difficult to predict due to key requirements to satisfy the doctrine being unclear. It 
shall be seen that in English law these ambiguities have been reduced due to clear 
requirements as to how the doctrine is engaged and clarity as to the scope of the 
doctrine. This is through the creation of ascertainable legal requirements to engage 
the doctrine and clarity as to the constitutional boundaries of review. 
                                                
122 Saluka (n17 above) at paras 304-305. The tribunal then emphasised the limits of the 
tribunals adjudicatory powers quoting the passage from S.D. Myers that it was not to 
tribunals role to interfere in the regulatory sphere of the state (n4 above) at para 293. 
(Saluka (n17 above) at para 305). 
 Further the analysis of the constitutionally restricted approach in English 
law demonstrates that ‘deference’ affords public interest protection in the 
application of this doctrine. This approach of legislative deference to implicitly 
preserve majoritarian consent in law and policy. Arguably, from this perspective, 
the doctrine has also maintained the democratic integrity of judicial review of state 
action. This protection of majoritarian or public interest through deference is not 
a clear position under the FET, through its review on occasions of law and policy. 
 To improve coherence, it can be seen from determinations of tribunals 
that the doctrine of in investment arbitration requires the following: (i) the use of 
a discretional deference to the legislature; (ii) the requirement of a clear state act 
upon which an expectation can be based; (iii) the development of a consistent 
range of procedural rights that can be afforded to the investor; (iv) a consistent 
position as to the scope of the doctrine-I.E. Whether it includes the right to 
overrule law and policy. These will all mitigate against the incoherence necessary 
for a legitimate use of the doctrine so that rights and obligations can be easily 
determined. This will increase predictability and efficaciousness of the doctrine 
that will increase its coherence. The EU Law approach of deference may also 
assist here as a model for emulation.  
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Abstract 
This chapter will look at the FET interpretation of transparency and see whether the burden it 
places on states is realistic. It shall also look at general coherence of the rule under FET by 
illustrating two contrasting positions regarding the rule. It shall also suggest how improvements to 
the rule could be made, if necessary, by incorporating work of other international institutions on 
transparency.  
  
3.1. Introduction. 
 
The requirement of transparency is a rule created under the FET standard in 
order to assist investors in their dealings with state organs. This chapter will argue 
that transparency under the FET is illegitimate due to both the lack of coherence 
and the inability of many developing states to comply with the standard in some 
of the current formulations. English public law shall be used as a reference to 
 demonstrate how transparency under FET can become more coherent, and 
develop more specific and useful rights for investors in dealing with public 
administration. 
 
Transparency as defined by arbitrators under FET will also be analysed in respect 
of international drives towards transparency in government processes. It will be 
seen that transparency drives, both in investment arbitration and other 
international spheres, involve evolving and changing administrative practices. This 
comes at a cost and burden to the host-state, and thus creates a fundamental 
question of whether states can comply with it, due to a variety of resources of 
available to different contracting parties for the purposes of state administration.  
 
The outline of the investment arbitration jurisprudence in this chapter 
demonstrates that there is no clear approach of what level of transparency is 
required by the state in its dealings with the investor in order to avoid a breach of 
FET. There are two different approaches in general. One that plays an extremely 
high level of obligation upon the host-state, and one that places a lower level of 
obligation upon the host-state. Both of these are far more onerous than current 
practices in England, a developed state, which spends a significant sum on the 
upkeep of public administration.1 It is also arguable that they are comparatively 
more onerous than in other international agreements and best practices 
recommended by FDI [Foreign and Direct Investment] promotion organizations 
such as the OECD, as discussed below. 
 
Further, the disparity between these standards demonstrates that arbitrators have 
both ignored the level of transparency needed to protect and promote 
investments and are at odds, between decisions, as to which levels are appropriate. 
 
                                                
1 Payment of salaries and pensions in the civil service totaled £7,000 Million in the 
United Kingdom in the 1980s: See, J. Pierre, Bureaucracy in the Modern State: Introduction to 
comparative public administration (Edward Elgar) (1995) at p.100-101. 
 To illustrate how the use of the doctrine could be rendered more coherent, rights 
available to individuals to participate in administrative decision-making enshrined 
in English Administrative law shall be illustrated. It shall be seen that, in places, 
English administrative jurisprudence is much more aware of limitations to 
administrative capacity than current elucidations of transparency under FET. By 
way of contrast to FET transparency, English law offers a cost-effective solution 
to transparency deficiencies by requiring participation in state processes that affect 
the investor. It is also works outside the sphere of legislative activity that consists 
of public interest decision-making, hence reducing the likelihood of conflict 
between costs of investor rights and processes of government for nationals. It 
thus offers a solution that is more legitimate in terms of its cost and its respect for 
the public sphere. 
 
The rationale for using transparency as a part of FET is to assist FET in a 
governance role to improve state institutions in their relations with foreign 
investment. It shall be seen that this is a weak system of governance using 
transparency as it does not appreciate costs and availability of resources for 
transparency drives as developing countries, and the institutional development, 
including training of administrators that has to be undertaken to meet these 
objectives. 
 
3.2 Transparency as a concept. 
 
Transparency is a value often wished for in interactions between the state and its 
citizens, and also between private individuals interacting in fields such as the 
commercial market.2 Transparency of the state is a concept based on democratic 
theory that values disclosure of the operation of Government as a means of 
                                                
2 For market-transparency, See R. Bloomfield & M. O’Hara, ‘Market transparency: Who 
wins and Who Loses?’ (1999) 12(1) Rev. Fin. Stud 5 at p.5-7. (Note, Bloomfield and 
O’Hara  argue, ibid, that market transparency comes at a cost to certain transactions that 
may benefit from some confidentiality.  
 securing accountability.3 It is an idea rooted in political philosophy that concerns 
itself primarily with ensuring that subjects knew not just who was ruling them, but 
how they were being ruled.4 The key to transparent policy is the idea that those 
who are affected by policy decisions must know about them. Transparency is said 
to also counteract government tendencies to distort certain impact of policies so 
as to increase their acceptability, so that their real affects can be ascertained.5 This 
may be very important for investor activity, as well as for domestic nationals who 
value democratic processes.  
 
Transparency increases the security of investments through the availability of 
knowledge of state practices. By contrast, for the domestic national transparency 
increases the legitimacy of the democratic governing process through implicitly 
saying that the government has nothing to hide.6 These rationales are summarized 
in the APEC leader’s statement with respect to transparency stating that it:  
 
‘…is a basic principle underlying trade liberalization and facilitation, where removal of barriers 
to trade is in large part only meaningful to the extent that the members of the public know what 
laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings affect their interests, can facilitate in their 
development’.7  
 
Though this statement relates to transparent governing processes for domestic 
entrepreneurs, FET has given this right to participate in domestic policy-making 
to a foreign investor. Looking at the monetary costs of transparency for states and 
                                                
3 P.S. Kim, J. Halligan, N. Cho, C.H. Oh, A.M. Eikenberry, ‘Towards Participatory and 
Transparent Governance: Report on the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing 
Government’ (2005) 65(6) Pub. Admin. Rev. 646 at p.649 
4 D. Held, Democracy and the global order: From modern state to cosmopolitan governance (Polity) 
(1995) at p.6-12.  
5 OECD, ‘Public Sector Transparency and the International Investor’ (2003) (OECD)  at 
p.23 
6 B. Friedman, ‘The use and the meaning of words in central banking inflation targeting, 
credibility and transparency’ in P. Mizen, (ed.), Essays in honour of Charles Goodhart. Volume 
1: Central banking, monetary theory and practice. (Elgar) (2003) at p.118-121. 
7 APEC, ‘APEC Leaders statement to implement APEC Transparency Standards’ 
(October 2002) in OECD (n5 above) at p.17 
 that other international instruments normally expressly include such a right, it is 
likely to be far beyond what State Parties to investment treaties intended. 
 
Generally, accountability within governing processes is seen as being the key to 
good democratic governance.8 This is not possible without visibility of processes 
that can render them subject to public and individual approval. Thus transparency 
of governance is crucial to ensure that processes of regulation, administration and 
legislation are reflective of citizen’s needs and wishes. This idea of accountability 
of state action to the individual by opening state procedure to individual 
participation is a key role that British public law places through its imposition of 
appropriate procedure for public bodies to take account views of individuals 
affected by state decision-making.9 
 
It is important to note that when extending these rights to foreign investors, one 
is also opening the question of whether to extend the possibility of choice of 
outcome of state process to those investors would be acceptable to domestic 
nationals, particularly in the developing world where they would not have similar 
rights. This may lead to a lack of local acceptance of the investor, where there is a 
perception of preference over domestic nationals.10 Whilst English law grants only 
rights of procedure not outcome, at present investors may be able to claim, under 
the legitimate expectations doctrine, a particular outcome of a state process as well 
as a right to participate within it. From this perspective the inclusion of 
transparency under FET should be seen as another tool of ITA’s governance role 
of domestic institutions, working side by side with legitimate expectations. 
 
                                                
8 This is said to be a key part of global governance: H. Blair, ‘Participation and 
Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic local Governance in Six Countries’ (2000) 
28(1) World Development 21, at p.21 & p.27; N. Woods, ‘Good governance in 
International Organisation’ (1999) 5 Glob. Governance. 39 at p.43-49. 
9 A. Tomkins, The idea of public law (OUP) (2003) at p.229-338.  
10 This perception is seen in the field of intellectual property rights: See, De Long, 
‘Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Indigenous culture: An intellectual property 
perspective’ (1997-98) 23 N.C. J. Int’l & Comp. Reg. 229; P.L. Tsai, ‘Foreign Direct 
Investment and income inequality: Further Evidence’ (1995) 23(3) World. Dev. 469 at 
p.469-470. 
 From one point of view the inclusion of the transparency rule under FET is 
acceptable, if one does not see direct consent to laws by states as important. This 
is because transparency is also important in the commercial context of allowing 
markets and commercial activities to function effectively. It is important to 
investment decisions as it allows investors to manage liability, losses and credit 
through increased predictability that knowledge through information process 
brings.11 Transparency of government policy-making allows investors, and private 
citizens to see where special interest groups have preference, and how much 
policy making takes into consideration its affects upon private parties.12 
Transparency in public administration is important to the economic development 
of state, and is often valued by economic development strategists working to 
increase growth in developing economies.13 As foreign investment has a public 
impact transparency of investor-state relationships, not yet considered by FET 
standard, may be important for investor acceptance in the host-state.14 It may also 
alleviate perceptions of unfair practices by foreign investors in transition 
economies.15 
 
Transparent institutional practices include the effective collection of data and its 
publication.16 This assists individuals wanting to know how state action affects 
them. For example, efficient land registration in states is fundamental to the 
                                                
11 Z. Drabek & W. Payne, ‘The impact of transparency on foreign direct investment’ 
(2002) 17(4) Jnl. Economic Integration 777 at p.777-779 
12 Such exacerbation of private preferences can be seen in the process of non-transparent 
public procurement: S.J. Evenett & B.M. Hockman, ‘Government procurement: market 
access, transparency, and multi-national trade rules’ (2005) 21(1) Eu. Jnl. Pol. Econ 163 
at p.163-166. Investor claimants in investment treaty arbitration have acquired their 
rights by public-procurement: E.g. The airport works tender process in ADC Affilliate 
Ltd & ADC & ADMC Management Ltd v. The Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. 
Arb/03/16) (02/10/06) at p.16-17. 
13 OECD (n5 above) at p.17 
14 See, D. Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining Communities and the 
World Bank (Hart) (2007) at p.1-23. 
15 J. Hellman, G. Jones & D. Kaufmann, ‘Are foreign investors and multinationals 
engaging in corrupt practices in transition economies?’ (2000) (May/June) Transition 
(IBRD) 4 at p.4-6  
16 B.M. Hoeckman & P.C. Mavroidis, ‘WTO dispute settlement, transparency and 
surveillance’ (2000) 23(4) World Econ. 527 at p.527-535. 
 workings of the property market.17 Where the investor has to rely on public 
administration, information gathering and accessibility may be critical to an 
investment’s success. Transparency is thus a market-enabling value in governance 
as it creates market stability and assists regulatory compliance by ensuring that 
regulatory burdens are known by market agents.18  
 
Where regulation is key to the market’s functioning, transparency can also assist in 
ensuring that the market is sustainable by increasing compliance of commercial 
agents through knowledge. Transparency for the investor will be important where 
there is regulatory activity constricting investor action, such as environmental 
protection so that the investor can factor in regulatory compliance costs.19 It will 
also be requisite where there are permits and other administrative requirements 
that the investor has to fulfill.20 
 
Transparency is also developed in contract law of prior-disclosure in high-risk 
contracts.21 Due to perception of significant risks of political action causing loss 
of capital in unknown markets, an investor may thus wish special disclosure of 
government practices.22  
 
Good commercial practice by the investor involves a risk appreciation, particularly 
if there are credit undertakings, state transparency will be vital to the risk 
determinant process. Foreign investors find transparency desirable as working in a 
                                                
17 G. Feder & A. Nishio, ‘The benefits of land registration and titling: Economic and 
Social Perspectives’ (1998) 15(1) Land. Use. Pol. 25 at p.25-31. 
18 K. Koedjik & J. Kremers, ‘Market opening, regulation and growth in Europe’ (1996) 
23(11) Econ. Pol. 443 at p.443-451. 
19 As, for example, in the Methanex case. See,  Methanex v. U.S.A. (UNCITRAL) 
(NAFTA) (3/08/05) 
20 As seen in the Metalclad case: Metalclad v. Mexico ICSID Case No.ARB (AF) 97/1 
(NAFTA).  
21 In the common law these are termed contracts ‘uberrimae fidei?’, See E. M. Holmes, ‘ 
A contextual study of commercial good faith disclosure in contract formation’ (1978) 
39(3) U. Pitt. L. Rev 381 at p.411; Steyn ‘Reasonable Expectations’ 
22 C.J. Choi, S.H. Lee, J.B. Kim, ‘A note on counter-trade: contractual uncertainty and 
transaction governance in emerging economies’ (1999) 30(1) Jnl. Int Bus. Stud. 189 at 
p.189-201. E. M. Holmes, ‘ A contextual study of commercial good faith disclosure in 
contract formation’ (1978) 39(3) U. Pitt. L. Rev 381 at p.411 
 foreign country is often alien territory, and access to laws and regulations can be a 
key to regulatory compliance.23 This does not mean that the investor does not 
have to be proactive in finding information however the success of this action is 
dependent upon the transparency of states administrative and policy-making 
framework.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no obligation upon the investor, under FET, to collect and 
frame information. The current legal framework leaves information availability 
solely as a state burden. This may leave open liability where the investor has a 
lackadaisical attitude to information collection, and lead to bad investor practice 
of not seeking out and planning for adverse regulation and state policy. This also 
leaves a significant obligation upon the state to provide relevant information to 
the investor. By way of contrast a less paternalistic approach, may be one where 
information collection cost is left predominantly with the investor and he is 
responsible for the risks of information collection. The benefits of such an 
obligation on the investor, and whether it is an off-putting cost to investment 
need to be empirically analyzed.  This may result in a more balanced and fairer 
approach of constructing transparency.  
 
Such choices in legal position for states, as to what degree of burden of 
information production costs in transparency, would be available to states if they 
had a far greater input in deciding the legal framework of FET, rather than leaving 
it to arbitrators. Further, the cost of transparency as a defence may wish to be 
explored by the transparency law-maker to ensure liability is not found unfairly on 
developing states who cannot afford to provide the investor with transparent state 
practices in their institutional practices where there may be resulting harm to the 
investor.  
 
This is fair from the point of view that the level of transparency obtained by a 
state’s governing process is limited by its administrative framework, particularly 
                                                
23 R. Wolfe, ‘Regulatory transparency, developing countries and the WTO’ (2003) 2(2) 
World. Trad. Rev. 157 at p.157-161. 
 the ability of that framework to collect and create access channels between the 
information and users. This is dependent on quality of administrative personnel 
skills and, increasingly, availability of information technology in both the 
developed and developing world. Different states have different levels and 
methods of accountability of government acts.24 Further developing countries 
generally have weaker administrative institutions in terms of speed and efficiency, 
and often lack accountability and transparency of bureaucrats.25 These differences 
are important when attempting to construct a workable law of transparency that 
the state can actually adhere to. 
 
The OECD has stated that global transparency drivers must understand the 
distinctive features of national transparency practices. Communication of existing 
policy needs an administrative set-up to both collect and impart information.26 
The creation of a requirement of transparency will require empirical input as to 
the differences of administrative culture between states may be likely to produce 
different forms of information and prioritise different forms of information 
presentation. For example, contrasting regulatory administration in the USA to 
Denmark, the latter does have less information collecting processes resulting in 
less transparency of regulatory operations due to the lack of adversarial culture 
amongst commercial entities that constantly challenge the state.27 Further the 
collection and preparation of information is a cost burden on public 
administration that some states simply may not be able to meet.28 
 
Transparency ought to also apply to investment treaty arbitration, so as to increase 
the legitimacy of the system through removal of any perception of double 
standards. Transparency is also said to be important to legitimate governance for 
                                                
24 H. Blair, ‘Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic local 
Governance in Six Countries’ (2000) 28(1) World Development 21at p.31-32. 
25 P. Bardham, ‘The Journal of Economic Perspectives’ (2002) 16(4) Jnl. Econ. 
Perspectives 185 at p.189-190. 
26 OECD (n5 above) at p.11 
27 OECD (n5 above) at p.24 
28 OECD (n5 above) at p.31 
 other transnational legal processes such as the EU and WTO.29 Thus the legal role 
played by the fair treatment standard may also build up a concomitant requirement 
for institutional transparency in investment treaty arbitration.30 This is not wholly 
present at the moment. This requirement may include open adjudication in 
arbitration, as opposed to the current closed-door private arbitration. It may also 
mean greater involvement from affected parties31, and civil society, and require 
the important publication of awards so that both investors and states can see 
trends in obligations.32 
 
3.3. Thresholds for Transparency under FET 
 
In investment treaty arbitration there is a high threshold obligation, aorend a m 
generic lower, less onerous, obligation. The high threshold spells out specific 
things that a host-state has to do to comply with transparency under the FET. 
The high threshold under transparency is detailed below. 
  
High or Onerous Obligation: 
‘The Foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from 
ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it 
may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, 
as well as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices or 
directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. Any and 
all State actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the guidelines, 
                                                
29 P. Nanz & J. Steffek, ‘Global Governance, participation and the public sphere’ (2004) 
39(2) Government & Opp. 314 at p.314; T.W. Pogge, ‘Creating Supra-National 
Institutions Democratically: Reflections on the European Union’s ‘Democratic Deficit’’ 
(1997) 5(2) Jnl. Pol. Philos. 163 at p.163-165 
30 Nanz & Steffek, (n29 above) at p.319-320. 
31 At present NGO participation is restricted by rules of relevancy and permission, see T. 
Ishikawa, ‘Third party participation in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2001) 59(2) ICLQ 
413 at p.413-p.417. 
32 J.A. Scholte, ‘Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance’ (2002) 8 Global 
Governance 281 at p.281-293. 
 directives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved there under, but also to the 
goals underlying such regulations’.33 
 
This threshold places a positive obligation, an obligation to act, upon the state. It 
thus envisages liability on omission. The state has to ensure access to all rules and 
regulations that affect the foreign investment. This means that as well as having a 
system whereby such rules and regulations can be accessed, it must also spend 
revenue to calculate which rules affect foreign investors and collate and publish 
them. In practice, the state will have the onerous task of being wary of which 
foreign investors are present in its territory and what they are doing so that it can 
identify how they will be affected by current and future regulations. It is possible 
to construe this passage as having no burden to act on the investor. In this case 
the state may have to do a lot of work of identifying regulatory risk on the 
investor’s behalf and communicating that risk to the investor. Considering the 
cost of such an administrative framework, it is unclear how developing states 
might have consented implicitly to such a burdensome rule.  
 
By contrast, a different approach is seen in Wastemanagement II that intimates only 
procedural transparency in administrative process, which is similar to participation 
rights seen in English public law, as seen below.  
 
 
Low Obligation: 
‘the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is infringed by…a 
complete lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process.’34   
 
By contrast to the ‘High Obligation’, the criteria in Wastemanagement II  is much 
less onerous for the state and a much harder one for the claimant to satisfy. It 
relates to openness of administrative procedure when carrying out decisions, such 
                                                
33 Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB/00/02 
(29/05/03)  at para 154 
34 Wastemanagement (No2) v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No. ARB/99/4 
(30/04/04) at para 98 
 as permit grants, that involve the investor. Here the investor will have rights of 
participation that involve being notified of administrative requirements and to 
make submissions to administrators when there are decisions that affect the 
investment. In contrast to the ‘High Obligation’ it is not about transparency of 
regulation, laws and on-going government policy-making. Nor does it involve a 
positive obligation to publish laws, though the phrase ‘a complete lack of transparency’ 
is ambiguous and does not clarify as to what exactly transparency involves for the 
state and is thus incoherent in determining rights and obligations.  
 
It is though similar to the minimum standard in that it a breach only occurs 
through a significant failure by the state, not a lessor threshold through the more 
specific criteria laid out in the ‘High obligation’.  
 
The high threshold, with respect to the English law below, would grant the 
investor rights over domestic nationals in public policy. Further, it will also be 
seen that English law does not require ‘complete…candour in administrative process’ as 
with the low threshold obligation of transparency under FET.  
 
A low standard was also envisaged in S.D. Myers. There arbitrator Schwarz applied 
WTO jurisprudence that stated that the state had to provide ‘certain minimum 
standards for transparency and procedural fairness’.35 Critical to the breach of fair 
treatment in Myers is that Myers was not given access to the administrative 
process that other competitors were and there was a lack of opportunity to 
participate in key Government decision-making when important issues in relation 
to the investment were being determined. 
 
As well as incoherence as to rights and obligations on the investor and state 
caused by having two quite distinct obligations, as outlined above, there is also a 
lack of agreement as whether transparency has any role to play under FET. Thus, 
for example, following the Metalclad award the Supreme Court of British 
                                                
35 S.D. Myers v. Canada (NAFTA) (UNCITRAL) (12/11/00), Separate Opinion at para 
249. 
 Columbia, a domestic court, set aside the award on Article 1105 for expressing the 
requirement of Transparency as a part of Article 1105.36  
 
In Metalclad the tribunal said that the fair and equitable treatment, included the 
notion of ‘transparency’.37 The absence of a clear requirement of a municipal 
construction permit by the local administration and no explanation of the 
procedure or practice as to how to deal with applications for permits was a breach 
of the transparency requirement of NAFTA.38 The Supreme Court of British 
Columbia was faced with a challenge on the NAFTA tribunal’s interpretation of 
transparency and the fair treatment standard.  
 
The challenge was based on an excess of jurisdiction of Metalclad tribunal on two 
grounds: (i) Transparency was wrongly included in an Article 1105 conclusion 
and, (ii) The tribunal went beyond existing transparency obligations in NAFTA 
and created new obligations.39 The domestic courts agreed with these general 
propositions. It stated that the NAFTA arbitrators did not have a basis in 
customary international law to state that transparency had become a part of the 
customary law of foreign investment.40 On this basis the inclusion of transparency 
under FET is questionable. This further causes a problem of coherence in so far 
as it is not clear whether the obligation exists at all. 
 
Further, the Canadian court reviewing ‘transparency’ differed with the separate 
opinion in the S.D. Myers, which stated that transparency could be included in 
NAFTA on the basis that ‘international law’ in Article 1105 could be interpreted 
in an exploratory manner so that it reflected what international obligations ought 
to be.41 The Canadian federal court did not agree that transparency in investor-
                                                
36 United Mexican States v. Metalclad (2001) B.C.S.C 664 at para 70. 
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40 (n 36 above)  at para 68. 
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state relations was one of the objectives of NAFTA.42 The court distinguished 
between NAFTA Article 1105 where in its view obligations were, via a literal 
interpretation, rooted in extant customary international law, and general bilateral 
investment treaties that were distinct instruments43, thus indicating that NAFTA 
parties could not have consented to ‘transparency’ as being a part of FET.44  
 
Overall this leaves the nature and extent of obligations under the ‘transparency’ 
unclear in investment arbitration, as to what the threshold is, and whether they are 
included in the NAFTA’s Article 1105 FET provision. thus there is a legitimacy 
issue regarding the clarity of the law. As to the latter point, the review by the 
Canadian domestic court of Metalclad has only so much weight. This is particularly 
because a national court’s views regarding the approach of an international 
tribunal can only have so much value in legal terms in international law.  
 
As a matter of international law, national courts cannot determine obligations 
between sovereign states. This intimates, bearing in mind that tribunals have 
ignored FTC interpretations in the past made by state parties, a renewed statement 
of position by states as to whether transparency is an obligation they undertake 
towards investors and to what degree. Further, the national court still upheld the 
bulk of damages against Mexico despite rejecting the arbitrator’s position as to the 
law.45 
 
 
3.4. English law  
 
                                                
42 (n 36 above) at para 71. 
43 Key to this reasoning was that unlike general bilateral investment treaties, Article 1105 
NAFTA included an express reference to limit that obligation to ‘international law’. (n 36 
above) at  para. 65. 
44 (n 36 above) at para 65. 
45 C. Tollefson, ‘Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of 
NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven Investor State-Claims Process’ (2002) Min. J. Glob. Trad. 183 
at p.197 
 Procedural transparency in English law is provided below as an example of how 
ITA could develop transparency under the ‘Low obligation’. This is closer to the 
minimum standard of treatment, outlined by the Neer decision, that is currently 
accepted in international law. Thus giving rise to lessor concerns of legitimacy 
than the ‘High obligation’ approach as compliance would be less costly. However, 
the minimum standard does not include protection on the basis of transparency, 
thus even the low threshold still raises issues of state consent. Procedural rights of 
participation in administrative process are available in the public law of many 
states, will increase the coherence of transparency obligations and demonstrate 
how specific jurisprudence can assist both states and investors in determining 
their rights.  
 
Due to the detailed tests of procedural rights, public body obligations, and the 
availability of defences, English law provides some guidance as to how FET 
transparency obligations could become more coherent. Though English law is 
replete with myriad examples of participatory rights, a few fundamental 
illustrations will assist in demonstrating how transparency under FET could 
become more coherent. 
 
A. Procedural transparency. 
 
In English law procedural transparency is centered around rights of participation 
for the individual in public administration. Participation is said to be critical to the 
openness of administration.46 Three key rights of participation in administrative 
process exist in English law: (i) Prior Disclosure and notice of state decision-
making;; (ii) Participation and Consultation;  and a (iii) Duty to give reasons. 
However, as will be seen, these rights have not been granted without limits. 
                                                
46 For relationship between participation and transparency see, for example : P. Nanz & 
J. Steffek, ‘Global Governance, participation and the public sphere’ (2001) 32(2) Govt. & 
Opp. 314 at p.320-328; C. Harlow, ‘Global Administrative law: The quest for principles 
and values’ (2006) 17(1) EJIL 187 at p.204-205; D.M. Curtin, ‘Transparency and Political 
Participation in the EU Governance: A role for civil society’ (1999) 3(4) Cult. Val. 445 at 
p.445-453; S.Charnovitz, ‘Transparency and Participation in the World Trade 
Organisation’ (2003-04) 56 Rut. Law. Rev. 927 at p.939-944. 
 English courts have on occasion been aware of limitations that such duties can 
impose on administrative bodies and the problems administrative bodies may face 
with an absolute duty to disclose. The latter will often conflict with the need for 
administrative bodies to maintain confidentiality in their relationships with other 
private and public persons for their function.47 
 
The development of ‘freedom of information’ is a significant recent movement in 
English public law. This has been developed much later in the twentieth century 
than transparency in American administrative law.48 As Birkinshaw has stated in 
relation to the U.S, ‘Freedom of information is often part of a legislative framework providing 
for open Government, so that, in the USA, for instance, laws open up meetings of Government 
agencies and their advisory committees to public scrutiny and participation’.49 Transparency in 
the U.S. is enshrined in the U.S Freedom of Information Act 1966.  
 
The U.S. Act was designed to assist democratic governance, by ensuring ‘public 
knowledge’ of government action.50 Section 3 of the U.S. Freedom of 
Information Act states:  
 
‘each [Government] agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with 
published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute, and 
procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person’.  
 
It was designed to reduce the denials of disclosure under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.51  In terms of the level of obligation it is similar to the high 
                                                
47 This point is not always appreciated when dealing with competing interests in 
administration and disclosure requests, See G. Larry Engel ‘Introduction: Information 
Disclosure policies and practices of federal administrative agencies’ (1973-1974) 68(2) 
NW. U.L. Rev. 184 at p.184-185. An example of a disclosure conflict is in the public 
interest in a private persons tax return on appropriate payment, B.I. Bittker, ‘Federal 
Income Tax Returns-Confidentiality vs. Public Disclosure’ (1980-81) 20 Washburn L.J. 
479, at p.479-480. 
48 See, P. Craig, Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell) (2008) at p.224-228. 
49 P. Birkinshaw, ‘Freedom of Information’ (1997) Parliam. Aff. 166 at p.166; The British 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 was passed in 2000, the U.S. one in 1966: Freedom of 
Information Act 1966, 5 U.S.C. s.552 (1966).  
50 E.L. Richardson, ‘Freedom of Information’ (1973-74) 20 Loy. Law. Rev. 45 at p.45, 46. 
 threshold obligation under FET. The cost of information requests under the U.S. 
Act has proliferated since the Act was passed. By 1981 some estimates put the 
cost at $250 million, a price few developing countries today could afford in terms 
of cost or to prioritise over other policy needs.52  
 
English law has developed significant case law to ensure transparent public 
participation through the development of rights of participation. Investment 
treaty arbitration can further develop the investment protection role by 
incorporating such rights for investors. 
 
State bodies have been given standards by which administrative requirements are 
to apply to individuals. Thus in the Save Britain’s Heritage Case the English court 
stated that the requirements given by administrators that individuals were 
supposed to satisfy in relation to planning policy had to be ‘proper, adequate and 
intelligible’.53 This is so that individuals could be in full knowledge of requirements 
they have to comply with. Similarly, in Duggan it was held that a prisoner was 
entitled to have information and facts relating to a decision to maintain him 
within a certain categorization of prisoners from the Home Secretary. This 
categorization would have affected his rights during incarceration.54 Similarly to 
the S.D. Myers decision the Canadian Supreme Court in Ontario Women’s Teachers 
Association held that where a public consultation that affected an individual’s 
employment rights, it would have to ensure that the individuals be informed of 
the nature of the proceedings against them.55  
  
Even in sensitive areas such as child abuse, English courts have made it clear that 
local administrators have to be open and disclose all relevant material. Thus in K 
                                                                                                                                      
51 Engel (n47 above) at p.188-189. 
52 P. M. Wald, ‘Freedom of Information Act: A short case study in the Perils and 
Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values’ (1984) 33 Emry. L. J. 649 at p.660.  
53 Save Britain’s Heritage v. Number One Poultry Ltd [1991] 1 W.L.R. 153 at p.166. 
54 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Duggan [1994] 3 All. ER. 277 
at p.278 
55 Federation of Women’s Teachers Association of Ontario v. Ontario (Human Rights 
Commission) (1988) 67 QR (2d) 492- (The case concerned a public inquiry into 
discrimination claims). 
 and Hampshire County Council a local administrator investigating parental child 
abuse, had to disclose confidential medical reports given to him in order to 
determine whether action should be pursued against parents.56 The court overrode 
the need for local administrators to maintain a special working relationship with 
their medical officers under the rules of administrative confidentiality. 
 
The right of participation in public decision-making in English common law was 
developed in the nineteenth century.57 In the seminal case of Cooper, Justice Byles 
stated ‘although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard 
yet the justice of the common-law will supply the omission of the legislature’.58 
 
Echoing this sentiment over a hundred years later, Lord Mustill stated  in the case 
of Doody: ‘Fairness will very often require that a person who is adversely affected by the decision 
will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before the decision is 
taken with a view to procuring its modification, or both…since the person affected usually cannot 
make worthwhile representation without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests 
fairness will very often require that he is informed the gist of the case he has to answer’.59   
 
Further, the lack of effective participation of the individual in a decision that 
affects him (not a policy decision, but a specific decision) by a public body will 
afford the individual the remedy of quashing of the decision. Thus the importance 
of consultation as key component of accountability of public institutions is also 
recognized. In the ex parte N case it was held that a government body had to 
consult parents regarding the closure of school that affected their children.60  
 
Another example of the need to consult is where the state denies the exercise of a 
public right in law, over a private interest the courts will demand a public inquiry. 
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Thus in Emery where there was a refusal by the state to exercise a legal discretion 
to provide public access to land, for imposition on a private estate, the state had 
to conduct a public consultation before refusal to exercise grant of access.61  
 
Similarly, in Wainright the Court of Appeal held that not only did the local 
authority have to notify the public of matters affecting them, but it had to do so in 
a manner that ensured that all parties that were affected were notified. Thus the 
local authority had failed to comply with its statutory duty to give public notice of 
a proposal to install a pedestrian crossing where it had put just one letter through 
the letterboxes of houses, many of which contained four separate flats.62 Thus 
there are clear rights of public consultation and effective notice of decisions and 
administrative requirements in English law. ITA could incorporate these rights 
depending on the ability of the state to grant them.  
 
  
B.  Non-Disclosure in the Public Interest and the Need for Confidentiality. 
 
As seen above, there is a strong requirement of disclosure of material that affects 
individuals in public administrative decision-making, so that adequate opportunity 
is given to the individual to respond.  
 
However where speed and efficiency are critical parts of administrative process, 
the courts do not like excessive burdens of disclosure to delay administrative 
process. Thus the Court of Appeal overturned Sedley J’s judgment in Abdi, where 
Sedley J lay a burden on the Home Secretary to disclose matters supporting a 
deportation decision and also against it.63 The Court of Appeal stated that the 
courts should not add burdens on administration, where the aims of the 
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administration apparatus is to resolve public policy matters, here the 
determination of aliens rights, quickly.64 
 
In some English law cases courts will defer to government and administrative 
bodies decisions not too disclose. English law will also look at whether it is 
practical for the public authorities to allow participation in administration where 
the numbers of persons affected by the decision are so great that it would not be 
possible due to administrative limitations to hear them all. Further, there will be 
no duty of consultation for the administrative body if such a consultation 
precludes the administrative body from carrying out its function. For example, in 
the case of Bates changing the rules for practicing lawyers would have required 
excessive consultation in execution.65This may be an important provision to 
include into an investment treaty law of transparency, as it will allow states to 
bypass investor consultation where such a consultation undermines a public policy 
being effectively executed by a public body.  
 
To activate such a defence fairly, states would have to show the tribunal how 
exactly investor consultation would harm a particular administrative function, 
rather than merely use it as an excuse to avoid the investor.  
 
Examples of this in English law can be seen where English courts will also not 
grant a remedy when it affects the speed and efficiency of works of public 
administrative bodies. Thus in ex p. Argyll Group where the court refuse to grant a 
remedy on the different ground for a misuse of administrative discretion because 
it felt it would affect the efficiency of the work of the Monopolies and Merger 
Commission.66 English courts have also appreciated limits to the workings of 
administrative process.  
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Thus in Darshan Kaur the court held that a lack of translators at a public meeting 
was not improper due to the impossibility of providing public translators for all 
languages.67 Further English Courts have also been sensitive to the idea that in 
some circumstances it may be unfair to pro-long administrative consultation just 
to ensure all views are gathered. Thus in Williams it was held that where the 
closure of a school by way of amalgamation into another school was carried out 
by a public body, it would adversely affect the pupils if there was a delay and 
prolonged consultation.68All of these impacts can be incorporated into the ITA 
transparency law to make it more sensitive to limitations of institutional practices 
of the host-state. 
 
General national interest measures are deferred to by English public law. Thus 
there is a right of the state to non-disclosure of information related to state 
function where it is in the interests of national security. Thus in Hosenball the 
House of Lords denied an American investigative journalist all information 
relating a deportation order made against him on the grounds of national 
security.69 As Lord Lane put it: ‘There are occasions, though they are rare, when what are 
more generally the rights of an individual must be subordinated to the protection of the realm’.70 
 
There is also a doctrine of ‘Public Immunity’ of documents in English law, 
whereby the state can deny access to documents. This approach of non-disclosure 
of documents could also be included into transparency under ITA to protect 
sensitive areas of policy-making from claims before policy has fully formed, or to 
preserve state confidentiality. The powers of interim-relief available to investors 
under ITA may further justify its incorporation, so as to protect states from 
revealing unwanted issues in the public-sphere.   
 
 
C. Synopsis 
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Overall, English law is more coherent through developing specific rights of 
participation in administrative process than the vague rule of transparency 
developed under FET. It provides a right to clear administrative requirements 
(Save Britain’s Heritage); a right to be consulted where there is a decision that affects 
an individual (Wainright). Available defences include not conducting a full 
consultation where that undermines the administrative function of a state organ 
(ex parte Argyll Group; Bates; Darshan Kaur) and deference to important state 
exigencies such as national security (Hosenball). This is an important pragmatism 
that may be useful to developing states that are struggling to comply with the 
current obligations under both the high and low FET transparency rule.  
 
This deference to the limitations of state administration could be incorporated in 
subsequent elucidations of FET, where state consent is granted, to render FET 
transparency more coherent. 
 
  
3.5. International Transparency Drivers 
 
To appreciate some of the costs and logistical difficulties of the high threshold 
transparency, the position of international transparency drives under the OECD 
provides a useful context. There is significant soft-law support by international 
institutions seeking more transparent practices of governments in the developing 
world. The OECD has been a key player in this, particularly due to the benefits of 
transparent planning in the developing world being used to predict political risk by 
foreign investors. 
 
The OECD is an organisation that furthers economic policy of capital-exporting 
states. It is an inter-governmental organisation whose functions include the 
formulation of policies for states to improve governance towards foreign 
investment. The OECD is a driver in regulatory reform amongst its members, and 
 it sees increasing transparency of regulation as a key part of improving state 
governance of markets.71 
 
The articulation of ‘transparency’ by investment arbitration tribunals can be 
improved by taking into consideration the work of the OECD. The OECD has 
analysed transparency requirements in eight different international approaches, 
and found disparities between burdens outlined.72 Whilst six of the eight provided 
for open access to laws and regulations, and five timely publication of measures; 
only three of the eight approaches provided for publication of procedures for 
investment permits and licences. This places huge opportunities for arbitrators 
under FET to carefully craft transparency requirements to make these approaches 
more cohesive into law that contains these rights. 
 
One method for bringing about transparency proposed by the OECD strategy 
involves three phases: (i) Overcoming political obstacles to collecting and 
dissemination, (ii) improving Government institutions in their capacity to collect 
data; (iii) increasing access to information avenues for private agents.73 The latter 
includes formulating systems for official documentation.74 However ITA in its 
present state as an adjudicatory mechanism does not at present have the capacity 
to do this.  
 
A. Increasing Procedural Transparency 
 
Costs relating to transparency are present when one considers that 
communication channels have to be built between central policy-making in 
government to local administrations and individuals. The OECD, appreciating the 
importance of communication, has also encouraged the creation of 
                                                
71 OECD, (n5 above) at p.26 
72 The drivers assessed by the OECD were: (i) The Draft MAI (Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment); (ii) OECD Declaration on Transparency; (iii) GATS; (iv) NAFTA; (V) 
German Model BIT; (VI) US Model BIT; (VII) APEC Standard; (VIII) OECD Codes, in 
(n5 above) at p. 22. 
73 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.8 
74 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.18. 
 communication channels to give out information to local administration.75 
Bringing together international drivers, the OECD recommends some good 
standards for procedural transparency. These include: (a) prompt publication of 
rules; (b) dealing promptly with requests for information; (c) prior notification of 
information that is useful to the investor. Similarly, APEC (the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Co-operation) has also taken measures to implement its standards on 
transparency.76 These concern advance publication and availability of 
administrative procedures and regulatory frameworks that affect an investor. 
These would prevent adverse commercial impacts of the type seen in the  Tecmed 
and Metalclad cases. 
 
The OECD does appreciate that transparency of national institutions ought to 
reflect culture, history and values of governing processes.77 Some states may value 
openness in public relations with citizens to a greater degree than others, and a 
plurality of approaches on this front may be at odds with uniform transparency 
rules created under FET that may be applied against all respondent states. As the 
OECD has noted, there does need to be greater international collaboration if a 
definition of transparency that is legitimate and acceptable to all is to be 
achieved.78  
  
However, as national disparities with respect to affordability of providing 
transparency exist, transparency will very much depend on what state the investor 
is in. Further, the OECD has also stated that new information technologies may 
place a more exacting burden on some states from investors for information in 
contrast to others.79 As information technologies are costly and improving 
                                                
75 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.9 
76 APEC, ‘Implementation of APEC Transparency Standards’ (APEC, Committee on 
Trade and Investment; 2007 Annual Report) found at 
http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/committee_on_trade/transparency_stds.html 
77 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.11; To illustrate there are different approaches to public 
administrative reforms between states in southern Asian countries: R. Samaratunge, Q. 
Alam, J. Teicher, ‘The New public management reforms in Asia: a comparison of South 
and Southeast Asian Countries’ (2008) 74(1) Int. Rev. Admin. Sci. 25 at p.25-37. 
78 OECD, (n 5 above) 
79 (n 77 above). 
 constantly, this will exacerbate transparency gaps between developing and 
developed states.80 They may not have access to modern ‘information technology’, 
now vital to regulatory transparency, within administrative institutions.81 In some 
developing countries institutional capacity building for information technology 
usage is still underway, and debates as to the appropriate institutional structures of 
usage are still ongoing.82 The former Committee on International Investment and 
Multi-national Enterprises (‘CIME’) of the OECD has recommended that states 
engage corporate stakeholders in administrative capacity building- a process that 
itself requires a certain level of public administrative management.83 The OECD 
wishes to see foreign-investors having clearly defined rights of transparency in 
public administrative processes.84  
 
Direct information access at the host-state is not the only source of information 
for the investor. State to state information channels that feed into National 
Investment Protection Agencies may also be a useful tool of information 
gathering by the investor in its own state about the host-state.85 Further, states 
may wish to further this inter-state information collection to assist the economic 
benefits of investment treaties.86 The OECD also notes that the practice of ‘prior 
                                                
80 E.g. Basic information availability through information technology is limited in rural 
areas of India: P.D. Kaushik, ‘Information Technology and broad-based development: 
Preliminary Lessons from North India’ (2004) 32(4) World. Dev. 591 at p.595 
81 South American states have put into play policy to improve IT use by administrative 
bodies in the mid- late 1990s, See R. Montealegre, ‘A temporal model of institutional 
interventions for information technology adoption in less developed countries’ (1999) 16 
(1) Journal of Management Information Systems 207 at p.207-217. 
82 D. Ernst & B.A. Lundvall, ‘Information technology in the learning economy: 
challenges for developing countries’ in E.S. Reinert, ‘Globalisation, economic 
development and inequality: an alternative perspective’ (Edward Elgar) (2004) at p.258-
261 & p.266. It is also stated that the U.S. method of using IT for information collection 
is more formal and institutional as opposed to an informal process in use in Japan. Ibid,  
at p.279. 
83 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.9 & p.18. 
 
85 R.S. Rajan, ‘Measures to Attract FDI: Investment Promotion, Incentives and Policy 
Intervention’ (2004) 39(1) Econ. Pol. Wkly. 12 at p.12-16. 
86 Vandevelde, ‘The political economy of a bilateral investment treaty’ (1998) 92 AJIL 
621 at p. 621, and p.621-630. 
 notification and comment’ is not uniform amongst all OECD states, and is seen 
as best-practice.87  
 
There is also a negative impact on public interest, which questions the legitimacy 
of the inclusion of transparency. The OECD has also noted the crowding out 
potential of investor transparency.88 This is that investors will monopolise 
information gathering and presentation processes of public administration to the 
detriment of private citizens. In reality this may only be likely to occur where the 
investor’s rights to information are so burdensome that they effectively stop 
public administration in the public interest. Arbitrators have not considered such a 
potentiality, albeit it occurring in extremis.  
 
Another high cost aspect of transparency to the investor is the importance 
simplifying policy and laws for investor digestibility. The OECD advocates a 
system of making existing policy and regulation more transparent. This includes 
condensing and simplifying policy and law. It also advocates ‘plain language 
drafting’ so that alien technical terms to the investor do not make documentation 
inaccessible.89 This requires highly skilled legal draftsmen that are scarce, if not 
absent, in many parts of the developing world.90 It must also have a channel of 
communication with private investors to determine which formats of information 
are most useful.91 A register or other formal basis for recording regulation is also 
recommended. This would assist in meeting the burden set by the Tecmed tribunal, 
though again coming with a cost for developing states.  
The OECD also wishes transparency to be linked to general good administrative 
conduct. Here an incorporation of standards of procedural participation, similar 
to those in English law, may be useful to states- if they wish it. Amongst its 
members the OECD has pointed out that there are no explicit standards and 
                                                
87 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.21 
88 Ibid. 
89 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.24. 
90 W.L. Andreen, ‘Environmental Law and International Assistance: The Challenge of 
Strengthening Environmental Law in the Developing World’ (2000) 25 Colum. J. Envtl. 
L. 17 at p.27-32. 
91 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.24 
 procedures for decision-making of administrative bodies.92These guidelines 
should ideally extend to non-government bodies that relevant state administrative 
work is outsourced.  
 
The OECD also states that limiting administrative discretion to regulatory and 
administrative bodies can reduce uncertainty in decision-making, as it makes 
administrative alteration of central state policy less likely. This may be a more cost 
effective system for developing states, who may not have administrators who can 
make effective decisions, and it reduces the need for local transparency where 
transparency of central government processes exists. The OECD ‘best practice’ 
discourse also includes demands to remove invalid rules and laws quickly from 
legislative and regulatory publications that the investor is likely to use.93 Internet 
publication of laws is also best practice and all NAFTA parties have published 
laws online to some extent for investor accessibility.94 Ideally states should have 
proactive ‘Investment Protection and Promotion Agencies’  
 
Amongst OECD members several of whom who are developed states, there are 
deficiencies of transparency. Thus, for example, the openness of licencing for 
business in the telecommunications industry of OECD members is said to be 
poor.95 Transparency requirements are also not uniform across all sectors, thus in 
the UK, a developed state, for example, transparency requirements do not apply 
to independent regulators such as OFCOM.96 This would fall foul of the Tecmed 
threshold of transparency created under FET. 
 
Most of WTO agreements have transparency provisions. For example, The WTO 
arrangement for trade in services also has transparency guidelines for states for 
                                                
92 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.29 
93 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.39. 
94 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.39; who miss the developing regulatory transparency amongst 
in NAFTA 
95 OECD, (n 5 above) at p.30 
96 OECD, ‘Public Sector Transparency and the International Investor’ (2003) at p.30; D. 
Freedman, ‘Dynamics of power in Contemporary media policy-making’ (2006) 28(6) 
Media. Culture Soc 907 at p.907-916. 
 laws that impact on cross-border services. Article III of GATS requires members 
to provide prompt publication of all measures relevant to rights trade of cross-
border services.97 Other GATS rights provide minimum access on the basis that 
nationals are provided.98This is justified on the basis that the lack of such 
information may affect movement of services across borders.  
 
Under GATS, the Council for Trade in Services has to be notified of any changes 
to existing laws and regulations or administrative guidelines that affect trade in 
services. Article IV on GATS has the objective of creating more transparent 
regulatory implementation and enforcement methods. The Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism in the WTO is also an important instrument in maintaining 
transparency relating to overseas investment risk, as it makes national policy 
accessible to information seekers.99 The WTO has also developed sector specific 
transparency obligations for the telecommunications sector. Two key aspects of 
this are: (a) the public availability of licensing criteria; and (b) the creation of an 
independent regulator.100 It is important to note that this is occurred after detailed 
negotiations and consent from states,101 this opportunity is not currently afforded 
to states under FET law-making on transparency.  
 
The WTO is also attempting to create more transparent procedures for 
government procurement activity, and is seeking state support for doing so. This 
latter aspect may be particularly relevant to investment arbitration, and claims 
have been brought by investors that have achieved their permits in the host-state 
                                                
97 Article III GATS; For example of impact of transparent trade regulations, See S. 
Robertson, ‘WTO/GATS and the global education services industry’ (2003)1(3) 
Globalisation, Societies and Education 259 at p.259-268. 
98 See, Article XVIII General Agreement on Trades in Services in J.H. Dalhuisen, 
Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Law (Hart) (2000) at p.325. 
99 J.F. Francois, ‘Trade Policy Transparency and Investor Confidence: Some implications 
for an effective trade policy review mechanism’ (2001) 9(2) Rev. Intl. Econ. 303 at p.303-
310. 
100 M. Fredebeul-Krein & A. Freytag, ‘Telecommunications and WTO discipline: An 
assessment of the WTO agreement on telecommunications services’ (1997) 21(6) Telec. 
Pol. 477 at p.477-485. 
101 R. Wolfe, ‘Regulatory Transparency, developing countries and the WTO’ (2003) 
World. Trade. Rev. 157 at p.164-165. 
 through tender.102 Though again the current system of law-making under FET 
needs to incorporate states into the negotiating and law-making framework. 
 
 
B. Using international drivers for coherence. 
 
Alongside participation rights detailed above in English law, the OECD synopsis 
provides for a coherent legal framework for transparency. These are, however, 
high-level obligations that developing countries may struggle to comply with. The 
OECD developed five critical areas of reform for ideal regulatory practices: 
 
(a) Codification of laws and regulations. 
(b) Publication of register the of law and regulations. 
(c) Creating registers of regulation existing and proposed. 
(d) Plain language drafting of regulations. 
(e) Consultation with interesting parties. 
(f) Measures used to communicate regulations.103 
 
The OECD has also developed further principles for regulatory bodies to 
communicate information to commercial entities: 
 
(a) Publication of consolidated register of all subordinate regulation currently 
in force.  
     (b) Provision that only sub-ordinate regulation in the registry are enforceable. 
     (c) Public access via the Internet to the text of all or most primary laws. 
     (d) A general policy requiring ‘plain language’ drafting. 
     (e) Guidance on plain language drafting issued. 
 
                                                
102 Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Philippines ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/25 (16/08/07) at para 84. 
103 OECD (n5 above) at p.26-27. 
 These requirements create more transparent regulatory systems by ensuring that 
the investor is not taken by surprise by government requirements. They may wish 
to be given by some states to attract foreign capital, where the benefits of foreign 
capital outweigh the costs of such administrative reform. This is not possible at 
present due to transparency being construed by arbitrators in a particular dispute 
at hand. 
 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
Transparency can be described in development as the openness of public 
administration, with respect to allowing private persons the ability to discover the 
framework of operations within which policy is conducted, the ability to discover 
conflicts of interests within a policy framework and to access information 
affecting the commercial operations of the private economic agent.104It is based 
on democratic theories of government which originate in the West.  
 
Transparency for the investor can be justified from the perspective that there is a 
significant amount of government conduct that affects the private investors that 
the investors need to be aware of to plan for adverse commercial consequences of 
government conduct. As the OECD states:  
 
 
‘Governments also affect resource allocation through such policies as procurement, competition, 
state-owned enterprise, subsidies, infrastructure development, regulation and tax-expenditures’.105  
 
As Government policy often favours those that created it, there may be an 
inherent bias against the foreign investor in the policy machine.106  
 
                                                
104 Extrapolated OECD (n5 above) at p.17. 
105 OECD (n5 above)  p.17. 
106 OECD, ‘Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries: From Interventionism to 
Regulatory Governance’, (OECD) (2002) at p.1-24. 
 Overall, the creation of obligations of transparency of the specific type mentioned 
in Tecmed ought to be very much subject to express state consent, considering the 
obligation the rule places on host-states. There may be some implied consent, if 
arbitrators were given powers to make law of transparency on the basis that it is 
important for effective market activity. It permits citizens and investors to be 
informed of governmental activities, be it those of central or local administration.  
 
There are three key justifications for transparent government for states. The first 
is one of ideal governance, based on a particular ethical framework for 
Government. The second is a rule of law one. Without openness of operations of 
public administrations it is much more difficult to make their actions accountable 
by way of administrative law. The third is an economic one. This is based on the 
importance of information to decreasing uncertainty in the activity of contractual 
agents, and thus increasing the likelihood of contract.  
 
Transparency is rooted in democratic theory that concerns itself with 
accountability of institutions of the state and its leaders.107 It is based on the right 
of citizens to be informed of government activity that affects them. Thus policy-
making and law-making is carried out in a manner in which citizens can access 
information relating to its occurrence and in a form that is understandable.108 It 
has also been argued that public participation and consultation improves 
compliance with regulatory systems.109 
 
The rationale for its use in investment protection is that availability of information 
about government policy and regulation that will impact on the investor will 
decrease uncertainty through giving the investor an opportunity to assess risk 
prior to entering into contracts and moving capital.  
                                                
107 A.N. Licht, C. Goldschmidt, S.H. Schwartz, ‘Culture rules: The foundations of the 
rule of law and other norms of governance’ (2007) 35(4) Jnl. Corp. Econ. 659 at p.665 
108 Institutional reform to make the European Union more democratic has included 
information sharing and openness of institutional practice as a part of transparency 
drives. See, A. Méritier, ‘Composite democracy in Europe: the role of Transparency and 
access to information’ (2003) 10 (5) Jnl. Eu. Pub. Pol. 814 at p.815. 
109 OECD (n5 above) at p.9. 
  
The OECD is also aware of the need to work through limitations on states 
capacity to gather and assemble information. Thus not all laws and regulatory 
information may be given to the investor for the time pressure it will place upon 
other work by the administrative body.110This has to be incorporated into ITA 
law-making. 
 
Arbitrators in both the high and low threshold elucidations have not taken into 
consideration the ability of developing country capital exporters to comply with 
such administrative burdens. The other issue is that there are no available 
defences developed for the state to justify non-disclosure or closed Government 
operations. These ought to be incorporated into the ITA law of transparency to 
make it realistic with respect to developing states ability to comply with it.  
 
Broader investor burdens may also increase the acceptability of foreign investment 
on the ground. These can be divided into (a) Burdens to have transparent 
investment practices on the state and investor; (b) Burden for the investor to seek 
information. The latter may be particularly important in some developing states 
where administrative infrastructure is weak. 
 
There is also a case of deficiency from the general custom as to the method of 
consent. Where transparency is incorporated into agreements, as seen with the 
WTO where there is an express provision providing for it, thus in its absence it 
may not be said that they consent to this. This is supported by the express 
inclusion of ‘transparency’ in some Free Trade Agreements.  
 
A few have incorporated regulations towards a transparent framework for trade. 
For example, both the Australian-Singapore Free Trade Agreement and the US-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement provide obligations for transparent publication 
of laws, regulations and administrative rulings.111 Further there is an inter-state 
                                                
110 OECD (n5 above) at p.10. 
111 OECD (n5 above) at p.30 & at p.42  
 transparency requirement in these agreements, whereby parties have to inform 
each other of developments that affect their ability to meet their obligations. Thus 
the exclusion of a given treaty provision in investment treaty indicates that states 
were quite unprepared to give their institutions transparency for foreign investors. 
Thus constructions and findings of liability on this basis have been unfair. 
 
Burdens Regarding Investment Tranparency 
A. Burden to Have Transparency Investment Practices on the State and Investor. 
 
There is also no requirement for investor transparency in the public interest. For 
example, foreign investment in domestic land deals in the developing world are 
shrouded in secrecy and are not well-monitored, transparent nor beneficial to 
local communities.112Public awareness of investment-state relationships is critically 
dependent upon access to information and ability to process information. Local 
people often do not understand the process, or their obligations, rights and 
opportunities, which may raise objections. Locals may not be consulted or even 
aware that their government is negotiating contracts for land until after the deals 
have been finalized. Such transparency in investment dealings, created by ITA as 
state obligations, could bring a degree of public acceptability towards foreign 
investments. 
 
 
As openness of public administration increases public accountability it assists the 
maintenance and development of the rule of law. 
The fair and equitable treatment requirement of transparency could also be 
interpreted to place burdens of transparency upon the investor. Often foreign 
investments have a hidden, latent, impacts upon states and local inhabitants that 
were unforeseen at the time of initial investment. The investor may have to 
                                                
112 L. Cotula, S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard & J. Keely, Land Grab or Development Opportunity?: 
Agricultural Investment and International Land Deals in Africa (FAO, IIED, IFAD) (2009) at 
p.63-72. 
 demonstrate local impact of investment, including economic impact.113 This 
includes an analysis of local employment losses and gains as a result of foreign 
investment activity. 
 
B. Burdens on the Investor to Seek Information. 
 
FET could also encourage proactive investor activity to assist states in creating 
transparent administration. For example, investors could encourage networks in 
the state that lobby governments for regulatory change to improve clarity of the 
publication of relevant information. Arbitrators may wish to use this to articulate 
good conduct by investor, or alternatively create such an obligation upon 
investors, in order to ensure a fair share of responsibility for information 
gathering between investors and the state.  
 
If arbitrators decide to create a burden under FET, it would be on the investor to 
discharge, by showing that they have used all requisite tools of information 
collection, before the burden shifts on the state to defend a lack of transparency 
in its regulatory framework. Good guidance for investors, however, may be 
preferable by arbitrators if placing such a requirement as an obligation may 
discourage investors from investing. However, this burden may be a part of good 
commercial practice that sustains the investors activity, and this in turn would be 
beneficial for the host-state seeking capital. 
 
 
•   •   • 
 
Overall it is unclear what the exact threshold for the transparency rule is. Further 
it is unlikely that the rules of transparency can be complied with in either 
formulation by developing states that have weak state infrastructure and not 
                                                
113 OECD (n5 above) at p. 23 
 enough revenue available to train and equip administration to meet the burdens 
set by the law.  
 
Investor input may be of limited use on the ideal transparency law. The OECD 
has stated that private commercial entities are not necessarily best sources of 
guidance on good state practice in transparency due to the need to succeed in 
market competition making their claims disinterested.114Hence rules produced 
directly as result of determining adjudication where the investor has claimed of 
transparency flaws in the state may not be the best system of determining the 
appropriate standard. A more detailed system of law-formation that takes into 
consideration state-capacity to comply with transparent practices may be more 
requisite.  
 
 
                                                
114 OECD, ‘Public Sector Transparency and the International Investor’ (2003)  at p.21  
  
Chapter Four 
Denial of Justice 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 The notion of denial of justice in relation to the minimum standard. 
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Abstract. 
This chapter will analyse whether arbitrators have used the FET standard to develop further 
rules for domestic courts, as they have done for host-state administration through the legitimate 
expectations and transparency rules. Further, if they have done so, whether the standards 
produced for domestic courts are clear and cogent. It will also be questioned whether such rules, if 
produced, are done realistically bearing in mind the host-state’s ability to comply with them.  
 
The denial of justice rule can potentially be used in investment treaty arbitration to review the 
conduct of judges in municipal proceedings. It may also permit the investment arbitral tribunal to 
review the capacity and ability of municipal justice systems to accommodate claims by the investor. 
Under FET it may also permit tribunals to set appropriate rules for application of law by 
municipal courts. However, implementing such rules may come at a price to domestic nationals 
and at a burdensome cost to the host-state. This chapter illustrates the scope of review of 
investment arbitration using this rule and whether it has formulated standards, and done so 
appropriately considering practical concerns such as these.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The denial of justice rule has been incorporated into the fair and equitable 
treatment.1 Denial of justice is a rule of customary international law that grants 
investors protection from certain difficulties encountered in the host-state’s courts 
including denial of access, and ‘improper’ administration of justice.2  
The law of denial of justice may be linked to other breaches of international law 
by a state concerning the ability of the foreign investor to obtain redress for 
plaints.3  
Potentially a claim under denial of justice would allow international tribunals to 
review the conduct and decisions of municipal courts. This review gives the 
tribunal an opportunity of assessing the conduct of the host-state’s courts vis-à-vis 
international standards, and other standards that investment treaty arbitration 
deems fit.4  It feasibly allows investment treaty arbitration to determine what 
appropriate conduct of municipal courts is. The benefits of developing standards 
for conduct of municipal legal systems will not only be to the investor but also for 
the rule of law for domestic nationals.    
                                                
1 Mondev International Ltd v. USA ICSID Case No. ARB/AF/99 (11/10/02) at para 
120. 
2 See Professor Greenwood, Second Opinion in Loewen: Loewen  Group, Inc. and 
Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, ICSID  Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3. (NAFTA). 
(Award, Merits) (26/06/03) , at at para 132; See Rubens ‘Loewen v. United States: The 
Burial of an Investor-State Arbitration Claim’ (2005) 21(1) Arb. Int’l at p.1-14. 
3 The conduct of municipal courts of a state will engage a states’ liability in international 
law:  ‘A governmental authority surely cannot be faulted for acting in a manner validated by its courts 
unless the courts themselves are disavowed at the international level’. Azinian v. Mexico at para 97. 
In the law of state responsibility states are liable for the actions of their courts where 
those courts impinge on international obligations, See J. Crawford, The International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Text, Cases & Materials (Cam. Uni. P). at 
p.94-98.  
4 This is so where the fair and equitable treatment standard is seen as an open right for 
tribunals to decide what is fair, and thus use the denial of justice norm to create 
standards for municipal justice. See: I Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in 
the International Law of Foreign Investment  (OUP) (2008)- at p.56. International standards, 
include those enshrined in human rights instruments, such as speedy and effective trials. 
See, M. Shaw, International Law 6th Ed (Cam. Uni. P) (2008) at p.348. 
 Thus, this chapter will outline the jurisprudence on the denial of justice in 
investment treaty arbitration to see how it has been applied by tribunals and to 
what extent it differs from the customary international law position. 
 
4.2 Denial of Justice in general international law. 
 
A. Overview: 
 
The origins of denial of justice come from the treatment to be given to an alien in 
a host-state where the alien has a complaint relating to acts of that state or of 
private entities in the host-state.5 After seeking redress in local courts, the alien, if 
not satisfied with the outcome, could seek the remedy of his or her state.6 This 
was under the process of diplomatic protection.7 The standard of protection that 
applied in these circumstances was known as the minimum standard.  
 
In the early 20th Century, it was not precisely clear as to what the minimum 
standard actually entailed.8 The law of denial of justice was illustrated and formed 
in early jurisprudence when recourse to diplomatic protection of the interests of 
foreign nationals resulted in ad-hoc inter-state arbitration.9 For some the modern 
                                                
5A. Freeman, The International responsibility of states for denial of justice (Kraus Reprint (1970) 
at p.1-17; Tudor The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard (OUP) (2008) at p.61; Borchard, 
The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims (Banks Law) 
(1915) at p.330. Borchard states that denial of justice encompasses two concepts: (i) 
misconduct by any State organs vis-à-vis aliens or (ii) misconduct of the judicial branch 
of a state-ibid. Note, one uses the phrase ‘alien’ instead of ‘national’ as not all foreigners 
in a host-state had nationality when such plaints were made in the early 20th C. 
6 The requirement of seeking local courts first, called the local remedies rule, has been an 
important part of customary international law of the treatment of aliens. See,  and below 
s.5.3. 
7 Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (OUP) (2008) at p.37 
8 A.H. Roth, The Minimum Standard of International law, Applied to Aliens (A.W. 
SIJTHOFF/Leiden) (1949) at p.86.  
9 K. Grzybowski ‘Interpretation of decisions of international tribunals’ (1941) 35 AJIL 
482 at p.483-587; who does not liken the pacific settlement in the middle ages to the 
settlement of international disputes by arbitration developing in the mid 19th C, such as 
in the Mexican Claims Commission of 1839. Increase in inter-state arbitration lead to 
proposals for an international tribunal towards the end of the 19th C- L. Levi ‘Draft 
 rule of freedom from a denial of justice developed as a part of the international 
law of state responsibility to foreign nationals, which provided the minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens in the host-state.10 
 
Minimum standard elucidations have been based on broad and vague references 
to contemporaneous best-practices. Thus denial of justice has also been described 
in these terms with respect to the outcome of processes of justice that the alien 
pursues: ‘if it unreasonably defeats from the principles of justice recognised by the principal legal 
systems of the world’.11 On another reading this standard was the treatment that a 
state would give its own nationals or ‘national treatment’, however the standard 
that came to be accepted, and which governed the success of a claim of denial of 
justice is the formulation of the minimum standard in the Neer decision.12  
 
Whether denial of justice under the FET standard has gone beyond the minimum 
standard will be discussed below. Despite the incorporation of denial of justice 
under FET, it is not clear whether it should be restricted to the high threshold for 
a breach set by the minimum standard.  The tribunal in Wastemangement II stated 
that NAFTA must not be interpreted with the general law of diplomatic 
protection in mind.13 Further this is also said to be the case by the International 
Court of Justice in Diallo, where a distinction is made between investment treaty 
law and the general international law of diplomatic protection to illustrate that 
levels of protection for foreign nationals were different under each system.14  
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Project of a Council and High Court of International Arbitration’ in Arbitration Treaties 
and Tribunals   (Int’l Arb & Peace Assc ) (London) (1889)) at p.11.  
10 G Roha, ‘Is the Law of State Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of 
Universal International Law?’ (1961) AJIL 863 at p.864-891. 
11 See Guerrero Report in the 1961 Draft Convention on the International Responsibility 
of States for Injuries to Aliens (1961) 55 AJIL 548 at p.551. 
12 Neer and Pauline Neer (US v. Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 60 at p. Roth describes the Neer 
test as ‘one of the strongest expressions of the minimum standard’ at p.95-96. 
13 Wastemangement v. United Mexican States (No.2) ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3(NAFTA) at para 85. 
14 See Joint Dissent of Yusuf & Al-Khasawneh in Ahmad Sado Diallo (Republic of 
Guinea v. DRC), ICJ Judgment, (10/11/10). General List 103. at p.21. 
 B. Theoretical Basis and Scope in Customary International Law. 
 
The doctrine can be rationalised as assisting relations between states. This based 
on the presumption that a state has concerns for its citizens, and this concern 
extends to their activities overseas.15 As states are composed of their citizens, 
there is an intrinsic value to each citizen which can be expressed not only in 
economic terms of human capital, but also on moral terms of responsibility of 
state action. As Vattel says ‘Who ever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the state, which 
must protect the citizen’.16 This concern of states extends to valuing justice for its 
citizens and it sees the grant of justice towards its citizen as symbolic of respect of 
the host-state to itself.17  
 
There may be a case however to interpret the denial of justice rule as part of the 
minimum standard more onerously on states in the investment treaty context. As 
investment treaties are specific obligations that can, controversially, said to involve 
a policy agenda of capital promotion,18 this may justify interpretations that give 
more specific guidelines as to the manner of redress to be afforded to aliens.  
 
As a result of the large jurisprudential content concerning denial of justice, it 
eludes precise definition. 19  In simple terms it is correct to say that there is a right 
of freedom from denial of justice as the state must not breach the customary 
international law obligation to not deny justice to foreigners, this includes resort 
through courts and other means of redress, including administrative processes. 
 
                                                
15 This approach was exemplified by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston in the 
19th Century: G. Hicks, ‘Don Pacifico, Democracy and Danger: The Protectionist Party 
Critique of British Foreign Policy’ (2004) 26(3) Int. Hist. Rev. 515 at p.515-540. 
16 Vattel, Law of Nations (AMS Press) (1982) at p. 136. 
17 For reciprocity as a concept in international law, See: F. Parisi & N. Ghei, ‘The Role of 
reciprocity in international law’ (2003-04) 36 Corn. Int’l L.J. 93 at p.119-123. Note also 
the importance of justice to the function of a state is a corner-stone of jurisprudential 
study. One definition equates justice to adjudication fulfilling social values and goals: 
‘Adjudication is the social process by which judges give meaning to our public values’ O.M. Fiss ‘The 
Forms of Justice’ (1979-1980) 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1 at p.2.  
18 M. Sornarjah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cam. U. P) (2004) at p.211-217. 
19 J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (Cam. U. P) (2005) at p.98 
 Freeman in his seminal work on Denial of Justice in the minimum standard 
context summarised six elements to the content of denial of justice:20 
(i) Every wrong that a state commits to an alien that is a breach of 
international law. 
(ii) Unlawful acts and omissions by judicial authorities. 
(iii) A procedural breach based on the refusal to recognise a wrong.  
(iv) Denial of justice as related to application of municipal standards of 
judicial conduct, and wrongful (in the sense of municipal law). 
(v) Failure to obtain redress by an alien for a wrongful act of private 
individual or Government. 
(vi) Failure of judicial organs to meet international standards. 
  
As well as Freeman’s synopsis, Paulsson makes a further distinction between 
procedural and substantive denial of justice.21 A procedural denial of justice (a 
misleading term) is concerned with the overall fairness of the proceedings and the 
consequential outcome. A substantive denial of justice is concerned with the 
manner in which proceedings are carried out, such as the way the law is applied by 
the judge. The latter is where FET could feasibly develop denial of justice beyond 
its customary international law position. 
 
 
C. Illustrating the Customary International Law Position 
 
As the decisions of international courts and tribunals are sources of international 
law, they will be incorporated into the FET standard through the minimum 
standard in international law.22 As denial of justice was one of the most significant 
                                                
20 A. Freeman The International responsibility of states for denial of justice (Kraus Reprint (1970) 
at p.67-168, and, specifically, at p.161.  
 
21 J. Paulsson, (n19 above) at ps.98 & 167. 
22 The minimum standard is the lowest level of protection feasibly afforded to the 
investor under FET. See, I. Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in The 
International law of Foreign Investment (OUP) (2008) at p.56-60.  
 substantive doctrines under-which a range of complaints of foreign nationals were 
brought there are several cases on this.23 Some of the examples given demonstrate 
that, some international tribunals, aided by a much more specific remit in their 
compromis have gone into reviewing the decision of municipal court in order to 
determine whether the breach of the rule has in fact occurred.  
 
The Neer decision is the most important decision in this field, as it is formulaic of 
the customary international law level of treatment of foreign nationals. It also 
gives a high threshold for a denial of justice that is not easy for the claimant to 
satisfy: ‘that the authorities… acted in an outrageous way, in bad faith, in wilful neglect of their 
duties or in a pronounced degree of improper action’.24 The claim itself is not directly 
related to the conduct of or outcome of judicial proceedings, but rather a broader 
issue of access to justice. The claimants were denied an investigation into the 
death of a relative in Mexico. Their claim for a denial of justice was rejected. This 
was on the basis that the efficacy and intricacies of a states’ criminal justice 
system, including the decision as to whether to prosecute and investigate, was a 
matter of municipal law and policy outside the realm of international 
adjudication.25 
 
A classic example of a denial of justice is a complete absence of legal remedies. 
Thus in the Atocha case it was unjust to expel without judicial proceedings an 
American citizen for a finding of complicity in a revolution.26 
 
 
Construction of an ‘objective or ‘outcome’ based approach to denial of justice 
 
The ‘objective’ approach (or ‘outcome approach), termed here, is where denial of 
justice does not look into how a judge exercises his or discretion on law or facts, 
                                                
23 See, Freeman (n20 above) at p.97-101.  
24 L.F.H. Neer & P. Neer (U.S.A) v. United Mexican States (1926) IV RIAA 60 (Award 
05/10/1926) at p.62 
25 Neer (n.24) at p.61-66. 
26 J.B. Moore, Digest of International law  (Washington) (1906) Vol. 4 at p.97, s.551.  
 but rather looks at the decision as a whole bearing in mind the alien’s case and 
determines whether there should have been judgment in the alien’s favour. This, 
however, allows the international tribunal to substitute its judgment for that of the 
national court. 
Most approaches to the doctrine fall this way, and looking into the national 
judge’s exercise of discretion is usually avoided. Thus the tribunal in Martini would 
not extend its review to the personal motivations of judges passing judgment. 
From a pragmatic view point these may be difficult to prove, as the tribunal 
stated:  
 
‘The tribunal is not in a position to form an opinion upon motives that might have inspired 
the Venezuelan judges at the time of the Martini case. If the decision of the Venezuelan court 
is based upon law, the psychological motives play no part. On the other hand, the defects in 
the decision maybe such as to cause the inference of bad faith on the part of the judges, but, in 
this case it is also the objective character of the decision which is decisive’.27  
 
This ‘objective’ or reviewing the overall ‘outcome’ of the case based approach 
focuses the review of the international tribunal on the final decision, and whether 
in it there are elements that may breach the Neer threshold. This is an ‘effect to 
cause’ based reasoning that may not protect the alien from minor, yet significant 
biases, by domestic remedies that cannot be spotted in the final outcome. 
Fitzmaurice, for example, envisages an objective approach through analysis of the 
decision first, then as opening a door to investigate the process. The threshold 
suggested again is high:  
 
‘The only thing which can establish a denial of justice so far as a judgment is concerned 
is an affirmative answer, duly supported by evidence to some such question as ‘was the 
court guilty of bias, fraud, dishonesty lack of impartiality, or gross incompetence.’28 
  
                                                
27 Martini Case (Italy v. Venezuela) 3 May 1930, (II RIAA 975); 5 ILR 153 at p.156. 
28 G.G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The meaning of the term denial of justice’ (1932) 13 BYIL 93 at 
p.113-114. 
 However, ‘objective’ or ‘outcome’ assessment can however relate to one part of a 
dispute or claim. Thus the tribunal stated that for a claim of denial of justice that 
all reasoning upon which the judgment was decided did not have to be have been 
unjust in order to bring a denial of justice claim. The tribunal stated:  
 
‘A decision may contain several independent findings and certain of them may be taken 
into consideration apart from the others’.29  
 
 
Misapplication of National Law and unwanted interpretations of national law as a basis of the 
claim 
 
The doctrine does not extend to errors of law made by national courts. This is 
illustrated by the Martini case. The Martini case concerned a mining concession 
granted to Venezuela.30 A claim was brought for a denial of justice and a breach of 
the 1861 Treaty between Venezuela and Italy. This claim was made in relation to a 
hearing in the Federal Court of Appeal in Venezuela.  
 
The concession for mining was issued in 1898 for a period of 15 years. The 
company was to pay the Government rent under the concession. The company 
ceased exploitation work on the basis of a civil-strife. The municipal court rejected 
the claimant’s plea that civil-strife allowed it to breach its obligation under the 
concession.31 The Venezuelan Governmentt then brought an action in the 
Venezuelan Courts.  
 
The tribunal drew a distinction as to which matters were for the jurisdiction of the 
international tribunal for the denial of justice claim, and which matters had to be 
left for a municipal court. Thus, if a Venezuelan court had erroneously stated that 
                                                
29 Martini (n27 above) at p. 157. 
30 Martini (n27 above) 
31 Martini (n27 above) at p.154; The position in international law may be different today 
due to the concept of attributability in the international law of state responsibility – See, 
Crawford (n3 above). 
 the concession was not in breach of the treaty then the actions of the court would 
invoke the international liability of Venezuela. However the tribunal stated that 
the related question of monopolies to the concession was a matter only for the 
Venezuelan Court.32It would thus not pass judgment on this matter.  The denial 
of justice doctrine did not extend so far as to cover to cover errors of law as far as 
the tribunal was concerned. 
 
The tribunal cited the basis of a discussion suggested by the Preparatory 
Committee for the Codification of International Law (the precursor to the 
International Law Commission) on the engagement of state responsibility to 
aliens. This is summarised below: 
(i) The foreigner refused access to courts to defend his rights. 
(ii) A judicial decision which is final and without appeal is 
incompatible. 
(iii) There has been an ‘unconscionable delay’ on by the court system. 
(iv) The substance of a judicial decision is prompted by ill-will towards 
foreigners. 
(v) Damaged suffered by the foreigner by judicial process- ‘is so gross 
as to indicate that they did not offer the guarantees indispensible 
for the proper administration of justice’. 33 
 
As to non-interference with judicial discretion to interpret contracts, Martini 
tribunal stated that where the municipal court had a choice of interpretations as to 
a contract, a single choice of one over another could not amount to a denial of 
justice. There would have to be bad faith as to the choice of a particular 
interpretation over another. Thus any bad faith would have to be demonstrated by 
the claimant through the decision itself. The tribunal had noted that as regards the 
agreement to pay rent, this was subject to many interpretations, so that it could not 
                                                
32 Martini (n27 above) at p. 155. 
33 The tribunal cited the basis of discussion No.5 suggested by the preparatory committee 
for the  codification of international law (in the matter of state responsibility to foreign 
property or persons). Martini (n27 above) at p.155, ftn 1. 
 as the facts before the tribunal, be said that the decision of the Venezuelan court 
was manifestly unjust.34  
 
A classic example of the ‘objective’ or ‘outcome’ approach is deciding whether the 
national court has been affected by public pressure. There is also possibility of 
public pressure concerning proceedings that may influence a decision amounting 
to a denial of justice. This was argued unsuccessfully, in the Soloman case, where 
the tribunal found that there was no clear link between public pressure and the 
actual adverse judgment that was passed.35 It may often be the case that foreign 
investors in proceedings will lead to public interest.36  
 
 
No basis of complaint on denial of justice for failure of alien to bring plaint 
 
The alien could not also blame the national court for errors in the way it had 
conducted its litigation. With regard to the civil-strife related defence of the 
claimant, the tribunal noted that this had not clearly been put before the court.  
Thus ‘the court could not be reproached for not having entertained an exception 
which was not clearly presented to it’.37  
 
 
Decisions of municipal courts contrary to international court judgments where international 
obligations apply 
 
The tribunal also discussed the issue of whether judgments of municipal courts 
contrary international awards could amount to a denial of justice. The tribunal 
stated that where there was a finding of a municipal court contrary to a finding of 
an international tribunal the State was bound to follow the international award. 
                                                
34 Martini (n27 above) at p.156. 
35 Abraham Solomon US v. Panama 29 June 1933, VI RIAA 370. 
36 See, D. Szablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: Mining Communities and the 
World Bank (Hart) (2007) at p.1-23. 
37 Martini (n27 above) at p.156. 
 Further, this did not require a national court to review the decision before 
following it. Nor could a municipal court invalidate it. In the Ralston award, the 
tribunal stated that state responsibility is engaged if ‘the attitude of a Venezuelan court 
is incompatible with an international arbitral award rendered in accordance with an 
international treaty to which Venezuela is one of the Contracting Parties’.38 The tribunal also 
noted the inherent obligation upon states to follow an international award:  
 
‘An international arbitral award is rather of the nature of an international treaty than a 
decision of a national court’.  
Freeman in his analysis also included the possibility of a denial of justice occurring 
when a national court breaches international law.39  
The case of El Triunfo concerned a Presidential decree that closed a port. A state 
concession for the operation of the port was acquired by a corporation with 
foreign shareholders. The corporation was thus unable to enjoy the benefits of the 
concession agreement. 40 The tribunal analysed the possibility of breach of 
contract stated in its own terms and stated: 
 
‘it cannot be said, as now here claimed by the Government of El Salvador, that there 
was any such failure of its obligations in the circumstances of the case as would have 
justified or sustained a complaint, for a breach of contract in a court of justice’.41  
 
The tribunal is placing its own subjective view of contract law, and specifically, 
what amounts to a breach of contract. However, the arbitrators believed that the 
success of the company lead to it being seized from foreign control, this was said 
to be a denial of justice as on remedy was given to that claimant for this 
usurpation of its rights to corporate control. Thus though the contractual element 
failed, the case still succeeded on other grounds. 
 
Judicial Errors 
                                                
38 Martini (n27 above) at p.157). 
39 Freeman (n20 above) at p.310. 
40 El Triunfo (US v. El Salvador) – 8 May 1902 XV RIAA 455 at p.467  
41 El Triunfo at p474 
   
There is a view that the doctrine does not cover errors of judges with regard to 
law. Such errors of the judicial role would amount to a denial of justice. 
Fitzmaurice states that ‘if all that a judge does is to make a mistake, i.e. to arrive at a wrong 
conclusion of law or fact, even though it results in serious injustice, the state is not responsible’.42 
This approach may be justified on the basis that it may not be fair to make the 
state responsible for a minor aberration of judicial process. Realistically speaking, 
errors of fact and law may be inherent in all judicial systems. Thus in the absence 
of bad-faith it may not be fair to invoke international responsibility.  
 
Lack of Judicial Competency engaging state responsibility 
 
This has some support for leading jurists, though it is difficult to see how this 
would work without a lessor threshold working with the ‘outcome’ approach. 
Thus the following proposition by Paulsson may be unworkable; Paulsson also 
does not agree that the international tribunal should not review a decision of a 
municipal court where an adverse competence is made: ‘what needs to be understood is 
that even if in extreme cases the substantive quality of a judgment may lead to a finding of denial 
of justice, the objective of the international adjudicator is never  to  conduct  a substant ive  
rev iew ’43 Paulsson believes that there must be a manifest injustice to impugn the 
competence of a municipal court.44  
 
For Fitzmaurice state responsibility is engaged when it appoints judges.45 De 
Visscher also wishes competency to be an international obligation. If competency 
is a part of the doctrine then it is a state’s duty to provide for proper recruitment 
                                                
42 G. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Meaning of the Term ‘Denial of Justice’ (1932) 13 BYIL 93 at 
p.112-113; Note also, E. J de Archèchaga ‘International Responsibility of States for Acts 
of the judiciary’, in Friedman, W.G. Henkin, and O.J. Lissitzyn Eds Transnational Law in a 
Changing Society- Essay’s in Honour of Philip C. Jessup (Columbia. Uni Press) (1972) at p.171-
188. 
43 Paulsson (n19 above) at p.84. 
44 Paulsson  (n19 above) at p.84-85. 
45 Fitzmaurice (n28 above). 
 of judges. However, Paulsson also states that where the court is not competent 
there is a denial of justice.46  
 
 
4.3 The Local Remedies Rule. 
 
In customary international law, prior to an alien seeking redress through 
diplomatic protection or another international remedy and thus engaging inter-
state relations, he or she has to ensure that he had sought out and exhausted all 
local-remedies. This requirement is known as the ‘local remedies rule’.47  
 
There is not a clear consensus as to whether the local remedies rule applies in 
investment arbitration.48 Some international dispute arrangement provisions 
expressly provide for it.49 As far as the engagement of the rule through existing 
                                                
46 See Paulsson (n19 above) at p.80-90. 
47 See C.F. Amerasinghe Local Remedies in International Law (2nd Ed, 2004) at 
p.11-29; see Certain Norweigean Loans ICJ 1957 ICJ Rep 9 at p.39; J.E.S. 
Fawcett ‘The exhaustion of local remedies: substance or procedure’ (1954) 31 
BYIL 452; J.M. Pasqualucci The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (CUP) (2003) at p.132.; D.R. Mummery, 
‘The content of the duty to exhaust local remedies’ (1965) 59 AJIL 398 at 
p.401; El Triunfo (n40 above) at p.477; In the ELSI case Judge Schwebel 
stated that he agreed with the US that ‘all reasonable’ local remedies had 
been exhausted, prior to bringing the claim. See, Electronica Sicula S.p.A 
(ELSI) Case (1989) at ICJ Reports 15 at p. 94. The requirement is thus not to 
pursue avenues which are otiose. It is regarded as part of customary 
international law. See, Interhandel Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 
1959, at p.27. 
48 See C. Schreuer ‘Calvo’s grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment 
Arbitration’ (2005) 4 Law & Prac. Int’l Cts. & Trib 1 at p.1-3; In Loewen, the tribunal 
rejected Sir Robert Jennings’ proposition in his opinion that local remedies rule is 
essentially confined to cases of diplomatic protection (n2 above) at para 150. NAFTA 
tribunals have stated that Chapter 11 of NAFTA dispenses with the notion of satisfying 
local remedies. See, Wastemanagement (No2) v. United Mexican States ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/4 (30/04/04) (116). It is has been stated that a full imposition of the local 
remedies rule is compatible with the investment treaty arbitration system, C. McLachlan, 
L.Shore & M.Weiniger Investment Treaty Arbitration Substantive Principles (OUP) 2007 at 
p.231-232.   
49 See, for example, . The application of the rule also exists in other international dispute 
resolution forums, See, for example, N. Udombana ‘So far, so fair: the local remedies 
rule in the jurisprudence of the African commission on human and peoples rights’ (2003) 
 customary international law, the first thing an international tribunal has to do 
prior to determining whether there has been a denial of justice is to assess whether 
the local remedies rule applies. This will occur so long as there is no express 
exclusion by the treaty. Secondly, the international tribunal must ensure, by 
reviewing the processes, that the alien has satisfied the rule. To explain further, 
Paulsson states:  
 
‘The issue of exhaustion of local remedies relates to the admissibility of claims and must be 
distinguished from issues of jurisdiction’50  
 
Similarly, in Loewen the Court stated that ‘the local remedies rule deals with the 
admissibility of a claim in international law, not whether the claim arises from a 
violation or breach of international law’.51 Thus prior to lodging a claim for denial 
of justice in international justice, municipal avenues for the compliant have to be 
attempted. Thus in the Leighland case the judge stated that ‘The Umpire (judge) does not 
conceive  that any Government can thus be made responsible for the conduct of a judicial officer where no 
attempt has been made [for redress] to a higher court’. 52 
 
 
On a strict application of the rule a claimant will only be willing to pursue 
international remedies if the claimant has, what is termed, ‘exhausted’ all local 
remedies. Thus the local remedies rule is not concerned with the substantive 
question whether there is a violation of international law. It is concerned with the 
question of whether a prerequisite procedural hurdle to international dispute 
resolution has been met.  
                                                                                                                                      
97 AJIL 1 at p.9. The rule has also been applied for claims under the European 
Convention of Human Rights,  
50 Paulsson (n19 above) at p.130  
51 The tribunal was referring to the reference to the local remedies rule in the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles for State Responsibility, Article 44 states: 
‘The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if…(b) the claim is one to which the rule of exhaustion 
of local remedies applies and any effective local remedy has not been exhausted’. Crawford (n3 above) 
at p.264. 
52 Leighland & Co v. Mexico (Case No.374 3 Moore Int Arb), cited at Loewen (n2 
above) at para 150-151. 
  
 
Rationales for the rule 
 
One of the key rationales of the local remedies rule is to give the state opportunity 
to redress the error.53 Freeman, on the other hand, finds that the fundamental 
rational for the local remedies rule is 'territorial'.54That is that the state where the 
violation occurs must be the where the judicial avenue for remedies must be 
pursued. The requirement that local remedies be exhausted is also based in 
fairness. Prior to the host-state being liable to the state of the alien, the host-state 
has been given adequate opportunity to remedy its wrong. Further the remedy 
allows the alien to reconcile the differences between itself and the host-state 
through seeking national remedies, particularly where the alien wishes to carry on 
operating in the host-state on secure or good terms. Further, international 
adjudication may be more costly than domestic litigation.55 Cost may be an issue 
for justifying the rule where feasible local remedies exist. This would certainly be 
the case with respect to investment treaty arbitration where lodging of plaints and 
costs are significant.56  
 
 
Exceptions to its application 
 
When determining whether local remedies have been satisfied-the tribunal can 
look at the judicial system to see whether viable remedies exist. Where they do 
not, the requirement will be waived. In the case of Robert E. Brown, the Claimant 
had been promised prospective licences to use a public gold field.57There was a 
                                                
53 Loewen (n2 above) at para 71. 
54 Freeman (n5 above) at p.416. 
55 Professor Reisman states that ‘The domestic remedy rule is founded on principles of 
economy, localisation of delict, remedy, and good faith’. W. M. Reisman, Nullity and 
Revision: The Review and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards (Yale Uni Press) 
(1971) at p.364. 
56 Paulssson does not firmly grasp this point, (n19 above) at p.99-101. 
57 Robert E. Brown (US v. GB) (23.11.1923) VI RIAA 120 
 refusal to grant the licences. There was an initial judgment in Brown’s favour 
setting aside the decision not to grant compensation as unconstitutional. Whilst a 
claim for damages was lodged the Chief Justice was dismissed by the President. 
The judgment was then made impossible to enforce by the executive. The tribunal 
stated that it did not matter that Brown had not lodged the claims he could have 
done, as in this instance it was futile. 58 
 
Similarly, the tribunal in El Triunfo noted that the Government had enervated the 
concession prior to local remedies being pursued thus the pursuit of local 
remedies would have been in vain.59 In that instance, there was a law annulling the 
investment and it is impossible that the municipal judiciary would quash it or 
review its appropriateness. It would be sensible however to do away with the local 
remedies rule where the perusal of local remedies is costly and futile. This would 
be for example where the foreign national has no hope of success.60 
 
Overall it is likely that the local remedies have to be exhausted prior to engaging a 
denial of justice claim. This allows a state to remedy its breach of justice. Where a 
state cannot afford a functioning appellate process, it may not able to use the local 
remedies rule as a defence to admissibility of a claim. 
 
 
4.4 Denial of justice in investment treaty arbitration. 
 
A. General Expositions as to current approach. 
                                                
58 Brown (n57 above) at p.128-129. 
59  El Triunfo (n40 above) at p.477-478. 
60 Paulsson endorses the approach that it is not worth pursuing local remedies 
where they are not available: ‘there can be hesitation [ to remove the 
requirement of the local remedies rule] if the international tribunal is satisfied 
as a matter of fact that theoretically available local remedies are incapable of 
altering a decision’ (n19 above) at  p.115. Reisman states that international 
tribunal’s should do away with the local remedies rule if there are legislative 
enactments precluding suit. See, (n55 above) at p.365. 
 
 Denial of Justice is included in FET, both through the minimum standard and 
exclusively of it. The key question is whether the tribunals have developed it 
further, particularly as regards to creating law for the court and reviewing 
domestic decisions. The basic concept is fundamentally the same. As stated in the 
Loewen the tribunal accepted that customary international law, through NAFTA 
Article 1105, imposed on states an obligation ‘to maintain and make available to aliens, 
a fair and effective system of justice’.61  
Currently broad statements by investment tribunals intimate that they will look at 
both the ‘outcome’ and the conduct of courts.  For example, in Loewen the 
tribunal elucidated a threshold for denial of justice based on the expert opinion of 
Sir Prof. Greenwood QC CMG. Thus for a breach there had to be one of the 
following resulting from the municipal proceedings:62 
1. ‘Manifest unfairness, or gross unfairness’.  
2. ‘[A]flagrant and unexcusable violation’.  
3. ‘[A] palpable violation’ in which ‘bad-faith seems to be the heart of the matter, 
not a mere judicial error’.  
4. ‘[T]he alien must sustain a heavy burden of proving that there was an 
undoubted mistake of substantive or procedural law operating to his 
prejudice’.  
 
As far as judicial error is concerned there is something of high threshold for a 
breach. The third and fourth elements indicate that this could lead to a breach but 
only in extreme cases.  The nature and purpose of these requirements is to set a 
high-threshold for denial of justice.63 
The tribunal in  Mondev International Limited v United States of America, also envisaged 
looking at the conduct of the court whether a breach had of the doctrine had 
occurred. The tribunal stated that by looking at all the facts and the conduct of 
                                                
61 Loewen (n2 above) at para 129 & para 153. 
62 Greenwood (n2 above). 
63 Professor Greenwood explained his opinion in [Greenwood in Sarooshi]. 
 the court whether there had been a breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. 64  The tribunal in Mondev, reaffirmed the classification on denial of 
justice by the tribunal in Azinian v Mexico. This highlighted four elements to the 
doctrine-  
(i) The relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit.  
(ii) Courts subject a suit to undue delay.  
(iii) Courts administer justice in a seriously inadequate way.  
(iv) Courts take part in a clear and malicious application of the law. 65 
Refusal to entertain a suit is a key element of denial of justice. As far as (ii) and (iii) 
are concerned, standards as to how domestic justice is carried out could 
potentially be incorporated by the adjudicating panel.  The latter two certainly 
would permit an international tribunal to review the municipal decision. The term 
‘inadequate’ is broad and vague and leaves it open to the international tribunal to 
determine adequacy. This in turn may lead to a review in the manner in which the 
judge approached the trial, determined the admissibility of evidence and other 
procedural and evidential rulings of the judge. Where adequacy becomes a judicial 
construct it may not factor in the capacity of municipal courts to administer 
certain types of justice without an express requirement to observe this factor. 
 
The third and fourth here also allow the investment treaty panel to review the 
municipal courts conduct but set a very high threshold for a breach. As far as 
overall threshold put down in these four criteria, it is very similar to the Neer test 
in that it requires serious failings of the municipal court to engage state 
responsibility under denial of justice. 
                                                
64 Mondev International Limited v United States of America, (ICSID Case No. 
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The tribunal in Mondev felt that the ICJ determination in ELSI in relation to the 
degree of arbitrary conduct by a state invoking state responsibility for 
mistreatment of aliens was useful in determining these tests for denial of justice. 
The ICJ in ELSI described it as ‘a wilful disregard of due process of law, … which shocks, 
or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety’.66 The tribunal stated that ‘in the end the 
question is whether (at the international level and having regard to generally accepted standards of 
the administration of justice)…the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable’.67 
This perhaps conflates a little the process of arriving at a bad decision. It is not 
clear from this statement whether one or the other will lead to a breach.  
With respect to the administration of justice or legal system, the tribunal in 
AMTO also emphasised that the tribunal should have regard to the development 
of the host-state’s legal system.68 In AMTO the tribunal said that there is also a 
burden on the investor to use available legal rights and avenue in the host-state:  
‘The investor that fails to exercise his rights within a legal system, or exercises its rights unwisely, 
cannot pass his own responsibility for the outcome to the administration of justice, and from there 
to the host State in international law’. 69  
 
B. An Overview of the Substantive Content: 
 
Key tribunal decisions in investment treaty arbitration on denial of justice follow 
in detail below. Other decisions are cited where relevant to the discussion.   
 
Azinian.  
 
                                                
66 Mondev (n64 above) at para 126. 
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One of the first substantive dispute relating to denial of justice under NAFTA was 
the case of Azinian.70 Ultimately,  the claims under the treaty failed as the 
international tribunal felt that the investor had grossly misrepresented its 
experience in the industry.71 However, the tribunal did address the issue of denial 
of justice. The State decision to annul the concession contract, for waste-disposal 
services in Mexico, was contested in municipal courts by the investor. The 
claimant stated that the Mexican courts had not addressed the contractual breach 
issue properly and accordingly there was a denial of justice. It was a claim on how 
judges had used the applicable law. The tribunal rejected the claim. The tribunal 
noted that there had been ‘three levels of Mexican courts’ that had found against 
the investor.72 For this reason the tribunal emphasised that its proceedings at the 
international level were not an appeal avenue from the municipal courts.73 The 
claimant, thus, had adequately opportunity to have his concerns about the 
applicable law adjudicated. 
 
The tribunal affirmed Aréchaga’s work that stated that there are three grounds on 
which an international court could intervene in domestic legal process:74 
 
(i) Decision of a municipal court that is clearly incompatible with a 
rule of international law. 
(ii) Denial of justice.75 
(iii) ‘in certain exceptional and well-defined circumstances, a State is 
responsible for a judicial decision contrary to municipal law’. 
 
It is the citing Aréchaga’s third ground that places investment treaty arbitration in 
a position to overturn national judges application of domestic law. It could review 
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the municipal court decision vis-à-vis this standard. This approach, may have the 
possibility for an appellate regime for the municipal courts application of the law. 
The Tribunal stated that the Claimant had not met the above requirements.76 
 
Loewen.  
In Loewen v. US, the foreign investor was sued by a domestic business for 
contractual interference.77 The case went to trial by jury on a broad range of 
causes of action. The domestic business won the suite and was awarded damages 
of half a billion dollars. The plaints as to denial of justice were based on two 
fronts. The first basis of its claim was a requirement that appeals to the Mississippi 
court of appeals would require an unobtainable deposit of 125% of the award 
against a party to appeal. This rule was enacted in the nineteenth century, where 
the likelihood of such high jury awards was remote, and remains unchanged. 
Secondly, the investor claimed that the judge failed to give the appropriate jury 
direction in the trial to curb the behaviour of opposing counsel.78 The investor 
here was specifically asking the international tribunal to determine the 
appropriateness of the conduct of the municipal judge. The tribunal dismissed all 
the claims, declining to do the latter. It stated that there was no basis in 
international law for such an intervention, into judicial discretion nor could the 
claimant challenge the out of date appeal rule.  
On reflection, it is also difficult to explain how the huge $625 million dollar 
deposit required to appeal was not a procedural rule amounting to the detriment 
of the investor. The Loewen decision has been heavily criticised as a feasible 
injustice.79  
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Mondev.  
 
 In Mondev v. US the tribunal dismissed all claims, including a denial of justice 
claim.80  In Mondev, the dispute arose in relation to real estate development 
contract concluded in between two state bodies. The investor filed a suit in the 
Massachusetts Superior Court against the City and another state contracting party. 
The trial resulted in a verdict in favour of the investor against both defendants. 
The trial judge upheld the jury's verdict for breach of the Agreement against the 
City. However the judge held that the other State body was immune from liability 
for interference with contractual relations by reasons of a Massachusetts statute. 
The investor appealed with respect to this immunity.  
 
On an appeal the immunity was upheld and the judgment previously in favour of 
the investor was overturned.  Further, the investor’s appeal to the US Supreme 
Court was denied. The investor claimed the denial of appeal, and the resulting 
upholding of the immunity of liability was contrary to the FET standard. 
Rejecting the investor’s claim the tribunal said that in the absence of customary 
international law requiring statutory bodies to be liable for torts, it could not be 
said that the immunity of the breached Art 1105(1).81 Further, the tribunal noted 
that there was no international consensus between states on the tort liability of a 
public body’s interference with contractual rights.82 The tribunal said that the 
immunity in this case was not a breach of NAFTA.83  
 
In this decision, the tribunal assessed the discretion available to the municipal 
court to apply precedent. The international tribunal took a close examination of 
the proceedings. The tribunal stated that the municipal court had not applied 
appropriately its common-law discretion available to it to apply and disregarded 
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81 Mondev (n64 above) at para 140.  
82 Mondev (n64 above) at para 149.  
83 Mondev (n64 above) at para 154.  
 precedents when adjudicating the investors’ contract claims against the City.84 
This demonstrated the detailed extent to which the international tribunal was 
willing to review the municipal court’s exercise of judicial discretion when 
applying municipal law.  
 
In an analysis, not so dissimilar to an appeal court, the tribunal went as far as to 
comment on the appropriateness of the municipal tribunal’s application of 
municipal tax law. The tribunal stated that the municipal court’s application of the 
municipal tax law principle of the ‘square corners rule’ in a contract law case, may 
raise a ‘delicate judicial eyebrow’, i.e. it might take judges who might try the same 
case by surprise but this did not mean that a denial of justice had occurred.85  
 
Overall, the tribunal leaves it open whether a large misapplication of precedent 
would amount to a denial of justice. Opening this aspect of denial of justice more 
would lead investment treaty arbitration to question the municipal courts 
discretion as to application of law.  
Wastemanagement II .  
In Wastemanagement II, the dispute related to a concession for the provision of 
waste disposal services in the Mexican City of Acapulco.86 The concession 
agreement was made between the claimant’s subsidiary Acaverde and the 
Acapulco city council. Under the concession agreement, the ‘subsidiary’ 
undertook to provide on an exclusive basis certain waste disposal and street 
cleaning services in an area of Acapulco.  The claimant claimed that the city acted 
in default of the agreement, particularly by not arranging financial relief. The 
investor brought a claim for denial of justice based on the manner of arbitration 
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of the concession dispute by the municipal Chamber of Commerce, and the 
national courts.  
Further the investors claim for denial of justice based on discrimination failed due 
to a lack of evidence of discrimination.87 Material to the denial of justice claim was 
evidence of discrimination that was absent.88 Further, even if state responsibility 
was engaged there was no breach of international law regarding the municipal 
arbitration process, as the claimant discontinued the process due to financial 
difficulty.89  
In the Federal Court proceedings, Mexican courts granted standing for the 
Claimant’s subsidiary against the Federal Bank for non-payment under the line of 
credit agreement.90 The case and the appeal were struck out on the basis that the 
Claimant’s subsidiary had not complied with terms of the line of credit 
agreement.91 The appeal was struck out on the further ground that there was a 
dispute between the city and the subsidiary as to a provision of services.92 A 
constitutional action by the claimant failed due to the failure of the subsidiary to 
prove a debt under the Line of Credit agreement.93 A second action was dismissed 
on the basis that the Federal Bank having been notified of the dispute between 
the subsidiary and the city was entitled to withdraw payment.94 Subsequent 
applications and appeals on this basis have failed.95 The rejection of the investor’s 
claims were thus justified by the municipal courts according to the tribunal.96 
Further, the tribunal also noted that the investor had brought the action against 
the wrong person in the municipal courts and that the substance of the dispute 
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was erroneously brought.97 This is a pure ‘outcome’ or ‘objective’ approach as 
seen in customary international law. 
The tribunal further emphasised that a litigant, such as a state party, cannot 
commit a denial of justice in proceedings-there has to be collusion by the courts. 
It is not unusual for litigants to be obstructive.98  
‘A litigant cannot commit a denial of justice unless improper strategies are endorsed and acted on 
by the court, or unless the law gives it some extraordinary privilege which leads to a lack of due 
process’.99  
There was no evidence of this in the case, hence the denial of justice claim based 
on the actions of Federal courts failed.100  
 
AMTO. 
In Amto v. Ukraine, the claim for denial of justice was dismissed.101  The claimant 
was a corporation registered in Latvia that played a key role in investing in an 
energy company, EYUM-10. EYUM-10 supplied its services to Energoatom. 
 There was an attempt by EYUM-10 to resist majority shareholder takeover by the 
claimant through the Ukranian Courts. The Ukranian judicial process also sought 
to determine whether the existing purchase of shares by the claimant in EYUM-10 
was a valid purchase of shares. However, following a partial hearing in the 
investor’s favour the judgments were not executed due to the bankruptcy of 
Energoatom. The claimant claimed that the non-enforcement of judgments and 
partial conclusion of court proceedings amounted to a denial of justice.  
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The denial of justice claims were rejected. The tribunal said that there was no 
evidence that the Ukranian Commercial Court of Appeal or Supreme Court were 
influenced by Government measures. The tribunal stated that the delays in 
proceedings that were complained of could be explicable due to complex nature 
of the litigation.102 This could not be a basis for denial of justice. Thus the tribunal 
refined the idea of delays amounting to a denial of justice in Azinian, namely, that 
the complexity of the litigation had to be borne into consideration when 
determining a finding on delays.     
 
Summary on scope of review 
 
The tribunal in Mondev formulated the doctrine as follows: 
 
‘in the end the question is whether, at an international level and having regard to 
generally accepted standards of the administration of justice…the impugned decision was 
clearly improper  and discredi table , with the result that the investment has been 
subject to unfair and inequitable treatment’.103  
 
The difficulty here is whether there is such a thing as ‘generally accepted standards of 
the administration of justice’. Standards of justice will depend on states and available 
revenue, as discussed below. In absence of specific formulations for rules, the 
denial of justice doctrine remains, in investment treaty arbitration, at a position 
where it only provides protection for the most egregious breach. Further, taking 
the Loewen decision into consideration, even this is questionable. Lack of standards 
of how efficiently and methodically both a judicial system, and judges, ought to 
operate, closes the opportunity for investment arbitration to carefully review the 
behaviour of legal systems. 
 
                                                
102 AMTO (n64 above) at para 83. 
103 Mondev (n64 abovbe) at para 127. 
 Instead the approach to denial of justice is that investment treaty arbitration 
panels is that there is not likely to be a breach baring the kind of glaring injustice 
envisaged under the minimum standard. Further, Loewen suggests that a glaring 
injustice caused by a peculiar national law, here an old appeal bond requirement, 
will not result in a denial of justice as extant (as opposed to retrospective) national 
laws cannot form part of a successful plaint. 
 
However, the high threshold approach coupled with a denial of review of 
municipal proceedings is not a consistent position. An assessment of the way the 
municipal court applied the tax law in Mondev is distinct, and feasibly incompatible 
from the strict boundary of not interfering with judicial directions to jury in 
Loewen. The difference between reviewing judicial discretion on law in the former 
and not reviewing jury direction on the latter is difficult to justify or rationalise. 
Both are interventions into judicial discretions, and it seemingly makes no sense to 
exclude one from the scope of a breach of state responsibility and not the other. 
 
The lack of clarity as to what the scope of review of municipal decisions is for 
arbitrators is also created by lack of certainty in definitions of denial of justice. 
Thus, broad definitions of denial of justice, in some cases still leave open the 
possibility of a close review of the municipal system including judicial discretion. 
For example, the tribunal in AMTO stated: 
 
‘It is, [denial of justice], a manifestation of a breach of the obligation of a State to provide fair 
and equitable treatment and the minimum standard of treatment required by international law. 
Denial of justice relates to the administration of justice, and some understandings of the concept 
include both judicial failure and also legislative failures relating to the administration of justice 
(for example denying access to the courts)’.104  
 
The scope or review here depends on the threshold of what is and what is not 
‘failure’. On one reading, errors of judicial discretion could fall within this. In 
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another decision, Mondev, the tribunal goes close to assessing this regarding the 
judicial application of municipal law. Thus the tribunal in Mondev looked at the 
application of the Leigh v. Rule of domestic law by the municipal court. Further, 
the tribunal looked at whether the judge departed significantly from this and 
stated that he had not done, as it falls within a range of applications that would 
have been applied by a common-law judge.105 A significant departure would have 
indicated a judicial error that may have given a finding of denial of justice. This 
does not mean that the threshold of denial of justice would be changed by a closer 
review than the close door approach in Loewen. In fact, only the most arbitrary and 
aberrant exercise of judicial interpretation of law may still engage the doctrine. 
Thus Loewen could have been decided the same way despite carrying out the same 
review, but having a high threshold of breach.  By contrast, in Mondev the 
tribunal’s review of the judicial discretion was the ‘appeal’ process approach that 
the tribunal itself had sought to avoid.106 As the tribunal in Azinian stated:  
 
‘The possibility of holding a State internationally liable for judicial decisions does not, 
however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of the national court decisions as 
though the international jurisdiction seised as plenary appellate jurisdiction. This is not 
true, generally, and it not true for NAFTA’.107   
 
Possible Defences and Issues with Current position. 
There are a few defences available for the host-state, including unacceptable 
review of the municipal judges’ discretion as in Loewen (rather muddied by the 
review of the Mondev tribunal). Further, as well as saying that the high threshold 
for a denial of justice has not been met, or that the host-state’s courts are not fully 
developed108 or do not have full avenues for appeal and the investor has to take 
                                                
105 AMTO v. Ukraine (n64 above) at para 133.  
106 Mondev (n64 above) at para 126. 
107 Azinian (n65 above) at para 99, cited in Mondev (n64 above) at para 126. 
108 AMTO (n64 above) at para 76. 
 these as it finds them there is also the slightly more controversial immunity 
defence.   
At present there is an available escape door for states to avoid suit for denial of 
justice in investment treaty arbitration. This is state immunity. If public bodies are 
immune from actions in municipal law, then the preclusion by immunity is 
enough to prevent a claim for denial of justice.109 The tribunal in Mondev did say 
that there could be circumstances where the general conferral of immunity for a 
municipal public authority could breach NAFTA, but did not elucidate how.110 
The international tribunal noted, however, that there would be reasons why a 
state may make a regulatory body immune from suits. 111 For example, it would 
affect the work of the body to meet negligence suits. 
Thus, the tribunal in Mondev explained:  
‘…it can be well imagined why a legislature might decide to immunize a regulatory 
authority, mandated to deal with commercial redevelopment plans, from potential 
liability for tortuous interference. Such an authority will necessarily have both detailed 
knowledge of the relevant contractual relations and the power to interfere in those 
relations by granting or not granting permissions.  If sued, it will be able to plead that it 
was acting in good faith and in the exercise of a legitimate mandate – but such a claim 
may well not justify summary dismissal and will thus be a triable issue, with consequent 
dis trac t ion to the work of the Authority.’112    
The preclusion of liability of public bodies by a host-state is an important policy 
choice regarding affordable cost of operating public bodies.113 A state may 
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preclude liability not only due to paying out money for such costs, but also due to 
the loss of revenue possibly fettering the function of public bodies. For example, 
in the UK, public bodies can be sued with respect to their statutory functions 
only.114This is done not only to give justice to a victim for a breach, but also for 
the ulterior motive of getting them to comply with their statutory functions. 
Government actions taken under the Crown can be sued in tort, though the range 
of these acts in public administration is limited. This by virtue of a specific 
statutory enactment, the Crown Proceedings Act 1947. 115 States may also have 
reasons to put certain acts beyond judicial accountability and control. This can be 
rationalised from the basis that states will place immunity on public bodies due to 
the costs of suits and that compliance with civil liability laws may interfere with 
their function.  
From this point of view, unfortunately for the investor, if a state contracts with an 
investment treaty and wishes to restrict the review of an international tribunal 
entertaining a suit for denial of justice, it may wish to pass municipal immunity 
laws prior to any investments being made under investment treaties. The tribunal 
in Mondev dealt has permitted immunity to preclude a possible finding for denial 
of justice, that does not sit tightly with the benefits of investment treaty 
arbitration as providing state responsibility without application of state immunity 
doctrines.116 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions. 
 
                                                
114 See Clerk & Lindsell On Torts 19th Ed. (Sweet and Maxwell) (2006) at p.519 et subsq; 
Buckley, ‘Liability in Tort for Breach of Statutory Duty’ (1984) 100 LQR 204 at p.204-
212; K. Stanton ‘New forms of the tort of breach of statutory duty’ (2004) 120 LQR 324 
at p.324-336. 
115 See Clerk & Lindsell On Torts (Sweet and Maxwell) (2006) at p.258-268; Trietel, 
‘Crown Proceedings: Some Recent Developments’ [1957] PL 321 at p.321-330. 
116 Though this specific exclusion is exclusive to ICSID, as opposed to investment treaty 
dispute resolution under other rules. See, D.R. Sedlack, ‘ICSID’s resurgence in 
international investment arbitration’ (2004) 23 Penn. S. Int’L. Rev. 147 at p.149. 
 The denial of justice claim under the fair and equitable treatment standard is an 
area of interpretation of FET, which, in contrast to legitimate expectations and 
transparency, has not resulted in significant positive outcomes for the investor.117 
This supervision of judicial conduct, the road taken by the Mondev tribunal, may 
require a response by states to prevent breaches of judicial errors in applying 
national law, in terms of accuracy of discretion in applying law. In host-states 
where such problems are persistent, appropriate training of judges to ensure that 
such discretion is exercised appropriately may be required.118 However, 
investment arbitration is not at present littered with complaints by investors of 
this type. This may also be an unaffordable cost burden to many developing 
countries.  
 
Further international review of domestic judges could result in states encouraging 
domestic courts to take care in investors disputes to avoid liability. This may lead 
to a preferential treatment of foreign investor’s over municipal nationals who do 
not stand to benefit from the creation of such international obligations. 119 If the 
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standards created under FET were to be greater than those provided to nationals, 
then this protection of the investor in municipal courts comes at a cost.  
Municipal proceedings are conducted at a financial cost to the state. 120  If specific 
standards for judicial discretion had been produced by investment treaty 
arbitration, then there would have been a further compliance cost as judges may 
need to be trained to accommodate international standards and to adhere to them.  
 
There are also ramifications of the possible investor preference intimated earlier. 
Host-states, particularly developing ones seeking capital, in order to comply with 
international standards, may re-align their municipal legal systems to carefully 
consider investor plaints.121 Civil justice systems are needed to facilitate and 
ensure harmony in social order and for legitimate allocation of social resources.122 
This is often due to revenue limitations that result in a state only being able to 
accommodate certain types and quantity of claims for justice.123 These may be 
good reasons not develop more specific rules using FET for domestic 
proceedings, though, as a matter of consistency, these reservations have not been 
borne with respect to transparency and legitimate expectations under FET. 
 
Specific rules, as with administrative burdens, have to be created in a way that 
states can comply with them. This will be an issue with developing states where 
there will be restricted revenue available to legal systems in contrast to the 
developed world. 124 In some developing countries legal systems are under 
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development and reform.125. Judicial systems in the developing world have the 
following characteristics that could harm the investor in disputes:126 
 
(i) Lack of judicial independence from the judiciary 
(ii) Ineffective resource management 
(iii) Inadequate legal education 
(iv) Difficult access due to raised fees 
(v) Inaccessible procedure 
 
Thus an investor used to judicial standards in a better resource allocated system 
may feel aggrieved as to the manner of proceedings or outcome.127 However, if 
carefully tailored, potentially these are standards for host-states that could have 
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America and the Caribbean: proceedings of a World Bank Conference (Technical Paper No. 280) 
(IBRD) (1995) at p.vii 
127 The institutional efficacy of legal systems in the developed world and their 
appreciation of the value of judicial independence is far greater than the developing- See 
a comparison between France and Germany, and Ecudador, Hungary and Peru in 
M.Dakolias, Court Performance around the World: A comparative perspective (Technical Working 
Paper a No.430)  (IBRD) (1999) at p.33-45. Note particularly that an increase in budget 
in Germany increased the courts ability to handle and resolve cases, at p.37. 
 been brought in under FET, which could assist the investor. The FET standards 
could have been tailored with caveats as to development. Thus ‘undue delays’ 
could be reformulated as, ‘taking into consideration the available resources in the state, the 
legal system has to be prompt in dealing with the investor’s complaint’. It is also worth noting 
that not all countries will wish to develop to market-based economies where the 
rule of law is a vital part of societal structure.128 
 
Such standards may not be able to be created through adjudication, where 
arbitrators may not have speed or resources to assess domestic legal systems. A 
legal criterion under FET of having expert evidence could provide some guidance. 
Alternatively, there could be an adequate system brought into determine whether 
these standards can be complied with domestically. There are also benefits for the 
host-state of incorporation. In transition economies where there is a developing 
rule of law, such standards- carefully construed to be cost viable- could assist 
economic development. This would support the purpose of many developing 
countries signing up to investment treaties: to receive capital for the end game of 
economic development.  
 
Current Issues with High Threshold and Scope of Review. 
 
There are benefits of the high threshold and restricted scope of review of 
municipal proceedings and legal systems. For one, they provide a level of 
coherence and clarity that other FET legal positions in transparency and legitimate 
expectations do not. However if certain caveats are observed, there is no reason 
to suggest that only the high threshold and restricted scope of review without 
standards could achieve this level of clarity and not a, different, more expansive 
normative position. Further clarity here with the minimum standard is not 
absolute, the current state of denial of justice in investment treaty arbitration 
                                                
128 This disparity between states can be illustrated by the various difficulties faced by 
commercial agents in getting contracts enforced in transition economies-See J.Sekolec 
‘The Rule of Law and the Transition to a Market Based Economy’  in M. Andenas & 
G.Sanders Eds. Enforcing Contracts in Transition Economies, Contractual Rights and Obligations 
in Central Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (BIICL) (2005) at p.11-19. 
 merely tells us that it is very difficult to bring such a claim, in the absence of the 
‘outrageous’ conduct envisaged in the Neer decision. 
 
The lack of development of denial of justice is arguably inconsistent with 
developments made by other law under FET for the improved conduct of 
domestic organs towards foreign investors.  A case for caution has been 
mentioned by some commentators. There is a school of thought that advocates 
caution by international tribunals reviewing in detail municipal proceedings. For 
example, Paulsson also does not agree that the international tribunal should not 
review a decision of a municipal court where the court is of questionable 
competence:  
 
‘what needs to be understood is that even if in extreme cases the substantive quality of a 
judgment may lead to a finding of denial of justice, the objective of the international 
adjudicator is never  to  conduct  a substant ive  rev iew ’129 
 
Paulsson’s concern of review of domestic courts decisions can be substantiated by 
the decision of Yuille Shortidge & Co.130 Here, the tribunal stated that the acts of a 
municipal judge including the judgment and his or her conduct could not be 
relevant to a finding of denial of justice. Pertinently, the tribunal noted that in the 
Portuguese Constitution there was a marked distinction between the executive 
and the judiciary.131 Rationalising the observation of this distinction it is possible 
that if a finding was made to the contrary, the executive arm of the state may have 
to monitor judicial conduct to prevent a denial of justice where a foreign national 
is involved in a dispute. This may affect judicial impartiality. In turn this may be 
unconstitutional in Portuguese law. Thus the tribunal stated that it would be 
                                                
129 Paulsson (n19 above) at p.84. 
130 International courts would not develop state liability for judicial acts due to a possible 
compromise of the independence of the judiciary. See, Yuille Shortridge & Co (21 
October 1861) in A. de Lapradelle and N. Politis, Recueil des arbitrages internationaux vol.I, 
78, at p.103-106. 
131 Yuille (n131 above). 
 unjust to make the Portuguese government to be liable for the courts, as courts in 
the Portuguese constitution were independent of the government.132  
 
It is still open to debate whether international tribunals can review the manner in 
which municipal tribunals have applied law. In doing so they may create an 
appellate regime for the investor. This is through providing another opportunity 
to debate points of law for a different outcome. This may be beneficial as it may 
create legal certainty in litigation involving the investor.133  Concerns include 
criticisms of appellate regimes of law-makers or political institutions are accurate, 
then this may result in enervation of the autonomy legal systems.134 As the 
Tribunal in Idler noted, the effect of executive ability to constantly invalidate 
judicial decisions: ‘otherwise the validity and strength given by law to the final decisions of the 
courts of justice of competent jurisdiction , upon full knowledge of the facts and the law of the case, 
and in faithful compliance with the precepts of law, would be weakened and destroyed’.135 
Another possible concern of international review by municipal courts is already 
stated, investor preference.    
 
Fitzmaurice envisages a higher level of obligation than Paulsson stating ‘if all that a 
judge does is to make a mistake, i.e. to arrive at a wrong conclusion of law or fact, even though it 
results in serious injustice, the state is responsible’.136 It is possible that in investment 
treaty arbitration a broader scope or review into municipal proceedings and legal 
system efficacy could have been done on these authorities, they would have 
covered the problem in Loewen regarding not exercising appropriate judicial 
directions to the jury. 
 
                                                
132 Yuille (n131 above). 
133 B. Atkins, ‘Interventions and Power in Judicial Hierarchies: Appellate Courts in 
England and the US’ (1990) 24(1) Law and Society Review 71 at p.74-75; M. Shapiro, 
Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) (1981) 
at p.37-64.   
134 B. Atkins (n135 above) at p.76. 
135 See, Idler v. Venezuela discussed in Paulsson (n19 above) at p.160 
136 Fitzmaurice (n28 above) at p.112-3  
 
 Further a lower threshold could be chosen for denial of justice. For example the 
following test: ‘an exercise, or omission, of judicial discretion which no reasonable judge could 
have made’ would increase the likelihood of a breach. It would allow the 
international tribunal to review the municipal court’s application of the law and 
decide whether and appropriate conclusion had been reached. Such a problem 
increases judicial flexibility, though ‘reasonableness’ is problematic still in terms of 
legal certainty. 
 
Overall there are reasons for a more substantive review, as well as against it. A 
greater form of review, and a lower threshold for a breach would have prevented 
the glaring injustice in Loewen.137 
 
                                                
137 See Rubens (n2 above). 
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Abstract 
 
The importance of coherence in rules to legal certainty shall open the discussion in this 
chapter, to put a case for why the lack of coherence in transparency and legitimate expectations 
may be a problem 
This chapter will then discuss the origins of administrative law, particularly with 
reference to the U.K., a developed nation. It will suggest that the creation of administrative law 
and the process of judicial review is a part of a particular set of historical circumstances in the 
development of the U.K., as with other developed nations. These pertain to the rise of the 
administrative and regulatory state in developed countries.  
Thus the creation of rules under FET that pertain to administrative standards that 
apply to developing countries will be opened to a critique of problems associated with transferring 
these rules from developed states to developed states. This will be further elaborated in the 
subsequent chapter. With respect to this problem the importance of consenting to rules by states, 
particularly developing countries to, what is possibly, a novel legal framework of liability, shall be 
intimated. 
 Issues discussed here are an outline of the value of deference to the legislatures in using 
public law doctrines such as substantive legitimate expectations, particularly as investment treaty 
arbitration operates without constitutional constraints.  
 
5.1. Introduction 
This and the following chapter is an examination of issues relating to the 
jurisprudence outlined in the previous three, particularly in relation to legitimate 
expectations and transparency. As these are rules that affect public bodies and 
state action at the policy level, the underlying question is why they ought to be 
formulated clearly so that states and investors can identify their rights and 
obligations. This shall be done by starting with a discussion on the importance of 
coherence in rule-making. 
 
This Chapter will then shift direction to develop a second set of critiques in 
relation to FET rule-making, mutually distinct from coherence. It shall being a 
discussion of what issues there may be in relation to public administrative liability, 
that has its origins as an idea in the developed world. This is because through FET 
rules are being transposed to the developing world due to the proliferation of the 
FET standard in investment treaties. It shall begin this discussion by outlining the 
origins of administrative law, giving a case study of England and demonstrate 
there were distinct historical reasons for its creation. This shall form the basis of 
further criticisms with its compatibility in investment treaty law, again regarding 
the existence of developing states who will take on such obligations through 
current decisions being a valid form of law under the sources of international law. 
 
Further to this, the idea of choice to a new form of accountability envisaged in 
public law rules under FET for the developing world shall be opened, to be 
developed into discussions in the next chapter. Here it will be done in an initial 
phase, outlining why it is important for states to be able to consent to legal rules.  
 
Critiques of FET rules which bring in administrative liability into ITA shall be 
discussed in the next chapter, and will then be used to strengthen a case for direct 
 consent of FET rules for developing countries that may struggle to appreciate 
what is involved in incorporating such rules domestically. Further to this, 
institutional changes for accommodating this value of consent will be brought to 
light in the final chapter.  
 
These discussions, predominantly in the abstract here, will be coupled with a 
discussion of legal transplantation in the next chapter, to formulate a critique of 
whether it is appropriate to incorporate public law liability where so many 
potential defendant states, due to their capital-importing desire, are likely to be 
from the developing world. 
 
5.2. Coherence 
 
The problems of coherence in relation to legitimate expectations and transparency 
have been outlined in the discussions in preceding chapters. Here is an 
explanation of why coherence is important so as to make a case for some 
institutional changes in the concluding chapter that may improve coherence with 
respect to the doctrine. Regarding this value, this chapter will also discuss 
‘deference’, which will be later explored as a tool to increase coherence of FET 
rules created by arbitrators in the final chapter. 
 
Coherence of construction and application of legal doctrine by adjudicators is 
needed for the acceptability of a system of adjudication.1 On a fundamental level 
legal incoherency occurs when laws cannot be identified.2 Of further significance 
                                                
1 E.J. Weinrib, ‘Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of the law’ (1988) 97 
Yale. L.J. 949 at p.952; T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (OUP) (1995) 
at p.38-41 & p.121-130. 
2 For example, this problem is seen with native American Indian law which is 
predominantly derived from historical analysis: P.P. Frickey, ‘Adjudication and its 
discontents: coherence and conciliation in Federal Indian Law’ (1997) 110(8) Harv. Law. 
Rev. 1754 at p.1756-1578; Methodological problems with customary international law 
may also lead to incoherence- J.P. Kelly, ‘Twilight of Customary International law’ (2000) 
40 Va. J. Int’l 449 at p.449-450. For a different position, See J. Pearce, ‘Customary 
International Law: not merely fiction or myth’ (2003) Aust. Int. Law. Jnl. 125 at p.125-
126. 
 is what such lack of clear identification does to the rule of law, or the acceptability 
of judge made law.  
 
A key component of coherency is predictability of the application of legal doctrine 
and its comprehensibility by subjects. Coherency renders judicial decision-making 
comprehensible where legal principles are being applied clearly3, and within the 
mandate given to adjudicators. Further, coherency allows subjects to whom rules 
apply to determine their obligations and rights, permitting acceptability of rules 
through their knowledge.4 Legal coherency thus supports the rule of law, by 
supporting a key part of it: knowledge and accessibility of rules.5 Coherence of 
legal doctrine is also vital to the functioning and management of adjudication6: 
courts and tribunals may not be able to control the type of claim before them but 
they must be able to exclude unmeritorious claims, provide justice and at the same 
time maintain legal doctrine.7 These aspects go into judicial decision-making 
simultaneously and they do not necessarily sit together hand in hand. Balancing 
such factors may make coherence of legal outcome a challenge. Absolute 
coherence is not necessary,8 but subjects of laws ought to be able to 
                                                
3 K. Kress, ‘Coherence and formalism’ (1993) 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 639  at p.641. 
4 E.J. Weinrib, ‘The jurisprudence of Legal Formalism’ (1993) 16 Hav. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
583 at p.590-p.596; E.J. Weinrib, ‘Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of the 
law’ (1988) 97 Yale. L.J. 949 at p.972. 
5 This idea goes to the heart of administrative law’s aims of promoting the rule of law: D. 
Dyzenhaus, ‘Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law’ (2004) 68 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. 127 at p.129. 
6 P.P. Frickey, ‘Adjudication and its discontents: coherence and conciliation in Federal 
Indian Law’ (1997) 110(8) Harv. Law. Rev. 1754 at p.1756-1578 
7 This is particularly so in precedent based system where judge’s make and maintain legal 
doctrine: K.J. Kress, ‘Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Rights 
Thesis, Retroactivity and the Linear Order of Decisions’ (1984) 72 Cal. L. Rev. 369  at 
p.354- p.390. 
8 Weinrib argues it is not possible: Weinrib, (n1 above) at p.966. This may be because 
obligations that are unclear, due to either: (i) Because the application of a given rule to a 
context is not clear or, (ii) that the drafting of the rule itself is unclear, will need 
resolution often by legal adjudication. Hence legal adjudication in some extent is a 
process of clarification of previous ambiguities in rules. Thus the efficacy of such a 
process itself can be determined by coherence of outcome, i.e. how a rule is formulated 
or reformulated through judicial dicta. Kress, for example, also states that borderline 
cases would not affect overall doctrinal coherence: K. Kress, ‘Coherence and formalism’ 
(1993) 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 639 at p.666. This is because they can be ignored by 
judges when applying legal doctrine. E.g. the permissiveness of abortion would not 
 approximately determine their rights and obligations from legal rules.9 Further, it 
has been argued that only with legal certainty through coherent legal doctrine, can 
law-makers and judges ascertain whether rules have beneficial or harmful 
effects,10thus allowing rectification of bad laws where necessary to maintain the 
rule of law. Assessment of the quality of judicial adjudication is also done by 
looking at how legal coherence is maintained and sustained.11  
 
The advantage of legal coherence is that it reduces conflicting propositions of law, 
and different outcomes on similar disputes.12 A key component of coherence is 
linguistic clarity in drafting, of judgments and laws. Ambiguous language or 
articulation of doctrine may harm legal coherence.13 Coherence may have to be 
weighed against other factors of ideal adjudication.14 Hence rigidity of doctrine, 
though assisting its coherence may undermine judicial flexibility to do justice.15 
From this perspective its relationship to acceptability of rules may not be absolute, 
but only as one important component of an ideal process of adjudication. 
However it is also argued that coherence is key to maintaining formal law-making 
(law-making by mandated institutions as opposed to custom) in a modern rule of 
law based government.16 
                                                                                                                                      
dismantle the law of murder. See also, J. Pearce, ‘Customary International Law: not 
merely fiction or myth’ (2003) Aust. Int. Law. Jnl. 125 at p.125-126 on non-requirement 
of absolute coherence. 
9 J. Rawls, ‘Outline of a decision procedure for ethics’ (1951) 60 Phil. Rev. 177 at p.178-
181.; Rawls’ states in his Theory of Justice that coherence is co-dependent on the subjects 
ability to assimilate the rule- Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP) at p.19 ; See, Kress (n8 
above) at p. 664. 
10 See, Kress (n8 above) at at p.645. 
11 Weinrib (n1 above) at p.971. 
12 A problem inherent in investment treaty arbitration due to its lack of supervisory 
judicial institution: See, Y. Shany, ‘Contract Claims vs. treaty Claims: mapping conflicts 
between ICSID decisions on multisourced investment claims’. (2005) 99(4) AJIL 835 at 
p.835-840; See, Kress (n8 above) at p.657. 
13
 R. Charnock, ‘Clear Ambiguity’, in A. Wagner & S. Cacciaguidi-Fahyat (Eds.) Legal 
language and the search for clarity: practice and tools (Peter Lang) (2006) at  p.65. 
14 See, Kress (n8 above) at at p.647, who does not place coherence of legal doctrine as an 
absolute in maintaining legitimacy of doctrine. 
15 Similarly, legislative processes may have to be pragmatic in weighing the passage of a 
law over and above its absolute coherence: See, Kress (n8 above) at at p.679 
16 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at p.150-171. 
  
Fundamentally, coherence of the law is important as subjects of the law rely on 
rules to determine what appropriate conduct and burdens are. In a commercial 
context awareness of rules may change decisions to enter into obligations of a 
private nature.17 Coherence also goes to the subject-matter of rules. Thus, though 
consistency of doctrinal application forms an important part of the fabric of 
coherence, mere consistency alone, without acceptable subject-matter of a given 
doctrine of law would not suffice for a workable doctrine. Such an approach 
would permit incomprehensible or unacceptable doctrine or its parts to exist 
without rectification. Coherence may mean something more than mere 
consistency and clarity; something more akin to actual relationships between 
ideologues behind a given doctrine, the application in a given case and its impact 
as a general rule.  
 
Coherence also values comprehensiveness of legal doctrine, so that most 
circumstances the rule seeks to control are within its ambit.18 This is so that 
effects of the rule and the aims of the rule are clear and comprehensible to 
subjects. However, detail or comprehensiveness of legal doctrine does not 
necessarily import coherence.19 On a basic level varied and different forms of a 
single cause of can undermine its coherence,20 though the benefits and losses of 
this may not be balanced.   
 
Thus, a judge faced with a huge range of different actions as forming the law of 
negligence, may decline to exercise his inherent power of not granting jurisdiction 
on the possibility of his removing a genuine claim. This would leave defendants 
unable to grasp what conduct is acceptable and which is not,21 thus leading to 
behaviour that is both risk averse and commercially detrimental. On the other 
                                                
17 R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 7th Ed. (Aspen) (1998) at p.101-111. 
18 See, Kress (n8 above) at at p.650. 
19 See, Kress (n8 above). 
20 See, Kress (n8 above). 
21 R. Stammler, Fundamental Tendencies in Modern Jurisprudence (1922-23) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 
862 at p.881-883. 
 hand, an excessively conservative restriction on doctrine, could preclude new 
areas of law developing through older ones, despite preventing any intervening 
incoherence in this development. Some common attributes to forms of liability 
within a given legal doctrine are important to maintain coherence, so that causes 
of action can maintain some degree of predictability in their existence.22 
Coherence of rules is more important than consistency, due to the need to change 
law to meet changing social circumstance, for example, a rule of murder that 
encompasses all forms of voluntary killing barring those done with a particular 
implement maybe incoherent, as well as irrational, for rational subjects to accept.23 
 
Coherence is subject to varied definitions.24 Coherence theory can be generally 
articulated as ‘monist’ or ‘dualist/ pluralist’, although there is significant similarity 
as to the goal of these approaches.25 Monist theories consist of analysing 
coherence of legal doctrines from how different parts can fit together without the 
doctrine losing sense.26 As an example of monism, Weinrib’s conception of 
coherence values legal certainty but is also concerned with the existence of an 
overriding theme. Thus coherent rules are those that have a unifying theme, and 
an absence of competing ideologues or values within the same laws or legal 
system.27 From this perspective, the coherence of fair treatment would mean the 
existence of some common goals between interpretations, in order to make 
interpretations predictable as opposed to random.   
 
                                                
22 See Franck (n1 above). 
23 R. Alexy & A. Peczenik, ‘The concept of coherence and its significance for discursive 
rationality’ (1990) 3 Ratio. Juris. 130 at p.13 
24 Dworkin, for example, believes that legal coherence is made of constituent organs of 
the state that participate in legal norm making and the cohesiveness (or compatibility) of 
the values these organs produce- See, Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart) (1998) at p. 178-200.  
25 This follows a general distinction made by Kress. See, Kress (n8 above) at at p.662. 
26 The work of Weinrib, as described by Kress, is monist. See, Kress (n8 above) at at 
p.641; J. Stick, ‘Formalism as the Method of Maximally Coherent Classification’ (1992) 
Iowa. L. Rev. 773 at p.773-782. 
27 E.J. Weinrib, ‘Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of the law’ (1988) 97 
Yale. L.J. 949 p.971. 
 Pluralist theories seek to focus on how different aspects of a given legal doctrine 
co-exist and their relationships.28 Thus such analysis relates to the compatibility of 
different interpretations of the same legal doctrine, and whether the inclusion or 
exclusion of any specific part breaks or undermines a given taxonomy. For 
example, such an analysis would include a determination as to whether product 
liability, which may only arise through breaches of contract, is effective in its aims 
of deterrence as with other forms of strict liability in the law of negligence so as to 
be a part of that legal field. Appropriate plurality maintains relevant aspects of the 
law that make it coherent, and removes parts that render it incoherent. There thus 
exists a commonality of varying subject-matter, including effect of the rule, or the 
particular policy the rule conveys. Plural coherence is not concerned with a 
singular overriding guiding principle for an area of law, or cause of action as 
monist coherence might be.  The monist and dualist distinction serves to 
demonstrate some important attributes of legal coherence that will create 
legitimate legal doctrine.  
 
Determination of plural coherence may be important to overall acceptance of the 
law. To a degree legal coherence is affected by conflicting ideologues within legal 
doctrine or their parts. Plural cohesion understands that approaches to an area of 
law may affect its form.29 For example, whether one sees the aims of tort law to 
provide distributive or punitive justice will affect the law of damages that attach to 
the substantive law, and to a degree, the formation of doctrines of liability. A 
given elucidation of legal doctrine by a court should also be coherent in its 
content; it ought to contain import factors that play into a correct and fair 
adjudication of a cause of action based on it.30 Analysing from the same 
proposition, the opposite may also hold a truth: namely that irrelevant 
considerations may render the application of a doctrine incoherent to parties to 
the adjudication. Weinrib, for example, sees it as important that the policy behind 
                                                
28 For example, Dworkin sees institutional coherence as been filled by multiple facets of 
institutional behaviour. Dworkin (n24 above) at p.178-220. 
29 Kress, (n8 above). 
30 D. Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685 at p.1721-1725. 
 the rule is clearly ascertainable from its judicial application.31 This will protect 
judge made law from arbitrariness that can harm the rule of law by affecting the 
predictability of rules.32 
  
Overall the following two key characteristics of coherence will be important to 
rule-making, or elucidation of legal doctrine. These are: (i) linguistic clarity of 
elucidated rules and (ii) predictability and consistency of rules. These attributes are 
not fully satisfied with FET in relation to the scope of review being different 
between denial of justice and legitimate expectations, and the lack of clarity within 
transparency and the legitimate expectations doctrine.  
 
If the standard wishes to increase legal certainty and move to a more concrete 
doctrinal position, ensuring these two factors are met will increase legal 
predictability and enhance the rule of law in investment arbitration. As the FET 
standard is linguistically ambiguous, perhaps even with customary international 
law as an aid to its interpretation,33 there is a challenge for arbitrators is to reduce 
clarity through the creation of coherent interpretations. Interpretations that 
improve legal clarity of obligations will make it easier for states to follow the rules 
and ensure investors know of what their rights are.34  
 
Systemic problems such as different arbitrators being able to apply different 
interpretations of FET law with different aims of what the doctrine that may 
create legal incoherence, will be discussed in the concluding chapter.35 Suffice to 
                                                
31 E.J. Weinrib, ‘The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism’ (1993) 16 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Poly 
583 at p.585-589; For Kress this has to manageable rather than absolute: See, Kress (n8 
above) at p.677 
32 E.J. Weinrib, ‘Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of the law’ (1988) 97 
Yale. L.J. 949  at p.971. 
33 See chapter 1; J.P. Kelly, ‘Twilight of Customary International law’ (2000) 40 Va. J. 
Int’l 449 at p.449-450 
34 E.g. An  exercise of police discretion is found to be more lawful where the rules are 
clear. See, C.E. Smith, ‘Bright-Line Rules and the Supreme Court: The tension between 
clarity in legal doctrine and justice’s policy perspectives’ (1989) 16 Ohio. N.U. L. Rev. 
119 at p.120-121. 
35 A similar problem is faced with theory: See, Kress (n8 above) at at p.668; D. Kennedy, 
‘Distributive and Paternalist motives in contract and tort law; with special reference to 
 say at this stage, in common-law systems this problem is to a degree off-set by 
controlling appellate jurisdiction and giving that jurisdiction power to reformulate 
rules.  
 
 
5.3. The Nature of the FET rules. 
 
The fair and equitable treatment standard has been interpreted to ensure 
government process acts in accordance with certain standards, as outlined in 
Chapter 1. What follows is a discussion of the nature of administrative liability and 
its rationales in order to explore what difficulties states, particularly those in the 
developing world, may face with these forms of liability. 
 
A. Rationales of Public Law 
 
The existence of rules to govern administrative organs and avenues of legal 
accountability of state action is based on specific ideals of governance.36 This ideal 
of governance evolved to avoid the dangers of the unlimited and arbitrary exercise 
of power.37 This is because such power was not always exercised in the public or 
national interest, nor did it result in circumstances favourable to either.38 
 
The development of the ability of courts to adjudicate matters of state that affect 
private individuals is a reflection of this historiography towards transparent 
democracy. Where legitimate government is only government by consent, the 
availability of state accountability to the individual will be a fundamental 
prerequisite in making government action acceptable. This is a key rationale 
                                                                                                                                      
compulsory terms and unequal bargaining power’ (1982) 41(4) Maryl. Law. Rev. 563 at 
p.563-564. 
36 M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP) (2003) at p.1-27. 
37 Ibid. 
38 W.M. Sloane, ‘History and Democracy’ (1895) 1(1) Am. Historical. Rev. 1 at p.5-6 
 towards the development of public law.39 A legal avenue to redress wrongs of 
state action was thus seen as an important step in not only constraining the power 
of the state but also ensuring that affected individuals could obtain redress, thus 
maintaining acceptability of the machinery of government as a whole.40 
 
Administrative law also aims to play an important role in strengthening the rule of 
law by ensuring the framework of state action is bound by rules that can be 
subject to adjudication.41 Its theoretical foundations and development are based in 
the Western concept of the state and Government. 42  It is particularly a response 
to the growth of the administrative state.43 This form of governance, rooted in 
individual accountability is one that has been accepted globally with reservation,44 
as well as currently being short of full institutional implementation.45Thus in a 
global legal system that would prefer political plurality, the formation of uniform 
rules of public law may not sit happily with that preference.46 
 
At the heart of public law is the idea of state function as opposed to private 
function. This distinction of private and public, is based on a liberal conception of 
the state that seeks to protect the realm of private action for the individual. This 
liberal reading of public law has at its heart legal avenues that seek to maintain 
                                                
39 R.C. Moe & R.S. Gilmour, ‘Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration: The 
Neglected Foundations of Public Law’ (1995) 55(2) Pub. Admin. Rev. 135 at p.135-138; 
M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory  (OUP) (1992) at p.29-36. 
40 See T.R.S .Allan, Law, Liberty, Justice: Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (OUP) 
(2001) 
41 (n36 above). 
42 See Loughlin (n39 above). 
43 A.W. Bradley & K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Pearson: Longman) 
(2007) at p.661-663. 
44 K.L. Remmer, ‘New theoretical perspectives on democratisation’ (1995) 28(1) Comp. 
Pol. 103 at p.103-105. 
45 G.A. O’Donell, ‘Delegative Democracy’ (1994) 5(1) Jnl of Democ. 55 at p.55-58 For a 
discussion of how international governance models need domestic implementation capacity see, 
A. Dimitrova, A. "Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity 
Requirement". (2002). 25 (4),  West European politics 171. at p.173 
46 Pluralism would look at more than one source of law, See P.S. Berman, ‘A plurarlist 
approach in international law’ (2007) Yale. Int’l L. 301 at p.310, 312-313. (c.f. Moravcsik 
does not feel that pluralism is possible due to inherent tendencies towards hegemony in 
polity-See, A. Moravcsik, ‘Taking preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international 
politics’ (1997) 51(4) Int. Org. 513 at p.518). 
 individual liberty through ensuring public participation in administrative decision-
making.47 From this perspective, public law is actively involved in ensuring the 
legitimacy of the individual and the state. Thus legislation to control 
administrative action became popular where state administrators could not be 
relied upon to use unlimited discretion granted to them appropriately. As 
Loughlin argues, this developed from ideas of natural rights conceived during the 
enlightenment, including the idea that the end game of governance is to exercise 
power for individual interest. Thus public lawyers now ascribe administrative law 
as constraining unlimited power so as to corroborate the rule of law.48 
To assess the appropriateness of placing constraint on investment tribunals, 
rationales for constraints in English law are useful. English Public law is 
concerned with both the substantive law that governs administrative institutions 
and the judicial process of reviewing administrative action. This latter process is 
termed ‘judicial review’.  
 
Judicial review in English law has developed certain key rules for individuals to 
challenge acts of administrative organs.49 A key theme within judicial review in 
English law is that whilst it grants substantive remedies to annul or override 
administrative acts, it cannot do so with respect to legislative acts.50 For political 
expediency and to maintain judicial integrity,51 the English constitution has been 
arranged so that direct decision of matters of policy and law are out of reach of 
                                                
47 The liberal basis being a fundamental part of democracy. Doyle defines democracies as having 
four major characteristics: (1) protection of private property; (2) a market economy; (3) equality 
under the law and respect for human rights; and (4) a representative government individuals. See 
M. W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 Phil. & Pub. Af. 205, at p. 206-09. 
48 J.L. Jowell, Law and Bureaucracy: Administrative Discretion and the Limits of Legal-Action 
(Dunellen: New York) (1975) at p.12. 
49 The rules of (a) irrationality; (b) illegality; and (c) procedural impropriety has 
highlighted by Lord Diplock in the seminal English case of Council of: Civil Service 
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374  at p.410; H.F. Rawlings, ‘Judicial 
Review and the ‘control’ of Government’ (1986) 64(2) Pub. Admin. 135 at p.135-144. 
50 S. Susan, ‘Judicial Review in Britain’ (1994) 26(4) Comp. Pol. Stud. 421 at p.425-p.426. 
51 Judicial integrity is said to be important to maintain judicial legitimacy over disputes so 
that parties comply with judgments. It is also important to the rule of law: as institutions 
that assess the abuse of power by individuals and the state ought not to themselves act in 
excess or without restraint- See, T. Persson, G. Roland, G. Tabellini, ‘Separation of 
powers and political accountability’ 113(2) Qrt. Jnl. Econ. 1163 at p.1163. 
 courts.52 This approach of ‘deference’ to the legislature is at the heart of the 
English constitutional arrangement between law-makers and adjudicators.53  This 
means that courts can review the decision of administrative organs and quash 
inappropriate decisions, but not any law, delegated law, or regulation.54 Though 
the process of review may include issues of law, the remedy available in the 
process is not used to annul it.55 The process also avoids an impact that has a 
similar effect. 
 
A further reason for this is to preserve democracy in rule making. Thus whilst 
legislative processes are done by consent of the citizens that those rules affect, 
there is no consent prima facie granted to courts to annul law by the public. 
Citizens at large cannot participate in a judicial analysis that results in the 
production of a rule. Denying a legislative effect or altering it judicial through 
interpretation may impact upon the policy that the rule is promoting.56 The 
judicial position, a fortiori, becomes a policy choice itself. There is also a general 
concern that judicial law-making is inefficient in making general rules due to it 
                                                
52 This unwritten rule of the English constitution is primarily the result of historical 
development of a constitutional convention. For a broader discussion: See, D. Jenkins, 
‘From unwritten to written: Transformation in the British common- law tradition’ (2003) 
36 Vand. J. Trans. 863 at p.864-867. 
53 Though this has been no means absolutely accepted. Judges continue to argue of the 
role of judicial law-making when there is a conflict between fundamental rights and 
legislative enactments, See P. Mullender, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty, the Constitution 
and the Judiciary’ (1998) 49 (1) N.I.L.Q. 138 at p.138-139. In the U.S. there have been 
calls for a ‘political question’ doctrine whereby the Supreme Court can evade dealing 
with political questions related to constitutional disputes, to preserve the constitutional 
separation between legislature and judiciary: See, L. Henkin, ‘ Is there a ‘political 
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54 J. Jowell, ‘Beyond Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of administrative law’ (1998) 14. 
Commw. Law. Bull. 858, at p.858-859 
55 Determinations of the legality of administrative acts vis-à-vis the statutory powers 
granted to them through the use of the ultra-vires norm are a classic example of this, See 
P. Craig, ‘Ultra-vires and the Foundations of Judicial Review’ (1998) Cam. Law. Jn. 57 at 
p.57-63. 
56 Federal control of insurance regulation that was espoused in the U.S. McCarran-
Ferguson Act 1945 was said to be ‘emasculated’ through judicial interpretations of the 
Act over decades. See: S.L. Kimball & B.P. Heaney, ‘Emasculation of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act: A study in judicial activism’ (1985) Utah. Law. Rev. 1 at p.2 
 being a result of particular disputes.57 A particular dispute is not necessarily a basis 
on which to determine general law or policy. Thus judicial law-making can only 
have a specific scope restricted to the case before it, rather than be of general 
application. Alternatively judges may have to balance creating a general rule with 
dealing with the dispute before them, at the cost of efficacy of the former. This is 
said to restrict judicial constraints 
 
A deferential approach by courts has on occasion affected fundamental rights that 
were sought to be vindicated by the judicial review process. Thus, criticism has 
been thrown at English courts for their strict adherence to doctrines such as 
‘irrationality’ which set a high threshold for review, and thus restrict the scope of 
the courts interference with administrative decision-making until that threshold is 
met.58 
Judicial review in English law was subject to concern in its early days by those 
who supported the Diceyan orthodoxy. A common justification and response for 
the process of judicial review is that it would improve the efficiency of law. 
Sunkin criticises this emphasis on efficiency as it is not the key concern of 
democratic rights in public processes with which public law is concerned. Rather 
it is concerned with participation in decision-making to increase consent of 
outcome, often at the cost of efficiency.  
 
 
B. A brief history of English Public Law and the Administrative State 
 
In some states judicial review is a relatively recent phenomenon.59 This is so even 
amongst developed or capital importing states, as a brief history of English public 
                                                
57 A. Scalia, ‘The rule of law as a law of rules’ (1989) 56 (4) Uni. Chicago. Law. Rev. 1175 
at p.1176-1177. 
58 See Jowell (n54 above) at p.861. 
59 The World Bank is advocating judicial review of legislative acts in the third world on 
the basis of filling the gap in generally weak democratic accountability mechanisms- See, 
R.E. Messick, ‘Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A survey of the issues’ 
(1999) 14(1) World Bank Research Observer 117 at p.123; Problems of developing 
judicial accountability of acts of state is not restricted to developing states, and have been 
 law can demonstrate. Judicial review is a dispute-settlement response to the rise of 
the administrative state or public administration and the need to regulate new 
forms of economic activities.60 This form of state construct started to form at the 
end of the nineteenth century and through the twentieth century.61 It was both a 
part of a shift of ideological approach to the nature of the state, such as the rise in 
welfarism from liberal laissez-faire approaches,62 and a functional one. The latter 
includes the need of the state to respond to the development for the general safety 
of its citizens as well as maintain its power through economic hegemony. The 
growth of public administration is a product of a particular historical paradigm. 
Arguably administrative frameworks using the law were built to minimize the 
discretion of state officials and organs to prevent the abuse of power. The 
reduction of the powers and discretion of the police to carry out legal 
determination in the nineteenth century has been cited as an example of this.63 It 
has been argued that it is the specific political discourse and economic factors of 
the western post-industrial state that has given rise to the growth of administrative 
institutions to execute an increasing range of state activity.64 In simple terms, this 
has the growth of the industralised state at the heart of it and, subsequently, the 
rise of welfarism in the developed world.65 This has had a significant impact on 
developing governing processes as distinct from central government to meet 
multifarious administrative, and also, regulatory institutions. The latter was 
                                                                                                                                      
seen in the transition to democracy in prior communist states, H. Schwartz, ‘The Struggle 
for Constitutional Justice in Post Communist Europe’ (Uni Chicago Press) (2000) at 
pages, ix-xii, p.1-4.  
60 For a brief historical account See, P.P. Craig, Administrative Law (1999) (4th Ed) (Sweet 
and Maxwell) at p. 54-67 where Craig highlights the increased use of the administrative 
state in the 19th and 20th C.  
61 G. Majone, ‘The rise of the regulatory state in Europe’ (1994) 17(3) West. European. 
Pol. 77 at p.78 
62 A.J. Taylor, Laissez-Faire and state intervention in the 19th Century, (Macmillan) (1972) at 
p.14-452. 
63 G.H. Williams, The Law and Politics of Police Discretion (Greenwood Press) (1984) at p.16 
64 O.P Dwivedi &  K.M. Henderson, ‘State of the art public administration & 
development administation’ in Public Administration in a World Perspective (IOWA Uni 
Press) (1990) at p.13-15. 
65 For example their was a significant rise in public administration as a result of the U.S. 
New Deal in the 1930s, See, G. Lawson, ‘The Rise and rise of the administrative state’ 
(1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231  at p.1232-1233 
 primarily a state response to economic theory developing beyond mere laissez-
faire to advocating the benefits of state intervention in the market.66  
 
With the growth of administrative institutions came the need to develop particular 
working cultures and practices amongst their employees.67 The rise of the 
administrative state raised concerns about maintaining democratic controls over 
administrative acts.68At its heart, this is was the development of safety-regulation 
and related administrative frameworks in the industrial period. As a contrast, 
today, many African and South American states with a different historiography, 
including a lack of economic and industrial development, have a weak 
administrative infrastructure along with a tendency for centralized government.69 
Where initiatives of developing an administrative state come from economic and 
social development,70 they are absent from many developing states.71 Further 
administrative infrastructure and reform requires key resources such as an 
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the Judicial Statehood’ (1982) 35(1) World Pol. 1 at p.7 
70 D.A. Rondinelli, Development projects as policy experiments: An adaptive approach to development 
administration 2nd Ed (Routledge) (1993) at p.viii; Dwivedi and Henderson argue thte 
social and economic factors where not present in the developing world to bring about an 
effective modern administrative state- O.P Dwivedi & K.M. Henderson, ‘State of the art: 
Comparative Public Administration & Development administration’ in O.P ivedi & K.M. 
Henderson (Eds.), Public Administration in a World Perspective (Iowa Uni Press) (1990) p.13-
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effective revenue base and professional civil servants to function.72 The restricted 
availability of these fundamental resources in the developed world has often 
thwarted administrative development. This places states with weak or non-existent 
administrative institutions at a greater risk of violation of administrative standards 
created at the international level. This is due to the absence of appropriate 
administrative infrastructure that can meet the ideal needs of foreign investor. In 
essence this means that administrative efficiency is less, and thus more likely to 
violate administrative law under the fair treatment standard, particularly as those 
rules are created without reflection of administrative structure of the state.    
 
Judicial review of administrative acts in English law did not materialize as a 
cohesive process until the 1970s.73 Until then English law operated under a 
stricter doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, whereby the courts were not to 
adjudicate on legislative acts. In England, there was for a considerable period 
from the end of the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century significant 
judicial opposition to officially recognizing public law. This opposition was based 
on the idea that the state should be subject to the common-law, or private law, 
and to grant the state a distinct system of law was to lead to special privilege. This 
would not be compatible with a liberal democracy.74 As stated, English Public law 
is concerned with the substantive law of administrative frameworks and the 
judicial process of reviewing administrative action.  
 
Thus, in broad terms, Public law can be seen historically as the legal response to 
the development of civil rights and the modern state. The latter incorporates 
administrative and regulatory apparatus, that were developed primarily as a result 
of the industrial revolution in the nineteenth century.75 These rights originated in 
political discourse reflecting upon and, in turn, inspiring revolutionary movements 
                                                
72 Dwivedi & Henderson (n70 above).at p.13-14. 
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(1988) at p.36-37 
75 See, E. Hobswan, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (Vintage) (1996) at p.29-47. 
 away from monarchical Government to democratic ones.76 As such they focus 
around a particular conception of the state and its relationship with the individual 
that historically pertains to specific states in the world.77 This democratic political 
theory placed primary emphasis on the role and rights of the individual vis-à-vis 
those that governed him. It included notions of liberty that minimized state 
interference in the individual’s life and ensure that the Government apparatus 
functioned as far as possible with the consent of the individual.78For this reason 
administrative legislation in England was regarded with some suspicion as it 
seemed to remove power away from a democratically elected body that legislated. 
When rights against administrative institutions were developed by English courts, 
it was with strict reverence to law that was formed through the democratic 
process of Parliament. This preservation of law that is made through electoral 
consent in actions in English public law has been highlighted by public lawyers 
through the term ‘deference’. ‘Deference’ then can be an important method of 
preserving consent in adjudicatory action. 
 
C. The Role of Deference 
 
The orthodox position of not granting remedies that affect substantive law and 
regulation in Judicial Review is termed ‘deference’ to the legislature. Deference is 
justified from the perspective that a court overruling a law passed in a democracy 
is impinging on the consent of people to govern themselves. The U.S. judge 
Kenneth Starr states that courts are deferential due to the lack of explicit power to 
supervise administrative action, in the way that courts can supervise policy vis-à-
vis a constitution.79 Where no such power exists constitutionally, there may be no 
consent from citizens given to courts to make decisions that affect law. Deference 
to legislature is also said to maintain judicial integrity. This stems from realising 
                                                
76 For historical analysis, See: A.E. Howard, ‘For the common-benefit: Constitutional 
History in Virginia as a case book for the modern constitution-maker’ (1968) 54 Virg. 
Law. Rev. at p.816 & p.902. 
77 For a history of the concept of the modern constitution, See 
78 Stolleis, A history of public law in Germany 1914-1945 (OUP) (2004) at p.17 
79 Starr, ‘Judicial Review in the post-Chevron ear’ (1986) 3 Yale J. Reg 283 at p.300 
 that judges are not best equipped to deal with issues of policy,80 and thus rulings 
that affect legislative enactments can be indirect policy decisions. Limitations on 
judicial capacity on legal review are based on the reality that the inherent policy 
within rules can involve fields as diverse as economics, science, and revenue 
requirements of the state.  
 
Deference also maintains public integrity in the judicial institution, in that key 
policy decisions are left to the realm of politics where the public may have a 
greater opportunity for participation. In the US, where judicial review of policy 
has occurred through the application of the constitution, the legitimacy of the 
judiciary has been called into question.81 
 
 
 
Deference is also indicative of acceptable limitations of adjudication in certain 
forms of disputes. 82 Controversies relevant to legislative deference are faced by 
the national courts when determining obligations in international law.83  Such 
issues become more pertinent when one is considering the limits to judicial 
interpretation where interpretations are tantamount to law-making. Law-making 
may transcend the implied authority of a court in the separation of powers, and 
when it determines obligations between states, as the creation of rules under FET 
has done, it may become an usurpation of executive function.  
 
Whether the creation of law under FET makes assumptions about the relationship 
between states, or where the boundaries lie,84 is not easy to delineate. For 
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delegation doctrine’ (1988) 2 Admin L.J. 269 at p.269 
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83 Charney, ‘Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations’ (1989) 83 AJIL 805 at p. 
84 Benevisiti discusses two critical judicial avoidance techniques that national courts use 
to avoid elucidating international obligations: (i) the use of doctrines of deference, such 
as act of state; (ii) refusing standing or justiciability of claims through narrowing the 
 example, Koh does not advocate an unrestricted role for the national court in 
such a matter, neither is a position propounded that is absolutely deferential to the 
legislature. Koh’s own value judgment is that courts in such instances have to 
value three critical factors: (a) comity of nations; (b) separation of powers; (c) 
judicial competence to deal with international issues.85 However, exact 
methodology as to how to characterize this is lacking and it seems that the degree 
to which each of these may be applied may have to be to be determined on a case-
by-case basis.86 
 
As has been seen with the interpretation of a fair treatment standard in relation to 
substantive FET, the arbitral system has not followed any strict doctrine of 
deference.  
The issue of deference becomes important in relation to substantive legitimate 
expectations outlined in Chapter 2. This is because these can potentially force 
states to keep policies the same if they wish to avoid liability to the investor. This 
aspect of deference will be discussed further in Chapter 7, particularly with respect 
to its incorporation in future decisions. 
 
5.4. Rule-Making issues regarding FET. 
 
For FET rules to be accepted as law domestically by states they have to be able to 
comply with them.87 This means that they have to be able to understand and relate 
to the rules, and also be able to afford the institutional changes needed to comply 
with them. As seen earlier the Westerncentric provenance of public law liability may 
make this difficult for developing states in terms of knowing and understanding 
what such liability involves and how to institutionally adjust to it. They have not 
directly consented to this. The importance of consent is discussed below. Then 
                                                                                                                                      
criterion for these. E. Benevisiti, ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of 
International Law: An analysis of the attitude of national courts’ (1993) 4 EJIL 159 at 
p.161 
85 H. Koh, ‘International law as a part of our law’ (2004) 98 AJIL 43 at p.43-57. 
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begins a discussion of why developing states may wish to directly consent to FET 
rules. This discussion is continued into the next chapter which postulates that this 
consent may be important due to FET being used to turn investment treaty 
arbitration into a system of governance that operates by transplanting forms of 
administrative law into the system. 
 
 A. Participation and Consent in Rule-Making. 
 
Consent to rules is important, as it can to affect its subjects complying with the 
laws it produces.88 Here the acceptance of FET rules will be related to 
participation of states in the rule -making process of arbitrators.89 Participation 
will be based on the inability of states, as representative of people to effectively 
participate in the law-making process of investment tribunals. Whilst states can 
prepare defences to argue against a proposal of a new law by the claimant, the 
process of formulating law is ultimately left to arbitrators, not states.90 The 
questioning of legal content can only occur after damages have been awarded on 
the challenge of the award. Prior to adjudication there is also an issue of adequate 
representation of public interest when states enter into treaty obligations.91 
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Governments may be manipulated by private interests when entering into treaties 
to prefer their needs over other important public interest.92  
 
Thus participation may still have will also include public interest being diluted by 
special interest groups, such as investor claimants,93 who may wish investment 
treaties to be drafted in an open textured way or adjudication set-up that will not 
take a restrictive approach to investor rights. The investment arbitration system 
has not at present adequately accommodated NGO and third party interest 
groups in the formation of laws so that protection of public interest is ensured.94 
 
State consent to legal frameworks, can be formulated, amongst others methods, 
along two relevant lines considering the narrow provenance of the public 
administration liability brought in by FET.95 This is as follows: (i) lack of direct 
state control over what rules are and (ii) the implicit concern within this that the 
peoples of that state have not consented to such rules created by a private, usually 
close-door, international adjudication process.96 Such concerns have been raised 
in the human rights field with law-making through interpretation.97 It is thought 
that lack of direct consent by Governments that manifests through open-textured 
interpretation may undermine the will to comply with the laws in the long-term. 
Similar, concerns have been raised about universalist approaches to customary 
international law. Thus Kelly states that placing a creation of an (assumed) 
customary rule without state consent creates concerns due to the ‘lack of democratic 
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Governance’.98 The views against this suggest a pragmatic view of how international 
relations work.99 However, in the field of foreign investment consent may still 
matter due to historical concerns regarding enervation of sovereignty of 
developing countries, particularly those relating to the their right to expropriate. 
 
To illustrate: the classic example of where consent and compliance were inter-
related in the field of foreign investment protection was the tension surrounding 
the general acceptance of the Hull Formula, where many states did not wish to 
accept the giving of compensation of where expropriation occurred.100 In relation 
to the US, it has been questioned whether derivations of universal customary 
international law by international institutions and their application to the state sits 
in firmly with domestic democratic law-making procedure.101  
 
Bradley and Goldsmith state that it is important to have a fail-safe mechanism, 
where rejection of international law created without direct domestic ratification is 
possible in order to preserve the invaluable tenet of consent.102 This may allow the 
state to reject laws that are created through teleological processes by institutions 
or judicial exposition. However it is not altogether clear why consent itself should 
be a basis for the rejection of a useful and efficient rule, or one of high moral 
standing.103Michelman approaches the question of acceptability of rules as being 
one dependant on their moral standing and whether on this basis rules are worth 
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A critique of the modern position’ (1997) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 at p.870-873. 
103 E.g. Jus Cogens rules. See, G.A. Christenson, ‘Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests 
Fundamental to International Society’ (1987) 28 Virg. Jnl. Int. law. 585 at p.585-593. 
 following, rather than one based on direct state consent provided through some 
procedural process of approval.104 This approach is subject to the immediate 
shortcomings with respect to objectivity.  
 
Consent based understandings of acceptability of law-making is criticized from 
the perspective that it is Eurocentric, based on democratic political theory.105This 
critique is further based on a particular conception of the state that is not 
universal.106 Fallon, on the other hand, makes a more subtle point about 
acceptability of law-making in reference to the US constitution. He states, 
implicitly, that the inherent gulf in behavioural practices between law-makers and 
their objects, and the shortcomings of law-making processes in reflecting the 
desires of those whom they govern make absolute legitimacy dubious as a pure 
goal of a governing legal system.107 From this perspective it may be unfair to ask 
arbitrators to determine what states want from FET, despite the obscurity of the 
standard giving some mandate to determine laws for themselves, as states may not 
know themselves what exactly should be done with FET. 
 
A consent based analysis of acceptability of international law maybe limited due to 
it being shaped by conceptions of domestic politics and the role of people in 
Government processes, which may not be applicable in parallel with international 
institutions.108 Many states may not be concerned with their ability to consent to 
rules made outside domestic legislatures, as done by arbitrators using FET. For 
                                                
104 F.I. Michelman, ‘Ida’s way: Constructing the Respect Worthy Governmental-System’ 
(2003) Ford. Law. Rev 345 at p.345-356. 
105 J. T. Gathii, ‘Neoliberalism, colonialism and international governance: Decentring the 
international law of Governmental legitimacy’ (1996) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1996 at p. 1997-
2000; For response to Gathii, See B.R. Roth, ‘Governmental illegitimacy and 
neocolonialism: response to review by James Thuo Gathii’ (1996) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2056 
at p.2056-2058; Roth has however, criticized the one-sided political values in democratic 
legitimacy analysis- See, also, B. Roth, ‘Democratic Intolerance: Observations on Fox 
and Nolte’ (1996) 37 Harv. Int. L.J. 235 at p.235-247. 
106 N.Rose & P.Miller, ‘Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government’ 
(1992) 43 (2) Brit. Jnl. of Soc. 173 at p.173-175. 
107 R.H. Fallon, JR. , ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005) 118 Harv. Law. Rev. 1787, 
at p.1787-1788. 
108 D.Kennedy, ‘The Disciplines of International Law and Policy’ (1999) 12 Leiden. J. 
Int’l 9 at p.17 
 some the lack of consent over certain actions of international institutions is not a 
matter of concern or problematic. Developing states may be deliberately passive 
in participating in international law-making process.109 
 
This may be partly due to their political history, where issues of political rights to 
question authority are not as deep rooted, thus their demand for accountability is 
not pressing.110 Consent based critiques of international institutions are important 
as they provide a check on the abuse of power and ensure that action of 
international institutions serves appropriate state interests.111 Held has stated the 
eurocentricity of consent as an ideal should not weaken the important role that 
the concept can play in validating the action of international institutions.112  
 
In international law acceptability of transnational institutional action can also be 
seen as protecting the state from unmandated impositions of law.113Further, the 
acceptability of institutions in international relations questions the political dogma 
of international institutions and whether states have consented to the political 
ideologues behind their actions, particularly these come into effect after the 
institution has been created and takes on a conceptual framework of its own.  
 
From this perspective realistic control is only retrospective, and maintaining 
consent is about maintaining effective access to the law-making process. As only a 
defendant in an investment treaty claim, developing states have some input, 
however the problem arises when other states could be subject to the arbitrators 
reasoning in that case due to that decision being a source of law to assist in treaty 
                                                
109 J. Stiglitz, Making Globalisation Work (Penguin) (2007) at p.128. 
110 A. Leftwich, ‘Governance, democracy and development in the third world’ (1993) 
14(3) Third. World. Quarterly. 605 at p.606. 
111 D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitcan Governance 
(Cambridge: Polity Press) (1995) at p. 282; L.W. Pauly, ‘Capitial Mobility, State 
Autonomy and Political Legitimacy’ (1995) 48(2) Jnl. Int Affairs. 369 at p.317-374 
112 Held, (n111 above). 
113 Gathii (n105 above) at p.1998. 
 interpretation.114 Thus true consent for an FET law such as transparency may only 
possible if all states that are likely to be bound by it have an input into it.  
A pertinent critique on this front is the lack of political accountability of 
institutions following the pro-capital or commercial agenda, investment treaty 
arbitration being one of these institutions.115 International law-making is 
inherently restrictive on state sovereignty in relation to law-making competence. If 
the effects of non-participation result in particular ideologues such as market 
liberalism dominating interpretations, they may potentially override, as some 
decisions under substantive legitimate expectations show, important social reasons 
to regulate and have other commercial costs for the public benefit. This is through 
re-prioritisation of policy to fit the commercial agency of the investor.116 It is this 
diminishment of public good that makes concerns as to effective participation in 
law-making that has a commercial agenda important.  
 
These concerns are made real when one sees that there only a few capital 
exporting developed states that have been able to control agendas of international 
institutional processes, such as the bilateral investment treaty program, to this 
end.117 Foreign investment is also under scrutiny and suspicion from domestic 
nationals in the developing world.118 Foreign investors’ use of resources, 
particularly those that are scarce such as land, can cause social discontentment and 
political pressure.119 For this reason states may have to ensure that FET law-
                                                
114 See Article 31 of the  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, as discussed in 
A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cam. U. P) (2000) at p.186-p.201. 
115 These are the Bretton woods institutions, See Gatthii (1996) at p. 1999; J.T. Gathii, 
‘Representations of Africa in Good Governance Discourse: Policing and Containing 
Dissidence to Neo-Liberalism’ (1998-99) Third. Wrld. Legal Stud 65 at p.65-74. 
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269-80. 
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10(1) Global Change, Peace & Sec. 23 at p.23-32. 
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making balances rights of foreign investors against the importance of public views 
and other social needs. This balance may wish to be left to arbitrators for risk of 
an adverse outcome. Possibility of a remedy here is intimated in relation to a case 
for constitutional ‘deference’ in the final chapter. 
 
Within this discourse highlighting possible inherent partisanship of transnational 
commercial agency through institutions such as investment treaty arbitration, 
there are issues of consent of greater concern. This is where international 
agreements delegate out public interest decisions, such as the creation of laws or 
policies, to international institutions.120 This can be seen to be done in investment 
treaty arbitration, a predominantly private dispute resolution process that has 
created working law such as substantive legitimate expectations doctrine.  
 
For some the lack of state consent in the creation of law in this private way has 
been extremely described as a method of international ‘authoritarianism’.121 The 
private nature of formulating substantive legitimate expectations under FET, has a 
particular public interest conflict potential and gives some merit to these 
criticisms- albeit their rather coloured expression. 
 
The key issue in investment arbitration of concern here is the gap of consent and 
accountability of all states of the liberal democratic assumptions in formulating 
public law form of liability.122 If peoples are to delegate further public interest 
issues under interpretative powers to investment tribunals, it is at least 
questionable whether further public participation in that law-making process is 
necessary. This is particularly so where for many developing states the end game 
of investment treaties is economic development that would increase human 
capital, social choices, and economic opportunities for their own nationals. Thus 
                                                
120 For example, the European Commission: See, S. Weatherill & P. Beaumont, EU Law 
(Penguin) (1999) at p.45-49. 
121 H. Giroux, The terror of neo-liberalism: Authoritarianism and the Edge of Democracy (2004) 
(Boulder Co: Paradigm) at p.1-11. 
122 This has been approached by Van Harten, though distinctly and not from the premise 
of provenance of public law or legal transplantation. See. Van Harten (n96 above) at 
p.48-49.  
 they have a real concern over the success of the system’s function, in a way that is 
distinct from the capital-exporting country that may only wish to see its 
investments protected and profits brought home. 
 
 
B. A Law and Economics Perspective on Transplantation. 
 
Further problems of adequacy of FET law-making will be highlighted here, by 
looking at what the current law-making process has not done: by assessing 
whether these rules, if complied with, can bring about the desired effect of 
improving administration and regulatory conduct in the host-state. This may be 
important for future investors from other states (which the host-state may wish to 
benefit from) and also the on-going investment of claimants in cases (particularly 
where an expropriation has not occurred).  
 
Law and development does not always have the desired positive economic 
benefits.123Two aspects of the vast field of law and economics will be applied here 
to illustrate the difficulties of transplants. The first is the discussions in relation to 
how effectively rules influence the behaviour of objects they are aimed at.124 The 
second is how the objects influence the formulation of the rules, and how 
effective rules are in carrying out their needs or aims. The latter analysis pertains 
to an argument concerning the viability of law to carry the social process that 
forms them across jurisdiction. It is not here concerned with the efficiency of legal 
systems or legislative processes as such. How both these aspects may relate to one 
another is also important. If rules are very much part of specific social processes 
and their compliance co-dependent upon them, then transplants may be less 
viable where significant differences in society are present. The study of law and 
                                                
123 It is unclear whether law and development could have prevented market instability in 
the developing world in the 1970s and 1980s, See, A.O. Krueger, ‘Government Failures 
in Development’ (1990) 4(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 at p.9-12 
124 See Posner (n17 above). 
 economics also reveals that law itself has a limited impact on altering the 
behaviour of its objects.125  
 
Thus, the field of law and economics identifies shortcomings between the 
intended behaviour a law seeks to bring about and the reality of conduct that a 
given law induces.126 From this perspective it is important to analyze the 
limitations of law’s impact and appreciate that liability is limited form of coercion 
towards compliance.127 This is important in the field of legal transplantation, 
particularly where transplants are assumed to have the same social impact in the 
state of designation as the state of origin. This is not necessarily the case, 
particularly due to the sociological differences between states and their cultural 
make up.128 Mattei argues that transplants themselves have different impacts in 
similar legal systems, thus questioning their ability to operate in an investment 
treaty system across several dozen states.129 Thus an economic analysis of 
transplants needs to be taken, so that it can be determined whether their intended 
impact is viable at all. Where this is not the case, an alternative method of 
obtaining the goal of the rule may need to be used distinctly or in tandem with the 
rule. This may be done as an alternative to jettisoning the transplant or letting it 
evolve into a different rule.130 However, this may not sit with investment 
arbitration’s claim that the fair and equitable rules protect and promote cross-
border investment. Mattei also intimates that economically inefficient law, that is 
law where there is a gulf between social practice and conduct envisaged within it, 
                                                
125 J. Griffith, ‘Is law important?’ (1979) 54 NYU L.Rev. 339 at p.341-348; B.G. Garth & 
Y.Dezalay, Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation and Importation of a New Legal 
Orthodoxy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press) (2002) at p. 
126 Samuels, ‘Interrelations between legal and economic processes’ (1971) 14 J. Law & 
Econ. 435 at p. 
127 From one perspective international law liability relating to investments has only been 
historically enforceable by some threat of physical force; D. F. Vagts, ‘Coercion and 
Foreign Investment Rearrangements’ (1978) 72 AJIL 17 at p.26-30 at p.435-447. 
128 A. Watson, Legal Transplantation. An approach to Comparative Law. (1974) at p.1-26. 
129 U. Mattei, ‘Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and 
Economics’ (1994) 14 Int. Rev. of Law and Econ. 3 at p.3 
130 On one theory of law and economics, laws evolve naturally to reach a balance 
between the ideals of the rule and the capacity of the society to comply. See Epstein, 
‘The Static Conception of the Common Law’ (1980) 9 Jnl. Leg. Stud. 253 at p.253-258. 
 might increase the cost of compliance, perhaps making compliance unviable.131 
Thus, for example, the investment rules of transparency may be far easier to 
comply with in some states than others, and the cost of meeting the same level of 
conduct as between different states may be too great for some states to bear. On 
one view, the framing of legal rules is an outcome of a competitive process, where 
various interested parties compete to materialize their views in the rule. 132 
Different social processes will give rise to the different tenders, and in an ideal 
process the most effective and important formulation of a law will result.133 From 
this perspective, legal rules are inherently state specific and the social processes 
that give rise to the rules may also have to be mirrored if transplants are effective. 
Otherwise transplantation itself may be mere guesswork as to parallels of social 
processes between legal systems or states. Where there is a relationship between 
social processes of law creation and compliance, then transplantation is at risk of 
being undermined due to alien sociology inherent in transplanted rules. Mattei 
also states that transplants assume that they are the most efficient rules for dealing 
with their intended aims, however as the competitive construct alludes to, this is 
not always the case.134The implication for transplantation of law by arbitrators is 
that they may need to be aware of the sociological and political disparities between 
states that impact upon rule compliance. 
 
 
 
5.5. Conclusion. 
 
Overall, a fair process of creation and implementation of rules that appreciates the 
short-comings of consent to transplants may be important to make arbitral 
                                                
131 Mattei (n29 above). at p.7 
132 Mattei (n29 above)( at p.8. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Cross border application of principles of tortious liability is a clear example of this-
Priest, ‘The invention of Enterprise Liability, A critical history of the intellectual 
foundations of modern tort law’ (1985) 14 J. Leg. Stud 461 at p.461-474. 
 interpretations more acceptable.135 The differences in origins of rules, particularly 
their political nature will have an impact on legitimacy of transplants. The 
products of such a process ought to be coherent to subjects in their form and in 
the substance of rights and obligations they seek to obey.  
 
Further, issues such as the feasible alien nature of transplants to states in the 
developing world with a developing a transitional rule of law system, can be 
overcome by giving those states a greater say in whether they wish to be bound by 
such rules, including within this an opportunity to determine whether they can 
comply with them considering current institutional practices. 
 
                                                
135 Ecuador pulling out of the investment dispute resolution system ICSID to protect its 
sovereignty as a classic example of this concern amongst developing states. For further 
analysis see: E. Gillman, ‘Article: The End of Investor-State arbitration in Ecuador? An 
analysis of Article 422 of the Constitution of 2008’ (2008) 19 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb 269 at 
p.269-274. 
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6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will assess whether FET rule-making is a system of governance of 
domestic administrative and regulatory institutions. Further, it shall be determined 
whether its use of administrative law is suitable considering that many Contracting 
Parties to investment treaties are from the developing world. This shall be done 
through critiques of legal transplantation. If FET is described to be a system of 
governance over domestic institutions, critique of the law and development 
movement shall be used to suggest improvement to the governance role. This will 
lead the discussion into the final chapter on further reforms. 
 
6.2. Governance via the Fair Treatment Standard 
 
The analysis here shall be related to the effects of rules created by interpretation 
of the FET standard. It will be argued that current interpretations have turned 
FET into a system of governance of state administration and regulatory activity. 
This forms state institutions with control, something which contracting parties 
 may not wish to delegate, neither the foreign states seeking capital nor the 
investor, as it is not expressly provided for in model investment treaties.1 
 
The term governance is frequently used in international relations as a metaphor to 
describe the acts of international institutions that share the characteristics of 
domestic legislatures.2 The plurality of the use of the word ‘Governance’ at the 
international level creates ambiguity.3 Without strict definition and application, the 
use of the term can suffer from a tendency to become intangible and excessively 
abstract.4  
 
This can undermine its effectiveness both as a descriptive and an analytical tool to 
ascertain the legitimacy of institutional action. Governance here, in the general 
sense, will be used to mean processes that provide order to domestic 
administrative and regulatory institutions.5 Governance, of this form, is a Western-
centric idea dependent upon the formation of institutions (or institutional based 
activities), e.g. corporations, hospitals, government bodies.6 Hence FET 
interpretations of legitimate expectations and transparency are not just neutral 
values but they also incorporate a particular idea of what investment treaty 
arbitration as an institution should be requiring, as an institution, from states. 
                                                
1 See, for example, the U.S. model: G. Gagne, ‘The Evolving Foreign Policy on 
Investment Protection: Evidence from Recent  FTA’s and the 2004 Model BIT’ (2006) 
9(2) Jnl. Int. Econ. L. 357 at p.369-p.379; J.W. Salacuse, ‘Do BITs really work: An 
evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and their grand bargain’ (2005) 46 Harv. Int. 
L.J. 67 at p.82-85. 
2 Finkelstein says that governance ‘mirrors the breadth of Government activity’, See, 
Finkelstein ‘What is global governance?’ (1995) 1 Global Governance 367 at p.369 
3 Finkelstein (n2 above) at p.371. 
4 See, for example, the following vague postulation given by Ruggie: ‘an indivisibly 
related complex of processes and problems with the increasing scale of huan activity 
viewed within the context of planetary life-support systems’ in J. G. Ruggie, ‘On the 
Problem of the ‘Global Problematique’ What Roles for International Organisations?’ 
(1979-1980) 5 (4) Alternatives. Social Transf. Humane. Gov. 520 at p.520 
5 See statement by Council of Rome in A.King & B.Schneider, The First Global Revolution: 
A Report of the Council of Rome (New York: Pantheon Books) at p.181-182, cited in 
J.N.Rosenau, ‘Governance in the Twenty-first Century’ (1995) 1 Global Governance 13 
at p. 14 
6 M.L. Djelic & K. Sahlin-Andersson, Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (Cam. Uni. P) 
(2006) at p.13-14. 
 Governance as a conceptual tool can be used to describe a variety of factors 
related to the roles that domestic governments play.7 Standard setting (or the 
creation of a system of rules) to bring order to a field of activities is a key part of 
government action that is common to the use of governance as a descriptive tool.8  
 
Governance has also been described as restructuring or reordering.9  Thus the phrase 
‘Governance’ can be used to describe various processes and analytical processes 
that reorder institutions, institutional conduct, and varied subjects of the law from 
corporations to individuals.10 Rule-making is a part of Governance but not the 
only role that Governance plays.11  
 
Based on this broader conceptualization, another understanding of governance is 
a range of acts of government that can extend beyond the creation of law.12 From 
this governance can also conceptually encapsulate processes of determining 
appropriate norms and their effectiveness in pushing their subjects towards 
desired conduct.13Effectiveness includes institutional design and overcoming 
institutional shortcoming. Thus Governance is also concerned with ensuring the 
appropriate impact of institutional decision-making.14 This is why the critique of 
legal transplantation discussed earlier is relevant to administrative liability formed 
under FET. The appropriateness of this role for arbitrators, as opposed to 
national governments, has to be questioned in relation to their ability to factor in 
and overcome the transplantation problems discussed earlier. 
                                                
7 (n2 above). 
8 See, for example, the role played by ‘Transmission Control Protocol’ in the field of 
internet law in P.J. Weiser, ‘Internet Governance Standard Setting and Self-Regulation’ 
(2001) Nth. Ky. Law. Rev. 822 at p.825-826. Similar standard-setting occurs in other 
fields, See D.O. Rourke, ‘Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing non-Governmental System 
of Labour Standards and Monitoring’ (2003) 31(1) Pol. Stud. Jnl. 1 at p.1-8. 
9 D. Held, Democracy and the global order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance. 
(Cambridge : Polity Press) (1995) at p.16-23. 
10 (n2 above). 
11 Ibid. 
12Caron has described it as a fundamentally a legislative process undertaken by 
international institutions: See, D.D. Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority 
of the Security Council’ (1993) 87 AJIL 552  at p.552-553 
13 See Finklestein (n2 above) at p.370. 
14 (n2 above). 
  
Governance outside the paradigm of domestic legislative activity is not confined 
to international institutions. Governance is also a municipal phenomenon, a 
classic example of governance being regulatory systems in some states. 
Governance processes also provide useable legal frameworks for state 
administration and regulation to follow. Regulatory models and institutions, 
including formal contractual guidelines and standards, and commercial monitoring 
institutions, are taking over and are increasingly being used by states too.15 
Further, outside of institution-based governance, governance has not just been 
understood as an external process controlling or directing an agent. It can also be 
understood as a system of self-ordering or control, like a laissez-faire 
market.16Therefore subjects of governance may also be its agents, particularly 
where it may be useful to have fields of self-ordering activity. Thus ‘Self-
Governance’ is also a form of Governance.  
 
Overall, key attributes of governance for the purposes of this discussion are:  
(i) Providing ‘order and coherence’ to a given system and  
(ii) Generating rules and standards that seek to fulfill a given ‘order and 
coherence’ of a given system.  
 
These two elements have occurred through FET, due to it ‘ordering’ how state 
institutions should conduct themselves. This ordering includes not only 
transparency, and legitimate expectations as described in Chapters 2 and 3 
respectively. It also includes a requirement that state institutions should not 
discriminate against the investor;17 should not treat investors in an arbitrary way;18 
                                                
15 C. Hood, R. Henry & R. Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regimes 
(2001)  at p.11-16.  
16 D. Coen & M. Thatcher, ‘The new governance of markets and non-majoritarian 
regulators’ (2005) 18 (3) Governance 329 at p.329-340. 
17 SD Myers Inc v. Government of Canada (2000) 8 ICSID Rep at para 259. 
18 Lauder v. Czech Republic (2001) 9 ICSID Rep 62, at para 219. 
 behave with bad faith;19 misuse their powers;20 and that they should refraining 
from harassing investors.21  
 
Thus on this conceptualization, FET is performing a governance role on state 
institutions.22 
 
A. Administrative and Regulatory Governance 
 
‘Administrative governance’ is the process of ordering state administrative organs 
and administrative processes by rule-making through interpretations of the fair 
treatment standard. Administrative governance ensures that the organs of the state 
are receptive to the needs of the foreign investor through norms determined by 
arbitrators. This process of ordering is possible due to the enforcement 
mechanism of classical international arbitration being available to investment 
treaty arbitration.23 
 
The fair and equitable treatment standard has been used to order both the 
domestic administrative and regulatory frameworks so that they can accommodate 
the needs of the investor, as arbitrators perceive them to be.24 Administrative 
governance through interpretations creates burdens of transparency for public 
bodies. They also require that the investor be allowed to participate in 
administrative decision-making,25 and envisage specific good conduct for 
                                                
19 Wastemanagement II v. United Mexican States (2004) 43 ILM 967 at para 994. 
20 Metalclad v. United Mexican States (200) 5 ICSID Rep 209, at para. 228 
21 Pope & Talbot v. Government of Canada (2002) 7 ICSID Rep 43 at para 163-163. 
22 B. Kingsbury & S. Schill, ‘Investor-state arbitration as governance: Fair and Equitable 
Treatment and proportionality’ (2009) New. Yrk. Uni. Pub. L. & Legal. Theory. W. Paper 
No. 146 at p.1-8; K. J. Vandevelde, ‘A unified theory of fair and equitable treatment’ 
(2010) NYUJ Int’L & Pol. 44 at p.49-63. 
23 Z. Douglas, ‘The hybrid foundations of investment treaty arbitration’ (2003) 74 BYIL 
151 at p.226-236. 
24 Y. Dezalay & B.G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
transnational world order (Uni Chicago P) (1996) at p.27-39. 
25 S.D. Myers Inc v. Government of Canada (NAFTA: UNCITRAL) (2000) 8 ICSID 
Rep 3 at p.115. 
 administrators.26 Thus in cases such as Metalclad and Wastemanagement, the Tribunal 
placed a burden upon public officials to ensure that they would not make 
promises to investors that could not be kept, or they would breach the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. The cases of Tecmed and Wastemanagement imposed a 
standard of transparency on public administration.27 
 
A mere framework of rules, may not, however, be enough to create an effective 
system of administrative governance through FET. Standards of administrative 
law may require a change in the behaviour of public institutions that they apply 
to.28 This may result in the re-configuring of administrative bodies to incorporate 
rules such as transparency which require the investor to participate in decision-
making processes,29 or ensure that the notification of decisions is possible.30 Staff 
may have to be retrained or reallocated to meet these burdens.31 Though this may 
be an immediately unaffordable cost for some contracting parties, an 
administrative law framework for investment treaty arbitration may also have the 
incidental, and important effect, of improving public administration through 
                                                
26 See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States (Award)  
ICSID CASE No. ARB (AF)/00/2  (29/05/03) at para 154. 
27 See, Choudhary’s analysis on transparency in B. Choudhary, ‘Caveat Investor?’ The Relevance 
of the conduct of the investor under the fair and equitable treatment standard’ (2005) 6 JWIT 
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28 Standards of judicial review provide standards for administrative decision-making, such 
as Wednesbury reasonableness in English law: See J. Jowell & A. Lester, ‘Beyond 
Wednesbury: Substantive Principles of Administrative Law’ (1987) PL 368 at p.368-370.  
29 See Chapter 3.  
30 Administrative conduct includes the speed of processing applications for permits, 
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31 There is a systemic problem of administrative standards in the developing world, 
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J.E. Jreisat, ‘Administrative Reform in developing countries: A comparative perspective’ 
(1988) 8 Pub. Admin & Devlp. 85 at p.93-94 Alternative strategies, due to lack of 
appropriate public administration training for administrators, include delegating these 
functions out to the private sector: J.S. Wunsch, ‘Institutional Analysis and de-
centralisation: developing an analytical framework for effective third world administrative 
reform’ (1991) 11 Pub. Admin & Devlp. 431 at p.445. The feasibility of this in turn 
depends on market availability of such services. 
 liability.32 Though whether public law does in fact have the effect of improving 
administrative performance is questionable; 33 and whether it can have such an 
impact in the developing world, as will be illustrated by the discussion on legal 
transplantation later in this chapter, is also questionable. 
  
In addition to administrative governance, there is also a regulatory governance 
role that is played by the fair treatment standard. In this role the standard is used 
by arbitrators to review the manner in which states pass regulations and the 
appropriateness of passing regulations.34 The obligation on the host-state, often a 
developing country, is outlined by the tribunal in the GAMI in the NAFTA 
context:  
 
‘The duty of NAFTA tribunals is rather to  appraise  whether  and how 
preexisting laws and regulations are applied to the foreign Investor. It is no excuse that 
regulation is costly. Nor does a dearth of able administrators or a deficient culture of 
compliance provide a defence. Such is the challenge of governance that confronts every 
country’.35  
 
The burden is thus on states to improve both their legislative and administrative 
frameworks of law, and institutions to standards set by arbitrators. Further states 
                                                
32 As stated in Chapter 1, Legal liability is an incentive to train public servants to cut-
costs of litigation associated losses, as far as empirical data is concerned it does not have 
an impact on public servant behaviour directly, as for example argued in Y.S. Lee & D.H. 
Rosenbloom, A Reasonable Public Servant: Constitutional Foundations of 
Administrative Conduct in the U.S.  (M.E. Sharpe) (2005) at p.1-12.; Thus civil servants 
are trained to follow administrative norm protocol, E.g. training in Romania at: 
http://www.kas.de/proj/home/events/103/1/year-2010/month-2/veranstaltung_id-
39723/index.html 
33 For an example of no relationship between the review and improved performance, See 
M. Sunkin, ‘Does judicial review influence the quality of local authority services’ (2008) 
(Jan)  ESCRC Working Paper No. 47 at p.1-17. ; In the U.S. empirical studies are limited. 
One suggests that there is a relationship between the administrative review and improved 
performance, though it is subject to qualification: P.H. Schuck & E.D. Elliot, ‘To the 
Chevron station: An empirical study of federal administrative law’ (1990) Duke. L.J. 984 
at p.985-987 & p.1059-1061. 
34 G. Van Harten & M. Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a species of global 
administrative law’ (2006) 17(1) EJIL 121 at p.122 & p.124. 
35 GAMI v. UMS (UNCITRAL)  (Final Award) (15th November 2004) at para 94.  
 must comply with rules set for regulatory bodies by arbitrators under the 
standard.36 As the dicta in Gami indicates, there is no regard given to the capacity 
of developing states to comply. The state must simply overcome existing 
shortcoming in regulatory, legislative and administrative infrastructure.37  
 
An example of regulatory impact of the fair treatment standard is given by the 
Lauder case. There the arbitrators had interpreted fair treatment to include a 
requirement of consistency of regulatory practice. Thus in Lauder in reference to 
domestic media regulation the tribunal stated: ‘The state bound by the Treaty must 
indeed pursue the stated goal of achieving a stable [regulatory] framework for investment. The 
minimum requirement is that the State does not engage in inconsis t ent  conduct, e.g. by 
reversing, to the detriment of the investor, prior approvals on which he justifiably relied’.38  
 
In the case of CME the tribunal reasoned to prevent the state from regulating 
broadcasting that would have harmed the profits of an investment in a 
broadcasting company.39 Preserving an important public interest in proscribing 
broadcasting was not a factor that the tribunal took into consideration. 
 
Occasionally, fair treatment has used a ‘regulatory governance’ role to determine 
the appropriateness of regulation in terms of its effects on the investor. However 
it has not always considered national or public interest in such a role,40 
questioning its legitimacy from the concern of public interest deficit in this 
approach.  
 
Broadly speaking, regulation is passed to improve the working of the economy, 
particularly the market, for all commercial agents and to ensure that negative 
                                                
36 CME Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (SVEA Judgment) (15 May 2003) (C.A. 
Sweden), 15(5) World Trade and Arb. Mat. 171 
37 Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic (Final Award) (3 September 2001), (2002) 4 World 
Trade and Arb. Materials 35 at para 290. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See CME (n 35 above). 
40 See Azurix v. Argentine  Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 (Award 14/07/06) at 
para 372-378. 
 effects (termed ‘externalities’) of market activity on the public are contained.41 
Approaches, such as the Lauder one requiring consistency of regulatory 
frameworks, are unrealistic: as the short outline of the nature of regulation below 
will show, regulation can only be consistent, unchanging or static if the agency it is 
intending to control is so. However, this would defeat the very purpose of 
regulation itself, to react to changes, often adverse, in human and economic 
agency. This is why regulation serves as an important tool of protecting public 
interest in the role of modern states. 
 
Commonly accepted characteristics of regulation are: (i) gathering information on 
a field of commercial agency, (ii) behavioural modification of the economy, & (iii) 
standard setting for the economy or a given sector of it.42 Definitions of 
regulation tend to stem from the general encompassing all forms of control of 
economic activities by organs of the state, to the more specific such as 
encouraging conduct beneficial to the economy.43 Regulatory organs in this sense 
promote behaviour that they perceive boosts the market economy and preclude 
harmful acts.44 Regulation in this sense operates subsidiary to legislation in 
achieving policy objectives by more direct forms of control, by being closer in an 
abstract spatial sense, to the agents needed to be controlled.45 Regulatory 
governance thus concerns itself with the appropriateness of regulatory decision-
making. It does not solely concern itself with decisions to regulate, but also 
deregulation or re-alignment of regulatory practices between states.46 The latter 
point has been seen in the CMS Gas Transmission case, where the tribunal found 
                                                
41 A. Ogus, ‘Regulation: Legal, Form and Economic Theory’ (Hart) (2004) at p.21-22; C. 
Sunstein, After the rights revolution: reconceiving the regulatory state, (Cambridge: 
Harvard Uni Press.) (1990) at p.3-14. 
42 C. Hood, H. Rothstein, & R. Baldwin, The Governance of Risk (OUP) (2001) at p.23 
43 Morgan & Yeung, Introduction to Regulatory Theory (Cam Uni. P) (2001) at p.3-4. 
44 J. Francis, The politics of regulation (OUP) (1993) at p.5-17. 
45 For example, regulation of industry: G. J. Stigler, ‘The theory of economic regulation’ 
(1971) 2(1) Bell. Jnl. Econ. & Mngment. Sc. 3 at p.3-5. 
46 J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cam. Uni. P) (2000) at p.3-11; D. 
Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) (598) (1) Ann. Am. Acd. Pol. 
Sc. 12 at p.12-17; The EU is an organ vested with powers of regulatory harmonization: See, G. R. 
D. Underhill, ‘Keeping governments out of politics: transnational securities markets, regulatory 
cooperation, and political legitimacy’ (1995) 21(3) Rev. Int. Stud. 251, at p.251-255.  
 that the removal of a regulatory system of which controlled the valuation of 
currency by the state breached the fair treatment standard.47 
 
With this in mind, the inherent danger of a regulatory governance role of fair 
treatment is the risk of inadvertently determining what are the appropriate 
boundaries of regulation are without an adequate appreciation of the political, 
economic and social, consequences of doing so.48 Determining when to regulate is 
a decision that can be of political nature and of significant economic 
consequence.49Further, regulatory decisions can involve complex economic 
calculation that tribunals are unable to perform.50 This can occur without the 
arbitrators knowing that they have done this. For example: by being blind to the 
needs of regulating the activity in question, then determining that the regulation is 
harmful to the investor, and subsequently determining that the investor has a right 
not to be affected by the regulation. This approach is exemplified by the case of 
Azurix. This case epitomizes the difficulties of determining the need to regulate, 
broader economic considerations, and determining the appropriate economic 
freedom of the investor.51 Here the tribunal overruled price-freezing regulation in 
favour of consumers, which was a promised policy at a national election, as it 
reduced investor profits. As consumer needs are an important part of maintaining 
a fair price of supply in the water economy, the tribunal’s preference of one over 
                                                
47 CMS Gas Transmission v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8) 
(Award May 2005)  at para. 273 – 275 (Here the regulatory system concerned a currency 
valuation method which was removed by the state). 
48 The general function of commercial regulatory institutions is to restrict or encourage 
behaviour of market agents: See R. Baldwin & M. Cave, ‘Understanding Regulation: 
Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP) (2002) at p.2; P. Selznik, ‘Focusing organisational 
research on regulation in R. Noll, Regulation Policy and the Social Sciences (Uni Cal: 
Berkley) (1985) at p.363-369. 
49 CMS was a decision by the Argentine Government to link the peso to the dollar, repeal 
of which harmed the foreign investment (n46 above);  See B. Morgan & K. Yeung, An 
Introduction to Law and Regulation, Text and Materials (CUP) at p. 1-2; L.N. Cutler & 
D.R. Johnson, ‘Regulation and the Political Process’ (1975) 84(7) Yale. Law. Jnl. 1395 at 
p.1395-1400. 
50 R. Baldwin & M. Cave, ‘Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(OUP) (2002) at p.11. See also discussion of public utility regulation. Thus Baldwin and 
Cave discuss how regulation can incentive commerce and yet reduce cost is not 
empirically clear (p.203-205).  
51 See (n39 above). 
 another was an economic choice usually with the domain of a national 
government’s economic policy.52  
 
Some governments prefer social economic policies resulting in an aggressive style 
of market regulation that restricts economic activity to prevent most harm.53 On 
the other hand laissez-faire theorists can prefer larger degree of error and harm in 
the market in order to realize greater capital, and see regulatory interference as 
commercially harmful.54The former framework of national policy, that was a part 
of democratic choice at an Argentine election, was implicitly usurped by the 
tribunal in Azurix.55 Once arbitrators assume a regulatory role, and usurp the 
related democratic mandate through their construction of a mandate to protect 
investments, there is nothing to restrict their value judgments shaping the 
regulatory system, or consequentially a part of the economy, one way or another.56 
As regulatory activity is a political risk investors account for in deciding whether 
to invest,57 it may be incorrect for arbitrators to use their mandate to promote 
investments through deciding the inappropriateness of regulation.58 As regulation 
                                                
52 For an example of need for pricing policy for water supply, See C. Varela-Ortega, J.M. Sumpsi, 
A. Garrido, M.Blanco & E. Iglesias, ‘Water pricing policies, public decision making and farmers' 
response: implications for water policy’ (1998) 19 (1-2) Agricult. Econ. 193, at p.193-197. 
53 S. Issacharoff, C. Camerer, G. Loewenstein & T.O.’ Donoughue,  ‘Regulation for 
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for" Asymmetric Paternalism’ (2003) 151(3)  
Uni. Penn. Law. Rev.   1211 at p. 1211-1212 (Though Issacharoff et al argue for a less aggressive 
moderate regulatory control of markets, at p.1212-1213). 
54 A. Ogus, ‘Rethinking self-regulation’ (1991) 15 OJLS 97 at p.97-99 
55 (n39 above). 
56 Regulation of economic risk often requires a balancing of the freedom of commercial 
agency with reducing risk to public interests, such as the environment or the overall well-
being of the economy. An increase in the latter may reduce the former-Broadly, see 
United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer in S. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious 
Circle: Toward effective risk regulation (Harv. Uni. Press) (1993)at pps. ix-x, 1, 10-
12;The economic complexities of determining appropriate boundaries of regulation are 
shown, for example, in the field of banking capital adequacy regulation, See M. Koehn & 
A.M. Santomero, ‘Regulation of bank capital and portfolio risk’ (1980) 35(5) Jnl Finance. 
1235 at p.1235-1239. 
57 This is a position stated by the investment tribunal in Maffezini 
58 Political risk is the risk of state action adversely affecting the investment, as opposed to 
an error in commercial feasibility of the investment (a commercial risk)- See, N. Rubins 
& N. S. Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute Resolution: A 
practitioner’s guide (OCEANA) (2005) at p.11-17, describing regulation as political risk. 
It has been argued that investment treay arbitration should not place the burden of 
commercial risk on the host-state. This is stated by the tribunal in Maffezini v. Spain 
 is also passed to prevent harmful economic agency, an increase in the use of fair 
treatment to restrict regulation may make the cost of investments with respect to 
harmful economic activity too high to allow some states to afford investment 
treaties.59  
 
Overall, the case law demonstrates that there are two ways in which the fair and 
equitable treatment standard has operated to be regulatory governance system: 
(i) Where Government regulation is involved in the subject matter of the 
dispute, and the investor complains that the manner of the passage of the 
regulation is unfair.60 
(ii) Where the legitimate expectations doctrine is used as a policy estoppel that 
affects matters to be regulated in order to prevent the state from regulating 
in its desired way once a foreign investment is made.61 
 
There is also a third way. This is where the tribunal decides whether the regulation 
in question is appropriate by determining whether it pursues the aims the state 
intended. This analysis would include looking at the intended economic 
consequences of the regulation and noting whether the overall public interest in 
regulation justifies harm to the investor.62 This third way is representative of a 
national regulatory body. The fair treatment standard has not, so far, been used 
for this purpose. However if the constraint of regulation is important to investor 
                                                                                                                                      
Case No. ARB/97/7 (9/11/00) at para 64. Note also, P. Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Emptor?: 
The relevance of conduct of the investor under the fair and equitable treatment standard’ 
(2006) 53(3) ICLQ 527 at p.527-538. 
59 For example, developing economies may need to regulate markets more intensively 
than developed states to counter economic cycles: J.A. Ocampo, Capital Account and 
Counter-Cyclical Prudential Regulations in Developing Countries (United Nat) (2002) at 
p.29. This differs from broad and generic liberal economic assumptions about the 
benefits of removing regulation for general economic development, See: J.L. Guasch & 
R.W. Hahn, ‘The costs and benefits of regulation: implications for developing countries’ 
(1999) 14(1) World Bank. Res. Obs. 137 at p.154-157. 
60 See, Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada (Merits, Phase 2) (10 April 2001), 13(4) 
World Trade and Arb. Mat. 61. 
61 E.g, Azurix (n39 above). 
62 This approach is similar to the application of the doctrine of proportionality in some 
legal regimes, See M. Andenas & S. Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality: WTO law: In comparative 
perspective’ (2006-07) 42 Tex. Int’l L.J. 371 at p.382-388. 
 protection, the arbitration process may have to equip itself with the means to 
determine regulatory policy by having details of the economic impact of its actions 
at hand. This is certainly beyond the textual mandate offered in investment 
treaties, however it may reduce the risk of adverse impact of an incorrect 
regulatory decision. At the moment there is an usurpation of national regulatory 
action by arbitrators that is without consent from Contracting Parties.63 
 
B. International Governance and Concerns.  
 
Administrative and regulatory governance reflects general concerns of lack of 
legitimacy of international or global governance. One use of the phrase ‘Global 
Governance’ is an encapsulation in social science literature as a phenomenon 
known as globalization. Global governance is the use of international institutions 
to order inter-state and cross-border interactions caused both by state agents and 
private parties.64Investment arbitration is an a priori institution of global 
governance, seeking cross-border capital through a legal adjudicatory structure 
that has been developed by arbitrators into a system of administrative and 
regulatory governance. 
Global governance has been described as more than just ordering of human or 
economic agency across borders, 65 as it also provides guidance for municipal 
governance.66 Global governance encapsulates supra-national ordering of 
domestic policy and institutions, which occurs with a set paradigm over several 
                                                
63 Note, that due to reciprocal nature of bilateral investment treaties a restriction of 
regulatory action in the defendant state, would also mean the same activity would be 
implicitly curtailed for relevant foreign investors in the investor’s state. See, A. Lenhoff, 
‘Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea’ (1954-55) 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 752 at 
p.753-759. All investment treaty decisions on fair treatment thus far have omitted this 
fundamental point. 
64 The U.N. is a classic example, See. P. Williams & G. Baudin O’ Hayon, ‘Global 
governance, Transnational Organised Crime and Money Laundering’  in D. Held & 
McGrew Ed. Governing Globalisation: Power Authority and Global Governance (2002) (Wiley 
Blackwell) at p.127-145; I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, Transcending the 
Deregulation debate (OUP) (1992) at p.3-6. 
65 (n2 above). 
66 See, S.K. Sell ‘Intellectual Property Rights’ in D. Held (n.63 above) at p.171-183. 
 states.67 In this context foreign investment relationships are by their very nature 
supra-national. This is due to their being created by international treaties.68 The 
regulatory and administrative governance has a broad reach as the FET standard 
occurs in several thousand bilateral investment treaties with varied and numerous 
state contracting parties.69 It is also present in multilateral treaties such as NAFTA 
and the ECT.70 
 
Global governance occurs through a variety of institutions, and their processes of 
rule creation.71  Global Governance is partly a response to the need of sovereign 
states to direct and order cross-border agency of varied entities.72 On this basis, 
the creation of investment arbitration has been done to bypass weaknesses in 
domestic governance to protect commercial interests of foreign investors.73  
 
The proliferation of supra-national institutions playing a governance role over 
                                                
67 A.C. Robles Jnr, ‘Global Governance: and Political Economy: German and French 
Perspectives’ (1995) 1 Global Governance 99 at p.100. 
68 K.W. Abbott & D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 
54(3) Int. Org. 421 at p.421-424; T. Ginsberg, ‘International Substitutes for Domestic 
Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance’ (2005) 25(1) Int. Rev. Law. 
Econ. 107, at p.107-112. 
69 See Douglas, (n23 above) at p.6. 
70 J.E. Alvarez, ‘Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter 
Eleven’ (1997) 28 Inter-Am. L.R. 303 at p.303-314; A.E.L. Tucker, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty 
and ‘Compulsory’ International State/ Investor Arbitration’ (1998) 11 Leiden J. Int’l L. 513 at 
p.513-516. 
 
 
71 A similar and relevant example of global governance to concerns of legitimacy is 
transnational regulation which has been described as:  'Transnational regulation is a mode 
of governance in the sense that it structures, guides and controls human and social 
activities and interactions beyond, across and within national territories'.  Djelic & Sahlin-
Andersson (n6 above) at p.6 
72 Though a range of foreign policy, power-play between states and other factors are also 
of important. Thus in investment treaty arbitration, there is a view that the system is 
imposed on the developing worlds through a zero-sum game where those states do not 
fully appreciate burdens of the treaties, A.T. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt 
them: Explaining the popularities of BITs’ (1997-98) 38 Va. J. Int’l 639 at p.666-682. 
73 This has been an approach advocated to deal with the failures of the developing world 
to deal with financial liberalization, See K.Rogoff, ‘International Institutions for 
Reducing Global Capital Instability’ (1999) 13(4) Jnl. Econ. Persp  21 at p.21-24.  
 national institutions has raised questions of the accountability of those institutions 
to states. The impact is firstly on the reduced power of territorial control of 
domestic governments, which may weaken their acceptability to their citizens. 
This concern particularly arises from the perspective of a master-citizen theory of 
democratic governance, which sees the role of governance as one primarily 
concerned with fulfilling public interest.74 It also limits protection that domestic 
democratic processes usually afford citizens when dealing with governance, seen 
in terms of democratic theory as ‘the exercise of power’.75 It also reduces the 
ability of democratic processes to control the harm of international activity by 
creating external spheres of order and conduct outside the peripheries of political 
control by citizens.76  
The benefit of political control is that it can increase public acceptance of 
international transactions that are beneficial to the states. In investment arbitration 
this is important where the foreign economic agent is likely to be viewed with 
suspicion by the local populace.77 Public concerns over global governance include 
increasing complexity and lack of transparency in those realms where it existed 
before in simpler forms. Concern also related to global governance is the 
extension of control to new realms of social and human life without expectation 
but due to domestic governments leaving those sectors uncontrolled.78  
Global governance differs significantly from municipal governments in key ways 
relevant to its legitimation from the point of view of public consent. As far as 
direct accountability is concerned in democratic states global governance is usually 
accountable to the executive; whereas domestic governance to the 
                                                
74 In modern democratic theory, the citizen is the principal or master and his or 
government is the servant, See P. Pettit, Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government 
(OUP) (2007) at p.8; P. Manent, Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy (Rowman & 
Littlefield) (1996) at p.xiii-ix.  
75 J.A. Scholte, ‘Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance’ (2004) 
39(2) Govt  & Opp 211 at p.211-212. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See, for example, Peruvian attitudes in Swablowski, Transnational Law and Local Struggles: 
Mining, Communities, and the World Bank (Hart) (2007) at p.41-42. 
78 See Djelic & Sahn-Andersson (n6 abovbe) at p.12 
 populous.79Thus accountability to public interest depends upon the ability of 
citizens to hold the executive function accountable. This is more difficult than 
legislative accountability in democratic states, as executive function is generally 
not transparent or directly controlled by the legislature, but operated through 
governmental discretion.80 Thus, global governance does not often involve direct 
participation by the citizens of nation states. Further, this is heightened by the fact 
that global governance has the capacity to adapt its governing mandate and self-
determine its roles beyond the original conception of its mandate.81 It is this 
aspect that gives rise to concerns about its ability to fulfill public interest, due to 
the omission of direct representation of all affected parties. Thus the omission of 
public representation in the exercise of arbitrators’ interpretative powers is of 
particular concern where that exercise creates novel rule-making, rather than being 
merely an exercise of executive discretion of national governments in international 
relations.82  
Where there are genuine public interest concerns raised by states that are being 
complained above, the issue of whether public interest is maintained in 
governance under FET is of importance.83  
 
                                                
79 See B. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (OUP) (1999) at p.6-23. 
80 In the U.S. the concern over international norm-making altering rights and obligations 
of domestic private parties resulted in a period of exclusive legislative control of such 
off-shoots of legislative action. See debates regarding the Bricker Amendment: G.A. 
Finch, ‘The need to restrain the Treaty-Making power of the United States within 
Constitutional Limits’ (1954) 48 AJIL 57 at p.54-64. 
81 E.g,  The European Court of Justice has expanded the realm of powers of the 
European Community through expansive readings of the Treaty text. For example in 
European Law provisions: L. Hinnekens, ‘Recent trends in the case-law of the ECJ in 
matters of direct taxation’ (2006) 7(2) ERA Forum 281 at p.281-282. 
82P.B. Stephan, ‘The New International law-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority and 
Freedom in the new Global Order’ (1999) 70 Uni. Col. Law. Rev. 1555 at p.1579;  Lack 
of control of executive function is a classic approach to determining the legitimacy of 
EU policy-making is based on this, See, for example,  J. Tallberg, ‘Executive Politics’ in 
Eds., K.E. JØrgenesen, M.A. Pollack & B. Rosamond, Handbook of European Union Politics 
(SAGE) (2007) at p.201-202 
83 *Nanz and Steffek argue that this will only be possible through the creation of a 
‘transnational public-sphere’ where public scrutiny and input occurs into fully transparent 
international institutions, See P. Nanz & J. Steffek, ‘Global Governance, Participation 
and the Public Sphere’ (2004) 39(2) Gov & Opp. 314 at p. 314-321. 
 However, as public interest has not been factored into fair treatment 
interpretations,84 both regulatory and administrative governance by the fair 
treatment standard give rise to issues in relation to both state and direct public 
participation.85 These concerns are also heightened by a spatial conception of 
proximity of governance to its subjects. This can exacerbate the lack of 
democratic consensus of law-making by the international institution.86 This spatial 
gap between subjects and international governance can restrict the ability of 
international institutions to act as effective coordinators of domestic regulatory 
activities.87These issues are of concern due to the some of the restrictions of 
regulatory activity that some interpretations of FET have done. These give cause 
for a greater input from public interest bodies and agencies which can represent 
public interest that may not be reflected by governments in their orthodox 
paradigm of foreign relations role that comprises negotiation and execution of 
treaties, contrary to the general perceptions of government activity in the 
international sphere.88 Alternatively states can respond by constricting the powers 
of arbitrators or increase executive control over arbitral decisions by subjecting 
them to greater control.89  
 
 
                                                
84 Note Chapter  2 on legitimate expectations.  
85 See, Roth (n.78 supra). 
86 This issue has permeated governance discourse regarding the EU. See, A. Follesdal & 
S. Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and 
Moravcsik’ (2006) 44(3) JCMS 533 at p.534-537. 
87 See, J.O. McGinnis & M.L. Mousesian, ‘Against Global Governance’ (2004) 45 Harv. Int. L.J. 
353 at p.355-356, countering Guzman’s call for expanding the WTO’s mandate beyond direct 
trade matters: A.T. Guzman, ‘Global Governance & The WTO’ (2004) 45 Harv. Int. L.J. 303 at 
p.307. This implies a degree of locality is important to effective governance, i.e. institutions of 
governance or government are to be present at the local level- See, H. Blair, ‘Participation and 
Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries’ (2000) 28(1) 
World. Dev. 21 at p.21, p.23-25. 
88 Models of direct input of public interest have been discusses with the WTO, See E-U. 
Petersmann, ‘Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading System: Democratic Governance 
and Competition Culture in the WTO: Introduction and Summary’ (2004) 7 (3):  Jnl. Int Econ. Law  585 at 
p.590-593. These include controls on negotiators of international agreements that force them to 
consider democratic consequences of treaties, and level of control that national legislatures can 
have over international governance. The latter can be modified so that it has a greater input in 
international governance when norms are being created (discussed ibid). 
89 See Chapter 7. 
 6.3. Administrative Rules and Transplantation. 
 
Investment treaty arbitration is a quasi-universal system of jurisprudence; judicial 
reasoning being applicable to disputes concerning several thousand investment 
treaties.90 It can be seen from the legitimate expectations and transparency chapter 
that this system applies notions of administrative law and controls domestic 
regulation through the fair and equitable treatment standard. This is through the 
operation of judicial decisions as a source of international law.91 Thus these rules 
are potentially applicable to all states party to investment treaties irrespective of 
their stage of economic development, and without regard to how developed their 
administrative infrastructure or systems of regulation are.  
 
The application of administrative law and regulatory standards in the 
interpretation of FET can be termed ‘legal transplantation’. ‘Legal transplantation’ 
is the transfer of rules or laws from one legal system to another.    
 
In this context, legal transplantation places Western domestic administrative law 
on defendant States in investment treaty arbitration proceedings.92 The investment 
arbitration system pre-supposes that certain administrative conduct is appropriate 
for states to accommodate administrative interaction with the investor and 
beneficial for the long-term development of state infrastructure.93 However, not 
                                                
90 Z. Douglas, The international law of Investment Claims (Cam Uni. P) (2009) at p.2-3. 
91 The potential of investment treaty arbitration decisions to be used as the subsidiary 
method to interpret and render unambiguous the fair and equitable treatment standard is 
significant: See Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as an 
accepted method of determining international rules. Shaw, International law 5th Ed (Cam 
Uni, Press) (2003) at p. 66; W.W. Burke-White, ‘International Legal Pluralism’ (2003-04) 
25 Mich. J. Int’l 963 at p.970-971 (Investment treaty arbitration jurispdrudence can also 
be used by other international courts, at p.972-94).  
92 A. Watson, Legal Transplants: an approach to comparative law (Scottish Academic Press) 
(1974) at p.1-26; T. Waelde & J.L Gunderson, ‘Legislative Reform in Transition 
Economies: Western Transplants- A short-cut to social market economy status?’ (1994) 
43(2) ICLQ 347 at p.366-370. See also Chapter 5 discussions on administrative law 
origins. D. Krueger, ‘The Combat Zone: Mondev International Ltd v. United States and 
the Backlash against Chapter 11’ (2003) 21 Bostn. U. Int. L.J. 399 at p.420. 
93 See, S. Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional Law in the 
BIT Generation (Hart) (2009) p.146-155. 
 all states that are a part of this system may be familiar with notions of liability 
through administrative law.94 The law and development movement sheds lights on 
the problems that ‘legal transplantation’ of administrative law may create for the 
practicability interpretations of FET. The movement fundamentally concerns 
itself with problems that ‘legal transplantation’ may face when transferring law 
from developed to developing states. 
 
Transplantation was advocated in the ‘law and development’ movement. This 
sought to create economic growth through the transplantation of legal norms and 
institutions from developed states.95 This was thought to assist in the creation of a 
viable legal system in developing states that was based on the rule of law. Initially, 
focus of legal development had been primarily to directly use law to assist 
economic development, rather than integrate legal development with other forms 
of development such as social and political development that may indirectly assist 
economic development.96 Law was seen as a fundamental servant to economic 
growth. There was little evaluation of the relationship between the two during the 
early application of legal transplantation.97  
 
Problems of ‘legal transplantation’ were realized in the critiques that were applied 
to the field of ‘law and development’ in the 1970s and are relevant to problems 
that might be faced by current legal constructions under FET.98  A key facet of a 
                                                
94 For example, problems for harmonization of rules within the European Union can 
occur due plural legal systems. See in the field of accountancy rules: A.G. Hopwood, 
‘Some reflections on the harmonization of accountancy in the EU’ (2001) 94(3) Eur. 
Acc. Rev. 241 & p.250-251. 
95 Nyhart, ‘The Role of Law in Economic Development’ (1962) 1 Sudan. L.J. & Rpts. at 
p.394; Friedman, ‘On Legal Development’, (1969) 24 Rutg. L. Rev 11 at  p.53 
96 E.M. Burg, ‘Law and Development:  A Review of the Literature & a Critique of 
‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement’ (1977) 22 Am J.  Comp.  L. 492 at p.502. 
97 Nyhart, (n6 above) at p.398.  
98 T. Geraghty, ‘People, practice, attitudes and problems in lower courts of Ethopia’ 
(1969) 6 Journal of Ethopian Law 427 at p.429-435. ; N. Singer, ‘Modernisation of law in 
Ethopia: a Study in process and personal values’ (1970) 11 Harvard Int. Law Journal. 73; 
at p.73-79. B.O. Bryde, ‘The reception of European Law and Autonomous Legal 
Development in Africa’ (1978) 18 Law and State 21 at p.21-30; B. de Sousa Santos, ‘Law: 
a map of misreading, towards a post-modern conception of law’ (1987) 14(3) Jrnl of Law 
& Soc. 279 at p.279-283 & p.288-292. 
 critical approach to that field was the work of Trubeck. Trubeck’s fundamental 
concern with ‘legal transplantation’ was that it did not sufficiently appreciate: (i) 
distinctions between cultures;99 (ii) the limitations of law’s impact on social 
development; (iii) the complexity of modern legal-systems and (iv) ambiguity over 
the exact effect transplanted rules were supposed to have.100 The latter affects the 
efficacy of ‘transplanted rules’ through the ambiguity of what precise role 
transplants are supposed to play. 
 
Trubeck noted that cultural practices in the developing world, including forms 
and methods of governance, would make it difficult for rule of law-based ideals to 
be transplanted. Where this transplantation would occur, without democratization, 
it would be at risk of increasing the control power of autocratic government.101 
On one reading, transplanting rules from a state with a functioning rule of law and 
institutional accountability to one without them, might undermine the 
development of the economy of the new host state of the transplant, by reducing 
the autonomy of market agents through increased central control. 
 
Two immediate concerns for ‘legal interpretation’ in FET may arise from this.  
The first here is that it is assumed, by way of justification for interpretations, 
rather than proven that administrative law and regulatory standards in 
interpretations will have desired benefits to the host-state. Secondly, that the lack 
of clarity and specificity to what those benefits are, and where exactly beneficial 
impact is to occur, may affect the ability of transplants to be successful on a 
general level, as well as the specific. At this initial stage of critique, such ambiguity 
may militate against the construction of any consent to the process of 
                                                
99 D.M. Trubeck & M. Galanter, ‘Scholars in estrangement: some reflections on the crisis 
in law and development studies in the U.S.’ (1972) 4 Wis. L. Rev 1062 at p.1070. 
100 D.M. Trubeck,’ Towards a social theory of law: An essay on the study of law and 
development’ (1972) 82(1) Yale L.J. 1 at  at p10-11 & p.34-40; G. Maydea, ‘Appreciate 
the difference: The role of different domestic norms in law and development reform: 
Lessons from China and Japan’ (2006) 51 McGill L.J. 547 at p.550-551. 
101 D.M. Trubeck,’ Towards a social theory of law: An essay on the study of law and 
development’ (1972) 82(1) Yale L.J. 1 at  at p.28-29  
 transplantation itself, particularly due to the aforementioned unpredictability for 
developing states. 
 
Further, there is an inherent problem with the idea that mere transplantation of 
administrative law and regulatory standards can benefit the host-state economy. 
Transplanted rules and ideas were geared towards a singular aim of development 
that would create market-based economies that would become key drivers of 
growth.102 These would assist in the creation of fixed institutions and their 
accountability under a working rule of law.103 The process failed because it 
presumed certain reactions of development on institutional reform. These were 
perhaps far too multi-variant in practice to be done by transplantation alone, 
without the re-calibration of other relevant factors in states, whether sociological, 
political or economic, to be effective.104This is what arbitrators creating standards 
such as transparency may need to appreciate.  
As a response, since the initial phase in the late 1960s and 1970s, law and 
development through transplantation has made a recovery through shifting its 
discourse to allow for the broader aspects of development structure, such as those 
which relate to economics, cultural differences and social structure. It is this meta-
legal re-focus that has allowed it to become, comparatively, a more effective tool 
for international development. From this, creation of administrative law using 
FET may need to take into consideration other factors related to providing the 
institutional development needed for an investor friendly environment, through 
broader input into FET interpretations that create rules. 
 
Further criticisms of transplantation related to its legal coherency. These were 
elaborated along the lines that there was no clear consensus over what is 
                                                
102 All of these ideologies have issues of legitimacy relating to non-plural approaches to 
domestic polity- namely not recognizing existing development status of states as 
indigenous cultures and ways of life, See: F. von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Legal Pluralism & 
Social Justice in Economic and Political Development’ (2001) 32(1) IDS Bulletin 46 at 
p.46-49. 
103 H.W. Arndt, Economic Development, The history of an idea (Chicago Uni) (1987) at 
p.115-165. See also, J. Hatchard & A. Perry-Kessaris, Law and Development: Facing 
Complexity in the 21st Century (Cavendish) (2003) at p.vii-viii. 
104 (n99 above). 
 developed law, or what form the appropriate rules would take.105 Significant 
disparities regarding the role of law with respect to its impact on the market exist 
between the developed and developing world.106 On a fundamental level 
developing countries may not wish to create institutions accountable to public 
law. Further, they may have genuine concerns such as the problems accountability 
may pose to the flexibility of administrative organs carrying out key development 
policies. The problem of coming to a generally acceptable definition of what law is 
itself makes transplantation difficult.107  
 
The transplantation of administrative law also includes the presumption of the 
existence of effective legal institutions to adjudicate public law disputes.108 The 
existence of formal adjudication in the developed world, such as that found in the 
adversarial system or the process of inquiry, may depend on the legal culture and 
practices of developing states.109  
 
Even within developed states there are considerable differences in public law 
dispute resolution amongst developed states. Thus, to take an example, specific 
frameworks of administrative law in French and English law are very different in 
their approach to legal content and adjudicatory process.110 Some states may have 
almost non-functioning systems of law and no framework of accountability for 
public institutions.  
 
                                                
105 There is tendency for the critics of law and development to succumb to instrumentalism, 
forgetting their own skepticism. See Burg (n97 above) at p.523. 
106 J.W. Salacuse, ‘From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Changing Role 
for law in the third world’ (1999) 33 Int’l 875 at p.875-878 & p.889-890. 
107  (n97 above) 
108 See, Salacuse, (n106) at p.888-889. 
109 S.E. Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1998) Law & Soc. Rev. 869 at p.869-871. 
110 The detail and structure of French administrative law is still significantly more detailed 
than the common-law; B. Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common Law World 
(Law Book Exchange) (2006) at p.2-p.5; J.H. Merryman, ‘How others do it: The French 
and German Judiciaries’ (1987-88) 61 S. Cal. L. Rev 1865 at p.1866 & p.1870; J.H. 
Merryman, ‘Public Law – private law distinction in European and American Law’ (1968) 
J. Pub. L. 3 at p.3-12; J.H. Merryman, ‘The French Deviation’ (1996) 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 
109 at p.110-p.113, p.117-118. 
 It is feasible that states that have developed administrative law, or special 
administrative tribunals, will be able to adjudicate public law claims better than 
others due to an understanding of what the limits of administrative rights of 
individuals are and how to procedurally manage claims. This difference in capacity 
to utilize administrative law works against the attempts of arbitrators to create a 
generic and universal system of administrative rules under the fair treatment 
standard for all states.111 
 
Transplanted rules may have to be in line with the customs, institutional practices 
and cultures of states to be effective.112In law and development, the weakness of 
compliance with foreign transplanted rules by developing states had been 
attributed to a lack of this alignment.113 Public administrative law is a particular 
type of system of accountability that is based on the creation of formal 
administration, usually emanating from a centralized Government structure, and 
formal written (non-customary) rules.114 This is not present in many developing 
states, where administration away from central Government tends to be weak and 
underdeveloped. De Soto states that greater enforcement mechanisms are 
required where there is a mismatch between the transplanted law and domestic 
custom, the result of this is to drive up the cost of the legal process for the host-
                                                
111 T. Heng Cheng, ‘Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2006-07) 
30(1) Ford. Int. Law. J. 1014 at p.1016 & p.1036-1037; S.D. Franck, ‘The Nature and 
Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do Investment Treaties 
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112 See, E.Buscaglia & W. Ratliff, Law and Economics in Developing Countries 
(Stanford) (2000) at p.4; Further, where a transplanted norm requires a centralized 
enforcement mechanism, it may be less likely to result in behavioural change that is 
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113 See, R.D. Cooter, ‘The Rule of State Law and the rule of law State: economic analysis 
of the legal foundations of development’ in Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development 1996 (IBRD) (1997) at p.191-192. 
114 See, Buscaglia & Ratliff, (n 112 above) p.11-12. Note that customary law, as opposed 
to formal written code is the practice in many developing states. Some are undergoing 
reform to formalize customary rules as written law passes through a formal process of 
enactment, See, D. Berkowitz, J. Pistor & J-F. Richard, ‘Economic development, legality 
and the transplant effect’ (2003) 47 Eu. Econ. Rev. 165 at p.165-174. 
 state to comply with the norm.115 There may be a degree to which states have to 
take the burden of implementing new rules imposed upon them by processes that 
use transplantation, whether domestic or international. This will depend on 
available resources of both monetary and non-monetary nature (see below). 
However, investment arbitration may have to be sensitive to difficulties of 
compliance with its FET administrative law transplants, if they are to be a fair 
burden of responsibility upon states.  
 
Arbitrators applying the process of ‘legal transplantation’ may have to factor in 
some sensitivity to national particularities such as cost compatibility of rules and 
the cost of their enforcement to make compliance with administrative law 
frameworks more feasible. This may mean that the interpretive method may have 
to be customized to reflect national approaches to administrative liability and 
law.116 Greater recourse to domestic law and custom in interpreting fair and 
equitable treatment may be useful for arbitrators, if not as a source of law then for 
a context in which to determine appropriate rules.117 Domestic law, if part of an 
effective system of national legal accountability, may reflect compliance ability of 
states.  
 
This approach of domestic referencing may be useful despite concerns in 
investment treaty arbitration of the lacunae of legal protection available to 
investors in many states and the resulting use of general international law in 
                                                
115 H. de Soto, The Other Path: The invisible revolution in the third world (I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd)  
(1989) at p.55-57. 
116 An appreciation of domestic normative positions on potential international rules can 
be fundamental to their acceptance: See, Gotlieb and Dalfen’s work on contrasting 
international rules on the law of the sea and concomitant Canadian positions:  A. Gotlieb 
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ICSID, See: C.H. Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A commentary (Cam U. P) (2001) at 
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confidence, Understanding Political Risk Management in the 21st Century (IBRD) (2009) 
at p.10. 
 arbitration as a buffer against these.118 Ensuring that rules brought in through 
transplantation are not significantly too onerous for states would reduce the cost 
of implementation of the norm and would make the imposition of liability on the 
host-state fairer considering the unpredictability created by the textual ambiguity 
of the fair treatment standard.119 In some instances the issue of cost may be 
determinative of the unworkability of administrative law transplants due to 
developing countries lack of resources. Where there is a significant short-coming 
it may require an increase in cost sharing by the investor’s own state if it feels that 
administrative law application by arbitrators is intrinsic to gathering foreign 
investment for development, and it benefits from having many investors working 
in the territory of the developing state.  
 
Thus investment treaty arbitration as a system may have to be re-designed in order 
to address possible long-term compliance abilities of developing states to meet its 
legal espousal. To reduce cost, in turn, legal harmonization may be an option. This 
is balancing the ideal administrative framework of the investor against the capacity 
to comply with the host-state.120 Depending on interpretations, one might even 
choose to water-down existing investment arbitration rules in order to increase 
compliance, if adequate mechanisms for compliance are not built in into the 
arbitration system or developing states.  
Transplantation does often require behaviour change of institutional 
practices and individuals.121 This can have an unwanted impact on local culture.122 
                                                
118 C.N. Brower & L.A. Steven, ‘Who then should judge?: Developing the international 
rule of law under NAFTA Chapter 11’ (2001) 2 Chi. J. Int’l 193 at p.196. The advantage 
of a contextual approach with respect to domestic law, rather than a mere restriction of 
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119 See Chapter 1, for textual ambiguity. 
120 See, Waelde & Gunderson (n 92 above) at p.368-371. 
121 E.g. In the Eastern block countries following the cold-war the bureaucracy has taken 
reform and time to change habits under centralized power to alter to a free-market state, 
See, A. Kotchegura, ‘A decade of transition is over: What is on the Reform Agenda  in T. 
Verheijen (Ed.), Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Edward Elgar) (1999) at 
p.9-15. 
122 This issue has been debated with the transplantation of human rights and civil liberties 
norms into developing world. E.g A case made to protect incompatible national culture, 
 Transplanted rules do not always have their desired effects. This means that the 
factors that affect the impact of rules have to be factored in by arbitrators in order 
to make the rule more effective in achieving its desired ends. Depending on the 
complexity of these factors, arbitrators may need input from litigating parties 
where this is possible, or development institutions that are able to study factors 
relating to compliance of rules.  
 
 
Co-Dependency on the rule of law culture of administrative law transplants 
 
Law and development also states that effective change on the ground for 
transplants requires both an analysis of the rules being transplanted, and the 
practices of institutions or individuals that they seek to affect. Complex rules of 
administrative law may encounter difficulties of compliance due to a lack of 
appropriately trained domestic administrators. There may be a gulf of technical 
knowledge that will need to be overcome in the developing world to understand 
the rules and to design a method of implementation at the national level.123  
 
Further, transplantation without effective training and education of what 
compliance entails may render the process nugatory.124Specific training may need 
to be harmonized with general legal education about the importance of 
compliance with transplants, such as administrative law, to maintain the rule of 
law domestically and international obligations towards foreign investors.125In 
some states it may need to be a part of a broader institutional development 
process of transplanting general Western rule of law notions such as 
accountability of governmental action.126 Investment arbitration may need a 
                                                                                                                                      
see: I. Bonny, ‘Between culture and constitution: Evaluating the cultural legitimacy of 
human rights in the African state’ (2000) 22(3) Hum Rts. Qrt. 838 at p.839-841. 
123 M.S. Tanner, The Politics of Law-Making in China: Institutions, Processes and Democratic 
Prospects (OUP) (1999) at p.1-17. 
124 Otto, Stoter, & Arnscheidt, Law Making for Development (Leiden) (2008) at p.56. 
125 (n. 124 supra). 
126 J.A. Widner, Building the rule of law: Francis Nyali and the road to judicial independence in 
Africa (Norton) (2001) at p.178-179. 
 system of oversight that both reviews and also builds the correct institutional 
frameworks for compliance with administrative law transplants to be possible.127 
 
General education in developing states about the rule of law is a difficult and 
costly process that investment treaty arbitral panels need to be aware of.128 Rule of 
law implementation also depends on the availability of domestic legal processes to 
challenge incorrect implementation and oversight by an international institution.129 
None of these are yet available in investment treaty arbitration. Implementation of 
foreign rules in developing countries often has to be protected from political 
process and political interference. There may be an increased risk of this in 
developing states due to the weakness of the rule of law and the concomitant 
increase in arbitrary interference with private property interests.130These factors 
are critical to a legitimate, from a workability point of view, framework of 
administrative law rules created through interpretations of FET.  
 
To some extent the investment arbitration system may provide such an oversight 
through its enforcement process. The enforcement of a given particular 
arbitration award, however, does not monitor post adjudication compliance with 
rules.131 If the system wishes to move beyond punitive liability to create rules that 
effectively protect and promote foreign investment then it may have to do this. 
Effective transplantation may well require a system of monitoring.132 Of all the 
benefits of transplants, it must be recalled that in some states they are a substitute 
for omissions in the organic domestic legislative process.  
 
 
Domestic Political Context. 
                                                
127 T. Eggerston, Imperfect Institutions, Possibilities & Limits of Reform (Uni of 
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As stated, a compatible political context may be necessary for administrative law 
transplants. For their long-term enforcement, accountability of administrative 
institutions to legislatures and the courts will be necessary. This form of 
accountability of institutions depends upon values of democratic governance in 
the host-state.133  The law and development movement, for example, found that 
certain transplants did not work in ex-Soviet states due to different political values 
held by states in the cold-war. Once socialist based political reforms occurred in 
the developing world, rules that were based on free-market liberalism and the rule 
of law like administrative law were transposed, with huge difficulty.134  
 
In some states where the nature of the government is autocratic similar problems 
may persist. Hungary in the cold war, for example, did not allow judicial 
adjudication of contractual disputes. Instead a Government body itself would 
intervene on the basis of national interest over private interest.135This form of 
centralized government would affect the accountability of administrative acts by 
independent means. These issues are still being dealt with by political reform 
strategy in the Western block.136  
 
Thus arbitrators in FET administrative law transplantation may wish to note the 
distinctions of political context between various states to be taken into 
consideration when applying public law rules into the investment treaty system. 
This is particularly where there is a claimant from a significantly more developed 
state, who seeks public law liability.137 Further transplantation of rules that were 
                                                
133 See, P.P. Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America (OUP) (1990) at p.47-50. 
134 See, Waelde & Gunderson (n 92 above). 
135 See Trubeck, (n 100 above) at p.34 
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reliant on the rule of law to function was not wholly successful due to the lack of 
local enforcement mechanisms and culture in the developing world.138  
 
It can thus be seen, that administrative law transplants face political139 and 
institutional hurdles to become effective in the developing world. Further, public 
law can fetter the operation of government processes to the detriment of the 
developing world. For example, transplantation of rules associated with open 
public processes, a key public law rule in England, does not always sit 
harmoniously with a government’s need to prioritize efficient close-door decision-
making to protect policy priorities and reduce cost in public decision-making.140 
Further cost and viability of appropriate institutional training in institutional 
practice transplantation was underestimated.  
 
Long term compliance with FET administrative law by state institutions may be 
limited by a lack of willingness and institutional capacity to change institutional 
practices and culture on the ground.141 Transplants can be affected by local 
educational limitations such as language and literacy requirements generally and in 
public administration.142 Further ethical training may be requisite for fair public 
administration practices, which has to have the right educational background and 
framework to be effectively absorbed. For example, Seidman states that it is vital 
to study existing behavioural conduct on the ground before transplantation to 
create rules that will be acceptable.143 Further, transplants themselves may need to 
be modified, by watering down onerous obligations such as transparency, in order 
to assist compliance, and following an assessment of whether absolute compliance 
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260. 
141 See, Waelde & Gunderson (n 92). 
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is possible. This, perhaps, realist position on transplantation may leave many of 
rules under the fair and equitable treatment standard unreal ideals as opposed to 
workable goals. 
 
There is also the view that administrative law cannot be transplanted into the 
developing world at all because for many states compliance with administrative 
law liability under FET would be unfeasible. Freidman, for example, questioned 
whether transplantation of formal Western rule of law based rules could work at 
all, considering the history of the development of the rule of law, which was part 
of a slow historical evolution of society and linked to other cultural variables such 
as progress in political philosophy and science.144  
 
Further, the fundamental premise of administrative law transplants using the FET 
is questionable. Arbitrators have justified legal interpretation on the basis that they 
are within the purposes of what Contracting Parties to investment treaties had in 
mind with respect to the aims of treaties being to encourage capital across 
borders. However, it is not clear that transplants from states with a functioning 
rule of law, such as FET interpretations of transparency, can assist economic 
development through creating a preferential environment for investments.145  
 
Trubeck, the predominant proponent of this critique, re-iterates Weber’s position 
that the economic development of Western states occurred through the series of 
particularly historical conditions that may themselves have to be transplanted for 
law and development to occur.146  
 
It is also unclear whether administrative law catalyzed economic development, or 
whether it was the other way around. To make this latter point one can see, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, that the rise of the bureaucratic apparatus that 
                                                
144 Friedman, ‘On legal development’ (1969) 24 Rutg. L. Rev. 11 at p.12 
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was needed to administer the industrial state required the development of legal 
rules to ensure that this apparatus was fulfilling the role it had to play.147 This 
analysis challenges the fundamental rationale behind administrative law 
transplants. Arbitrators under FET have, perhaps, on one feasible explanation 
assumed transplantation would work automatically due to acceptability of new 
rules being automatic considering the developing states’ needs for reform.148 
Alternatively, they have sought to find liability in the abstract, not engaging upon 
the idea of liability at all. Though there has been some sensitivity to this by the 
AMTO tribunal regarding the state of the host-state’s courts.149 This approach 
however has not extending to constructing legitimate expectations or 
transparency.  
These weaknesses of viability are of fundamental importance when determining 
the legitimacy and appropriateness of public law in investment treaty 
arbitration.150 
 
Transplantation itself may require political change to be effective, hence for 
administrative law values to be transplanted into institutional practice political 
involvement in institutional reform may also be necessary.151 The problems 
encountered by transplantation in law and development occurred partially through 
not understanding the theoretical basis of the rules. This included the political 
values that were imbued in the rules and the apposition of those political values 
with the culture of the state in question.152 Transplantation often failed as it had 
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no system of monitoring whether transplantation had been absorbed into practice 
through compliance.153  
 
There are also conservative views to transplantation that arbitrators may wish to 
consider. For example, Steiner warns of law interfering with natural social change 
to the point of inhibition.154 Thus public law forms of liability may inhibit nascent 
developing political movements of accountability thus inhibit policy concerning 
reforms of institutions. 155 
 
 
Overall 
 
Transplantation as a part of law and development was justified on the basis of 
‘spill-over’ of economic development from transplanted rules associated with a 
functioning rule of law, and often the incorporation of the rule of law itself. This 
is not so distinct from the presumption of transplantation in investment treaty 
arbitration.  
 
Thus the tribunal in Tecmed to justify a series of legal standards for public 
administration through interpreting the fair and equitable treatment standard 
states:  
‘If the above were not its intended scope, [Fair and Equitable Treatment] would be 
deprived of any semantic content or practical utility of its own… the parties intended to 
strengthen and increase the security and trust of foreign investors that invest in the member 
States, thus maximizing the use of the economic resources of each Contracting Party by 
facilitating the economic contributions of their economic operators.’156  
 
                                                
153 Ibid. 
154 Steiner, ‘Legal education and socio-economic change: Brazilian Perspectives’ (1971) 19 
Am.J. Comp. L. 39 at p.87-88. 
155 M.R. Somers, ‘Citizenship and the place of the public sphere: law, community, and 
political culture in the transition to democracy’ (1993) 58(5) Am. Socg. Rev. 587 at p.588-
p.589. 
156 Tecmed (n 26 above) at para 156. 
 The tribunal here both assumes the intention of contracting parties and, 
heuristically, the economic benefits to the host-state of its own interpretations.157   
 
What processes of transplantation, like the Tecmed elucidation, may fail to 
appreciate is that the creation of administrative standards and may need at least 
partial habit of institutional practice on the ground. Further, to bring this about 
effectively it may have to emanate from domestic political will,158 and mere 
exposure to liability from investment arbitration may not be enough of an 
incentive.  
 
The transplantation of the rule of law is seen as key to development projects.159 
Public law transplantation, based on the rule of law, has an inherent set of 
assumptions about the relationship of the state and law towards people.160 
Different states with different approaches to the rule of law will have different 
inherent assumptions regarding its role. Thus there may be an immediate 
incompatibility between the value of the transplanted norm and the existing or 
non-existing legal framework on the ground that will hinder its functionability.  
 
According to Trubecks’ latest retrospective analysis, the rule of law 
transplantation has not yet overcome the short-comings of differences in 
governance models between States that hinder transplantation.161Rule of law 
based accountability also involves a particular relationship between the courts and 
the State, whereby the courts have jurisdiction to bring Government actions to 
account in legal process.162  
 
                                                
157 Ibid. 
158See B.R. Weingast, ‘The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law’ 
(1997) 91(2) Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 245 at p.245-247 & p.254. 
159 J.M. Otto, W.S.R. Stoter, & J.Arnscheidt, ‘Using legislative theory to improve law and 
development projects’  in J J.M. Otto, B. Van Rooij, J. Arnscheidt Eds. Lawmaking for 
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Projects (Leiden) (2008) at p.54 
160 See, Trubeck and Galanter (n99 above). 
161 (n 99 above). 
162 See, Trubeck and Galanter, (n99 above) p.1071-1072 
 Thus without the support of independent, effective, functioning of courts 
transplantation of conceptions of the rule of law may fail. Administrative law 
transplantation may overestimate the ability of law to alter the conduct of public 
institutions.163 Galanter and Trubeck stated that there are social harms associated 
with excessive legislation associated with rule of law-based transplants.164For 
example excessive legalization through a particular concept of the rule of law (that 
for consistent conduct to occur legal proscription is required) may undermine 
comprehensibility of the legal system to nationals in developing states.165  
 
These may weaken commercial development and institution building. Although 
rules may be clear in drafting, their proliferation may decrease accessibility of 
public process without effective communication channels. Other social harms 
highlighted by Trubeck and Gallanter is that formal law from the developed world 
may actually increase elitism and undermine social equality through lack of 
knowledge of legalistic procedure, it will also increase the prevalence of social 
hierarchy due to limited availability of education, particularly literacy.166  
 
Overall, the process of legal transplantation under FET could be improved by a 
greater appreciation of limitations of compliance from the ground in the 
developing world, as the above critiques highlight. 
 
 
6.4. Capacity of states to respond to FET Governance. 
 
It is of importance in formulating fair burdens of liability whether all contracting 
parties can comply with the legal framework created by arbitrators using the 
                                                
163 (n 162 above). 
164 See, Trubeck and Galanter, (n 99 above) p.1073-1076. 
165 A. Nollkaemper, ‘On the effectiveness of international rules’ (1992) Acta. Politica 49 
at p.51-52; *For a general narrative on the relationship between comprehension of laws 
and compliance, See: J.L. Tapp & L. Kohlberg, ‘Developing senses of law and legal 
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FET.167Differences of institutional development between states question the 
legitimacy of arbitrators’ elucidations of the FET that construe standards for 
administrative process and regulatory institutions.168 
 
The ulterior aims of cross border investment include the raising of capital for 
development and to increase the size of domestic markets through previously 
unavailable resources and consumers.169 Institutional development is of particular 
concern to capital importers.170 Commercial agents need support from 
administrative institutions of the state to function effectively.171 From this 
perspective, perhaps, there is an implicit licence, if not a temptation, for 
arbitrators to choose the administrative law framework to meet the needs of 
investors. This may be acceptable to some states, though it is not ascertainable 
through investment treaties whether this is so. Bearing in mind certain 
assumptions regarding the impact of administrative law on public institutions, 
administrative liability might improve institutional practice towards foreign and 
                                                
167 The Gami tribunal has pointed out that the failure of the state administration to meet national 
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Performance (Cam. Uni. Press) (1990) at p.3-5. 
171 See, D.C. North (n170 above) 
 national investors.172 The acceptability of this is entirely an assumption of 
arbitrators when they are constructing laws that affect states institutions and 
regulation.  
 
No doubt for certain states administrative institution building is a key part of 
international development, and useful for economic stimulus.173 Hence there is 
some legitimization of arbitrators’ assumptions to create laws that may assist this. 
However, what arbitrators have failed to appreciate is that different states have 
different capacities, frameworks and training of administrative bodies.174 Some 
standard setting by arbitrators may be useful, if it bears in mind domestic 
institutional practices, their state of development and availability of resources for 
reform. This is not done in the present method of standard-setting by tribunals. 
Investment treaty arbitration’s incorporation of administrative law, through 
transplantation, is alien to many states in the world, or still subject to development 
reform processes to be fully functionable.175 
 
A fundamental issue relating to capacity of states to comply with arbitrators’ 
standards is the novelty of the idea of effective administrative institutions. On a 
general level the problems with law and development suggest that, institutions, 
and other affected subjects and relationships,176 generally require time to adapt to 
alien legal systems.177The administration of private-property rights, that 
investment treaties protect, requires effective state institutions.178 This may be 
problematic as the protection of private property rights is a relatively recent idea 
                                                
172 See Montt (n93 above) at p.154. 
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ST/ESA/SER.E/31, United Nations, New York, 1983 at p.4-17. G.E. Caiden, 
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Schereuer, Principles of International Investment Law (OUP) (2008) at p.9; D.C. North, (n 
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177 Ibid. 
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Direct Investment inflows to developing countries’ (2003) 57 Int. Org. 175 at p.177 
 in some developing states and institutional development for its protection is still 
in a nascent phase.179 The novelty of protection of private property, in the 
developing world, comes from the fact that it is an idea that originates in the 
political ideal of negative liberty, developed within the Enlightenment discourse in 
the West.180 The spirit of private property protection is to preclude state 
interference with private property rights.181 The idea of protecting property rights 
and restricting state action from the sphere of private contractual relations is still 
undergoing acceptance in the developing world.182 Institutions in the developing 
world are often not equipped to work effectively to administer private-property 
rights: this includes processing permits for contracts and effective enforcement 
institutions for breaches of agreements.183Further, in the developing world there 
may be a greater need to interfere with private property rights to sustain the 
economy and protect economic growth.184  
 
 
Capacity of administrations and regulatory systems in the developing world to 
fulfill standards of FET such as,185 consistency, non-arbitrariness and 
transparency, is questionable. Compliance with administrative law may not be 
possible due to lack of ability of administrative institutions to comply with formal 
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on Freedom at p. where Berlin defines negative liberty as leaving things alone by 
preventing action that interferes. This concept of negative liberty was first espoused in 
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rules of administrative law. This can occur due to lack of training of administrative 
staff due to cost of that training.186 Administrative law requires trained 
professional civil servants who have a high degree of numerical and verbal 
literacy. In Less Developing Countries where formal education is not widespread, 
it will impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of state administrative organs 
through available highly literate administrative bureaucrats.187  Difficulties of 
compliance can also occur due to inability of the state administration to formalize 
administrative conduct into a code or a set of rules, either through lack of 
knowledge of formal administrative management techniques or financial 
resources. Good administrative governance it requires a certain level of 
communication within governmental apparatus. Thus, central government must 
be able to effectively communicate international rules to local administration.  
 
Where a state does not historically have a solid rule of law, developed 
administrative organs of a state and a strong judicial system it is likely that 
administrative law is an alien obligation. As stated earlier, it must be understood 
that in some states judicial review is a relatively recent phenomenon. This includes 
the idea of legal accountability to standards within judicial process.188 Thus the 
idea of international courts reviewing administrative organs and setting standards 
for institutions of states will be a concept alien to many states. Further, states may 
not be able to comply with administrative law due to the constraints standards can 
place upon the creation and execution of policy by organs of the state by slowing 
down administrative processes for compliance.189 
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Overall, for developing countries, many of which do not have organized public 
institutions, compliance will come at significant cost.190 It will on occasion involve 
creation and monitoring of institutions that may not be feasible. In formulating 
the administrative and governance role arbitrators have not noted that not all 
states will be able to comply with the administrative law developed under the fair 
treatment standard. Nor have arbitrators paid regard to the development status of 
a state’s administration. Some interpretations demonstrate the opposite.191 There 
is also no assessment taken of the revenue required for state administration to 
comply with the FET laws created, and this in turn may undermine administrative 
and regulatory governance role for investor protection.192 The omission of an 
assessment for the capacity of states to comply with laws created under FET 
interpretations renders the current practice of interpretations of questionable 
legitimacy. 
 
6.5. The Nature of International Governance under Fair Treatment 
 
 
As alluded to earlier, some interpretations of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard can be characterized as being similar to the concept of ‘negative liberty’. 
193  This is freedom from state action for private agency, and placing as a priority 
                                                                                                                                      
disguising policy as administrative discretion and hence making it subject to review: M. 
Shapiro, ‘Administrative Discretion: The next stage’ (1983) 92(8) Yale L.J. 1487 at 
p.1489. 
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of the autonomy of the individual or commercial entity over general public 
interest in state action. In the economic context, 194 this approach results in a 
tendency to preclude state interference with private property rights.195  The 
protection of private property is an ideology that many developing states are not 
familiar with, or are still engendering.196 It is unclear from negotiations of 
investment treaties that such an ideology is to be imposed upon developing 
countries through the interpretation of investment treaties.197 Further, as Montt 
intimates, private property rights are generally interfered, at the domestic level, 
with an overriding public interest in mind. Arbitrators have, in instances such as 
rejecting the doctrine of state necessity as a justification for interference with 
investors, rejected public interest or omitted it from the FET governance role they 
have constructed. They have implicitly, in some cases dealing with regulation, 
created a state-free zone for foreign investments that is characteristic of negative 
liberty and carries a significant public interest deficit. This is a key legitimacy issue 
of current usage of FET. 
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One of the aims of cross border investment is to raise capital for development 
and increase size of markets through previously unavailable resources and 
consumers.198 From this perspective perhaps there is an implicit licence for 
arbitrators to choose an administrative law and regulatory law framework, 
constraining both activities at will.199 There are also certain assumptions regarding 
the impact of administrative law on public institutions, such as improving 
institutional efficacy that can legitimize its creation through ‘legal interpretation’.  
For certain states administrative institution building is a key part of international 
development.200 However, as discussed above, different states have different 
capacities, frameworks and training of administrative bodies. Investment treaty 
arbitration’s Eurocentric conception of administrative law is alien to many states 
in the world, or still subject to development reform processes to be fully 
functional. Thus, some states may find it difficult to meet some FET 
administrative law. 
 
FET governance can be seen as a part of the global liberal economic movement. 
Liberalism is the movement towards deregulation, privatization and encouraging 
capital based growth towards a free-market economy.201 This process has been 
sold to developing countries, many of whom are capital importers, under the guise 
of sustainable economic development. Investment treaties were signed by many 
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in Human Geography 3 at p.3-11. 
 for assisting this very purpose.202It is also relevant that the adverse problems in 
relation to liberalism’s impact on states which would give them cause to question 
some of the role of administrative and regulatory governance under the FET, 
have not been addressed by arbitrators. For example the key concern relating to 
liberalism is of distribution of state resources for private investors, through 
regulatory and administrative re-alignment, away from the public sphere has not 
been factored into decisions, including GAMI, CME, Lauder and CMS. 
 
States can be seen to enter investment treaties to bargain for foreign corporations 
that act as domestic privatization catalysts.203 However, privatization allows 
market forces to determine resource allocation over the state.204 Privatization of 
key public utilities, such as water and energy, has a significant impact on public 
life, including health and well-being. The availability and access to these key 
resources would be subject to huge public interest, and an implicit question of 
legitimacy can be formulated on the basis of fair Government distribution of 
them.205 A key concern of the impact of liberalism is that it affects social 
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equity.206Concerns about employment availability and fairness to access 
opportunities that new capital creates have led to protests.207 
 
Free-market liberalism also has an impact on social structures and indigenous 
culture in the developing world. This is seen clearly in the impact of imported 
technology on municipal culture.208 This impact is not often foreseen by 
Governments that sign up to neo-liberal instruments.209 It should be noted that 
investment treaties are not just bargains for capital but also for technology and 
skill. Foreign businesses will also not necessarily abide by fair employment 
practices including gender equality.210 The state may need to act in order to 
redress fairness in opportunity. 
 
Overall, the FET standard has been interpreted so as to affect the internal order 
of the state and restrict its regulatory powers to the benefit of the investor. From 
this perspective, it liberalises the investor from state interference. Thus the system 
usurps the critical power of the state to determine the space allocated to the public 
function and private function in the domestic market, by taking it upon itself to 
determine where and where not the state can appropriately act vis-à-vis foreign 
investment.  The mandate for such action, perhaps, is found in a teleological 
reading of investment treaties, specifically that minimizing the public sphere of 
state action, by restricting regulation, the investment arbitration system can reduce 
political risk. Thus such an approach can have an implied mandate within 
investment treaties and the ICSID Treaty. 
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6.6. Reforms of FET Governance. 
 
On the analysis thus far some reforms to investment arbitration will be useful to 
alleviate current short-comings in the governance role of the fair treatment 
standard. The governance usage of the fair and equitable treatment standard, 
highlighted above, requires institutional responses to be improved if it is to 
function effectively and not ignore key criticisms of legal transplants. This is not 
just changes to investment arbitration as an institution, there may also need to be 
some alterations to the methods in which treaties are formulated in order to make 
state intent clear as to the scope of FET These systemic changes will be fully 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
The limits of general legal coercion at least bring forward the question of different 
approaches to long-term effective compliance with FET administrative law and 
FET’s requirements for regulatory consistency.211 At the moment, for example, 
there is no monitoring of post award compliance by states of FET laws. Further, a 
significant institutional short-coming in the FET governance role is the inability to 
ensure that the legal framework of administrative governance is capable of being 
complied with by all states to investment treaties.  
 
To improve current usage, perhaps, there needs to be within investment treaties 
and ICSID some restriction of FET to reflect limitations of state capacity for 
compliance with FET administrative law. In the absence of this, arbitrators need 
to develop a defence for states along these lines. These defences need to reflect 
explanations for limitations, such as current institutional frameworks of the state 
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the will of the objects of law to comply and the complexity of the rules, See R. Pound, ‘The 
Limits of Effective Legal Action’ (1917) 27(2) Int. Jrnl. Ethics 150 at p.151-153. For a specific 
example of the negligible effects of law through coercion in the field of criminality, See, T.K. 
Gregoire & A.C. Burke, ‘The relationship of legal coercion to readiness to change among adults 
with alcohol and other drug problems’ (2004) 26(1) Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 35 at 
p.35-41. 
 that the investor ought to have researched, and limitations of revenue.212 This may 
allow for more effective FET governance in encouraging institutional 
development by giving states a realistic opportunity to comply, and a fairer 
construction of liability for some developing states. The resulting requirement of 
investor knowledge of comparative development of institutions may create an 
incentive for states to develop institutions to compete more effectively for FDI.213 
 
Transplantation of administrative law is not enough to create the institutional 
improvements that will assist investors. To deal with the lack of institutional 
development in the third world, institutional development needs strategies over 
and above liability. These will include understand the limitations of domestic 
institutional practices, including availability of adequate human resources.214 
Where there are ingrained cultural practices transplants will need gradual 
implementation methods that can change practices.215 These include appropriate 
changes to conduct through training and changes in procedures in institutional 
practices. If FET laws wish to apply burdens to national administrations, 
investment arbitration may need to assist by providing the means to meet those 
burdens. 
 
To build the capability of institutions to learn models of governances for states 
that breach FET administrative law may need appreciate the lack of the best 
schools of public administration training in developing states to build behavioural 
changes within institutional practice to meet high maintenance obligations under 
FET, such as transparency.  
 
                                                
212 A shift of burdens to investors to research conditions in states has been intimated by 
Muchlinski, See P. Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Emptor’? The relevance of the conduct of the 
investor and the fair and equitable treatment standard’ (2006) 53(3) ICLQ 527 at p.527-
529. 
213 For a positive correlation between institutional development and FDI see, A. Bevan, 
S. Estrin & K. Meyer ‘Foreign Investment Location and Institutional Development in 
transition economies’ (2004) 13 Int. Bus. Rev. 43 at p.43-45. 
214 D.C. North, (n170 above). 
215 See, Burg (n96 above) at p.522. 
 At the moment there is no system of monitoring between arbitrators creating law 
under FET and reviewing whether national governments ensure that public 
bodies carry out their functions effectively.216 The investment arbitration law-
making process needs to be given the appropriate equipment to carry out 
regulatory and public policy decisions, such as specialist input that can highlight 
broader policy impacts of FET administrative and regulatory governance, through 
FET’s law-making role.217 Further, a legal system of governance needs to 
appreciate limitations of its subjects to comply with laws that it produces.  
From a developing state’s perspective, the risk of adverse outcomes in dispute 
resolution should not outweigh the benefits of cross-border capital gained from 
the investment treaty agreement.218 The excessive damages currently awarded in 
the investment arbitration system could be mitigated by a complementary 
institutional development programme to assist states in compliance.219This would 
create a fairer liability for future breaches, as states would be able to strategize,220 
through institutional development, to prevent FET administrative law breaches 
and ensure a more consistent national regulatory framework to meet requirements 
of ‘consistency’ under FET. 
 
Critiques of legal transplantation can also be used to improve the governance of 
FET over domestic public administration.221 For transplants to be effective, 
institutional awareness and political awareness for the rule of law needs to be 
                                                
216 For example of how this is done at the national level, See: C.C. Hooton, Executive 
Governance, Presidential Administrations and Policy Change in the Federal Bureaucracy 
(M.E. Sharpe) (1997) at p.12-34. 
217 For example, new governance models in the EU have included input from civil society groups 
in EU law making to determine public interest: See, J. Scott & D.M. Trubeck, ‘Mind the gap: Law 
and New approaches to Governance in the EU’ (2002) 8(1) Eu. Law. Jnl 1 at p.3 
218 See, A.T. Guzman (n 72 above). 
219 See, Sempra v. Argentina, where after four rounds of hearings an award of 
$75,000,000 was inflicted on Argentina. 
220 c.f. E.g, Corporate liability has been seen as a risk assessment and management 
exercise: W.S. Laufer, ‘Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance’ 
(1999) 52 Vand. L. Rev 1341 at p.1341-1343. 
221 Such institutional changes are not easily successful and may just be a mouth-piece for 
making the system more acceptable. See, Swablowski, (n 77 above) at p.19  
 brought about.222Bringing about the rule of law is co-dependent on other public 
reforms that have be identified, such as increasing transparency and removing 
corruption in the form of dominant private interests.223 Transplants will also only 
be effective with local institutions that can protect the rule of law.224 Further, the 
rule of law is not a static concept, it is subject to varied interpretations, and hence 
the governance model must communicate clearly the burdens and reforms 
necessary for states to increase its function.225 Thus, continuous monitoring of 
institutional development, particularly preparing institutions to respond to legally 
accountable rules, is needed as a part of an effective Governance process.226 
 
Good administrative and regulatory governance may include working out best 
solutions and executing them for development.227 Comparisons between existing 
legal frameworks, such as the comparatively conservative approach to FET seen 
with legitimate expectations in English law, may benefit improvements to schemes 
of governance by providing increased legal coherence.228 Further, the regulatory 
and administrative governance role of FET may find it useful to work with other 
international institutions. Another aspect of ensuring compliance with FET 
administrative law and regulatory governance would be investment arbitration 
providing technical legal assistance to developing states, following an adverse 
                                                
222 See, R. Dañino, ‘The Rule of Law and Contractual Rights in Transition Countries’ in 
M. Andenas & G. Sanders (Eds.), Enforcing Contracts in Transition Economies: 
Contractual Rights and Obligations in Central Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (BIICL) (2005) at p.5-6 
223T. Carothers, ‘The rule of law revival’ (1998) 77(2) For. Aff. 95 at p.95-96. ; For 
example, corruption fettered the commercial arrangement in the WDF case: WDF v. 
Kenya ICSID ARB/00/7 (Award) (04/10/06) , p.5-p.9 
224 R. Dañino, (n222 above) at p.6-p.7. 
225 For an example of variances in meaning in the development context, See: A. N. Licht, 
C. Goldschmidt & S.H. Scwartz, ‘Culture rules: The foundation of the rule of law and 
other norms of governance’ (2007) 35(4) Jnl Comp. Econ. 659 at p.650-655. 
226 F. Dahan, ‘Law Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: ‘the “transplantation” of 
secured transaction laws’ (2000) 2(3)  European Journal of Law Reform ? at p. 
227  J J.M. Otto, B. Van Rooij, J. Arnscheidt Eds. Lawmaking for development, 
Explorations into the theory and practice of International Legislative Projects (Leiden) 
(2008) at p.48-54 
228 See Finklestein, (n2 above) at p.369. 
 finding.229 This includes highlighting fundamental flaws of implementing legal 
transplants. This may use private law implementation strategies (such as the way 
commerce responds to new rules) to alter practices in public administration.230 
  
•  •  •  
 
In the first part of Chapter 5 it was noted that administrative law as a concept is 
tied into a particular form of political theory as outlined.231 Many of its legal 
positions used in investment treaty arbitration are predicated on a rule of law 
basis. Its theoretical foundations and development are based in the Western 
concept of the state and Government. It is particularly a response to the growth 
of the administrative state.232 Shifting public law from one country to another may 
cause difficulty for the state to which the obligations are new and unfamiliar. 
 
The function of law is seen often to reflect the desired direction that a particular 
society wishes to go into.233Legal frameworks created by arbitrators may, to a 
degree, be able to direct state institutions to create amenable institutions to 
investors. Though investment treaties have been contracted into for the benefits 
of foreign investment, the choice of public law laws espoused by the system is 
value laden. Public law, as outlined, carries with it a particular conception of the 
rule of law and particular values which are tied into a form of democratic 
Governance. It is not necessarily clear that states have agreed to this in investment 
treaties just in order to attract capital.  
 
                                                
229 Legal technical assitance has not always effectively worked due to short-comings in 
dialogue and financing, See S. Newton, ‘Law and Development, law and economics and 
the fate of legal technical assistance’ in J.M. Otto, B. Van Rooij, J. Arnscheidt Eds. 
Lawmaking for development, Explorations into the theory and practice of International Legislative 
Projects (Leiden) (2008) at p.31 
230 See Newton (n229 above) at p.31, criticizing the World Bank’s approach under 
Ibrahim Shihata to legal transplantation.  
231 See M. Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (OUP) 1992 at p.16. 
232 Brown & Bell, French Administrative Law (OUP) (2007) at p.3-12. 
233 Sedler, ‘Law Reform in the Emerging Nations of Sub-Saharan Africa: Social Change 
and the Development of the Modern Legal System’ (1968) 13 St. Louis U.L.J. 195 at 
p.245  
 The critical discourse of both law and development and law and economics is 
useful to creating an effective Governance mechanism in investment treaty 
arbitration.  
 
Law and Development techniques, particularly those of ‘legal technical assistance’; 
‘institution building’ and ‘legal education’ may assist investment arbitration 
towards realizing its public administration standard setting. In transition 
economies there is a general lack of appreciating private commercial interests and 
upholding contracts. This is both due to lack of institutional components to 
motivate and effectuate compliance and the related want of rule of law culture234 
This can filter into the Government sphere and influence attitudes in public 
administration. Hence investment arbitration may develop a system of effective 
Governance to counter this. This will assist in public administration of treating 
investors fairly.235  
 
As outlined, also relevant to this discourse are arguments put forward by the law 
and economics school of jurisprudence. This highlights short-comings in the 
ability of law to bring about desired affects. It also questions the feasibility of 
arbitrators to bring about the desired effects on the ground through a purely legal 
framework, without support from non-legal/legal techniques that engender 
change of institutional conduct. Thus it questions any absolute presumption that 
administrative law can change or improve administrative conduct to the benefit of 
the foreign investor. 236  
  
The aforementioned transplantation discourse also demonstrates compliance 
difficulties to be faced by states in the developing world. These include the 
inability of rules to fully shift institutional practice in the developing world due to 
                                                
234 K. Pistor, ‘Supply and demand for contract Enforcement in Russia: Courts, 
Arbitration, and Private Enforcement’ (1996) 22(1) Review of Central and Eastern 
European Law 55 at p. 57-58. 
235World Bank, Building Institutions for Markets (IBRD) (2002) at p.2-17. 
236 N.Mercuro, Ed. ‘Law and Economics Critical Concepts in Law’ Vol. 1 (Routledge) 
(2007) at p.3 
 inherent different cultural practices, and lack of adequate planning and revenue 
for institutional reform. For FET rules to succeed in changing environments in 
the developing world, where most states are capital-investors, the critiques of the 
law and development movement will be relevant to both support and adapt the 
law-making framework for arbitrators. Further, the viability of creating public 
administrative reform through legal transplantation that relates to the inability of 
states to meet certain obligations is important to the issue of legitimacy. 
 
  
Chapter 7:  
Conclusion and Proposed Reforms. 
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7.1. Introduction. 
 
This chapter intends to tie up some proposals regarding problems seen in 
the discussed substantive jurisprudence, and with respect to the effects that such 
jurisprudence has on the ITA system as discussed in the previous two chapters. 
From the point of an overview, the coherence of FET is questionable 
considering issues of competing decisions and unclear thresholds as to what 
constitutes a breach of a given standard. Further, arbitrators have not assessed the 
ability of states to comply with their interpretations. The system also lacks the 
ability to monitor long-term compliance by states. However, as will be discussed, 
these problems can be overcome with some institutional changes to the system, 
including altering treaties and possibly creating an investment court that is directly 
accountable to Contracting Parties. 
 Further, it shall be argued that, the lack of coherence with respect to the 
rules is not just an issue relating to the lack of having a court, or a system of 
precedent through an appellate regime, whereby rules can be improved, but also 
due to lack of judicial diligence in applying the rules themselves. This makes a case 
for appointed judges who can be dismissed by contracting parties when they do 
not create or apply rules diligently, and when they ignore important state 
announcements relating to the scope of treaty provisions. 
This chapter at least opens the question that there needs to be a system 
whereby states can directly participate in rule-making of the type done under FET, 
and raise their concerns about rules, such as their ability to comply with them, to 
create a workable international investment protection policy. 
Montt argues that the FET rules have legitimacy because they aid the 
institutional development of states.1 However, his argument has omitted how 
exactly this would be possible and not appreciated the fundamental difficulties 
that have to be overcome, such as available revenue in the developing world, for it 
occur. Further difficulties in relation to capacity have been highlighted by the 
earlier discussion on legal transplantation. There may be a case for norm-making 
assistance by another process for arbitrators, considering the complexities of 
developing states capacity to comply with foreign investment strategy as 
highlighted by FET rules such as legitimate expectations.2  
  The suggestions in this Chapter here may improve current rules made 
under FET. They aim to meet the following goals for improvement: 
 (i) Create systemic changes for a more coherent jurisprudential output and 
respect host-state’s policy-making competences; (ii) Ensure rules are more 
effective by being capable of being complied with; (iii) Ensure created rules are 
monitored for compliance to prevent future breaches; (iv) Grant technical 
institutional development support to developing states to increase their ability to 
lure foreign investment; (v) Allow scope for states to make important regulatory 
contingencies; (vi) Provide for an opportunity of public interest and civil society 
                                                
1 S. Montt, State Liability in investment Treaty Arbitration (Hart) (2009)  at p.154-155 
2 Thus increase in transport infrastructure and low taxes can encourage foreign direct 
investment, C.C. Couglin, V. Arromdee, J.V. Terza, ‘State characteristics and the location 
of foreign direct investment within the U.S.’ (1991) 73(4) Rev. Econ. Stat. 675 at p.678. 
 representation to participate in FET rule-making; (vii) Make arbitrators more 
accountable for their decisions.  
 
7.2. Coherence and Remedies 
 
A. Coherence. 
  Currently there is doctrinal incoherence in FET. Thus, as discussed, the 
legitimate expectations doctrine is far from clear in relation to: (i) whether there is 
a requirement of a direct representation by the state; (ii) whether it applies to 
expectations arising from prior to the BIT being in force;3 (iii) whether it is 
substantive to the extent that its acts as an estoppel on states changing their 
policy. As a corollary, it is difficult to comply with the doctrine in terms of scope 
of review. There are also different thresholds for the transparency norm for 
arbitrators to choose from. 
There is also lack of consistency between FET rules and denial of justice. 
The former are used to review administrative and regulatory organs, yet so far the 
scope of domestic courts to similar review is not available. This is despite the fact 
the latter is also an institution that will impact upon investor treatment and reform 
of improvements of it will assist economic development. 
 
Language of Elucidations. 
 
Further, current language of rules is unclear and imprecise. This can be 
seen from the different elucidations of ‘Transparency’. It is not that arbitrators 
cannot do this. Ambiguity is also inherent in the phrasing of the rules themselves. 
This is illustrated by the broad phraseology used to construct the Transparency 
norm, discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, contrastingly, the elucidation of the ‘freedom 
from arbitrary interference’ rule4 is useful despite ‘arbitrariness’ being a vague and 
difficult concept to define. Under the FET this has been expressed in the 
following terms: ‘the minimum standard of treatment of fair and equitable treatment is 
                                                
3 Fuchs. v. The Republic of Georgia ICSID Corp Nos. ABR/05/18 & ARB/07/15 
4 See, Lauder v. Czech Republic (2001) 9 ICSID Rep 62 at para 219. 
 infringed by conduct attributable to the state and harmful to the claimant if the conduct is 
arbitrary…’.5 What arbitrary has been subject to the following definition: ‘Depending 
on individual discretion…founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact’.6 This 
difference may be explained by a lack of arbitrator’s diligence in formulating the 
transparency norm. States may wish thus to have control over appointment of all 
arbitrators, and not just one at present. Thus two other arbitrators in ICSID 
proceedings one of which is provided for by the investor, and the other by mutual 
agreement would also then be provided for by the state.7 This may be particularly 
worth doing for developing states where future compliance with FET standards is 
expensive and costs of awards are high.8 
 
Further the FET rules require a certain degree of due diligence on the part 
of domestic administrators, and regulators, to be complied with. Limitations of 
the ability of arbitrators to create these rules, as to technical development bodies, 
may make a case against a legal role for FET that solely involves arbitrators. It 
may be left to non-legal methods of institutional development at the domestic 
framework. The limitations of legal impact on its subjects illustrated by aspects of 
law and economics demonstrates this.9 This demonstrates a requirement for a 
broader institutional political economy approach to norm making and 
enforcement, which engages varied development techniques of institution 
building.10   
 
B. Minimum Standard as a tool for coherence. 
 
The minimum standard may be useful to add coherence to the system, as 
illustrated by the denial of justice discussion. There a clear bar on reviewing 
                                                
5 Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States (2004) 43 ILM 967 at para 98. 
6 Lauder (n4 above) at para 221 
7 See L. Reed, N. Blackaby & J. Paulsson, Guide to ICSID Arbitration (Kluwer Law) (2004) 
at p.77-79.; G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP) (2007) at 
p.169-171. 
8  G. Van Harten (n7 above) at p.2 
9 See Chapter 6. 
10 See below. 
 domestic institutions, namely courts, gave some clarity as to the scope of 
protection afforded by the doctrine. In other areas of FET this would preclude 
FET rules relating to domestic institutions, such as transparency and legitimate 
expectations. However disadvantages are that the system will not longer be able to 
use liability to force improvements in administrative and regulatory standards on 
the ground, due to breaches only being possible when there is an outrageous 
conduct of state institutions.  
Clarifying interpretations as to scope of protection they offer by reference 
to the minimum standard may be useful. Thus, for example, legitimate 
expectations and transparency could only be breached if conduct was ‘outrageous’ 
as stated in the minimum standard. The denial of justice norm is a good example 
of consistency in jurisprudential output by using the minimum standard.  
Had this limitation not been made in Loewen, it would have been possible 
to develop a series of rules (or standard) to govern domestic courts when dealing 
with litigation by foreign investors. Nevertheless the minimum standard may not 
be entirely ineffective as it may not sufficiently meet the aims of investment 
treaties to promote and protect investments.  
 
C. The Case for Deference. 
 
 In certain instances the result of transplantation is that the fair and 
equitable treatment standard is used to override national regulatory policy and to 
prevent a state from abrogating existing legislation. But when this is likely to occur 
is difficult to decipher as this approach of FET is not a consistent one. 
The current use of the legitimate expectations doctrine leaves it open for 
several areas of public interest to be adversely affected by FET rules.11 This 
creates public policy uncertainty in the host-state for fear of being overridden. 
Further, the detrimental rejection of the defence of necessity by a strict literal 
application of it, as seen in cases concerning the economic collapse of Argentina, 
                                                
11 B. Choudhary, ‘Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of 
the Public Interest contributing to the Democratic Deficit’ (2008) 41 Vanderbilt. Jnl. 
Trans. Law. 775 at p.785-810. 
 demonstrates a need for a broader scope for policy deference needed to be tied 
into FET norm-making.  
This can be done by incorporating a deferential approach to public 
interest, whereby the investment law commission does not create rules that affect 
the competences of states to regulate and also legislate without express consent 
from states. This can also be done by expressly providing for public interest 
deference in future investment treaties.12 Further direct state input into the law 
commission will allow states to control key aspects of public policy rather than 
leaving it to the discretion of arbitrators.  
Thus some states may wish, due to their pressing need for foreign capital, 
for a lack of deference to legislative and regulatory competence.13 Where this can 
be bargained for by states, rather than by arbitrators creating rules such as 
substantive legitimate expectations, it may be that foreign investors may go to 
states that expressly provide for protection at the cost of public interest, and states 
can then weigh the need for foreign investment against general public interest 
curtailment through restrictions of law, policy and regulatory action.14 Through 
the competition of foreign capital that this approach may generate, states may 
improve the quality of their institutions and attempt to have regulatory and 
legislative stability to entice foreign capital. However, this approach will allow 
them to weigh the costs of these developments against other public policy, which 
at the present the system of FET norm making by arbitrators does not. 
In the absence of the law commission that has exclusive competence with 
investment protection and promotion norm making, deference may constrain 
tribunals from granting rights to investors that might conflict with public policy. 
Thus the Azurix decision, would have gone against the investor had the tribunal 
deferred to the state legislature.15 This form of treaty interpretation of FET to 
                                                
12 This is currently not provided for by the International Law Commisson’s Draft 
Articles of State Responsibility, See J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles 
on State Responsibility: Introduction, text, commentaries (Cam. U. P) (2002) at p.178-186. 
13 A.T. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularities of 
BITs’ (1997-98) 38 Va. J. Int’l 639 at p.666-678.  
14 Thus altering the bargain  inherent in investment treaties, See Guzman (n12 above). 
15 See, Azurix  v. Argentine  Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1 (Award 14/07/06) at 
http://ita.uvic.ca 
 prevent conflict with legislation is entirely distinct from a judge elaborating on a 
constitutional right from the perspective of mandate.16This is because such a 
judge does not create the right itself, it comes from the constitution which is not 
true for the arbitrator who creates it.17  
 
 Deference and Coherence  
 
Deference also assists coherence. By having the constitutional boundaries 
between the courts and the legislature in mind it will be easier to define the rights 
of investors and how far those rights extend. The example is given by the 
comparative approach in English law to legitimate expectations demonstrates that 
deference can provide clarity. In English law it is much clearer how the right is 
engaged and its scope of not adjudicating on the legislature is clear. This latter 
issue is unclear with the transparency, legitimate expectations, and freedom from 
arbitrary action rules developed under the FET.  
To explain further, while the minimum standard controls the threshold of 
the breach by setting it high, deference prevents courts form adjudicating on 
legislative enactments and regulation, thus protecting the democratic sphere, and 
where there is no democracy, general legislative competence. Deference thus 
corroborates the general rights of states to expropriate in accordance with 
international law, and a vital right contested in the NIEO period. It would 
increase the legitimacy of FET rules from the preservation of a state’s right to 
control internal matters through the acts of its own national legislatures. 
On the down side, the problem with of deference are is that it may place 
too much political risk for investors to account for as it would allow legislative 
promises by states to be broken.  
 
Deference preventing public interest conflict with substantive legitimate expectations. 
                                                
16 See Chapter 1. 
17 H.L.A. Hart, ‘American Jurisprudence through English eyes: The Nightmare and The 
Noble Dream’  at p.970-971, where Hart touches upon the mandate for interpretation 
that American judges exercised in comparison to British one’s due to the role assigned to 
them in the American Constitution (Article III (1)). 
  
 A substantive approach in legitimate expectations can be explained to a 
degree from the fact that the fair and equitable treatment standard was included as 
part of aims of investment treaties to ‘protect and promote investments’.18  This 
may justified from  the view that investment treaties play a role of foreign capital 
protection, means that foreign capital loss must be protected from government 
conduct The scope of this approach however may be difficult to justify 
considering that the question of whether investment treaties can actually promote 
and protect investments is questionable.19 of law that makes a licence invalid 
implicitly contrary to international obligations. 
 
The difference between English law and ITA as to legitimate expectations can 
probably be explained by the fact that investment treaty arbitration is not a 
precedential system of law. Overall the doctrine of legitimate expectations is a 
powerful tool in investment treaty arbitration to hold not only the actions of 
Government bodies, but also Government law and policy accountable to 
investors. 
 
                                                
18 Professor Walde states that this is the predication for the expectations doctrine in 
investment treaty arbitration, see separate opinion in International Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) 26/01/06. at paras 35-37. See also, Tudor, 
The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Law of Foreign Investment (OUP) 
(2007) at p.1-2. 
19 There is certainly disagreement between empirical studies on the is point. Thus, E. Neumayer 
& L. Spess ‘Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing 
countries?’ (2005) 33 World Development p.1567, which states that there is an increase in 
investment from investment treaties. This has also been a working presumption by lawyers, see 
K. J. Vandevelde ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2000) 41 Harv. Int’l L.J. 469; 
J. C. Beauvais ‘Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering 
Doubts (2002) 10 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 242 at p.253; S.D. Franck ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent 
Decisions’ (2004-5) 73 Fordham. L. Rev. 1521 at p.1524-1525 (& ftn 8 therein).  Conversely, 
Tobin and Rose- Ackerman state that there is no discernible benefit, and in some instances a 
decrease in investment following ratification. See, J.Tobin, & S. Rose-Ackerman in ‘Foreign 
direct investment and the business environment in developing countries: The impact of bilateral 
investment treaties’ (2005) Yale Law School Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy 
Research Paper No. 293 at p.1-16. In certain circumstances there may also be difficulties with the 
demonstration of any benefits of foreign investment: ‘Impossibility of demonstrating net 
benefits’ in D.W. Carr, Foreign Investment and Development in the Southwest Pacific with special reference to 
Australia and Indonesia (Praegar) (1978) at p.12-32. 
 
 Outside of Van Harten’s public law thesis, a possible explanation, for a 
broader scope in investment treaty arbitration for legitimate expectations is that it 
has been elided with ‘legitimate interest’ of performance in contract law that 
applies between private parties, where contractual agreements where both sides 
have undertaken performance obligations.20 A commercial arbitration influence 
on investment treaty interpretation, that draws parallels with contractual rights, 
may be responsible for this.21 Thus the investment arbitration hybrid paradigm of 
bringing commercial disputes against state bodies, have resulted in a novel form 
of public law doctrines with greater forms of review to reflect commercial 
necessity of the investor. This view to protect investments a priority when 
creating legal doctrine that come into play may justify an investment tribunal to 
grant, contrary to positions of deference argued in cases such as Maffezini and 
Gami. may have a great claim for review and protection from the arbitral court. 
 
By contrast, as explored below, it may be that a more cautious approach 
would involve policy deference that could be brought into the legitimate 
expectations doctrine.  
 
------  
Issues with Broad Review Under Substantive Legitimate Expectations and the case for deference. 
 
It will be seen below that factors that go into policy-making are 
multifarious and complex, further they are not constant. This means that there is 
                                                
20 See, for example see the ‘Clea Shipping Case’ concerning obligations undertaken by 
both the owners of a ship and a charter-party for the performance of a rental agreement. 
See, Clea Shipping Corpn v. Bulk Oil International Ltd, The Alaskan Trader [1984] 1 All 
ER 129   
21 E.g., Douglas who says that the system is a hybrid construct: Z. Douglas, ‘The Hybrid 
Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2003) 74 BYIL 151 at p.151-153. This 
does not sit comfortably with a positivist construction of international law that says that 
the system has to be moderated in the public sphere of state action, rather than through 
control of private arbitrators or a single national court reviewing decisions. Cf. See, E.g, 
J. Klabers, ‘On rationalism in politics: Interpretation of Treaties and the World Trade 
Organisation’ (2005) 74 Nord. Jnl. Int. law. 405 at p.406-408 & p.411. 
 some case for municipal courts to give the policy maker or law-maker a wide 
measure of discretion in policy-making areas.22 
One key reason for ‘deference’ is that many Contracting Parties to 
investment treaties will be developing countries, as well as some from the first 
world. In either instance complexities of policies, as highlighted below, may 
suggest why it would be important to defer to national governments as to whether 
policy changes that affect the investor are appropriate.23 This discussion also 
provides some guidance as to when there may be appropriate justifications to 
change policy, to defeat a claim for substantive legitimate expectations.  There will 
be different social needs and political exigencies that may come into play. For 
example, the theory that prisons is a method of effectively dealing with crime, may 
be subject to change as it is based on certain assumptions that may be proven to 
be false.24 This may result in a state changing its policy to build a prison that will 
have an impact on an investor involved in its construction not being granted a 
permit. It is clear that expropriation should follow. However to say that the 
investor has a legitimate expectation that the prison is to be built and the licence 
granted appears a dubious usurpation of social policy making powers by the 
arbitral tribunal. The tribunals also need to appreciate the need for a change of 
environmental policy. States may not have realised the importance of legislating 
for the private sector to control environmental pollutions and may later need to 
legislate for such exigencies25. The investor ought to be wary, as in Methanex that 
the state may take such measures26. Professor Craig has characterised the 
                                                
22 The European Court of Human Rights does this through the doctrine of ‘margin of 
appreciation’. See Y. Shany ‘Towards a general margin of appreciation in international 
law’ (2005) 16 EJIL 907 at p.907-912.  
23 This is explained in chapter 5 which deals with the concomitant rise of administrative 
law and the modern regulatory state. 
24 S. Karstedt & K. Bussmann, Social dynamics of crime control-New Theories for a world in 
transition (Hart) (2000) at p.148-152. 
25 Thus in the Eastern block this only started to occur in the early 1990s- See R. 
Bluffstone & B.A. Larson Controlling Pollution in Transition Economies (Edward Elgar) 
(1997) at p.1-3. 
26 There may be merit in this approach, though it is not the impact of narrowing Article 
1105 as thought by C. C. Kirkman ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Methanex v. United 
States and the narrowing scope of Article 1105’ (2002-03) 34 Law & Pol Int’l Bus 364 at 
p.364-367. 
 legitimate expectations doctrine’s choice between procedural and substantive 
rights as a ‘dilemma as between legality and justice’.27 However, as intimated using the 
doctrine to adjudicate in the policy sphere to find justice is a high-risk game such 
that legal adjudication is best suited to defer legality.  
 
Explaining the case for deference further: Implicit policy deference in English law to protect public 
interest. 
 
Another case for deference is provided by the English law on legitimate 
expectations described in this thesis. The English case law demonstrates deference 
in varied areas by municipal courts applying the doctrine. The decisions intimate 
that Government policy is too intricate for courts to adjudicate by virtue of the 
judicial reluctance to apply the doctrine to grant substantive rights. In the 
municipal law the courts have not interfered with Government employment 
contracts, criminal justice policy, tax policy, planning policy, immigration policy 
and national security policy.  
 A similar approach is seen from the ECJ by virtue of the adherence to the 
principle of legality. Investment treaty arbitration has gone further in that its 
application of substantive legitimate expectations is not restricted by the doctrine 
of legality in cases such as Durbeck. There the legitimate expectations doctrine is 
used as a powerful check against government policy change almost like an 
estoppel. 
 
There are good reasons why a cautious and more deferential approach 
following the principle of legality over the detrimental reliance approach may be 
suited. As stated in the first chapter courts are not designed to adjudicate in the 
policy-sphere. State policy is complex and subject, in its formation and 
maintenance, to a varied range of factors beyond judicial appreciation. This is why 
municipal public law follows legality (the law and policy of the state) and does not 
go against it. As a basic valid proposition all State policy is subject to change as it 
                                                
27 P. Craig, Administrative Law (OUP) (2006) at p.621.  
 is subject to limitations of expenditure, changes of social need, and changes in 
social consent28. A judicial process is not suited both in terms of legitimacy29 or 
capacity to deal with these processes.  
Entrenching one field of policy play to grant justice to one individual may 
work against the public interest in the policy itself and may have implication in the 
disposition of other policies, as the French case of Credit Arcole shows. Looking at 
the complex nature of policy highlights a want in judicial potential to appreciate 
what the public interest is. As to capacity, this fact can be ascertained from 
analysing the basic nature-tax and fiscal policy itself. Public policy is carried out 
due to social policy programmes of the state, for example ensuring a basic level of 
water supply or housing for individuals.30  
                                                
28 Social consent may be vital to policy considerations. For example, lack of funding may 
lead to close a mental-health hospital that may result in the opening of a community care 
programme for the patients. This may be due to consent of the community to such a 
policy through the desire to have more patient participation in the community and a 
different approach to mental-health care- See B. Whaf, Community and social policy in 
Canada (McClleland & Stewart) (1992) at p.37. Thus, it would not be feasible that an 
investor who ran the hospital would have a legitimate expectation that it would remain 
open. On a different note, a state’s concerns over employment may lead to non-grant of 
permits as it may need to promote some businesses over others. This may result in 
forcing a change of location of the investment due to this social concern, See: K. 
Banting, ‘Social Policy challenges in global society’ in  Morales-Gomez & Torres Eds., 
Social Policy in a global society, parallels and lessons from the Canada-Latin American experience 
(IDRC Canada) (1995) at p.27-55. Only a careful review, that appreciates the state’s 
social policy framework, by the arbitral panel will such conduct not be found to be a 
breach of fair and equitable treatment and discrimination provisions in the investment 
treaty. C.f. A Similar point could be made in relation to environmental concerns in 
Metalclad, See, Metalclad Corp v. United Mexican States (2005) 5 ICSID Rep 209 at 
p.227-230. 
29 Modern democratic regimes rely on legislative legitimacy on the basis of electoral 
consent. Hardin states: ‘democracy grounds political order in the consent of the 
Governed’ in R. Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy (OUP) (2003) at p.l41, 
& p.142-145. For limitations of theory see p.152 et subsq. 
30 For example of a discussion of a policy of creating available of social housing in the 
UK to deal with situations where landlords are insolvent or facing commercial difficulty 
and thus increasing rents see J. Driscoll ‘What is the future for social housing: reflections 
on the public sector provisions of the Housing Act 1996’ (1997) 60 MLR 823 at p.827. In 
this instance the state will provide public funds for landlords that provide social housing, 
this will have implications for revenue and land-use. 
 Public policy will involve public spending and its scope will be based on 
revenue and its availability.31 Revenue policy is part of the greater economic policy 
of states, which differs between states.32 Policy is subject to change due to change 
due to social needs and available revenue33. Democratic needs, social change and 
the continuous differing needs of the populace are all reasons for the state to 
change its law and policy in all areas. It is no doubt feasible that these will have a 
range of affects on the investor (some even being the level of indirect 
expropriation under obligations in investment treaties). However to entrench 
policy by applying the legitimate expectation doctrine is questionable, due to the 
effects it will have on other policy areas of the state. This is because such an 
estoppel may act as a revenue constraint and also, where there is a limit to policy-
making capacity, hinder policy-making capacity in other fields. It would be 
difficult, for example, to entrench tax-policy as the decision in Occidental v. 
Ecuador has sought to do. Tax policy depends on revenue and is one area could 
mean an increase in revenue in another. It is quite feasible that tax policy will 
impact upon the investment and result in a loss34. If an arbitral tribunal entrenches 
an area of tax policy it is applying the doctrine of public law against the public 
interest by saying the individual investor’s damage has a greater claim in the policy 
sphere than the host-state national. The arbitral tribunal would thus be claiming 
legitimacy for host-state policy making. For states to avoid liability the result 
would be for states to either (i) compensate the investor for the revenue increase 
(if the obligation exists in the investment treaty35, or avoid (ii) taxation in areas 
                                                
31 The availability of revenue is subject to complex economic calculation. See S. James & 
C. Nobes, The Economics of Taxation (3rd Ed Philip Allan, Publishers Ltd (1998)) at p.22-54. 
This beyond the sphere of competence of arbitral panels that are drawn from 
commercial lawyers and legal academics: See, Van Harten, (n8 above) at p.168-170 
32 The complexity of revenue prioritization for policies in the developing world is 
illustrated by Afxentiou in P.C. Afxentiou, Fiscal Policy and Economic Development (1976) 
14(2) The Develp. Econ. 164-178. 
33 All policy making is subject to revenue-based limitations. For example in relation to 
education, See H.F. Ladd, Making Money Matter: Financing America’s Schools (Nat. Res. Cncl. 
U.S.A) (1999) at p.1519. 
34 Feldman  v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1.  (NAFTA) (16/12/02) at para 
100-101. 
35 Note that in some ways the developing doctrine of indirect expropriation has played 
feasibly into the tax area, See at Tecnias Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United 
 where there is a feasible interaction with the investment. Alternatively, investment 
tribunals can take a more cautious approach and avoid a possibility of deleterious 
affects by rejecting such claims in altogether.  
  
Another are of policy that will be subject to multifarious factors in design and 
implementation is land-use policy. Thus an investor that appears to use the land, 
such as the claimant in the case of  Metalclad, for a particular purpose may find 
that licence for that use revoked or not granted as the state may need to have a 
different policy of land-use for that particular piece of land. The decision of a 
state for the use of land for a commercial related activity has to be carefully 
considered. For example, the grant of a permit to use land to build an airport may 
involve the following considerations: (i) saving of public money, (ii) the need for 
farm land, (iii) the preservation of existing rural areas, (iii) noise pollution, (iv) 
environmental pollution, (v) adverse affect on tourist-trade, (vi) adverse affects on 
business and trade36. These factors may cross-apply into other areas of land-use.37 
Environmental policy is also subject to complicated mechanisms of creation, such 
as assimilation of scientific data on the impact of certain substances and, further, 
input of social groups.38  
The latter is particularly important if any regulation passes as a policy is 
created is adhered to. In some ways the investor does not have an input on this 
process, barring the executive stage where a procedural legitimate expectation 
gives him some participation. However it is difficult to see why this participation 
should or would equate to social participation. On the other hand an investor may 
claim that his treaty right entitle him to the same level of participation in the 
determination of such policy as those locally socially concerned. His financial 
interest is thus equate to the social interest of the public in realising or not a 
                                                                                                                                      
Mexican States (2004) 43 ILM 133, at paras 113-116 and application in Feldman (n33 
above) at paras, 100-101. 
36 C. Buchanan, The Standstead Controversy, no way to the airport (Longman) (1981) at p.2-14. 
37 See B. Cullingworth & V. Nadin, Town and Country Planning in Britain 13th Ed 
(Routledge) (2002) at p.1-12.  
38S. Aguilar ‘Corporatist and Statist Designs in Environmental Policy: The Contrasting 
Roles of Germany  and Spain in the European Community Scenario’ (1993) 2 Environ. 
Pol.  233 at p.234, referring to environmental policy creation purposes in Germany and 
Spain. 
 particular environmental policy. Often domestic processes of policy making give 
affected corporate entities an input into environmental policy.39 It is not clear if 
investment treaties should play a role of giving the investor rights at the policy 
making stage. This may be a feasible alternative to the harsher impact of an 
estoppel approach that leads to damages. 
 
Similar examples can be demonstrated from educational policy. This will 
have an impact on a hypothetical investor coming investing in a policy of state 
privatisation of teacher training.40 The State then realises that it no longer has the 
quanta of need of so many teachers as it there is a labour shortage and the State 
decided to pass a law to change the school leaving age from 18 to 16. The investor 
then suffers loss a legitimate expectation that would grant substantive rights 
would fix the state’s policy. 
 
Education policy is also a complex area of policy-making. The shift in 
education policy is highly feasible considering the various factors that go into 
making state education policy. Thus an investor that comes in to build schools for 
a state or run a private educational establishment may suffer loss from a change of 
policy on the type or amount of school being built. The state education policy 
may depend on the affordability of suitable teachers.41There may be a change of 
public choice in the type of school being built.42 There will also be revenue-linked 
limitations. This latter restriction applies, as stated, to different areas of 
                                                
39 Ibid. 
40 The search for increased education in developing countries is encouraged by the UN 
Millienium Goals that may lead to a foreign investment to assist in obtaining this aim-
See, M. Kremer ‘Increasing School Participation’ in ‘The Contribution of recent 
innovations in data collection to development economics, randomized evaluations of 
educational programs in developing countries: Some Lessons’ (2003) 93 The American 
Economic Review 102 at p.102-107. 
41 J. Currie, ‘Employment determination in a unionized public sector Labor-Market: The 
Case of Ontario’s School Teachers’ (1999) 9(1) Jnl. Lab. Econ. 45 at p.63. 
42 For a discussion between the link between national educational curricula and public 
choice, See M. Holmes, Education policy for the pluralist democracy: the common school choice and 
diversity. (London. Falmer Press) (1992) at p.68-84. A foreign investment in schools may 
still be subject to government interference through national laws on curriculum 
changing. A right under substantive legitimate expectations may not be appropriate here. 
 Government policy may have to be altered due to short-coming in State financing 
due to change in the performance of the economy and thus taxation.43 
 
Thus policy-making is done on a public need and public utility basis and is 
based on available revenue. All areas of policy-making are complex and involve 
multi-tiered research and analysis.44 This may be a good reason to have ‘deference’ 
to the law-maker when applying FET. 
 
Deference to state intent in treaties. 
 
Deference to state consent may also operate to preclude a norm creation 
role for arbitration (if states do not wish a legislature) on the basis that there is no 
authority to do so without express state consent. Thus under an absence of 
express state consent to create rules or the inclusion of FET rules in treaties 
arbitrators may wish to defer to the literal language of the treaty as being the limit 
of state consent. From this point of view FET would mean ‘Fairness’, and where 
relevant, ‘equity’ as traditionally understood in international law.45  
 
 
D. Possibly Expanding the Legal Framework. 
 
                                                
43 For a basic account of the relationship between revenue and taxation, See, calculations 
for the UK Treasury’s official income and expenditure audit for central and local 
Government for 1996/7 in the UK Government’s annual spending proposal. For each 
year the public sector spending is based on revenue: N. Barr The Economics of the 
Welfare State 3rd (OUP) (1999) at p.170-171. 
44 Policy-making theorists often propose different factors that go into public policy-
making. Thus the following key factors in public policy-making: historical and 
geographical conditions, social and economic composition, mass political behavioural 
tendencies. See, W. Parsons, Public Policy-An introduction to the theory and practice of policy 
analysis (Edward Elgar Publishing) (1995) at p.17-32. 
45 Equity is usually applied to dealing with territories and other quantitative calculations 
in international law. See, M.N. Shaw, International Law 6th Ed. (Cam. Uni. Press) (2006) at 
p.590 & p.1087. 
 In the developing world, there are preconceptions about the harm that 
foreign investors represent to local communities and resources.46The open-texture 
of FET could be used by arbitrators to alleviate these concerns of local people in 
the developing world regarding foreign direct investment.  A part of this could be 
to incorporate an investor’s burden of a social impact assessment through FET.47  
This would assist in detecting harmful local impact of FDI on society, and 
can increase the potential of legal adherence by subjects of transplants.48 A part of 
this would be broadly framed CSR obligations, that will also allow the investor 
and the rights it claims on domestic institutions to be more acceptable to locals. 
There could also be CSR encouraging a positive local involvement for the 
investor.49 This could water down any public perception issues with public interest 
conflict that arises from having a substantive legitimate expectations doctrine. 
 
7.4. Adjudicatory System Alterations. 
 
On a literal reading of the FET standard there is no mandate for the construction 
of administrative law or a governance role to improve state institutions. Legal 
frameworks construed for this role are, of questionable of legitimacy as they are 
without direct state consent.50 A key to alleviating the lack of direct state may be 
to afford state parties affected by the rule to be able to participate in the decision-
making process of the legal framework under FET.  
The creation of rules under FET is also partially a result of the lack of 
clarity over whether there is power granted to arbitrators to make rules, as well as 
open-texture drafting of FET. An investment court would go some way towards 
                                                
46 For impact on indigenous culture of FDI, See: D. Estelle Long, ‘The Impact of 
Foreign Investment on Indigenous culture: An intellectual property perspective’ (1997-
98) 23 N.C. J. Int’l & Comp. Reg. 229 at p.229-234. 
47 H.A. Becker, ‘Social Impact Assessment’ (2001) 128 Eu. Jnl. Op. R. 311 at p.312. 
48 H. Rittick, ‘The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms ans the 
incorporation of social rights’ (2004-05) 26 Mich. Jnl. Int’l 199 at p.213-221. For similar 
methods of legal ordering in international governance, See: R. Wai, ‘Transnational 
Private law and Private Ordering of a Contested Global Society’ (2005) 46(2) Harv. Int’l 
L.J. 471 at p.483-484. 
49 R. Jenkins, ‘Globalisation, Corporate Social Responsibility and Poverty’ (2005) 81(3) 
Int. Aff. 525 at p.534-540. 
50 See Chapter 5 discussion on consent.  
 creating the legal certainty that currently affects the ICSID dispute system 
annulment process.51 As substantive application of the legitimate expectations 
doctrine shows this has allowed an ad-hoc commercial dispute-resolution process 
to conflict with important national policy, and conduct of institutions of national 
states. Hence, as well as altering treaty provisions, any discretion given to 
arbitrators may need to be accountable to states.52 This requirement of control 
could be provided by both a court suitably equipped to create obligations that take 
into consideration state’s abilities to adhere to rules. 
With selected input a court could create workable norms that provide 
guidance to states as to what investors will need to be protected and that they can 
afford to comply with these rules. Further, as an example of the cost benefit 
analysis53 that arbitrators can be carried out is given one by looking at a case of 
nuisance where private property interests are running up against commercial 
interests. In Sturges v. Bridgman a confectioner who makes sweets in his shop, is 
met with a claim for an injunction from his next-door neighbour doctor.54 The 
doctor carrying out his practice is hindered by noise from the confectioner’s shop.  
Here the judge decides to favour the doctor. What is not taken into 
account in such a decision is the commercial tax that might be raised from the 
now precluded practice of the confectioner, as opposed to a limited tax from the 
doctor, and the public benefit of such tax that could be used in welfare policy. 
Nor is it weighed against the availability of the particular health provision in 
                                                
51 See: K.S. Jacob, ‘Reinvigorating ICSID with a New mission with a renewed respect for 
Party Autonomy’ (1992-93) 33 Va. J. Int’l 123 at p.125-126. Note that Van Harten’ case 
for a court is distinct, it is not based on coherence but on the fact the ITA effects public 
policy through privately appointed arbitrators. See Van Harten, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Public Law at p.180-181. 
52 A description of the relevant failures of accountability of the present system as being 
inadequate, though done with respect to coherence, are discussed in detail by Franck. 
This includes a weak control annulment mechanism for ICSID, the only way to review 
ICSID decisions. See S.D. Franck, ‘Legitimacy crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatising Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 72 Ford. 
Law. Rev. 1521 at p.1551-1559.  
53 R.H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 at 
p.10-14, discussing the Chancery cases of Bryant v. Lefever (1878-1879) 4 C.P.D 172 and 
Sturges v. Bridgman (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 481; This piece has been criticized-S.G. Medema, 
‘Legal Fiction: The place of the Coase theorem in law and economics’ (1999) 15 Econ. 
and Phil. 209 at p.209-210.  
54 (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852 
 question. Thus the broader issues associated with the outcome are not taken into 
consideration by adjudication. The problems of adjudication to create rules is it is 
difficult to extrapolate general policy from specific disputes brought before courts. 
Hence it is better that policy should be left to legislatures that can be equipped to 
create and define it.  
This guidance would include cost-benefit analysis of the implications of the 
application of  investment protection rules such as legitimate expectations cases 
such as Azurix, where general public interest for cheap water conflicted with the 
investors profits. The benefit to both state parties, if a bilateral treaty, in terms of 
the benefits of profits taken to the investor’ state through its national, would be 
weighted against the gain in foreign investment and the public interest cost to the 
host-state. As FET leaves it open to arbitrators to make such decisions with 
substantive legitimate expectations the system could be altered to assist them in 
the making of such determinations.  
 The procedural process of dispute resolution could be altered so that 
investors from party states, as future claimants, could pro-offer rules that they 
wish to be subject to a cost-benefit analysis to adjudicators. This is similar to the 
NAFTA Article 1121 procedure available to states that allows statements of 
interpretations to be made via the FTC.55 They could also offer new standards of 
treatment that their investment would have assisted from had that being provided 
by the state.  
 
Thus, prior to adopting specific legal positions, such as transparency, the 
state would be able to make submissions on legal positions as to why these would 
not be appropriate. Though this may make the system more expensive and longer 
it would be fairer to all contracting parties of investment treaties that the investor 
had been fairly treated bearing in mind what the state could afford both monetarily and in 
terms of its current institutional development and existing policy priorities. Bearing in mind 
the current cost of adverse decisions in investment treaty arbitration, this may be 
preferred by contracting parties, at lease those who are in the developing world. 
                                                
55 T Free Trade Commission, ‘Notes of Interpretations of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions’ 
(31/07/01) 13(6) Wrld. Trd. & Arb. Mat. 139, art B(1).  
   
 
A. Institutional Transparency 
 
Ensuring that investment treaty arbitration is a transparent institutions are is 
important to legitimise the interpretations of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard.56 This is particularly so for transparency as this is demanded from states 
by the system, it is important that the system is not open to abuse of double 
standards.57  At present hearings are closed and not all awards are published. 
Hearings ought to be made public so that citizens affected by concerns over 
investors could see the dispute. Although the advantages of the present system of 
arbitration is close-door hearings to preserve commercial confidences, there is no 
reason why this could not be offered with a court, in exceptional circumstances. 
For example, closed door evidential hearings relating to admissibility in 
common-law criminal systems, termed voire-dire, could be used where there is 
confidential matters to be discussed and the public are asked to leave the court 
room.58 In this way public participation and commercial confidentiality could be 
balanced in a way that is absent at present. 
Further improvements to transparency could include models of direct 
input of public interest that are currently discussed as a part of WTO reforms.59 
There ought to be considered an automatic right to participation for NGOs or 
special public interest representatives in proceedings.60 This is at the very least 
where particularly where substantive legitimate expectations of investors are 
                                                
56 D.E. Skegg, ‘How can Parliamentary Participation in WTO Rule-Making and 
Democratic Control be made more effective in the WTO’ A United States Congressional 
Perspective’ (2004) 7(3) EJIL 655 p.655-658. 
57 See Van Harten (n8 above) at p.159-160. 
58 B. A. Babcock, ‘Voir dire: preserving its wonderful process’ (1974-75) 27 Stan. Law. 
Rev. 545 at p.545-547.  
59 See E-U. Petersmann, ‘Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading System: 
Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the WTO: Introduction and Summary’ (2004) 7 
(3):  Jnl. Int Econ. Law  585 at p.590-593 
60 T. Ishikawa, ‘Third Party participation in investment treaty arbitration’ (2010) 59(2) 
ICLQ 373 at p.373-381. 
 claimed that conflict with public interest so that conflicting policy implications can 
be assessed.  
At present this is left to the consent of parties. It may be important that 
some groups, who have an interest in the claim or wish to demonstrate harmful 
social impacts of investor conduct, get an opportunity to discuss the problems of 
associated with certain legal positions under FET.61  NGO participation has 
significantly improved the distributive benefits of international governance.62 This 
is through ensuring that adverse impacts of trans-national commercial activity, 
such as environmental consequences are considered in norm-making. Although 
not all public interest issues can be represented through the NGO medium, and 
NGOs on occasion represent politicised groups.  
 
B. An investment court. 
 
 There is a degree of uncertainty caused by lack of exact formulations of 
legitimate expectations and transparency  causes jurisprudential incoherence. This 
is partly caused by the choice available to claimants, states and arbitrators as to 
which decisions to apply due to the sources of international law allowing 
assistance from previous arbitrations to interpret FET. This undermines the 
creation of a rule of law-based system that will fairly outline investor’s rights and 
host-state’s obligations. The incoherence impacts on the overall legitimacy of the 
system.  
A permanent investment court with accountable judges and an appellate 
regime would be a useful suggestion to increase coherence.63 Judges would be 
appointed by states to ensure that the court is accountable to states, thus assisting 
the law commission’s norm creation role by ensuring that aberrant acts can be 
                                                
61 K. Raustiala, ‘States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions’ (1997) 41 
Int Stud. Qrt. 719 
62 S. Charnovitz, ‘Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance’ 
(1996-97) 18 Mich. J. Int’l 183 at p. 274-276. Though, as Charnovitz notes, a 
proliferation of NGOs may cause difficulty in assessing technical expertise of each one 
when determining which should have input due to procedural costs forcing a selection 
(ibid). 
63 For a different view See also, Van Harten (n49 above)at p.180-181.  
 made accountable. With compulsory input from state parties prior to norm 
creation as to their views and likelihood of logistical compliance with such 
obligations, the system would be much closer to the intentions of state parties.  
Arguments against this could be that the advantages of commercial 
arbitration, namely flexibility and speed, would be lost. But it is no means clear 
that investment treaty arbitration operates in its correct form in a manner similar 
to classic commercial arbitration between two private parties. The cost of lodging 
ITA claims, for example, are significant and the timing of the process is not 
short.64  
Self-rectification of arbitral elucidation may be possible under a system of 
binding precedent. This would close the choice of arbitrations approach through 
using previous decisions to assist in interpreting FET, as allowed by the law of 
treaties. However limitations on binding precedent also need to be appreciated in 
such a proposal. These include the possibility that precedent can make 
adjudication less flexible leading to injustice. Engaging precedent with a law-must 
not decrease flexibility of deciding disputes on a case by case basis. This may be 
remedies by having a flexible court, and a rectifying appeal court where 
boundaries of applying rules, or creating them with respect to state consent are 
overreached. Direct state input during the creation of an FET interpretation by 
the court of first instance could ensure that rules are realistically complied with by 
states, and are empirically likely to benefit both investors and the state when 
complied with.  
 There has been some support for the view that introducing an appellate or 
similar controlling regime for arbitrators using FET will not assist in settling ‘legal 
interpretation’.65 One argument is that it will simply make it less likely to control 
jurisprudence developing in one direction, once there is a consensus in the 
appellate regime as to a particular legal framework. Thus such a regime of 
                                                
64 See for example, costs of $4 Million awarded in Europe Cement Investment  & Trade 
S.A. v. Republic of Turkey ICSID No. ARB (AF)/07/2 at p.33. Note also that the 
Metalclad dispute took over 4 years from launching proceedings to the final domestic 
court resolution. (For launch: Metalclad Corp. v. UMS Case No./ARB/AF/97(1) at para 
11. For resolution See UMS v. Metalcad (2001) BCSC 1529).  
65 S. Montt, (n1 above) at p.155-159 
 appointed judges in a precedent style appellate system would not be able to then 
rectify legal errors, and would on the other hand entrench them.66 Montt’s 
advocation of this is based on the lack of control over such issues legislatures have 
on constitutional courts rectifying lower court rules.67  
However, this problem could be avoided by precluding all judicial norm-
making activity without express state consent. As stated the law commission 
would allow state input as to appropriate rules, either by interpretative 
declarations or by clearly defined restrictions in treaties.68 This will assist the 
appellate investment court in ensuring that the investment court acts within the 
legal framework. An appellate body will, however, deal with developing country 
concerns as to the misapplication of rules by investment judges.69  
 
C. Treaty Alterations.  
  
The implicit mandate for current FET interpretations that contain 
administrative law and restrict regulatory action is that they may encourage cross-
border investment by creating commercially favourable circumstances within 
states.70 This choice of economic growth through administrative and regulatory 
liability to foreign investors was not however a choice presented to Contracting 
Parties of investment treaties at the time negotiation.71 It is a value imposed by 
arbitrators.  
As suggested earlier, they have not been able to weigh it against other costs 
and benefits that such liability may create. Further, these rules may bring about 
excessive cultures of litigation through arbitration amongst investors that may be 
                                                
66 On a simple level this concern may not be so convincing as the system, on one 
reading, does this anyway. 
67 Montt (n1 above) at p.156. 
68 Montt has appreciated this point, (n1 above) at p.156 
69 A.H. Quereshi & S. G. khan, ‘Implications of an appellate body for investment 
disputes from a developing country point of view’ in K. Sauvant (ed) Appeal 
Mechanisms in International investment law (OUPp) 2008 at p.277 
70 D. Trubeck, ‘Max Weber on law and the rise of capitalism’ [1972] Wis. L. Rev. 720 at 
p.720-723. 
71 R. Dolzer & M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 
(1995) at p.1-29. 
 harmful to the economic growth of developing states by the sheer quanta of 
damages that these awards grant. 72 Further when implemented, they may increase 
cost of administration as states try to ensure compliance with standards. For this 
reason states may wish to have express provisions in the treaty to be able to 
directly choose such liability.73 
 
 Further, the administrative and regulatory governance role is beyond the 
express consent of Contracting Parties, and only feasibly legitimate through 
implication. The phenomenon of how individual agents, such as commercial 
entities, can utilise international treaties and institutions for beneficial legalised 
governance is not new international law.74  Considering that the problems with 
this governance role is the lack of knowledge of desired impact of rules of FET 
on domestic institutions lacks empirical support, the creation of FET rules is also 
of questionable validity based on implicit state consent that they further the aims 
of investment treaties of capital protection and promotion. It is not clear how 
                                                
72 Van Harten (n7 above) at p.1-3. 
73 B. Choudhary & P. Kulkarni, ‘Re-crafting bilateral investment treaties in a 
development framework: A comparative regional perspective’ in A. Deshpande Ed., 
Capital without borders: Challenges to development (Anthem) (2010) at p.209-218. 
74 K.W. Abbott & D. Snidal; ‘Hard and Soft law in International Governance’ (2000) 54(3) 
International Organisation 421 at p.421-433. This may give rise to the perception that the 
investment institutional set-up is biased towards one agency (the investor) and may undermine its 
legitimacy. This may be due to its lack of ability to represent or appreciate public interest within a 
given investor claim. Cf. D. Bodansky; ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming 
Challenge for International Environmental Law?’ (1993) 93 AJIL 596 at p.597-p.600, Note 
particularly the possible requirement of ‘independence’ of international institutions as a basis for 
legitimacy, at p.599. S.D. Franck, (n 18 above) at p.1529-1536. Policy orientation by international 
organs, such as ‘trade’ can often be used to incorporate soft-norm Governance-See, P.R.Trimble 
‘Globalisation, International Institutions and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and 
Democracy’ (1997) 95 Mich. L. Rev.1944, at p.1947-1948. Investment arbitral panels can 
undertake a similar role. This is through pursuance of the policy of ‘facilitation of the import and 
export of capital’-See A.T. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38 Virg. Jn’l of Int Law 639 at p.639-647. 
Public protests may form justification through the lack of participation or lack of clear 
manifestation of public interest-See P.Nanz & J.Steffek ‘Global Governance, participation and 
the public sphere’ (2003) ECPR Joint Session Workshop 11, 
(http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/edinburgh/ws11/NanzStef
fek.pdf) at p.7-12; J. Steffek, C. Kissling & P. Nanz Civil Society Participation in European and 
Global Governance: A cure for democratic deficit (Palgrave: Macmillan) (2008) at p. 5-12. This 
risk may be evident in investment arbitration as the investor is permitted to claim against 
Government regulatory or administrative activity carried out in the public interest (See chapter 
6). Appreciation of this by the investment arbitral panel may be particularly important, where it 
seeks a balanced construction of standards incorporated under the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. 
 some developing states would have taken on such costly burdens even if they did 
reap the benefits of foreign investment, or if they have weighed the costs of such 
rules against the benefits that foreign investment would bring.75  
 
To respond to this the next generation of bilateral investment treaties could 
expressly allow statements from states in relation to proceedings. This is similar to 
NAFTA’s FTC.76 
This latter aspect would reduce coherence and lack of accountability by 
giving states an opportunity to directly sign-up rules and reject unfavourable ones. 
Alternatively, on the present system, incorporating FET rules directly into draft 
treaties for states to ratify is the only way of maintaining clear consent for FET 
rules. The ambiguity surrounding the text of the FET standard and the 
incoherence of the current jurisprudence, both issues could be solved by specific 
incorporation of FET rules, including, how they are engaged and their scope in 
investment treaties.  
Further the restrictions on their scope, thus making it absolutely clear 
whether domestic laws and regulations could be overridden by the dispute 
resolution system. As highlighted by the coherence analysis, a problem of review 
without deference is that will cause domestic legislative and regulatory uncertainty 
where some decisions grant substantive review and others do not. This harms the 
cohesiveness of FET jurisprudence and makes it more difficult for subjects to 
prepare for the burdens of obligations. Further review without deference could 
end up rendering domestic legislative processes unpredictable. To deal with this it 
is important that states can expressly bargain for standards to have such a scope 
and treaties state clearly that they do so.  
  
Legal Transplantation of Administrative Law and a case for direct consent by states. 
 
Issues in relation to legal transplantation also suggests a case for direct 
consent through express treaty provisions, due to the problems of FET rules 
                                                
75 A.T. Guzman, at p.639-41. 
76 (n54 above). 
 administrative accountability being expensive, and difficult to comply with states 
which are reforming their legal systems towards a functioning rule of law. Like 
FET norm creation, rules in legal transplantation were based on a legal framework 
operating in a Western model of government and economic development.77 The 
initial application of transplantation failed to appreciate that the transplanted law 
cannot of its own bring about economic and governance improvements.78Thus 
transplanted rules did not create the desired institutional development and 
economic benefits that their proponents thought. Failure on this front is not a 
result of the rules themselves, but rather the lack of appreciation of the 
differences in economic capacity and social culture between the state of origin and 
the new host.79 
Problems brought about by transferring models of law across jurisdictions 
have been associated partially due to the desire, of both states and theorists, for 
rapid economic growth.80 This, as Trubeck suggests, is related to the lack of 
compatibility of legal rules to their new host-state. This is particularly the case 
where there is a disparate historical development to the states from where the 
norm originates to the new state where it is found.81 If administrative law rules, 
incorporated through fair treatment, are said to be legitimate because there is a 
presumption that they assist in economic development, then the problems of 
compatibility and cost faced by legal transplantation question such a presumption. 
Whether they do this needs to be put on an empirical footing and analysed by 
states so that they are aware of what changes in domestic legal culture, and 
institutional behaviour need to be undertaken to adhere to them. Further, states in 
the developing world need to be given an opportunity to look at the rules and 
                                                
77 Galanter, ‘The Modernisation of Law’ in M. Weiner, Modernization (Basic Books) (1966) 
at p.153-160 & p.164-165. 
78 This is a fundamental part of law and economics, and has been picked up in the law 
and development field. See Massell, ‘Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a 
Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia’ (1968) 2 Law & Soc’y Rev. 179 at 
p.227-228. 
79 See Chapter 3. 
80 See E.M. Burg, ‘Law and Development:  A Review of the Literature & a Critique of 
‘Scholars in Self-Estrangement’ (1977) 22 Am J.  Comp.  L. 492 at p.506. 
81 D.M. Trubeck, ‘Max Weber on the rise of capitalism’ (1972) 3 Wisc. Law. Rev. 720 at 
p.720-728. 
 determine whether they wish to be bound by them, by doing a cost-benefit 
analysis regarding the benefits of reform and costs undertaking it. 
 A basic analysis a state could do prior to consenting to such rules is 
shown by two illustrations of law and development failures of transplantation 
These claim that some of the areas that transplants needs to factor in to be 
effective are: (i) Domestic acceptability and costs of Transplants; (ii) Strategising 
for the difference between the intended conduct a norm brings about and the 
actual conduct in the host-state.82 To be an effective system of legal 
transplantation, the norm transferring institution needs to ascertain the level of 
behavioural change on the ground required to comply with new laws.83 At present 
FET transplantation is an inherently a legislative process that operates without the 
consultation or consent of national democratic legislatures that will affect their 
ability to prepare for and implement FET type rules. How to bring about those 
changes in the host-state will be a critical part of the implementation of 
transplants undertaken by the investment law commission.  
Further, the use of administrative law in transplants, due to its roots in 
theories of democratic accountability is itself subject to criticism as being Western 
in origin, or from alien cultures.84 There is no express provision in investment 
treaties that requires rule of law based accountability of the state to investors, yet 
arbitrators have created burdens under FET that do exactly this without state 
consent.85  
Another problem of legal transplantation is that it often assumes that there 
is a relationship between the conduct of institutions and formal law.86 
Transplantation, assumed is that formal law would have its designed impact on 
assisting bringing about the rule of law in transition economies. It did not 
appreciate that with some rules, that social conditions themselves had formulated 
                                                
82 J.M. Otto, W.S.R. Stoter, & J.Arnscheidt, ‘Using legislative theory to improve law and 
development projects’  in J J.M. Otto, B. Van Rooij, J. Arnscheidt Eds. Lawmaking for 
development, Explorations into the theory and practice of International Legislative 
Projects (Leiden) (2008) at p.54-55. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and 
Third World Resistance (CUP) (2003) at p.155-161. 
85 (n80 above). 
86 E.M. Burg, (n80 above) at p.516 
 the norm. Thus a lack of appreciating the reciprocal relationship of formation 
between law and society, and the limitations of each of these things to affect the 
other, lead to misconceived presumptions as to the success of rules altering 
conduct of their intended subjects.87 These are crucial hurdles for compliance of 
FET rules in the developing world.  
Burg, like Trubeck highlights that law is most successful in achieving 
compliance when it reflects existing customs. If this is so then if a particular FET 
norm is novel to the host-state, it will affect the ability of the state to comply.88 
This is likely for administrative law rules used for liability for transition economies 
where the rule of law is not fully functioning. Investment treaty arbitration as a 
system may need to focus, as well as liability, on the culture of conduct in public 
administrations and change that using non-legal techniques (those not associated 
with liability) before expecting long-term compliance with its created rules for 
investor protection.  
Where there are ingrained institutional practices transplants will need 
gradual implementation methods that can change practices.89 These include 
appropriate changes to conduct through training and changes in procedures in 
institutional practices. Rules such as transparency will need training of 
administrators in the developing world to adapt.90 Thus it may be better for states 
to directly agree to these in treaties, so that they can do so when they can comply 
with them. Where the proposed court is left to create such rules, some method of 
input when creating such rules, such as a compulsory technical body (or evidence) 
to assist on likelihood of compliance being possible may be useful. 
 Such technical input could use of law and development techniques 
such as those of ‘legal technical assistance’; ‘institution building’ and ‘legal 
education’ may assist investment arbitration towards realizing its public 
                                                
87 See, L. Pospisil, ‘Strucutral  Change and Primitive Law: Consequences of a Papuan 
Legal Case’ in L. Nader, Ed., Law and Culture in Society (Uni. Calf. Press) (1987) at p.208-
230.  
88 Burg (n86 above) at p.517. See also,. F.W. Riggs, ‘Economic Development and Local 
Administration: A study in circular causation’ (1959) 3 Phil. J. Pub. Ad. 86 
89 Burg at p.522 
90 Metalclad Corp v. United Mexican States (NAFTA: ICSID AF) (Award) 5 ICSID Rep 
209 at p.228 
 administration standard setting. Further input could look at the real attitudes on 
the ground and resources available. It would realise that in certain transition 
economies there are a general difficulties upholding private commercial interests.91 
This is both due to lack of institutional components to effectuate compliance and 
a want of rule of law culture92 This can filter into the Government sphere and 
influence attitudes in public administration towards private-property and 
commercial interest.93  
 
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks. 
 
The approach of coherence is value lade. It is based on a rule of law 
approach to jurisprudence, there are other systems in other states that may not 
have legal clarity. There is a need to move away from the ability of arbitrators and 
parties to pick decisions and have unlimited discretion to reformulated FET rules 
for the sake of legal consistency. This could be done by a court with a rectifying 
appeal chamber and a system of precedent. 
Further, the system has to take into consideration what rules states are 
likely to accept and be able to comply with. Thus legal positions such as subjective 
legitimate expectations may not be viable despite such claims being mounted by 
investors.94 Often expectations of investors, and states, maybe unrealistic. As 
Franck states, 
                                                
91 R.Dãnino, ‘The Rule of Law and Contractual Rights in Transition Economies’ in M. 
Andenas & G. Sanders, Enforcing Contracts in Transition Economies: Contractual Rihts 
and Obligations in Central Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(BIICL) (2005) at p.5-6. 
92 K. Pistor, ‘Supply and demand for contract Enforcement in Russia: Courts, 
Arbitration, and Private Enforcement’ (1996) 22(1) Review of Central and Eastern 
European Law’ 55 at p.55-64. 
93 P. Keefer, A review of political economy of governance: from property rights to voice 
(IBRD) (2004) at p.22-23. S. Tenev, C. Zhang & L. Brefort, ‘Corporate Governance and 
Enterprise Reform in China: Building the Institution of Modern Markets (IBRD & IFC) 
(2002) at p.5-28. 
94 See CMS Gas Transmission v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8) 
(Award May 2005) at para. 317-331. 
 ‘Both the exporter and importer of capital may harbour false or exaggerated expectation. 
The former may believe that the mere act of investing in an undeveloped country should make it 
an object of gratitude and protect it from all risk of state intervention in its high risk venture. 
The latter may see the investor as little more than a thinly disguised emissary of an exploitative 
colonialist regime, unconcerned with the social problems of a society to which it has no real 
loyalty’.95 
A fundamental issue that arises, albeit incidentally, from this analysis is that 
contracting parties to investment treaties have not given express consent to 
arbitrators to use FET to create rules. These are created through a vague 
implication to further the aims of investment treaties of capital promotion and 
protection. A legal role assumed by a judicial body without a direct mandate, but 
through a construed mandate, can be stated to be illegitimate.96 Here there is no 
empirical basis to show that such rules have desired beneficial effects on cross-
border capital,97 nor was such an analysis done prior to their creation through 
arbitration. 
Another basis for an indirect mandate for FET rules is that they assist the 
end game that investment treaties are trying to pursue, namely economic 
development and growth. However, if investment arbitration’s mandate for 
applying administrative law to a myriad number of states is economic 
development then it undertakes a range of suppositions.  
                                                
95 T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Institutions (OUP) (2002) at p.438. 
96 J.W. Nolin, ‘The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power’ (2000/2001) 
89 Kentucy. L.J. 387 at p.387-p.445. Implied power is not the only factor in expanding 
judicial power. Other factors include disguising the obvious political impact of judicial 
decisions, See, K.J. Alter, ‘Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”: European Governments 
and the European Court of Justice’ (1998) 52(1) Int. Org. 121 at p. 129-133. An 
explanation for this is provided for by Gibson and Caldiera, who state that uncritical 
deference by developed countries towards the rule of law allow international courts and 
international institutions to get away with expanding their mandate an exacerbate lack of 
political control- See, J.L. Gibson & G.A. Caldiera, ‘The Legitimacy of Transnational 
Legal Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice’ (1995) 39(2) 
Am. Jnl. Pol. Sc. 459 at p.482-p.484. 
97 The dubiousness of BITs attracting FDI has been asserted: See, UNCTAD, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in the 1990s (1998) 177 U.N. Sales & No.E.98 II. D.8 at p.8 ;J.W. Salacuse 
and N. P. Sullivan, ‘Do BITs really work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harv. Int'l L.J. 67 at p.111;  
 It presumes that there is a relationship between administrative law, 
institutional performance and economic growth.98 It is here that it comes within 
the zone of a range of critiques related to development economics. Fundamental 
of these is that the development of institutions and the rule of law does not 
necessarily result in economic development.99 This highlights the need to put the 
benefits of such rules to economic development on a stronger empirical footing, 
and this may require states to assess carefully whether FET rules can improve 
institutions and increase FDI, bearing in mind domestic legal culture and available 
revenue. 
Implicit authorization for the regulatory restriction interpretation can be 
found from the common perception that political risk is an impediment to foreign 
capital.100  However there is nothing in investment treaties to suggest that they are 
designed to curb, or create standards for regulatory activity as FET has done. Nor 
do they that this was a specific bargain that states gave-up between themselves in 
order to encourage foreign capital. Neither is it possible to deduce that the 
appropriateness of regulation should be left to arbitrators. Regulatory needs of 
states will differ according to needs to manage economic agency, thus whereas the 
same restrictive practice of regulation will be of little impact in one state, in 
another state it will be of enormous significance.101  
Arbitrators have not wholly appreciated this and took it upon themselves 
to review state regulation in a generic way without this analysis. This makes a 
strong case for express treaty provisions to mandate such a role for arbitrators, or 
the proposed court. 
                                                
98 L. Frischtak, ‘Governance capacity and economic reform in developing countries’ 
(World Bank Technical Paper No. 254;) (Washingon D.C: World Bank) at p. ; A. 
Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World 
(Princeton) (1995) at p.55-58. 
99For example see South Korea in the 1960s: Steinberg, ‘Law, Development and Korean 
Society’ (1971) 3(2) J. Comp. 215 at p.216-241. 
100 W. Smith,  ‘Covering Political and Regulatory Risks: Issues and Options for Private 
Infrastructure Arrangements’ in T. Irwin, M. Klein, G.E. Perry, M. Thobani Eds., 
Dealing with public risk in private infrastructure (IBRD) (1997) at p.45-p.53. 
101 M. Goodwin & J. Painter, ‘Local Governance, the Crises of Fordism and the 
Changing Geographies of Regulation’ (1996) 21(4) Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers 635 at p.635-p.637. 
 Further, there is no consent by many developing states of being bound by 
rules that have their conceptual origins in Western public law that desire of 
accountability of state organs in order to protect the rule of law.102  
 
There is also a historical case for having direct state input into norm-
making and express state consent to FET rules in treaties. Direct state input into 
norm making would douse historical concerns with foreign investment in the 
developing world. These were shown by the General Assembly resolutions that 
were reactions to a fear of losing control of sovereignty over resources by 
developing states.103 The lack of consensus over the Hull formula as too onerous 
on national sovereignty represented these concerns of developing states in 
practice.104 
Norm making under FET may need to be sensitive to the institutional 
reform may be necessary to bring about compliance with administrative law 
developed by arbitrators. As Frank argues that a particular intended outcome of 
law very much depends on the capacity of agents with respect to the norm to act 
in relation to it.105  It would need to be sensitive to the fact that particular legal 
positions may have to reflect existing conduct, in terms of output and working 
                                                
102See, S.W. Schill, ‘International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law- an 
introduction’ in S.W. Schill Ed., International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 
(OUP) (2010) at p.10-p.16. 
103 S.M. Schwebel, ‘The Story of the UN.’s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources’ (1963) 49 A.B.A. J. 463 at p.463-467. For Integrated Economic 
Development and Commercial Agreements See, UN GA. Res. 523 (VI),? Right to 
Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources G.A. Res. 626 (VII) GA Res. 1314 UN 
GAOR, 7th Sess., UN Doc. A/2332 (XIII); Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over 
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No. 31, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974) 50, 14 I.L.M. 251 
104 O. Schacter, ‘Compensation for Expropriation’ (1984) 78(1) AJIL 121 at p.121-124; 
P.J. Kelly, ‘Twilight of Customary International Law’ (2000) 40(2) Virg. Jnl. Int’l L 449 at 
p.502 
105 T. Frank, ‘The New Development: Can American Law and Legal Institutions Help 
Developing Countries?’ (1972) Wisc. L. Rev 767 at p.788 
 practices of institutions, to be accepted.106 This needs to be engaged by the system 
if it is to have an effective legal function. This, in turn, may assist transitional 
economies to avoid the excessive damages currently awarded in the investment 
arbitration system.107 The technical body suggested here to be considered may 
help with this, as it would provide useful evidence on conditions on the ground in 
the developing world and make FET interpretations less formulated in the 
abstract based on Western-centric ideas of public law. 
The act of ratifying investment treaties itself provides some legitimacy of 
arbitrators actions. On this reading the open-texture of investment treaties has 
given a licence to arbitrators to interpret standards as they see fit.108 On this 
approach ‘legal interpretation’ has automatic validity and legitimacy.109 This thus 
leaves the whole sphere of investment policy into the hands of arbitrators away 
from the control of national governments.  
In contrast, the idea of substantive consent is that states would only agree 
with rules that are currently created through FET interpretations and its products 
with direct express validity and where the state is fully aware of the rules and its 
consequences prior to taking on the burden.110 This may be particularly necessary 
due to public policy conflicts with substantive legitimate expectations that also 
make a case for deference to policy to protect it. ITA is subject to greater concern 
                                                
106 See for example, formal commercial rules were introduced in post Soviet Russia by 
aligning them with existing business practices, J.R. Hay, A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny, 
‘Towards a theory of legal reform’ (1996) 40 (3/5) Eu. Econ. Rev. 559 at p.559-561. 
107 See, Sempra v. Argentina, where an award of $128,250,000 was inflicted on Argentina 
at p.139. 
108 R. Wai, ‘Transnational Private law and Private Ordering of a Contested Global 
Society’ (2005) 46(2) Harv. Int’l L.J. 471 at p.483-484. 
109 A contrasting approach to this literal approach is the contextual, as broadly advocated 
by proponents in the field of hermeneuntics’ T.G. Phelps & J.A. Pitts, ‘Questioning the 
text: The significance of Phenomenological hermeneuntics for legal interpretation’ (1984-
85) 29 St. Louis U. L.J. 353 at p.355-356. On this approach arbitrators may be compelled 
to look at broader factors, such as feasibility and capacity to adhere to rules, in the 
construction of interpretations. 
110 For a discussion of validation of rules through formal decree, See T. Franck, Fairness in 
International Law and Institutions (OUP) (2002) at p.34-38.
 and criticism due to it currently being an international institution with structurally 
very little direct public control.111  
 
Overall, as suggested here appropriate changes to adjudication from ad-
hoc arbitration, to a permanent court with controlled jurisdiction by state parties 
and technical input will maintain consent and create a consistent jurisprudence 
that is clear and which can be complied with.  
 
•  •  • 
 
Postscript: 
Overview of Propositions discussed in this chapter. 
 
Option 1: Continue rule-making under FET to include more forms of administrative law 
liability. 
 
Benefits: Allows continuously expanding administrative law framework to built using FET with 
no restrictions.  
 
Drawbacks: Law-making under FET using current methodology lacks coherence. There are no 
technical draftsmen, nor is there appropriate expert input of the difficulties of applying 
administrative law standards to the developing world. Further it has not taken into consideration 
the capacity of states to adhere to the rules or been able to fine tune obligations to meet states 
needs and the diversity of legal systems, which a formal law-making institution with policy input 
could do. Compliance with administrative rules created may be an ongoing issue. 
 
 
Option 2: (Preferred Option) Continue rule-making under FET to include more forms of 
administrative law liability, but take special evidence as to the capacity of states,  to comply with 
                                                
111 It is fundamentally a private arbitration mechanism deciding disputes in the public 
sphere. Cf. Van Harten, (n8 above) at p.70-71. 
 rules and other broader input from NGOs. Further increase coherence via using a transparent 
investment court, with a rectification appeal mechanism, and a system of legal precedent. 
 
Benefits: Investors protected and will know the extent to which a state has a burden that it ought 
to be able to meet. States are imposed on fairer burdens of obligations under FET. All parties 
who are subject to rights and obligations will be better placed to identify more clear and coherent 
obligations. Adverse impact of foreign investment may become known in the rule making process 
through NGO participation. 
 
Drawbacks: It places investors at risks in developing states without investment treaty arbitration 
being an effective insurance. As many investors are from capital exporting states, they may expect 
some standards of good administrative conduct, failing which may not have a remedy. It may lead 
to less foreign investment in some states, particularly if judgments with respect to discussions on 
capacity are made public. 
 
Option 3: Express Provisions for administrative law protection in investment treaties, with no 
power of tribunals to create rules using FET/ 
 
Benefits: Developing, and developed, states can directly bargain for burdens under investment 
treaties rather than leaving them to arbitrators. Obligations are known to all parties prior a 
foreign investment starting operations in the host-state. It will increase competition for capital in 
the investment treaty system by having plural competing treaties. 
 
 
Decreases: Possible increased difficulties of negotiating treaties due to bargaining for more or less 
protection. Restricts arbitrators learning about investor plaints as they arise and developing 
appropriate rules to protect them against adverse host-state administrative practices. Significantly 
poor states that need foreign capital the most may not able to bargain for investors and may loose 
out on foreign investment if they are seen as comparatively more risky places to invest. 
 
The second option has the benefits of flexibility of FET by maintaining the 
current system but allows realistic burdens to be imposed on developing states.  
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Case Name  FET Breached(x)  FET Not Breached 
     
ADF    x 
AMT  X   
Azinian    x 
Azurix  X   
Bogdanov  X   
CME  X   
 Continental    x 
CMS  X   
CSOB  X   
EDF    x 
Eureko    x 
Gami    x 
Genin    x 
Lauder    x 
Loewen    x 
LG&E Energy  X   
Maffezini  X   
Metalclad  X   
Methanex    x 
Middle East C  X   
Mondev    x 
MTD  X   
Nobel     x 
OEPC  X   
Olguin    x 
Petrobart  X   
Pope & T  X   
PSEG  X   
RFCC    x 
Saluka  X   
Sempra  X   
SD Myers  X   
Siemens  X   
Tecmed  X   
Thunderbird    x 
Vivendi II  X   
Waste M II    x 
Wena Hotels  X   
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